Good Sense Part 2

18.

A thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually destroy one another, and which can neither be conceived nor united in thought.

Conviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony of our senses, which alone give birth to our ideas, and enable us to judge of their agreement or disagreement. That, which exists necessarily, is that, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. These principles, universally acknowledged, become erroneous, when applied to the existence of a G.o.d. Whatever has been hitherto said upon the subject, is either unintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear absurd to every rational man.

19.

All human knowledge is more or less clear. By what strange fatality have we never been able to elucidate the science of G.o.d? The most civilized nations, and among them the most profound thinkers, are in this respect no more enlightened than the most savage tribes and ignorant peasants; and, examining the subject closely, we shall find, that, by the speculations and subtle refinements of men, the divine science has been only more and more obscured. Every religion has. .h.i.therto been founded only upon what is called, in logic, _begging the question_; it takes things for granted, and then proves, by suppositions, instead of principles.

20.

Metaphysics teach us, that G.o.d is a _pure spirit_. But, is modern theology superior to that of the savages? The savages acknowledge a _great spirit_, for the master of the world. The savages, like all ignorant people, attribute to _spirits_ all the effects, of which their experience cannot discover the true causes. Ask a savage, what works your watch? He will answer, _it is a spirit_. Ask the divines, what moves the universe? They answer, _it is a spirit_.

21.

The savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some idea to the word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the breeze, the breath, that invisibly produces discernible effects. By subtilizing every thing, the modern theologian becomes as unintelligible to himself as to others.

Ask him, what he understands by a spirit? He will answer you, that it is an unknown substance, perfectly simple, that has no extension, that has nothing common with matter. Indeed, is there any one, who can form the least idea of such a substance? What then is a spirit, to speak in the language of modern theology, but the absence of an idea? The idea of _spirituality_ is an idea without model.

22.

Is it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal existence from the matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all the senses, and whose effects we experience, which we see act, move, communicate motion, and incessantly generate, than to attribute the formation of things to an unknown power, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive from his nature what he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual essence, can create neither matter nor motion? Nothing is more evident, than that the idea they endeavour to give us, of the action of mind upon matter, represents no object. It is an idea without model.

23.

The material _Jupiter_ of the ancients could move, compose, destroy, and create beings, similar to himself; but the G.o.d of modern theology is sterile. He can neither occupy any place in s.p.a.ce, nor move matter, nor form a visible world, nor create men or G.o.ds. The metaphysical G.o.d is fit only to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.

24.

Since a G.o.d was indispensably requisite to men, why did they not wors.h.i.+p the Sun, that visible G.o.d, adored by so many nations? What being had greater claim to the homage of men, than the day-star, who enlightens, warms, and vivifies all beings; whose presence enlivens and regenerates nature, whose absence seems to cast her into gloom and languor? If any being announced to mankind, power, activity, beneficence, and duration, it was certainly the Sun, whom they ought to have regarded as the parent of nature, as the divinity. At least, they could not, without folly, dispute his existence, or refuse to acknowledge his influence.

25.

The theologian exclaims to us, that G.o.d wants neither hands nor arms to act; that _he acts by his will_. But pray, who or what is that G.o.d, who has a will, and what can be the subject of his divine will?

Are the stories of witches, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins, etc., more absurd and difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action of mind upon matter? When we admit such a G.o.d, fables and reveries may claim belief. Theologians treat men as children, whose simplicity makes them believe all the stories they hear.

26.

To shake the existence of G.o.d, we need only to ask a theologian to speak of him. As soon as he has said a word upon the subject, the least reflection will convince us, that his observations are totally incompatible with the essence he ascribes to his G.o.d. What then is G.o.d?

It is an abstract word, denoting the hidden power of nature; or it is a mathematical point, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. David Hume, speaking of theologians, has ingeniously observed, _that they have discovered the solution of the famous problem of Archimedes--a point in the heavens, whence they move the world_.

27.

Religion prostrates men before a being, who, without extension, is infinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, all-powerful, who never executes his will; a being, sovereignly good, who creates only disquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in whose government all is in confusion and disorder. What then, can we imagine, can be the G.o.d of theology?

28.

To avoid all embarra.s.sment, we are told, "that it is not necessary to know what G.o.d is; that we must adore him; that we are not permitted to extend our views to his attributes." But, before we know that we must adore a G.o.d, must we not know certainly, that he exists? But, how can we a.s.sure ourselves, that he exists, if we never examine whether the various qualities, attributed to him, do really exist and agree in him? Indeed, to adore G.o.d, is to adore only the fictions of one's own imagination, or rather, it is to adore nothing.

29.

In view of confounding things the more, theologians have not declared what their G.o.d is; they tell us only what he is not. By means of negations and abstractions, they think they have composed a real and perfect being. Mind is that, which is _not_ body. An infinite being is a being, who is _not_ finite. A perfect being is a being, who is _not_ imperfect. Indeed, is there any one, who can form real ideas of such a ma.s.s of absence of ideas?

That, which excludes all idea, can it be any thing but nothing?

To pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of human conception, is to grant, that G.o.d is not made for man. To a.s.sure us, that, in G.o.d, all is infinite, is to own that there can be nothing common to him and his creatures. If there be nothing common to G.o.d and his creatures, G.o.d is annihilated for man, or, at least, rendered useless to him. "G.o.d,"

they say, "has made man intelligent, but he has not made him omniscient;"

hence it is inferred, that he has not been able to give him faculties sufficiently enlarged to know his divine essence. In this case, it is evident, that G.o.d has not been able nor willing to be known by his creatures. By what right then would G.o.d be angry with beings, who were naturally incapable of knowing the divine essence? G.o.d would be evidently the most unjust and capricious of tyrants, if he should punish an Atheist for not having known, what, by his nature, it was impossible he should know.

30.

To the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more convincing than fear. It is therefore, that theologians a.s.sure us, _we must take the safest part_; that nothing is so criminal as incredulity; that G.o.d will punish without pity every one who has the temerity to doubt his existence; that his severity is just, since madness or perversity only can make us deny the existence of an enraged monarch, who without mercy avenges himself on Atheists. If we coolly examine these threatenings, we shall find, they always suppose the thing in question. They must first prove the existence of a G.o.d, before they a.s.sure us, it is safest to believe, and horrible to doubt or deny his existence. They must then prove, that it is possible and consistent, that a just G.o.d cruelly punishes men for having been in a state of madness, that prevented their believing the existence of a being, whom their perverted reason could not conceive. In a word, they must prove, that an infinitely just G.o.d can infinitely punish the invincible and natural ignorance of man with respect to the divine nature.