The Iraq Study Group Report Part 3

Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political action. s.h.i.+a political leaders make distinctions between the Sunni insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) and s.h.i.+a militias (which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximize power within the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningful action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.

Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni politicians within the government have a limited level of support and influence among their own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency.

Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni leaders--a.s.sa.s.sinating the family members of those who do partic.i.p.ate in the government. Too often, insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al Qaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U.S. and s.h.i.+a forces. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently took the positive step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters in their midst, and have started to take action on those commitments.

Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the militias; s.h.i.+a politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches the other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the s.h.i.+a militias are disarmed. s.h.i.+a militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.

GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the situation is much worse. There are five major reasons for this problem.

First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of s.h.i.+a-governed Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and trash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdad is run like a "s.h.i.+a dictators.h.i.+p" because Sunnis boycotted provincial elections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in local government.

Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For instance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made.

Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that official corruption costs Iraq $5-7 billion per year. Notable steps have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit board and inspectors general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime Minister have identified rooting out corruption as a national priority. But too many political leaders still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests. There are still no examples of senior officials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges.

Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic cla.s.s was pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Other skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has risen. Too often, Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as political spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries, spending as little as 10-15 percent of their capital budget. They lack technical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, a banking system that does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensive red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry of Finance reluctant to disburse funds.

Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqi judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicated judges. But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function.

Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior U.S. official said to us, "We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended families, their friends." Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded.

3. Economics

There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous potential for growth. But economic development is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed to us, Iraq's economy has been badly shocked and is dysfunctional after suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a police state economy in the 1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, and a sanctions economy in the 1990s. Immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.

Economic Performance

There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are stable and growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, and other appliances have increased dramatically. New businesses are opening, and construction is moving forward in secure areas. Because of Iraq's ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, significant growth is possible if violence is reduced and the capacity of government improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than 40 percent in Kurdistan during this past year.

The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund. Most prominently, subsidies have been reduced--for instance, the price per liter of gas has increased from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 cents (a figure far closer to regional prices). However, energy and food subsidies generally remain a burden, costing Iraq $11 billion per year.

Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators are negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent.

Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation.

Oil Sector

Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq's GDP, and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq produces around 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about 1.5 million barrels per day. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqi government's target of 2.5 million barrels per day, and far short of the vast potential of the Iraqi oil sector. Fortunately for the government, global energy prices have been higher than projected, making it possible for Iraq to meet its budget revenue targets.

Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack of investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure target pipelines and oil facilities. There is no metering system for the oil. There is poor maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, as well as inadequate investment in modern technology. Iraq had a cadre of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extended migration of experts to other countries have eroded technical capacity. Foreign companies have been reluctant to invest, and Iraq's Ministry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15 percent of its capital budget.

Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to 200,000--and perhaps as many as 500,000--barrels of oil per day are being stolen. Controlled prices for refined products result in shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black market. One senior U.S. official told us that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector.

The Politics of Oil

The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's already fragile efforts to create a unified central government. The Iraqi Const.i.tution leaves the door open for regions to take the lead in developing new oil resources. Article 108 states that "oil and gas are the owners.h.i.+p of all the peoples of Iraq in all the regions and governorates," while Article 109 tasks the federal government with "the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields." This language has led to contention over what const.i.tutes a "new" or an "existing" resource, a question that has profound ramifications for the ultimate control of future oil revenue.

Senior members of Iraq's oil industry argue that a national oil company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of the revenue derived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious and resist this proposal, affirming the rights of local communities to have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in a.s.serting independent control of their oil a.s.sets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oil companies in northern Iraq. s.h.i.+a politicians are also reported to be negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies.

There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly to the population on a per capita basis. These proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chief natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated into state budget projections for the next several years. There is no inst.i.tution in Iraq at present that could properly implement such a distribution system. It would take substantial time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently lacks.

U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts

The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion to support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion has been appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund."

Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost all the funds have been committed. The administration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic a.s.sistance in FY 2008 also appears downward.

Congress has little appet.i.te for appropriating more funds for reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.

The coordination of a.s.sistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines establis.h.i.+ng who is in charge of reconstruction.

As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is changing its focus, s.h.i.+fting from infrastructure, education, and health to smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some degree managed by local communities. A major attempt is also being made to improve the capacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, and provincial levels to provide services to the population as well as to select and manage infrastructure projects.

The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, but it confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and therefore the ministries he controls--Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--will not work with Americans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States.

Several senior military officers commented to us that the Commander's Emergency Response Program, which funds quick-impact projects such as the clearing of sewage and the restoration of basic services, is vital. The U.S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, is focused on long-term economic development and capacity building, but funds have not been committed to support these efforts into the future. The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a positive effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hampered by significant security constraints.

Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided to contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has doc.u.mented numerous instances of waste and abuse. They have not all been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as more oversight has been exercised and fewer cost-plus contracts have been granted; in addition, the use of Iraqi contractors has enabled the employment of more Iraqis in reconstruction projects.

4. International Support

International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid.

International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, but less than $4 billion has been delivered.

An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a significant amount of Iraq's government debt and put the country on firmer financial footing. But the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven.

The United States is currently working with the United Nations and other partners to fas.h.i.+on the "International Compact" on Iraq. The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid from international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will agree to achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as building anticorruption measures into Iraqi inst.i.tutions, adopting a fair legal framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international officials told us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek greater international engagement in the country.

The Region

The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly influence its stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help it, and some are undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors are meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq's neighbors are intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official replied, "All of them."

The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. U.S.

efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focus of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several Iraqi, U.S., and international officials commented to us that Iraqi opposition to the United States--and support for Sadr--spiked in the aftermath of Israel's bombing campaign in Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in Iraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States.

Many Sunni Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in Iraq and the region. Most of the region's countries are wary of U.S.

efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.