Team Of Rivals Part 18

"I hear of ultra old Whigs in Boston who say they are ready to take up Mr. Seward upon his recent speech," a Ma.s.sachusetts delegate told Weed. "All the New England delegates, save Connecticut's, will be equally satisfactory." And in Ohio, Salmon Chase admitted that there "seems to be at present a considerable set toward Seward." Seward himself believed that the speech had been a great success, the final step in his long journey to the presidency.

In the heady weeks that followed, Weed a.s.sured him that everything was in readiness for a victory at the convention. By trading legislative charters to build city railroads for campaign contributions, Weed had a.s.sembled what one observer called "oceans of money," a campaign chest worth several hundred thousand dollars.

As the convention approached, overconfidence reigned in the Seward camp and poor judgment set in. Despite Weed's generally keen political intuition, he failed to antic.i.p.ate the damage Seward would suffer as a consequence of a rift with Horace Greeley. Over the years, Greeley had voiced a longing for political office, for both the monetary compensation it would provide and the prestige it promised. On several occasions, Greeley later claimed, he had made this desire clear to Seward and Weed. They never took his political aspirations seriously, believing that his strength and usefulness lay in writing, not in practical politics and public office. Greeley had written a plaintive letter to Seward in the autumn of 1854, in which he catalogued a long list of grievances and announced the dissolution of the political firm of Seward, Weed, & Greeley. He recalled the work he had done to secure Seward's first victory as governor, only to discover that jobs had been dispensed "worth $3000 to $20,000 per year to your friends and compatriots, and I returned to my garret and my crust, and my desperate battle with pecuniary obligations." With the exception of a single term in Congress, Greeley charged, Weed had never given him a chance to be nominated for any office. Despite hundreds of suggestions that he run for governor in the most recent election, Weed had refused to support the possibility, claiming that his candidacy would hurt Seward's chances for the Senate. But the most humiliating moment had come, Greeley revealed, when Weed handed the nomination for lieutenant governor that year to Henry Raymond, editor of the New York Times, the Tribune's archrival.

Seward was distressed to read Greeley's letter, which he characterized as "full of sharp, p.r.i.c.king thorns," but he mistakenly a.s.sumed that Greeley's pique was temporary, akin to the anger, he said, that one of his sons might display if denied the chance to go to the circus or a dancing party. After showing it to his wife, Seward cast the letter aside. Frances read it more accurately. Recognizing the "mortal offense" Greeley had taken, she saved the letter, preserving a record of the tangled web of emotions that led Greeley in 1860 to abandon one of his oldest friends in favor of Edward Bates, a man he barely knew.

Week after week, through his columns in the Tribune, Greeley laid the groundwork for the nomination of Bates. Seward's supporters were incensed when he subtly began to sabotage the New Yorker's campaign. Henry Raymond remarked that Greeley "insinuated, rather than openly uttered, exaggerations of local prejudice and animosity against him; hints that parties and men hostile to him and to the Republican organization must be conciliated and their support secured; and a new-born zeal for nationalizing the party by consulting the slave-holding states in regard to the nomination." The influence of the Tribune was substantial, and with each pa.s.sing day, enthusiasm for Bates's candidacy grew.

At some point that spring, Weed had a long talk with Greeley and came away with the mistaken conviction that Greeley was "all right," that despite his editorial support for Bates, he would not play a major role at the convention. The conversation mistakenly satisfied Weed that ties of old friends.h.i.+p would keep Greeley from taking an active role against Seward once the convention began.

Overconfidence also played a role in Weed's failure to meet with Pennsylvania's powerful political boss, Simon Cameron, before the convention opened. In mid-March, Cameron told Seward that he wanted to see Weed in either Was.h.i.+ngton or Philadelphia "at any time" convenient to Weed. Seward relayed the message to his mentor, but Weed, certain that Cameron would deliver Pennsylvania to Seward by the second ballot, as he thought he had promised, never managed to make the trip.

Weed's faith in Cameron was due partly to Seward's report of a special visit he had made to Cameron's estate, Lochiel, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Shortly before leaving for Europe the previous spring, Seward had spent a day with Cameron and had returned certain that Cameron was pledged to his candidacy. "He took me to his home, told me all was right," Seward told Weed. "He was for me, and Pa. would be. It might want to cast a first ballot for him or might not.... He brought the whole legislature of both parties to see me-feasted them gloriously and they were in the main so free, so generous as to embarra.s.s me." Reports of this lavish reception persuaded reporters and politicians alike that a deal had been brokered.

In the months that followed, even as gossip spread that Cameron did not have control of his entire delegation, Weed continued to believe that the Pennsylvania boss, so like himself in many ways, would do whatever was necessary to fulfill his pledge and deliver his state. After all, to Cameron was attributed the oft-quoted definition: "an honest politician is one who, when he is bought, stays bought."

Cameron had been quicker than Weed to exploit the lucrative potential of politics. Through contracts with ca.n.a.l companies, railroads, and banks, he ama.s.sed "so much money," he later boasted, that he might have become "the richest man in Pennsylvania" had he not pursued elective office. Unlike Weed, who remained behind the scenes, Cameron secured for himself two terms in the U.S. Senate; in 1844 and again in 1855. He began his political life as a Democrat but became frustrated by Democratic positions on slavery and, more important, on the tariff, which was his "legislative child." In 1855, he was instrumental in establis.h.i.+ng Pennsylvania's Republican Party, initially called the People's Party.

At the People's Party state convention in February 1860, Cameron received the expected favorite-son nod for the presidency, but Andrew Curtin, a magnetic young politician who was challenging Cameron for control in the state, was nominated for governor. Though Cameron received a majority vote at the convention, a substantial number of district delegates remained to be chosen, eventually producing a split between the rival forces of Cameron and Curtin. Curtin was uncommitted to any candidate when the Republican Convention opened, yet it was known that he questioned Seward's electability. Seward's name on the ticket might hamstring his own election, for the anti-Catholic Know Nothings, who still exerted considerable power in Pennsylvania, had never forgiven Seward for his liberalism toward immigrants and his controversial support for parochial education. Boss Cameron might have been able to resolve these obstacles with Boss Weed in private conversation before the convention. Since that meeting never took place, Weed was left to navigate the countervailing forces of the Pennsylvania state delegation without Cameron's guidance.

SEWARD'S LEISURELY SOJOURN abroad afforded Chase the opportunity to actively secure pledges and workers for his nomination. Never the most astute of politicians, Chase made curiously little use of the precious months of 1859 to better his chances. Sure of the power and depth of his support, he once again, as in 1856, a.s.sumed he would somehow gain the nomination without much personal intervention. News to the contrary Chase dismissed out of hand, even when the intelligence came from his close friend Gamaliel Bailey.

Bailey and Chase had become acquainted in Cincinnati when Bailey was editing The Philanthropist. Later on, when Bailey became publisher of The National Era and moved his family to Was.h.i.+ngton, they warmly welcomed the lonely Chase into their home. When the Senate was in session, Chase lived for months at a time at their house, forming friends.h.i.+ps with Bailey's wife, Margaret, and the entire Bailey clan. On Sat.u.r.day evenings, the Baileys' home became "a salon in European tradition," replete with dinner and the word games at which Chase excelled.

Throughout their long friends.h.i.+p, Bailey had always been frank with Chase, castigating him in 1856 for his temporizing att.i.tude toward the "detestable" Know Nothings. Nonetheless, Bailey remained loyal and supportive of his old friend, a.s.suring him on numerous occasions that he would rather see him "in the presidential chair than any other man." Yet, as Bailey a.s.sessed the temper of the country in early 1859, conversing with many people, "observing the signs of the times and the phases of public opinion," he concluded in a long, candid letter to Chase that he thought it best to support Seward in 1860. The time for Chase would come again four years later.

"He and you are the two most prominent representative men of the party," Bailey wrote on January 16, 1859, "but he is older than you." His friends believe it is "now or never" with him, "to postpone him now is to postpone him forever...you are in the prime of life and have the promise of continuing so-you have not attained your full stature or status-he has-every year adds to your strength, and in 1864, you will be stronger than in 1860.... To be urgent now against the settled feeling of Seward's numerous friends, would provoke unpleasant and damaging discords, and tend hereafter to weaken your position." Bailey suspected that Chase might disagree with his recommendation, but "I know you will not question my integrity or my friends.h.i.+p."

"I do not doubt your friends.h.i.+p," Chase testily replied, "but I do think that if our situations were reversed I should take a different method of showing mine for you.... The suggestion 'now or never' [with regard to Seward] is babyish...how ridiculous...but to sum up all in brief...let me say it cannot change my position. I have no right to do so.... A very large body of the people-embracing not a few who would hardly vote for any man other than myself as a Republican nominee-seem to desire that I shall be a candidate in 1860. No effort of mine, and as far as I know none of my immediate personal friends has produced this feeling. It seems to be of spontaneous growth."

Bailey responded that he presumed Chase's characterization of the "now or never" position of Seward's supporters as "babyish" was "a slip of your pen.... It may be erroneous, groundless, but...it is ent.i.tled to consideration. It has reference not only to age, & health, but other matters.... Governor Seward will be fifty-nine in May, 1860.... Should another be nominated, and elected, the chances would be in favor of a renomination-which would postpone the Governor eight years-until he should be sixty-seven, in the shadow of seventy.... You are still growing [Chase had just turned fifty-one]-you are still increasing in reputation-four years hence...your chances of nomination & election to the Presidency would be greater than they are now." Bailey a.s.sured Chase that he would never work against him. "All I desired was to apprise you, as a friend."

Deluded by flattery, Chase preferred the unrealistic projections of New York's Hiram Barney, who thought his strength in New York State was growing so rapidly that it was possible he might receive New York's vote on the first ballot. So heroic was his self-conception, Chase believed that doubtful supporters would flock to his side once they understood the central role he had played as the guardian of the antislavery tradition and father of the Republican Party.

Failing once again to appoint a campaign manager, Chase had no one to bargain and maneuver for him, no one to promise government posts in return for votes. He rejected an appeal from a New Hamps.h.i.+re supporter who proposed to build a state organization. He never capitalized on the initial support of powerful Chicago Press and Tribune editor Joseph Medill. He turned down an invitation to speak at Cooper Union in a lecture series organized by his supporters as a forum for candidates other than Seward. Refusing even to consider that his own state might deny him a united vote on the first ballot, he failed to confirm that every delegate appointed to the convention was pledged to vote for him. Indeed, his sole contribution to his own campaign was a series of letters to various supporters and journalists around the country, reminding them that he was the best man for the job.

Frustrated supporters tried to shake him into more concerted action. "I now begin to fear that Seward will get a majority of the delegates from Maryland," Chase's loyal backer James Ashley warned. "He and his friends work-work. They not only work-but he works." The willful Chase was blind to troubling signs, convinced that if the delegates voted their conscience, he would ultimately prevail.

"I shall have n.o.body to push or act for me at Chicago," Chase boasted to Benjamin Eggleston, a delegate from Cincinnati, "except the Ohio delegation who will, I doubt not, faithfully represent the Republicans of the State." While a large majority of the Ohio state delegation indeed supported Chase, Senator Ben Wade had his own devoted followers. "The Ohio delegation does not seem to be anywhere as yet," delegate Erastus Hopkins warned. Heedless, Chase remained positive that the entire Ohio delegation would come around, given everything he had done and sacrificed for his state. To support any other candidate would put one "in a position no man of honor or sensibility would care to occupy."

A month before the convention, Kate convinced her father that a journey to Was.h.i.+ngton would sh.o.r.e up his support among various congressmen and senators. Lodging at the Willard Hotel, they made the rounds of receptions and dinners. Seward was very kind to them, Chase admitted to his friend James Briggs. The genial New Yorker hosted a dinner party in their honor at which "all sides were pretty fairly represented" and "there was a good deal of joking." The next evening, former Ohio congressman John Gurley organized a party to honor both Chase and Ohio's new governor, William Dennison. Seward was invited to join the Ohio gathering, which included former Whig leader Tom Corwin and Senator Ben Wade.

Writing home after the dinner, Seward jos.h.i.+ngly noted that he "found much comfort" in the discovery that Ohio was home to at least three candidates for the presidency, "all eminent and excellent men, but each preferring anybody out of Ohio, to his two rivals within." While Seward immediately intuited signals that Ben Wade, in particular, coveted the nomination, Chase remained oblivious, refusing to believe that Ohio would not back its most deserving son. On the Chases' last evening in Was.h.i.+ngton, the Blairs threw them a lavish party at their country estate in Silver Spring.

As usual, Kate left a deep impression on everyone. Seward afterward told Frances that she was quite "a young lady, pleasant and well-cultivated." Chase wrote Nettie how pleased he was that many showed "attention to Katie," and many were "kind to me." He returned home convinced that his trip had accomplished a great deal. "Everybody seems to like me and to feel a very gratifying degree of confidence in me," he reported to a Cincinnati friend. Confusing hospitality with hard allegiance, he told one of his supporters that "a great change seemed to come over men's minds while I was in Was.h.i.+ngton."

THE BEGINNING of the pre-presidential year found the backers of Edward Bates more active in the pursuit of his nomination than the candidate himself. While Bates would gradually warm to the idea, he found himself, as always, conflicted about plunging into politics. Without the encouragement of the powerful Blairs, it is unlikely that he would have put his name forward. Once he agreed to stand, he was confronted with a political dilemma. His strength lay among old Whigs and nativists concentrated in the border states, and conservatives in the North and Northwest. To have a genuine chance for the nomination, he would have to prove himself acceptable to moderate Republicans as well.

Had he used the months prior to the nomination to travel to the very different states of Illinois, Indiana, Ma.s.sachusetts, Connecticut, or Maryland, he might have acquainted himself with the wide range of views that comprised the new party. But he never left his home state, preferring to rely on intelligence received from colleagues and supporters who came to visit him. Not only did he keep to Missouri, he rarely left his beloved home, noting in his diary when he was forced to stay overnight in St. Louis that it was "the first that I have slept in town for about two years." Four decades of marriage had not diminished his bond with Julia.

Secluding himself at home, Bates never developed a clear understanding of the varied const.i.tuencies that had to be aligned, a deficit that resulted in a number of missteps. While his distance from the fierce arguments of the fifties was considered beneficial to his candidacy, his long absence from politics made him less familiar with the savage polarization created by the slavery issue. In late February 1859, he answered the request of the Whig Committee of New York for his "views and opinions on the politics of the country." The New York Whigs had pa.s.sed a resolution calling for an end to agitation of "the Negro question" so that the country might focus on "topics of general importance," such as economic development and internal improvements, that would unite rather than fracture the nation. In his letter, which was published nationwide, Bates declared that he had always considered "the Negro question" to be "a pestilent question, the agitation of which has never done good to any party, section or cla.s.s, and never can do good, unless it be accounted good to stir up the angry pa.s.sions of men, and exasperate the unreasoning jealousy of sections." He believed that those who continued to press the issue, "after the sorrowful experience of the last few years," must be motivated by "personal ambition or sectional prejudice."

Lauded by Whigs and nativists, the letter provoked widespread criticism in Republican circles. Schuyler Colfax, who backed Bates for president, warned him that his comments "denouncing the agitation of the negro question" sounded like "a denunciation of the Rep[ublica]n party, and would turn many against [him]." Bates disagreed. "If my letter had been universally acceptable to the Republicans, that fact alone might have destroyed my prospects in two frontier slave states, Md. and Mo., and so I would have no streng[t]h at all but the Republican party," where Seward and Chase, he knew, were far better positioned. Maryland congressman Henry Winter Davis, the leading member of the American Party in the House, confirmed Bates's views, advising him that he was poised to secure majority approval and should not attempt to further define his views-"write no more public letters-let well enough alone."

As the new year opened, Bates believed his chances were growing "brighter every day." Supporters in the key battleground states of Indiana and Pennsylvania a.s.sured him that large percentages of the delegates appointed to the Chicago convention were "made up of 'Bates men.'" A visitor from Illinois told him that much "good feeling" existed in the southern part of the state, "but first (on a point of State pride,) they must support Lincoln." This was the first time in his daily entries that Bates so much as mentioned Lincoln's name as a presidential aspirant. In Illinois, Lincoln was keenly aware of Bates, answering an inquiring letter about how Illinois regarded the various candidates by saying that Bates "would be the best man for the South of our State, and the worst for the North of it," while Seward was "the very best candidate we could have for the North of Illinois, and the very worst for the South of it." With amusing self-serving logic, Lincoln suggested that neither Bates nor Seward could command a majority vote in Illinois.

On the last day of February 1860, the very day of Seward's conciliatory speech in the Senate, a great Opposition Convention comprised of Whigs and Americans met in Jefferson City, Missouri, and "enthusiastically" endorsed Bates for president. Two weeks later, Bates received a second endors.e.m.e.nt from the Republican state convention in St. Louis. The Missouri Republicans, however, were in a carping mood, particularly the German-American contingent, which threatened to block the endors.e.m.e.nt, still troubled by Bates's open support for the nativist party in 1856. To satisfy both the more ardent Republicans and the German-American community, Frank Blair suggested that Bates agree to outline his positions in answer to a questionnaire drawn up by the German-American press.

The questionnaire posed a difficult problem for Bates. He had to a.s.suage the doubts of Republicans who felt, like editor Joseph Medill of Chicago, that it was better to be "beaten with a representative man" who placed himself squarely on the Republican platform than to "triumph with a 'Union-saver'" and "sink into the quicksands." However, if he moved too far to the left to satisfy the pa.s.sionate Republicans, he would risk his natural base among the old Whigs and Americans. Though once noted for his deft touch in harmonizing opposing forces, Bates plunged into his answers without calculating the consequences.

Asked to render his opinions on the extension of slavery into the territories, he announced that Congress had the power to decide the issue, a position that directly contradicted the Dred Scott decision. He felt, moreover, that "the spirit and the policy of the Government ought to be against its extension." He advocated equal const.i.tutional rights for all citizens, native-born or naturalized, claiming to endorse "no distinctions among Americans citizens," and adding that the "Government is bound to protect all the citizens in the enjoyment of all their rights every where." Beyond this, he favored colonizing former slaves in Africa and Central America, a Homestead Act, a Pacific Railroad, and the admission of Kansas as a free state.

His statement met with approval in traditional Republican enclaves in the Northeast and Northwest, but in the border states, where his advantage was supposed to reside, it proved disastrous. The Lexington [Missouri] Express wrote that the published letter came "as a clap of thunder from a clear sky," placing Bates so blatantly in the Black Republican camp that he should no longer expect support from the more conservative border states. By subscribing to every article of the Republican creed, the Louisville Journal complained, Bates became "just as good or bad a Republican as Seward, Chase or Lincoln is.... He has by a single blow severed every tie of confidence or sympathy which connected him with the Southern Conservatives." Only four years earlier, the Memphis Bulletin observed, Bates had denounced Black Republicans as "agitators," labeling them "dangerous enemies to the peace of our Union." Now he had become one of them. Bates himself recognized the backlash his letter had created, lamenting "the simultaneous abandonment of me by a good many papers" in the border states.

The attempt to pacify the anxious German-Americans had diminished his hold on what should have been his natural base, without bringing a commensurate number of Republicans to his side. Though the Bates camp maintained faith that their man was bound to win the nomination, Bates confided in his diary that "knowing the fickleness of popular favor, and on what small things great events depend, I shall take care not so to set my heart upon the glittering bauble, as to be mortified or made at all unhappy by a failure."

NOT HINDERED by the hubris, delusions, and inconsistencies that plagued his three chief rivals, Abraham Lincoln gained steady ground through a combination of hard work, skill, and luck. While Seward and Bates felt compelled in the final months to reposition themselves toward the center of the party, Lincoln never changed his basic stance. He could remain where he had always been, "neither on the left wing nor the right, but very close to dead center," as Don Fehrenbacher writes. From the time he had first spoken out against the extension of slavery into the territories in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln had insisted that while the spread of slavery must be "fairly headed off," he had no wish "to interfere with slavery" where it already existed. So long as the inst.i.tution was contained, which Lincoln considered a sacred pledge, it was "in course of ultimate extinction." This position represented perfectly the views of the moderate majority in the Republican Party.

Though a successful bid for the nomination remained unlikely, a viable candidacy was no longer an impossible dream. Slowly and methodically, Lincoln set out to improve his long odds. He arranged to publish his debates with Douglas in a book that was read widely by Republicans. As more and more people became familiar with him through the newspaper stories of the debates, invitations to speak at Republican gatherings began to pour in. Not yet an avowed candidate, Lincoln delivered nearly two dozen speeches in Iowa, Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Kansas in the four months between August and December 1859.

While Seward was still touring Europe and the Middle East, Lincoln was introducing himself to tens of thousands of Westerners. "I think it is a mistake," a leading New Yorker wrote Lincoln, "that Senator Seward is not on his own battlefield, instead of being in Egypt surveying the route of an old Underground Rail Road, over which Moses took, one day, a whole nation, from bondage into Liberty." Lincoln capitalized on Seward's absence. The crowds that greeted him grew with every stop along the way. Most of his audiences had never laid eyes on him, and he invariably forged an indelible impression. Once he began speaking, the Janesville Gazette reported, "the high order of [his] intellect" left a permanent impact upon his listeners, who would remember his "tall, gaunt form" and "his points and his. .h.i.ts" for "many a day."

Speaking not as a candidate but as an advocate for the Republican cause, Lincoln sharpened his attacks on the Democrats and, in particular, on the party's front-runner, Stephen Douglas, who preceded him at many of the same locations. "Douglasism," he wrote Chase, "is all which now stands in the way of an early and complete success of Republicanism." In this way, ironically, Douglas's national reputation continually increased the attention paid to Lincoln.

Perhaps Lincoln's most rewarding stop was Cincinnati, which he had vowed never again to visit after the humiliating Reaper trial. This time, he was "greeted with the thunder of cannon, the strains of martial music, and the joyous plaudits of thousands of citizens thronging the streets." He arrived at the Burnet House and was put up "in princely style," delighted to find that the most prominent of Cincinnati's residents were vying to meet the "rising star."

Lincoln addressed the Southern threats that the election of a Republican president would divide the Union, directing his remarks particularly to the many Kentuckians who had crossed the Ohio River to listen to him. "Will you make war upon us and kill us all? Why, gentlemen, I think you are as gallant and as brave men as live; that you can fight as bravely in a good cause, man for man, as any other people living...but, man for man, you are not better than we are, and there are not so many of you as there are of us. You will never make much of a hand at whipping us. If we were fewer in numbers than you, I think that you could whip us; if we were equal it would likely be a drawn battle; but being inferior in numbers, you will make nothing by attempting to master us." The next day, his speech was described in the Cincinnati Gazette "as an effort remarkable for its clear statement, powerful argument and ma.s.sive common sense," and possessed of "such dignity and power as to have impressed some of our ablest lawyers with the conclusion that it was superior to any political effort they had ever heard."

Lincoln's crowded schedule allowed him no time to accept Joshua Speed's invitation to visit him in Kentucky for the opening of the national racecourse, "when," his old friend promised, "we expect to have some of the best horses in America to compete for the purses. In addition we think we can show the prettiest women," adding, "if you are not too old to enjoy either the speed of the horses or the beauty of the women come." If his speaking tour caused Lincoln to forgo speedy horses and beautiful women, it greatly increased his stature among western Republicans. "Your visit to Ohio has excited an extensive interest in your favor," former congressman Samuel Galloway told him. "We must take some man not hitherto corrupted with the discussion upon Candidates. Your name has been again and again mentioned.... I am candid to say you are my choice."

Rapidly becoming a national spokesman for the fledgling Republican Party, Lincoln sought to preserve the unity of the still-fragile coalition. He wished, he wrote Schuyler Colfax, "to hedge against divisions in the Republican ranks." An anti-immigrant movement in Ma.s.sachusetts "failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin us in the whole North-West," while attempts in both Ohio and New Hamps.h.i.+re to thwart enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law might "utterly overwhelm us in Illinois with the charge of enmity to the const.i.tution itself.... In a word, in every locality we should look beyond our noses; and at least say nothing on points where it is probable we shall disagree."

Colfax appreciated Lincoln's "kind & timely note," which underscored the need to enlist in the Republican cause "men of all shades & gradations of opinion from the Conservative...to the bold radical." To be victorious in 1860, he wrote, "we must either win this Conservative sentiment, with its kindred sympathizers, represented under the t.i.tle of North Americans, Old Line Whigs &c, to our banners" without alienating the radicals, "or by repelling them must go into the contest looking for defeat." In this cause of unity, Colfax a.s.sured Lincoln, "your counsel carries great weight...there is no political letter that falls from your pen, which is not copied throughout the Union." Lincoln's ability to bridge these divisions would prove of vital importance to his campaign.

On October 16, 1859, as Lincoln prepared for a trip to Kansas, the remaining bonds of union were strained almost to the point of rupture when the white abolitionist John Brown came to Virginia, in the words of Stephen Vincent Benet, "with foolish pikes/And a pack of desperate boys to shadow the sun." Brown and his band of thirteen white men and five blacks seized the federal a.r.s.enal at Harpers Ferry with a bold but ill-conceived plan of provoking a slave insurrection. The a.r.s.enal was swiftly recaptured and Brown taken prisoner by a federal force under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee, accompanied by Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart.

Brown was tried and sentenced to death. "I am waiting the hour of my public murder with great composure of mind, & cheerfulness," Brown wrote his family, "feeling the strongest a.s.surance that in no other possible way could I be used to so much advance the cause of G.o.d; & of humanity." In the month between the sentence and his hanging, the dignity and courage of his conduct and the eloquence of his statements and letters made John Brown a martyr/hero to many in the antislavery North. His death, when it came, was mourned by public a.s.semblies throughout the Northern states. "Church bells tolled," the historian David Potter writes, "black bunting was hung out, minute guns were fired, prayer meetings a.s.sembled, and memorial resolutions were adopted."

Brown's motivations, psychological profile, and strategy would be probed by historians, poets, and novelists for generations. The immediate impact of the intrepid raid, which "sent a s.h.i.+ver of fear to the inmost fiber of every white man, woman, and child" in the South, was unmistakable. While antislavery fervor in the North was intensified, Southern solidarity and rhetoric reached a new level of zealotry. "Harper's Ferry," wrote the Richmond Enquirer, "coupled with the expression of Northern sentiment in support...have shaken and disrupted all regard for the Union; and there are but few men who do not look to a certain and not distant day when dissolution must ensue." The raid at Harpers Ferry, one historian notes, was "like a great meteor disclosing in its lurid flash the width and depth of that abyss," which cut the nation in two. Herman Melville, in his poem "The Portent," would use the same metaphor, calling "Weird John Brown/ The meteor of the war"-the tail of his long beard trailing out from under the executioner's cap.

Throughout the South, heightened fear of slave insurrection led to severe restrictions on the expression of antislavery sentiments. "I do not exaggerate in designating the present state of affairs in the Southern country as a reign of terror," the British consul in Charleston wrote. "Persons are torn away from their residences and pursuits...letters are opened at the Post Offices; discussion upon slavery is entirely prohibited under penalty of expulsion.... The Northern merchants and Travellers are leaving in great numbers." In Norfolk, Virginia, the St. Louis News reported, a grand jury indicted a merchant "for seditious language, because he declared that John Brown was a good man, fighting in a good cause."

Leading Southern politicians were quick to indict the Republican Party and, by extension, the entire North. The Tennessee legislature resolved that the raiders at Harpers Ferry were "the natural fruits of this treasonable 'irrepressible conflict' doctrine, put forth by the great head of the Black Republican party, and echoed by his subordinates." A man representing "one hundred gentlemen" published a circular that offered a $50,000 reward "for the head of William H. Seward," along with the considerably smaller sum of $25 for the heads of a long list of "traitors," including Sumner, Greeley, Giddings, and Colfax. Lincoln was not included in the list of enemies.

Democratic papers in the North joined in, targeting Seward for special condemnation. "The first overt act in the great drama of national disruption which has been plotted by that demagogue, Wm. H. Seward, has just closed at Harper's Ferry," the New York Herald charged. "No reasoning mind can fail to trace cause and effect between the b.l.o.o.d.y and brutal manifesto of William H. Seward [the "irrepressible conflict" speech a year earlier]...and the terrible scenes of violence, rapine and death, that have been enacted at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah."

Republicans, naturally, countered Democratic attempts to implicate their party. Seward himself stated that although Brown was a sympathetic figure, his execution was "necessary and just." Weed's Albany Evening Journal also took a decided stance against the futile raid, deeming Brown's men guilty of treason for "seeking to plunge a peaceful community into the horrors of a servile insurrection." They "justly deserve, universal condemnation."