The Struggle Between President Johnson And Congress Over Reconstruction Part 7

[15] _Senate Journal_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, p. 24.

[16] See Pollard's _Lost Cause Regained_, pp. 44-57, for a discussion of the growth of Southern sentiment favoring measures of peace.

[17] It is improbable that he ever modified his views as to the continued existence of the States--views which were essentially those of his successor, though less dogmatically a.s.serted. See Hurd, _Theory of Our National Existence_, 36 and _Index_; Pollard, _Lost Cause Regained_, 65.

[18] Cooper, _American Politics_, pp. 141-3.

[19] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 36.

[20] _Congressional Globe_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 834.

[21] _House Journal_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 69, 70.

[22] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, pp. 141-3. On Lincoln's plan of Reconstruction, _Cf._ Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 297-9; Pollard, _Lost Cause Regained_, 65, which claims that Lincoln could have successfully carried out his policy had he lived, but does not sustain the statement; c.o.x, _Three Decades_, etc., pp. 336-345; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, iii, 519-20; Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 267 ff.

[23] These excepted cla.s.ses were: (1) Confederate civil and diplomatic officers; (2) Confederates who had left U. S. judicial positions; (3) officers above colonel in army and lieutenant in navy; (4) those who had formerly been U. S. Congressmen and had aided the rebellion; (5) those who left U. S. Army and Navy to aid the rebellion; (6) those who had treated negroes captured while in U. S. military or naval service otherwise than as prisoners of war.

[24] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 531-41; _Cf._ Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 304-7.

[25] For results of this reorganization in Tennessee, see chap. iii.

[26] With one exception--a Republican, Whaley, of West Virginia, voted with the negative.

[27] So called from the chairmen of the House and Senate committees reporting the bill.

[28] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 84.

See also _Lalor_, iii, 546; c.o.x, _Three Decades_, etc., 339-341; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 520-28; Johnson's _American Orations_, iii, 242-260; Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 274 ff.

[29] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, p. 169.

[30] _Congressional Globe_, part ii, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1246.

[31] _Congressional Globe_, iii, p. 2106, 1st Session, 38th Congress.

[32] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, 169-70. The President's action caused much dissatisfaction, Davis and Wade publis.h.i.+ng a protest which impugned Lincoln's motives, declaring that he had committed an outrage on American legislation. See Johnson, in _Lalor_, iii. 5 and 6; c.o.x, _Three Decades_, etc., 341.

[33] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 38th Congress, Feb. 8. Blaine (_Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 46) explains that this joint resolution was intended as a rebuke to the President by the refusal of Congress to accept the proclamation of December 8, 1863, as a basis for the restoration of the States fulfilling its requirements. He then points out how Lincoln, with his usual tact, overthrows what triumph may have accrued to the leaders of the opposition by explaining that he "signed the joint resolution in deference to the view of Congress implied in its pa.s.sage and presentation." His (Lincoln's) own opinion was that as a matter of course Congress had complete power to accept or reject electoral votes, and that the Executive had no right to interpose with a veto, whatever his own opinions might be. Blaine says that "his triumph was complete, both in the estimation of Congress and of the people."

[34] See c.o.x, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 123; Johnston, in _Lalor_, iii, 54; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_, 261-2.

[35] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 194-6.

[36] The inconsistency in declaring a State to be extinct, and at the same time acknowledging the obligation to guarantee to it a republican form of government, is due to careless phraseology. Obviously Sumner uses the word "State," in these resolutions, where he means state governments.

[37] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, part ii, p. 2041.

See also his remarks on the Confiscation bill. c.o.x's _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, pp. 365-374, contains a chapter on the policy of Stevens.

[38] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 531-541.

[39] McPherson, _Reconstruction_, pp. 44 f. Cf. Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 592.

[40] McPherson, pp. 46-7.

[41] McPherson, 44 ff; Moore, _Life and Speeches of Andrew Johnson_, 481 ff.

[42] McPherson, p. 47.

[43] McPherson, pp. 47-8.

[44] See Gillett, _Democ. in the U. S._, pp. 333-337, for a discussion of Johnson's policy and mistakes from the Democratic standpoint.

[45] Mr. Blaine in his _Twenty Years of Congress_, vol. ii, pp. 63-70, ascribes the apparently great modification of Johnson's att.i.tude towards the South to two causes: First, the personal influence of Seward; second, the flattery of Southern leaders. He a.s.sumes Johnson to have been thoroughly determined to carry out a harsh policy of reconstruction, and points out that of the six members of the Cabinet, excluding Mr. Seward, three were radical and three conservative in their views, offsetting each other in their influence upon Johnson. He then calls attention to the fact that Mr. Seward's most conspicuous faculty was the power to convince listeners against their will through his personal conversation with them.

With this remarkable faculty he believes Mr. Seward to have deliberately settled down to the task of reversing the President's views as to reconstruction. "Equipped with these rare endowments," he says, "it is not strange that Mr. Seward made a deep impression upon the mind of the President. In conflicts of opinion the superior mind, the subtle address, the fixed purpose, the gentle yet strong will, must in the end prevail."

Mr. Seward's fervent pleadings, Blaine thinks, caused a marked change in Johnson's beliefs, and inclined him to look favorably upon the glory of a merciful, lenient administration. The leaders in the South, quickly noticing the change in Johnson's att.i.tude, took advantage of the opportunity, and by judicious flattery completed the work which Seward had begun, and placed Johnson before the world as the ardent champion of immediate restoration. The theory impresses one with its apparent reasonableness, but as Mr. Blaine produces no evidence beyond his own authority, one is inclined to look upon it as an ingenious explanation based upon the environment of Johnson. Doubtless Seward presented his view on the situation with his accustomed ability, and probably it influenced Johnson's view to a certain extent. The second part of the supposition can also readily be granted--that the vanity of Johnson was played upon by those whose flattery was most pleasing to one who had sprung from the ranks of those accustomed to be dictated to and spurned by these same men.

Yet to ascribe the adoption of so important a policy, affecting all the fundamental principles upon which strict and loose constructionists are divided, to these influences, appears to be a superficial judgment based upon opinions formed in the heat of the struggle, when extraneous influences are always given undue prominence by the partic.i.p.ants. The whole career of Johnson proves the logical exactness with which he followed strict construction dogma in all points excepting the doctrine of secession.

[46] McPherson, _Hist. of Recon._, 45, 46

[47] The repudiation of the Sherman-Johnston agreement of April 18th was of a negative character, and did not commit the administration to any policy. Coming, as it did, so shortly after his inauguration, it was taken by those expecting harsh measures from the President as an indication of such a policy. An examination of the circ.u.mstances, however, shows that Johnson was merely following the policy supposed to have been adopted by Lincoln, and evidenced by instructions sent to Grant on March 3 in regard to a proposed conference with Lee. Stephens' charge (_War between the States_, ii, 632), that Johnson was bound to ratify the agreement as consistent with the Crittenden Resolution of 1861, is inadmissible.

Generals in the field manifestly have no right to decide momentous political questions. For a copy of the Sherman-Johnston agreement, and the official dispatch giving particulars of its disapproval, see McPherson, _Hist. of Recon._, 121-2.

[48] McPherson, p. 13-14.

[49] McPherson, p. 8.

[50] See Appendix; Savage, _Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson_, 370-373.

[51] Blaine, ii, 70-76, ascribes this amnesty proclamation to the personal influence of Mr. Seward, who favored all but the 13th excepted cla.s.s (property holders above $20,000). This certainly offers a good explanation of the promptness of his action, and is not inconsistent with the theory of Johnson's att.i.tude as outlined above.

[52] McPherson, p. 11; Blaine, ii, 77, 78.

[53] Tennessee, of course, having been reorganized during Lincoln's administration, under the direction of Military Governor Johnson, cannot be considered in connection with Johnson's policy as President. Louisiana and Arkansas also retained their reorganized governments until the reconstruction acts took effect. See Blaine, ii, 79, 80.

[54] The phraseology differed in the different States, depending upon the sensitiveness and pride of the legislature.

[55] McPherson, _Reconst._, 7, 8.

[56] McPherson, _Reconst._, 49.

[57] _Ibid._, 51-2.

[58] McPherson, 20.

[59] _Ibid._, 21-2.

[60] McPherson, 43; Blaine, ii, 102-3.

[61] See _Why the Solid South_, edited by Hilary A. Herbert, for a detailed presentation of the Southern view.