Good Sense Part 11

If religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible to all. If this religion were the most important concern of men, the goodness of G.o.d would seem to demand, that it should be to them of all things the most clear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it not then astonis.h.i.+ng, that this thing so essential to the happiness of mortals, is precisely that, which they understand least, and about which, for so many ages, their teachers have most disputed? Priests have never agreed upon the manner of understanding the will of a G.o.d, who has revealed himself.

The world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are several empirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the pa.s.sengers by decrying the remedies sold by his brothers. Each shop has its customers, who are persuaded, that their quacks possess the only true remedies; and notwithstanding a continual use of them, they perceive not the inefficacy of these remedies, or that they are as infirm as those, who run after the quacks of a different shop.

Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy. The devout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by the application of remedies. The wise man abstains from them entirely; he pays attention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature to her course.

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To a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the opinions, which the partisans of the different religions with equal folly entertain of each other. A Christian regards the _Koran_, that is, the divine revelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but a tissue of impertinent reveries, and impostures insulting to the divinity. The Mahometan, on the other hand, treats the Christian as an _idolater_ and a _dog_. He sees nothing but absurdities in his religion. He imagines he has a right to subdue the Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive the religion of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes, that nothing is more impious and unreasonable, than to wors.h.i.+p a man, or to believe in the Trinity. The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple wors.h.i.+ps a man, and firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_, ridicules the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of _transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous, because he kneels to wors.h.i.+p some bread, in which he thinks he sees G.o.d.

Christians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnations of _Vishnu_, the G.o.d of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true _incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter. The deist, who calls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be that of nature, content with admitting a G.o.d, of whom he has no idea, makes a jest of all the mysteries, taught by the various religions in the world.

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Is there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious, than the creation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though immutable, operates continual changes in the world? Is any thing more incompatible with every notion of common sense, than to believe, that a supremely good, wise, equitable and powerful being presides over nature, and by himself directs the movements of a world, full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders, which by a single word, he could have prevented or removed? In fine, whenever we admit a being as contradictory as the G.o.d of theology, how can we reject the most improbable fables, astonis.h.i.+ng miracles, and profound mysteries.

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The Deist exclaims: "Abstain from wors.h.i.+pping the cruel and capricious G.o.d of theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good; he is the father of men, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who fills the universe with his benefits." But do you not see that every thing in this world contradicts the good qualities, which you ascribe to your G.o.d? In the numerous family of this tender father, almost all are unhappy. Under the government of this just sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Among those blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold a mult.i.tude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes. Forced to acknowledge, that your beneficent G.o.d, in contradiction with himself, distributes good and evil with the same hand, for his justification you must, like the priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent, therefore, another G.o.d; for yours is no less contradictory than that of theologians.

A good G.o.d, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil; a G.o.d full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed; a perfect G.o.d, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works; are not such a G.o.d and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of the incarnation?

You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded, that the G.o.d of the universe could change himself into a man, and die upon a cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of the incarnation appears to you very absurd. You think nothing more ridiculous, than a G.o.d, who transforms himself into bread, and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousand different places. But are all these mysteries more contradictory to reason than a G.o.d, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men? Is man, according to you, free, or not free? In either case, your G.o.d, if he has the shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him. If man is free, it is G.o.d, who has made him free; therefore G.o.d is the primitive cause of all his actions; in punis.h.i.+ng him for his faults, he would punish him for having executed what he had given him liberty to do. If man is not free to act otherwise than he does, would not G.o.d be most unjust, in punis.h.i.+ng man for faults, which he could not help committing.

The minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound, are to many people truly striking; but they have not the courage to trace the source of these absurdities. They see not, that a G.o.d full of contradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only served to disorder men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession of chimeras.

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The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the existence of G.o.d, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries, have acknowledged some divinity or other; that every people have believed in an invisible and powerful being, who has been the object of their wors.h.i.+p and veneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who are not persuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to human nature.

But, can an error be changed into truth by the belief of all men? The great philosopher Bayle has justly observed, that "general tradition, or the unanimous consent of mankind, is no criterion of truth."

There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round the earth, but this error was detected. There was a time, when n.o.body believed the existence of the antipodes, and when every one was persecuted, who had temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmly believes it. All nations, with the exception of a few men who are less credulous than the rest, still believe in ghosts and spirits. No sensible man now adopts such nonsense. But the most sensible people consider it their duty to believe in a universal spirit!

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All the G.o.ds, adored by men, are of savage origin. They have evidently been imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious and crafty legislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who had neither capacity nor courage to examine the objects, which through terror they were made to wors.h.i.+p.

By closely examining G.o.d, we are forced to acknowledge, that he evidently bears marks of a savage nature. To be savage is to acknowledge no right but force; it is to be cruel beyond measure; to follow only one's own caprice; to want foresight, prudence, and reason. Ye nations, who call yourselves civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, the G.o.d, on whom you lavish your incense? Are not the descriptions given you of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous, revengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who has not cultivated his reason? O men! You adore only a great savage, whom you regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable master, as a sovereign full of perfection.

Religious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity, cowardice, and barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a child fond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing.

Ignorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments, and to magic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His priests appear to him sorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine, before whom his confounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are to him infallible decrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.

In religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitive barbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or presented under some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers, serpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the EGYPTIANS paid homage to crocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see nations, who think themselves wiser than they, wors.h.i.+p bread, into which they imagine, that through the enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended. Is not the Bread-G.o.d the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this respect, are as irrational, as the most savage?

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The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have ever disclosed themselves in religious practices, either cruel or extravagant. A spirit of barbarity still survives, and penetrates the religions even of the most polished nations. Do we not still see human victims offered to the divinity? To appease the anger of a G.o.d, who is always supposed as ferocious, jealous and vindictive, as a savage, do not those, whose manner of thinking is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments, by the command of sanguinary laws? Modern nations, at the instigation of their priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarous nations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of savages to torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest men for the invisible movements of their brains?

When we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German, etc., continue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before the barbarous G.o.d of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations divide into sects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculous opinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable G.o.d; when we see men of ability foolishly devote their time to meditate the will of this G.o.d, who is full of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cry out: O men, you are still savage!!!

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Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence, and stupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the more, as he finds them generally established. Men, for the most part, examine nothing: they blindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, above all others, are those which they have the least courage and capacity to examine: as they comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be silent, or at least are soon dest.i.tute of arguments. Ask any man, whether he believes in a G.o.d? He will be much surprised that you can doubt it. Ask him again, what he understands by the word _G.o.d_. You throw him into the greatest embarra.s.sment; you will perceive immediately, that he is incapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats.

He will tell you, that G.o.d is G.o.d. He knows neither what he thinks of it, nor his motives for believing in it.

All nations speak of a G.o.d; but do they agree upon this G.o.d? By no means.

But division upon an opinion proves not its evidence; it is rather a sign of uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himself in the notions he forms of his G.o.d? No. His idea varies with the changes, which he experiences;--another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree in demonstrative truths. In any situation, except that of insanity, every one knows that two and two make four, that the sun s.h.i.+nes, that the whole is greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary to merit the affection of men; that injustice and cruelty are incompatible with goodness. Are they thus agreed when they speak of G.o.d? Whatever they think, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects they attribute to him.

Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint it in a different manner. You will find no resemblance between the features, each has given it a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in giving us a picture of G.o.d, give us one of a great chimera, in whose features they never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who exists only in their imaginations. There are not two individuals, who have, or can have, the same ideas of their G.o.d.

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It might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics or atheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of G.o.d. How can we be a.s.sured of the existence of a being, whom we could never examine, and of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent idea? How can we convince ourselves of the existence of a being, to whom we are every moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed to the ideas, we had endeavoured to form of him? Is it then possible to believe what we cannot conceive? Is not such a belief the opinions of others without having any of our own? Priests govern by faith; but do not priests themselves acknowledge that G.o.d is to them incomprehensible? Confess then, that a full and entire conviction of the existence of G.o.d is not so general, as is imagined.

Scepticism arises from a want of motives sufficient to form a judgment.

Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments which combat, the existence of G.o.d, some persons have doubted and withheld their a.s.sent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined.

Is it possible to doubt any thing evident? Sensible people ridicule an absolute scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who doubted his own existence, or that of the sun, would appear ridiculous. Is this more extravagant than to doubt the non-existence of an evidently impossible being? Is it more absurd to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitate upon the impossibility of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroy one another? Do we find greater probability for believing the existence of a spiritual being, than the existence of a stick without two ends? Is the notion of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits an infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square triangle? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result only from a superficial examination of theological principles, which are in perpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles.

To doubt, is to deliberate. Scepticism is only a state of indetermination, resulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible for any one to be sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revert to its principles, and closely examine the notion of G.o.d, who serves as its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence, weakness, indifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt is to fear the trouble of examining things, which are thought uninteresting. But religion being presented to men as their most important concern in this and the future world, skepticism and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual anxiety and must really const.i.tute a bed of thorns. Every man who has not courage to contemplate, without prejudice, the G.o.d upon whom all religion is founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows not what he should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope or fear.

Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. This indifference is founded upon the absolute a.s.surance, or at any rate upon the probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion that a thing which is pretended to be important is not so, or is only indifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without which it would be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselves sceptics in the fundamental points of religion, are commonly either indolent or incapable of examining.

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