Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 Part 13

This is the tone which the Government adopted, after the consideration, as we are bound to believe, which the question demanded, after having incurred the responsibility of refusing the Congress offered by the Emperor of the French, after the death of the King of Denmark, after the question had been changed from a federal to an international one--such, I repeat, is the tone they took up, and in which they sent their menacing messages to every Court in Germany. I say that at the death of the King of Denmark it behooved Her Majesty's Ministers, instead of adopting such a course, maturely to consider their position in relation to the events which had occurred. There were two courses open to Her Majesty's Government, both intelligible, both honourable. It was open to them, after the death of the King of Denmark, to have acted as France had resolved under the same circ.u.mstances to act--France, who occupies, we are told, a position in reference to these matters so dignified and satisfactory that it has received the compliments even of a baffled Minister. That course was frankly announced shortly afterwards to the English Minister by the Minister of France in Denmark. On November 19 General Fleury said to Lord Wodehouse at Copenhagen:

That his own instructions from the Emperor were, not to take part in any negotiations here, but to tell the Danish Government explicitly that if Denmark became involved in a war with Germany, France would not come to her a.s.sistance.

If England had adopted that course it would have been intelligible and honourable. We were not bound by the treaty of 1852 to go to the a.s.sistance of Denmark if she became involved in a war with Germany. No one pretends that we were. As a matter of high policy, much as we may regret any disturbance in the territorial limits of Europe, being a country the policy of which is a policy of tranquillity and peace, there were no adequate considerations which could have justified England in entering into an extensive European war, without allies, to prevent a war between Denmark and Germany. That was, I say, an honourable and intelligible course.

There was another course equally intelligible and equally honourable.

Though I am bound to say that the course which I should have recommended the country to take would have been to adopt the same position as that of France, yet, if the Government really entertained the views with respect to the balance of power which have been expressed occasionally in the House by the n.o.ble lord, and in a literary form by the Secretary of State--from which I may say I disagree, because they appear to me to be founded on the obsolete tradition of an antiquated system, and because I think that the elements from which we ought to form an opinion as to the distribution of the power of the world must be collected from a much more extensive area, and must be formed of larger and more varied elements: but let that pa.s.s: yet, I say, if Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the balance of power were endangered by a quarrel between Germany and Denmark, they were justified in giving their advice to Denmark, in threatening Germany, and in taking the general management of the affairs of Denmark; but they were bound, if a war did take place between Germany and Denmark, to support Denmark. Instead of that, they invented a process of conduct which I hope is not easily exampled in the history of this country, and which I can only describe in one sentence--it consisted of menaces never accomplished and promises never fulfilled.

With all these difficulties they never hesitate in their tone. At least, let us do them this justice--there never were, in semblance, more determined Ministers. They seemed at least to rejoice in the phantom of a proud courage. But what do they do? They send a special envoy to Denmark, who was to enforce their policy and arrange everything. Formally the special envoy was sent to congratulate the King on his accession to the throne of Denmark, and all the other Powers did the same; but in reality the mission of Lord Wodehouse was for greater objects than that, and his instructions are before us in full. Without wearying the House by reading the whole of those instructions, I will read one paragraph, which is the last, and which is, as it were, a summary of the whole. They were written at the end of December. Recollect, this is the policy of the Government after refusing the Congress, and after the death of the King of Denmark, which had therefore incurred a still deeper responsibility, and which, we must suppose, had deeply considered all the issues involved. This is the cream of the instructions given by the Government to Lord Wodehouse:

The result to be arrived at is the fulfilment of the treaty of May 8, 1852, and of the engagements entered into by Prussia and Austria and Denmark in 1851-2. (No. 3, 353.)

Lord Wodehouse could not possibly be at fault as to what he was to do when he arrived at his destination. His was, no doubt, a significant appointment. He was a statesman of some experience; he had held a subordinate but important position in the administration of our foreign affairs; he had been a Minister at a northern Court; he had recently distinguished himself in Parliament by a speech on the question of Germany and Denmark, in which he took a decidedly dangerous view. Lord Wodehouse received clear instructions as to what he was to do. But, at the same time, what was the conduct of the Secretary of State? While Lord Wodehouse was repairing to his post, did the Secretary of State in the least falter in his tone? It was about this time that the great diplomatic reprimand was sent to Sir Alexander Malet for having talked of the 'protocol' of 1852 instead of the 'treaty'. This was the time that instructions were sent out that if anybody had the hardihood to mention the 'protocol' of 1852 he was immediately to be stopped. However elevated his position might be, even if it were M. Bismarck himself, he was to be pulled up directly, in the full flow of his eloquence; note was to be taken of this great diplomatic _lapsus_, and the Minister was to telegraph instantly home to his Government how he had carried out his instructions in this respect. On December 17, the n.o.ble lord wrote to Sir Andrew Buchanan, our amba.s.sador at Berlin:

Let it suffice at present for Her Majesty's Government to declare that they would consider any departure from the treaty of succession of 1852, by Powers who signed or acceded to that treaty, as entirely inconsistent with good faith. (No. 3, 383.)

Similar dispatches were sent to Wurtemberg, Hanover, and Saxony. On December 23 the n.o.ble earl wrote to Sir Andrew Buchanan:

If the overthrow of the dynasty now reigning in Denmark is sought by Germany, the most serious consequences may ensue. (No. 3, 411.)

I want to know what honourable members mean by cheering the words I have just quoted. If you wish to convey even to a little Power that if it does a certain thing you will go to war with it, you take care not to announce your intention in an offensive manner; because, were you to do so, probably, even the smallest Power in Europe would not yield.

And certainly if you wish to tell a great Power in Europe what may be eventually the consequences if it should adopt a different line from that which you desire, you would not abruptly declare that if it declined to accede to your wish you would declare war. Why, there are no dispatches on record in the world--there is no record in any Foreign Office of language of this kind. The question is, what interpretation can be put on these threats. The Secretary of State writes again on December 25 to Sir Andrew Buchanan, stating that:

Any precipitate action on the part of the German Confederation may lead to consequences fatal to the peace of Europe, and may involve Germany, in particular, in difficulties of the most serious nature. (No. 4, 414.)

On December 26 the Secretary of State writes to Sir Alexander Malet, and sends him a copy of the treaty of 1852, in order that he might communicate it to the Diet. Now, that is the state of affairs after the King of Denmark's death; after he had been perfectly acquainted with the policy of France; after he had been frankly told that the French Emperor had explicitly informed Denmark that if she got involved in war with Germany, France would not come to her a.s.sistance.

Now the words 'if she went to war' might have been interpreted in two ways; because she might get into war without any fault of her own, and Germany might be the aggressor: but there could be no mistake in regard to the words 'if she became involved in war'. Neither Denmark nor England could make any mistake in regard to the policy of France, which the Secretary of State now says was a magnanimous policy.

Notwithstanding these threats, notwithstanding these repeated menaces, and notwithstanding every effort made by Her Majesty's Government to prevent it, federal execution took place, as it was intended to take place. One day after the most menacing epistle which I have ever read--the day after the copy of the treaty of 1852 had been solemnly placed before the Diet by Sir Alexander Malet--on December 27, federal execution took place. At any rate, I do not think that is evidence of the just influence of England in the councils of Germany.

What was the course of Her Majesty's Government at this critical conjuncture? Why, Sir, they went again to France. After all that had happened their only expedient was to go and supplicate France. I will read the letter. [Mr. Layard: Hear, hear!] The honourable gentleman seems to triumph in the recollection of mistakes and disappointments.

I will give him the date, but I should think it must really be seared upon his conscience. December 27 is the date of federal execution: and Her Majesty's Government must have been in a state of complete panic, because on the 28th they made application to France, which is answered in a few hours by Lord Cowley: 'I said Her Majesty's Government were most sincerely anxious to----' (laughter). I wish really to be candid, not to misrepresent anything, and to put the case before the House without garbling any of the dispatches.--'I said that Her Majesty's Government were most sincerely anxious to act with the Imperial Government in this question.' No doubt they were. I am vindicating your conduct. I believe in your sincerity throughout. It is only your intense incapacity that I denounce. The pa.s.sage in the dispatch is Shakespearian; it is one of those dramatic descriptions which only a masterly pen could accomplish. Lord Cowley went on:

Her Majesty's Government felt that if the two Powers could agree, war might be avoided; otherwise the danger of war was imminent. M. Drouyn de Lhuys said he partook this opinion; but as his Excellency made no further observation, I remarked it would be a grievous thing if the difference of opinion which had arisen upon the merits of a general Congress were to produce an estrangement which would leave each Government to pursue its own course.

I hoped that this would not be the case. Her Majesty's Government would do all in their power to avoid it. I presumed I might give them the a.s.surance that the Imperial Government were not decided to reject the notion of a Conference. (No. 4, 444.)

Well, Sir, this received a curt and unsatisfactory reply. Nothing could be obtained from the plaintive appeal of Lord Cowley. Well, what did Her Majesty's Government do? Having received information that the threat of federal execution had been fulfilled, having appealed to France, and been treated in the manner I have described, what did the Government do? Why, the Secretary of State, within twenty-four hours afterwards, penned the fiercest dispatch he had ever yet written.

It is dated December 31, 1863, and it is addressed to Sir Andrew Buchanan:

Her Majesty's Government do not hold that war would relieve Prussia from the obligations of the treaty of 1852.

The King of Denmark would by that treaty be ent.i.tled still to be acknowledged as the sovereign of all the dominions of the late King of Denmark. He has been so ent.i.tled from the time of the death of the late King. A war of conquest undertaken by Germany avowedly for the purpose of adding some parts of the Danish dominions to the territory of the German Confederation might, if successful, alter the state of succession contemplated by the Treaty of London, and give to Germany a t.i.tle by conquest to parts of the dominions of the King of Denmark. The prospect of such an accession may no doubt be a temptation to those who think it can be accomplished; but Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that Prussia will depart from the straight line of good faith in order to a.s.sist in carrying such a project into effect. (No. 4, 445.)

You cheer as if it were a surprising thing that the Secretary of State should have written a single sentence of common sense. These are important state doc.u.ments, and I hope Her Majesty's Government are not so fallen that there is not a Minister among them who is able to write a dispatch--I do not say a bad dispatch, but a very important one. I wish to call attention to its importance:

If German nationality in Holstein, and particularly in Schleswig, were made the ground of the dismemberment of Denmark, Polish nationality in the Duchy of Posen would be a ground equally strong for the dismemberment of Prussia. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the safest course for Prussia to pursue is to act with good faith and honour and to stand by and fulfil her treaty engagements. By such a course she will command the sympathy of Europe; by a contrary course she will draw down upon herself the universal condemnation of all disinterested men. By this course alone war in Europe can be with certainty prevented. (No. 4, 445.)

Well, Sir, that I think was a bold dispatch to write after the rejection, for the second or third time, of our overtures to France.

That brings us up to the last day of the year.

But before I proceed to more recent transactions, it is necessary to call the attention of the House to the remarkable contrast between the menaces lavished on Germany and the expectations--to use the mildest term--that were held out to Denmark. The great object of Her Majesty's Government when the difficulties began to be very serious, was to induce Denmark to revoke the patent of Holstein--that is, to terminate the const.i.tution. The const.i.tution of Holstein had been granted very recently before the death of the King, with a violent desire on the part of the monarch to fulfil his promises. It was a wise and excellent const.i.tution by which Holstein became virtually independent.

It enjoyed the fullness of self-government, and was held only by sovereign ties to Denmark, as Norway is held to Sweden. The Danish Government were not at all willing to revoke the const.i.tution in Holstein. It was one that did them credit, and was naturally popular in Holstein. Still, the Diet was very anxious that the patent should be revoked, because if Holstein continued satisfied it was impossible to trade on the intimate connexion between Schleswig and Holstein, the lever by which the kingdom of Denmark was to be destroyed. The Diet, therefore, insisted that the patent should be revoked. Her Majesty's Government, I believe, approved the patent of Holstein as the Danish Government had done, but, as a means of obtaining peace and saving Denmark, they made use of all the means in their power to induce Denmark to revoke that const.i.tution. Sir Augustus Paget, writing to the Foreign Secretary on October 14, and describing an interview with M. Hall, the Prime Minister of Denmark, says:

After much further conversation, in which I made use of every argument to induce his Excellency to adopt a conciliatory course, and in which I warned him of the danger of rejecting the friendly counsels now offered by Her Majesty's Government--(No. 3, 162)--

M. Hall promises to withdraw the patent. What interpretation could M.

Hall place on that interview? He was called upon to do what he knew to be distasteful, and believed to be impolitic. He is warned of the danger of rejecting those friendly counsels, and in consequence of that warning he gives way and surrenders his opinion. I would candidly ask what is the interpretation which in private life would be put on such language as I have quoted, and which had been acted upon by those to whom it was addressed?

Well, we now come to the federal execution in Holstein. Speaking literally, the federal execution was a legal act, and Denmark could not resist it. But from the manner in which it was about to be carried into effect, and in consequence of the pretensions connected with it, the Danes were of opinion that it would have been better at once to resist the execution, which aimed a fatal blow at the independence of Schleswig, and upon this point they felt strongly. Well, Her Majesty's Government--and I give them full credit for being actuated by the best motives--thought otherwise, and wished the Danish Government to submit to this execution. And what was the sort of language used by them in order to bring about that result? Sir Augustus Paget replied in this way to the objections of the Danish Minister:

I replied that Denmark would at all events have a better chance of securing the a.s.sistance of the Powers if the execution were not resisted.

I ask any candid man to put his own interpretation upon this language.

And on the 12th of the same month Lord Russell himself tells M. Bille, the Danish Minister in London, that there is no connexion between the engagements of Denmark to Germany, and the engagements of the German Powers under the treaty of 1852. After such a declaration from the English Minister in the metropolis, a declaration which must have had the greatest effect upon the policy of the Danish Government--of course they submitted to the execution. But having revoked the patent and submitted to the execution, as neither the one nor the other was the real object of the German Powers, a new demand was made which was one of the greatest consequence.

Now, listen to this. The new demand was to repeal the old const.i.tution. I want to put clearly before the House the position of the Danish Government with respect to this much-talked-of const.i.tution. There had been in the preceding year a Parliamentary Reform Bill carried in Denmark. The King died before having given his a.s.sent to it, though he was most willing to have done so. The instant the new King succeeded, the Parliamentary Reform Bill was brought to him. Of course great excitement prevailed in Denmark, just as it did in England at the time of the Reform Bill under similar circ.u.mstances, and the King was placed in a most difficult position. Now, observe this: England, who was so obtrusive and pragmatical in the counsels which she gave, who was always offering advice and suggestions, hung back when the question arose whether the new King should give his a.s.sent to the Reform Bill or not. England was selfishly silent, and would incur no responsibility. The excitement in Copenhagen was great, and the King gave his a.s.sent to the Bill. But mark! at that moment it was not at all impossible that if Her Majesty's Government had written a dispatch to Copenhagen asking the King not to give his a.s.sent to the Bill for the s.p.a.ce of six weeks in order to a.s.sist England in the negotiations she was carrying on in behalf of Denmark; and if the King had convened his council and laid before them the express wish of an ally who was then looked upon by Denmark with confidence and hope, especially from the time that France had declared she would not a.s.sist her, I cannot doubt that the King would have complied with a request that was so important to his fortunes. But the instant the King had sanctioned the new const.i.tution, the English Government began writing dispatches calling upon him to revoke it. Aye, but what was his position then? How could he revoke it? The King was a const.i.tutional king; he could have put an end to this const.i.tution only by a _coup d'etat_; and he was not in a position, nor I believe if he were had he the inclination, to do such an act. The only const.i.tutional course open to him was to call the new Parliament together with the view of revoking the const.i.tution.

But see what would have been the position of affairs then. In England the Reform Act was pa.s.sed in 1832, new elections took place under it, and the House a.s.sembled under Lord Althorp, as the leader of the Government. Now, suppose Lord Althorp had come down to that House with a King's speech recommending them to revoke the Reform Act, and have asked leave to introduce another Bill for the purpose of reforming the const.i.tution, would it not have been asking an utter impossibility?

But how did Her Majesty's Government act towards Denmark in similar circ.u.mstances? First of all, the n.o.ble lord at the head of the Foreign Office wrote to Lord Wodehouse on December 20, giving formal advice to the Danish Government to repeal the const.i.tution, and Lord Wodehouse, who had been sent upon this painful and, I must say, impossible office to the Danish Minister, thus speaks of the way in which he had performed his task:

I pointed out to M. Hall also that if, on the one hand, Her Majesty's Government would never counsel the Danish Government to yield anything inconsistent with the honour and independence of the Danish Crown, and the integrity of the King's dominions; so, on the other hand, we had a right to expect that the Danish Government would not, by putting forward extreme pretensions, drive matters to extremities.

And Sir Augustus Paget, who appears to have performed his duty with great temper and talent, writing on December 22, says:

I asked M. Hall to reflect what would be the position of Denmark if the advice of the Powers were refused, and what it would be if accepted, and to draw his own conclusions. (No. 4, 420.)

Now, I ask, what are the conclusions which any gentleman--I do not care on what side of the House he may sit--would have drawn from such language as that? But before that, a special interview took place between Lord Wodehouse and the Danish Minister, of which Lord Wodehouse writes:

It was my duty to declare to M. Hall that if the Danish Government rejected our advice, Her Majesty's Government must leave Denmark to encounter Germany on her own responsibility.

Well, Sir, I ask again whether there are two interpretations to be put upon such observations as these? And what happened? It was impossible for M. Hall, who was the author of the const.i.tution, to put an end to it; so he resigned--a new Government is formed, and under the new const.i.tution Parliament is absolutely called together to pa.s.s an Act to terminate its own existence. And in January Sir Augustus Paget tells the Danish Government with some _navete_:

If they would summon the Rigsraad, and propose a repeal of the const.i.tution, they would act wisely, in accordance with the advice of their friends, and the responsibility of the war would not be laid at their door.

Well, then, these were three great subjects on which the representation of England induced Denmark to adopt a course against her will, and, as the Danes believed, against their policy. The plot begins to thicken. Notwithstanding the revocation of the patent, the federal execution, and the repeal of the const.i.tution, one thing more is wanted, and Schleswig is about to be invaded. Affairs now become most critical. No sooner is this known than a very haughty menace is sent to Austria. From a dispatch of Lord Bloomfield, dated December 31, it will be seen that Austria was threatened, if Schleswig was invaded, that:

The consequences would be serious. The question would cease to be a purely German one, and would become one of European importance.

On January 4, Earl Russell writes to Mr. Murray, at the Court of Saxony:

The most serious consequences are to be apprehended if the Germans invade Schleswig. (No. 4, 481.)

On the 9th, again, he writes to Dresden:

The line taken by Saxony destroys confidence in diplomatic relations with that State. (No. 4, 502.)

On January 18 he writes to Lord Bloomfield:

You are instructed to represent in the strongest terms to Count Rechberg, and, if you shall have an opportunity of doing so, to the Emperor, the extreme injustice and danger of the principle and practice of taking possession of the territory of a State as what is called a material guarantee for the obtainment of certain international demands, instead of pressing those demands by the usual method of negotiation. Such a practice is fatal to peace, and destructive of the independence of States. It is destructive of peace because it is an act of war, and if resistance takes place it is the beginning of war. But war so begun may not be confined within the narrow limits of its early commencement, as was proved in 1853, when the occupation of the Danubian Princ.i.p.alities by Russia as a material guarantee proved the direct cause of the Crimean War. (No. 4, 564.)