Area Handbook For Bulgaria Part 18

Each people's council has an elected executive committee, which is constantly in session and which acts for the council during the long periods when the full body is not meeting. On the local level the executive committee is to the people's council what the State Council is to the National a.s.sembly on the national level. An executive committee usually consists of a chairman, a first deputy chairman, several deputy chairmen (depending on size), and a secretary. The interlocking of party and governmental positions that is the hallmark of the central government is repeated at the district and rural and urban const.i.tuency levels, and often the members of a people's council executive committee are also the most prominent members of the local party organization. An executive committee usually serves for the entire term of its people's council.

In the implementation of national policy, people's councils are under the supervision and control of higher councils all the way up to the central government. The hierarchical and pyramidal structure of the people's councils, wherein the lowest bodies are subject to the direction of the next higher and of the highest bodies, is an example of the application of Lenin's principle of democratic centralism.

Coincident with this structure of government is the parallel structure of the BKP, whose members are in control or are influential at every level.

People's councils are empowered to adapt decisions and orders of higher authorities to their own individual needs. Local councils prepare plans and budgets in consonance with the national plans and, after decisions have been made at the national level, the local councils conform to the national policy. People's councils are involved in the day-to-day affairs of their const.i.tuencies in government services and administration, the maintenance of public order, the protection of state and communal property, and the protection of the rights of its citizens.

In these areas the local police, known as the People's Militia, are the instruments of the local council, but their responsibility is also to the next higher level and on up to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see ch. 15).

JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

The highest judicial organ is the Supreme Court, the members of which are elected by the National a.s.sembly for five-year terms. Below it are twelve regional and ninety-three district courts, and the military courts. The Supreme Court is a court of original jurisdiction as well as of appellate jurisdiction. It is organized into criminal, civil, and military divisions. In the administration of justice, courts and prosecution are referred to as "weapons of the dictators.h.i.+p of the proletariat." Judges and a.s.sessors take part in the dispensation of justice. These positions are elective.

The Office of the Chief Prosecutor is established to see that the laws are obeyed by the ministries and other national departments, bodies of local state power, economic and public organizations, and officials as well as citizens. The chief prosecutor is elected to a five-year term.

He is subject to recall, however, before the expiration of his term and is responsible only to the National a.s.sembly. Again, as is true with the Supreme Court, between sessions the chief prosecutor reports to the State Council.

The chief prosecutor exercises wide powers in the performance of his functions. Because he is elected by the National a.s.sembly, he is certain to be a loyal party member; he appoints prosecutors (district and communal) for lower levels and can recall them before the expiration of their terms. Together with the minister of justice, he controls the judicial system for the communist party.

In interpreting the communist theory of "unity of power," the const.i.tution places the judiciary below the executive and legislative branches of state power. It also lumps together the judicial bodies and prosecutors in overlapping and parallel functions. The fact that judges and lay a.s.sessors are elected indicates that the party echelons can control the workings of the judicial machinery.

THE ELECTORAL PROCEDURE

The basic election law of Bulgaria is embodied in a doc.u.ment adopted on February 17, 1953, and published as the Law of Election for the National a.s.sembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. It has been amended many times since then.

Article 6 of the 1971 Const.i.tution extends the right to vote to every Bulgarian citizen who has reached the age of eighteen, regardless of "s.e.x, nationality, race, creed, education, occupation, official or social status, and property status." The only exceptions are those persons under "complete tutelage." An earlier law had denied the right to vote only to those who had been sentenced by a court.

Members of both national and local representative bodies--the National a.s.sembly and the people's councils--are elected by direct and secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage.

Theoretically, they are responsible to their electorate and render an accounting of their activities. In this frame of reference they can be subject to recall even before the expiration of their term. In practice they are removed at the discretion of the BKP.

The State Council schedules dates for elections to the National a.s.sembly and people's councils. In no case is the date fixed later than two months after the expiration of the current mandate. The council is also empowered to schedule dates for holding referenda on decisions of the National a.s.sembly. All election dates are set on weekends or nonworking days to ensure continuous work production.

Under the election law and in accordance with the const.i.tution, elections are called by the State Council and conducted by the Central Election Commission, a body created by the National a.s.sembly and directed by the State Council. The Central Election Commission comprises representatives of various organizations, such as trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, special professional and interest groups, and other public organizations and societies, which must be duly registered according to acceptable procedures established by the National a.s.sembly. The election commission is headed by an executive committee consisting of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and twenty members, all of whom must be approved by the State Council.

Corollary to the right to elect is the right to be elected to public office. Candidates are nominated according to electoral areas.

Theoretically, the right to nominate candidates is secured through meetings of public organizations and such societies as trade unions, youth organizations, cultural societies, and cooperatives. In practice, however, candidates are nominated by the BKP leaders.h.i.+p of these public organizations, and their names are submitted for discussion during meetings. This procedure ensures the candidates' election and at the same time meets the obligation in the electoral law that nominations be discussed at public meetings.

Lists of candidates for public office are compiled in each village, town, and district and are submitted to the BKP-controlled National Council of the Fatherland Front where a final list of candidates is drawn. Only candidates nominated by the BKP, the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, and other ma.s.s social organizations approved by the Fatherland Front are allowed to go on the ballot. Quite expectedly, the single slate of candidates presented by the Fatherland Front usually gets elected unanimously.

In the parliamentary election held on June 27, 1971, voters elected a.s.sembly deputies, people's councillors, judges, and lay a.s.sessors. Out of 6,168,931 registered voters, 6,159,942 cast ballots, representing 99.85 percent of the electorate. A total of 6,154,082 voters, or 99.9 percent, voted for all Fatherland Front candidates as contrasted to 1,487 who voted against. About 4,373 election ballots were declared void because of irregularities.

The speed with which election results are tallied and announced was exemplified by the election of 1971. Two days after the election the Central Election Commission--headed by its chairman, Angel Velev--examined the protocols of the 400 urban const.i.tuency election commissions and announced the results. As expected, all 400 candidates nominated by the Fatherland Front were elected. Announcements of local election results in towns and villages are made by the respective executive committees of the people's councils.

The BKP's method of organizing the government after an election was ill.u.s.trated by the plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee held on July 6, 1971. It discussed and approved proposals for candidates for chairman and deputy chairman of the National a.s.sembly, members.h.i.+p of the State Council, Council of Ministers, heads of the different commissions, chairman of the Supreme Court, and chief prosecutor. Nominees were submitted for discussion and confirmation during the first session of the sixth National a.s.sembly held on July 7, 1971.

An amendment to the 1971 Const.i.tution on the nomination of candidates by the leaders.h.i.+p of public organizations obtained official sanction not only for the purpose of expediency but more importantly to guarantee the election of the nominees, as there had been cases of nonelection during the previous elections for people's councils. The election law also provides that candidates must garner 50 percent plus one vote in the electoral districts before being declared elected. Statistics of election results for people's councils in 1949 and 1966 showed that the percentage of votes ranged from 96.48 percent of the voting population in 1949 to 99.56 percent in 1966. The new amendment required that two-thirds of the registered voters cast their ballots in favor of the candidates before declaring that an election had taken place.

CHAPTER 9

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

In mid-1973 political affairs and the administration of the country remained completely in the hands of the ruling circle of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Bulgarska Komunisticheska Partiya--BKP, see Glossary), headed by First Secretary Todor Zhivkov. Political power was exercised by him and by the few select officials in the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, particularly those who were members of the Politburo and the Secretariat. The extent of such power was best described by Vulko Chervenkov, onetime premier and Politburo member, who declared that "no inst.i.tution, organization, or person can be above the Politburo and the Central Committee." This statement, made in the early 1950s, continues to be the cardinal rule of communist power in Bulgaria.

Retention of power by the party was ensured through its absolute control of governmental machinery and of all organized activities. Virtually every important government post was held by a high-ranking party member.

First Secretary Zhivkov, for example, was also president of the State Council, the leading government body, which made him the top man in both party and government. In addition to the interlocking of government and party posts at all levels, it was also customary for the top officers of ma.s.s organizations to be members of the party hierarchy. The continued existence of a second political party, the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (Bulgarski Zemedelski Suyuz--BZS), did not encroach on the monopolization of political power by the BKP because the prerogatives of the union had been curtailed to the point where it had become an auxiliary of the BKP rather than a compet.i.tor. Any opposition to the ruling elite had come from within the party rather than from outside organizations. As recently as 1965 an abortive attempt to overthrow Zhivkov was made, but this was the result of intraparty factionalism rather than antiparty opposition. Zhivkov managed to avert the attempted coup d'etat and afterward strengthened his power base within the party.

At the helm of the party for nineteen years, Zhivkov, despite occasional intraparty struggle and friction, remained the undisputed leader and, as such, he maintained very close relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with the Soviet government. On the one hand the close Bulgarian-Soviet relations.h.i.+p has been interpreted by Marxist theoreticians as the application of "proletarian internationalism"--a theory that contends that proletarian unity is "historically the higher right than that of national self-determination." On the other hand, many observers of Bulgarian-Soviet relations maintain that the nature of the unequal alliance stems not only from historical and cultural affiliations as well as political and ideological identification but, more important, from Zhivkov's need for strong Soviet support.

At the Tenth Party Congress in 1971 Zhivkov reiterated the necessity for close ties with the Soviet Union and introduced a five-year economic plan that continued the long emphasis on heavy industry. The congress reelected the Politburo, despite the advanced ages of some of the members and their demonstrated concern for maintaining the status quo at a time when the changes necessary to transform Bulgaria into a modern industrial country have placed new demands on old methods and inst.i.tutions. Success or failure of the Communists' ongoing efforts to industrialize, modernize, and communize the country depends on the adaptability of the leaders.h.i.+p and the political inst.i.tutions to meet the challenges of the 1970s.

MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1965-71

After discovery of the plot to overthrow him in April 1965, Zhivkov took steps to secure his position and to prevent future conspiracies. Because the threat to his regime had come mainly from the army, Zhivkov and his minister of defense often spoke to a.s.semblies of military officers to explain party policies and to a.s.suage dissident feelings within military ranks. In addition, state security functions were realigned in an attempt to tighten the system in order that such conspiracies would not be able to germinate in the future. The Ministry of the Interior lost its responsibility for security to the newly created Committee of State Security, which was under the direct supervision of Zhivkov in his position as premier. Later, in 1968, the Committee of State Security and the Ministry of the Interior were again merged under the latter's t.i.tle.

After the abortive plot against him, Zhivkov offered some reforms to placate disgruntled elements and to avoid a repet.i.tion of the incident.

Although the princ.i.p.al plotters were imprisoned, Zhivkov's reaction to the conspiracy was one of general appeas.e.m.e.nt. This policy of appeas.e.m.e.nt was shown by the fact that no general purges took place and that people who could have been suspected of dissident activity were allowed to remain in positions of authority in the party and in the government rather than being summarily swept aside. The programs of liberal reform that had been implemented before, but interrupted by, the 1965 plot were resumed, and Bulgaria seemed to be reaching for a national destiny rather than accepting the role of a Soviet puppet. The reforms affected all fields--political, economic, and cultural--and for a time it seemed that the abortive coup d'etat had given new impetus to Bulgarian national interests.

The promise of reform appeared to be the focal point around which the Ninth Party Congress was convened in 1966, and at the congress party leaders underscored the need for the widest partic.i.p.ation in the democratic process. Reforms, however, fell victim to the conservatism of older party leaders, and Zhivkov did not have the personal strength or magnetism to push forward his program. The ninth congress ended with the reelection of the essentially reactionary Politburo and a reaffirmation of the status quo. The bright hopes for economic, political, and social progress that had been evident in late 1965 and early 1966 collapsed in a return of rigid ideological dogma and a firm reliance on Soviet rather than Bulgarian initiatives.

The failure of the ninth congress to rejuvenate the party hierarchy and to chart a reform course for the future had repercussions throughout Bulgarian society. Initiatives in foreign affairs that had been taken in 1965 and 1966 foundered in the retrenchment into party orthodoxy.

Negotiations that had begun with Western European countries as well as with Balkan neighbors bore no fruit as the Zhivkov government failed to follow up earlier moves toward better relations. Even more detrimental to Balkan relations was Bulgarian partic.i.p.ation in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, which Yugoslavia and Romania strongly opposed. In the cultural area the party tightened its controls over creative artists and reorganized the Committee on Art and Culture to better serve the needs of the government. The First Congress of Culture, held in 1967, emphasized the constructive role of culture in society and called for an intensification of anti-Western propaganda in order to counter the dangerous influence of so-called bourgeois culture.

There was also great concern among party leaders about the so-called nihilistic att.i.tude of the country's young people. In December 1967 Zhivkov published his "Youth Theses" in an attempt to counter what the party considered to be dangerous apathy on the part of Bulgarian youth.

Zhivkov's theses initiated some inst.i.tutional reforms that dealt heavily with patriotic education in an attempt to instill some national pride in the young people, but about a year later patriotic education was deemphasized. Evidently the program had aroused strong feelings of nationalism that interfered with the pro-Soviet att.i.tudes that have been characteristic of Zhivkov's government. After publication of the "Youth Theses," all youth activities came under the aegis of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (Dimitrovski Komunisticheski Mladezhki Suyuz), referred to as Komsomol, which is the junior auxiliary of the BKP. The moves to politicize young people failed to arouse any widespread interest, and in the early 1970s Bulgarian youth remained essentially apolitical and apathetic.

In the economic sector the BKP blueprint for reform commonly referred to as the New Economic Model offered innovations in decentralized decisionmaking that delegated more responsibilities to public and state organizations on the lower level as well as to individual enterprises.

The attention given to economic reform at the time--late 1965--was motivated not only by Zhivkov's need to sh.o.r.e up his own political position after the attempted coup but probably more so by the examples of new economic programs that were sweeping the Eastern European communist countries and the Soviet Union. More important than the liberal reforms for decentralized management of the economy was the decision to allow planning from the bottom to the top. From the time of the enactment in 1965 up to about 1968 there were definite signs of change. The July plenum of the BKP Central Committee in 1968, however, formalized a number of changes that called for considerable reduction in the autonomy of the existing public and state organizations, thus setting aside the entire economic reform program. After the July plenum and another in November 1968, a reorganization of state enterprises took place in line with the new centralization policy.

During the remainder of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, Zhivkov's position remained stable, and there were no overt threats to his regime such as the 1965 plot to overthrow him. In 1969 and again in 1970 agreements were signed in Moscow that tied the Bulgarian economy even closer to that of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria's position, or more precisely the BKP's position, on relations with the Soviet Union was summed up in a statement made by Zhivkov just before the Tenth Party Congress in 1971: "The fraternal friends.h.i.+p and cooperation of the Bulgarian Communist Party with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the ever broader and deeper alignment of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union will remain the immovable cornerstone of the entire work and the domestic and foreign policy of our party."

At the Tenth Party Congress, which was attended by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union, there were no startling changes either in party policy or in high-ranking personnel a.s.signments. The same Politburo, with an average age of sixty-three, was returned to office, and the party program promised no alteration in the heavily centralized, pro-Soviet policies that had marked most of Zhivkov's tenure. A new const.i.tution was proposed by the party and later adopted by the government and, although some inst.i.tutional changes were made--for example, creation of the State Council as a collective executive branch of government--the absolute supremacy of the BKP over every aspect of Bulgarian life was in no way diminished. On the contrary, the power of the top leaders.h.i.+p was probably enhanced along with its ability to perpetuate itself in office.

THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Organization

Party statutes define the organization, members.h.i.+p, and program of the BKP. A statute promulgated during the Sixth Party Congress in 1954 proclaimed the party to be an "inseparable part of the world communist front" and acknowledged the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the leading political force within the communist bloc countries. Later party statutes refined the basic doc.u.ment but did not change the premise that the BKP looks to the Soviet party for leaders.h.i.+p.

Central to the observance of basic communist policy is adherence to the principles of democratic centralism. Patterned after the Soviet model, these principles call for a pyramidal form of command responsibility in which lower party organs are subordinated to the next higher body. This also means that decisions of higher bodies bind those below, individually and collectively. Party policy and practice encourage open discussion of issues during meetings of local party units as well as during conferences and congresses at higher levels; however, party discipline requires unitary action after a decision has been reached by the hierarchy.

The party hierarchy is composed of the Politburo, the Secretariat and, to some extent, the Central Committee, the members.h.i.+p of which interlock as one man may occupy two or more positions at any given time.

Theoretically occupying the apex of power is the congress of the party that is held every five years, following the example of Soviet party congresses. The congress is made up of delegates from various party units on the basis of proportional representation of party members. The main statutory functions of the congress include revising or amending party statutes, deciding party policy, electing the Central Committee, and receiving reports concerning past progress and future plans. It is customary for major governmental programs or reforms to be presented to a party congress before promulgation. The Tenth Party Congress, for example, listened to readings of the draft of a new const.i.tution and the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) and approved both unanimously. Actually, the purpose of a congress is to demonstrate unanimity and accord. The size of the congress (1,553 delegates in 1971) and the fact that it meets only at five-year intervals preclude carrying out its statutory role as a deliberative and policymaking body. Public politicking or wrangling by delegates to a party congress would be unprecedented.