Introduction to the History of Religions Part 31

+1143+. Judaism is too much enc.u.mbered with peculiar national usages to commend itself to non-Jews. There was a time just before and just after the beginning of our era when a considerable number of persons resorted to it for escape from the confusion of current religious systems, and since that time there have been conversions here and there; but these have been too few to affect the general character of religion in any community. Even to Reform Judaism, which has discarded Talmudic usages and does not differ doctrinally from certain forms of Christianity, there clings a racial tone that tends to isolate it, and it does not seem that this isolation is likely to cease soon.

+1144+. Christianity, beginning as a Jewish movement, speedily became Graeco-Roman, and in this form took possession of the whole of Western Asia (except Jewish districts and parts of Arabia), Greece, Italy, Egypt, and the northern coast of Africa, and was adopted, under Byzantine and Roman influence, by the Celtic, Slavonic, and Teutonic tribes. Most of its Asiatic and all of its African territory except Abessinia was taken from it by Mohammedanism in the seventh century, but small bodies of Christians remained in Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. With this exception it has since been the religion only of the Western Indo-Europeans and of a few half-civilized peoples who have been Christianized either by missionaries (the Karens of Burma, a part of the Telugus of Southeastern India and others) or by contact with Westerners (Philippine Islands, tribes of North America and South America) or by both these agencies (the Hawaiian Islands). Local peculiarities have been largely banished from its usages but not from its dogma. It is, apparently, its dogma (in the orthodox form) that has prevented its acceptance by most Semites, by the peoples of Central and Eastern Asia, and by many undeveloped tribes of Africa and Oceania.

+1145+. Zoroastrianism has never advanced to any important extent beyond the boundaries of its native land. It has never recovered from the crus.h.i.+ng blow dealt it by Mohammedanism in the seventh century, and is now professed by hardly more than 100,000 persons (mostly in Bombay).

+1146+. Islam is now the religion of the Turkish empire (except the Christian groups in Europe, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia), Persia, Egypt (except the Copts), and the North African coast, and has a large following in Central Asia, China, India, the Malay peninsula, the Malay Archipelago, the Sudan, and a considerable representation on the east and west coasts of Africa. Its spread, as is remarked above, has been effected sometimes by force, but oftener by social pressure and through traders and missionaries. Decadent Christianity in Palestine, Syria, and Egypt readily yielded to it; Persian Zoroastrianism made some effort to maintain itself but succ.u.mbed to the combination of military pressure and the prospect of civil advancement and peace; after the fall of Constantinople conversions of Christians in Europe were numerous, and the Moslem conquests in India were followed by a considerable accession of Hindus to the Islamic faith. At the present time it appears to be advancing only among the half-civilized tribes of Central Africa, but it maintains its position against Buddhism and Christianity.[2092]

+1147+. There is, thus, now no religion that, so far as extent of diffusion is concerned, can be called universal. Omitting the Jewish and Parsi groups, the Brahmanic and other religions of India, and the Chinese Confucian cult, three great religions have divided the world among them, Buddhism taking Eastern Asia, Islam Western Asia and Northern Africa, and Christianity Europe and America. It is sometimes suggested that the religion of the leaders of civilization, the Christian nations, must become the faith of the world. But, even if we may look forward to a time when social fusion, under the control of the present Christian nations, shall have brought about substantial unity of religious thought in the world, it is impossible now to predict what the nature of that thought will be, since Christianity has undergone and is now undergoing change, and may in the far future a.s.sume a different form from that of to-day; fundamentals may remain, but opinions differ even now as to what are fundamentals.

+1148+. _Cla.s.sification of religions._ A word may be added on proposed cla.s.sifications of religions.[2093] Certain resemblances and differences between religions are obvious, and groups may be made, geographical, ritualistic, theologic, or soteriological, but it is difficult to find a principle of cla.s.sification that shall bring out the essential characteristic or characteristics of every religion and yet distinctly mark every one off from all others. All have much in common, and the elements in all are so mixed that divisions necessarily cross one another. Every religion is the product of some one community and represents its peculiar view of human life in its relation to the supernatural; there may be borrowings and fusions, but the final outcome is shaped by the thought of the people to whom the religion specifically belongs.[2094] The differences between various religions are the differences of thought between the communities involved, and the differences and the resemblances are often curious and sometimes defy explanation.

+1149+. Leaving aside ritual, which, so far as it is a merely external form of approach to the deity, does not touch the essence of religion, the following points may be said to be common to all religions: (1) The sense of a supernatural control of life, and the conviction that the supernatural Power must be placated or obeyed.[2095] (2) The belief that religion deals with and controls the whole of life; this belief is p.r.o.nounced among savages, who know nothing of natural law, and is regarded as essential in more advanced communities, in which, from the religious point of view, law, physical or mental, is taken to be an expression of the will of the deity. (3) The creation of divine personalities[2096] (representing popular ideals), and movements toward a unitary view of the divine control of the world. (4) An ethical element in the conception of the character of the supernatural Power and the modes of pleasing this Power. The ethical side of religion corresponds to the general ethical standard of the people--in savages it is low, but it exists. (5) The conception of salvation as the goal of religious faith and service; the salvation looked for is at first physical, is gradually moralized, and ultimately takes the form of spiritual union with the deity. These are the essential elements of religion; they all exist in crude form in the lowest strata of society, and are purified in the course of social growth.

+1150+. A cla.s.sification naturally suggested by this enumeration of fundamentals would be one based on grades of general culture, savage, half-civilized, and civilized; but such a cla.s.sification would not take account of the differences of character in the members of the higher grades. These differ from one another in the conception of the ultimate Power of the world and of the nature of salvation and the mode of attaining it, and in other less important points. They are so highly composite in structure that their interrelations are complicated, and those that are brought together by one critical canon may be separated by another. Buddhism is allied on one side (the ignoring of deity) to Confucianism and Epicureanism, on another side (the hope of moral salvation) to Christianity. Zoroastrianism touches the Veda in its theistic construction, and is remarkably like Judaism in its organization. Christianity is Jewish on one side and Graeco-Roman on another. Islam has Christian and Jewish conceptions attached to the old-Semitic view of life.

+1151+. A distinction of importance is that between national religions and those founded each by a single man (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam).[2097] This distinction may be pressed too far--all religions have great men who have given new directions to thought, and no religion can be said to be wholly the creation of an individual man, since all, as is pointed out above, are outcomes of the ideas of communities.[2098] The distinction in question is not a satisfactory basis for a general cla.s.sification since it fails to note the theological differences between the various religions. Nevertheless, it embodies a significant fact: in the course of the history of the world the three religions above-named have come to divide the civilized world among them, that is, they have been selected as best responding to the religious needs of men. No one of them is universal, but the three together practically include the civilized world.[2099] They are modified in various ways by their adherents, but they have not been superseded. They have grown beyond the ideas of their founders, but these latter nevertheless occupy a unique position. Moses and Zoroaster are dim figures whose work it is impossible to define, but the teachings of Buddha and Jesus, though they left no writings, are known with substantial accuracy, and Mohammed has expressed himself in a book. The persons of the three founders are the objects of a devotion not given to other leaders. These things justify us in putting Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism in a cla.s.s by themselves, of which the distinguis.h.i.+ng note is the discarding of local national ideas and usages. These last are not wholly given up, but they are less prominent than in Judaism and Zoroastrianism. It is to the insight of the individual founders that this relative freedom from local features is due. This characteristic does not necessarily carry with it superiority in ethical and general religious conceptions.

A different line of cleavage is indicated by the designation "religions of redemption." In one sense all religions come under this head,[2100]

for all have for their object the freeing man from the ills of life. In a higher sense the term 'redemption' means deliverance from the power of sin and from its punishment, particularly in the world to come. This meaning appears in definite form in Buddhism and Christianity, and somewhat less distinctly in Mithraism and the later Judaism; in the Old Testament religion and Islam it is not clearly stated. As it appears in germinal form in the lower cults, its development may be traced up to its culmination in the systems in which man is freed from moral taint through the agency of an individual savior or in accordance with a cosmic ethical law.

+1152+. Unity exists among the lowest and among the highest religious systems. Among savage and half-civilized cults there are no important differences--they all have the same ideas respecting the nature and functions of supernatural Powers and the ways of approaching them.[2101]

In the higher cults a process of differentiation goes on for a certain time while each is developing its special characteristics, and then a counter-movement sets in--they all tend to come together by suppressing local features and emphasizing general ideas.[2102] Thus at the present day there are groups of Buddhists, Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Moslems that, without abandoning their several faiths, find themselves in substantial accord on some essential points. The unity of savages is the uniformity of undeveloped thought; the later unity rests on discrimination between fundamentals and accessories.

+1153+. Tabulated cla.s.sifications of religions, it would seem, must be arbitrary and misleading--they give undue prominence to some one religious fact, they maim the individuality of cults, and they obscure the relations between certain cults by putting these into different divisions. The true relations between the various religious systems may be brought out by comparisons. In this way individuality and unitary character may be preserved in every case, while the agreements and disagreements may be made clear by referring them to general principles of religious development.

CHAPTER XI

SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL ELEMENTS IN RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS

+1154+. It is remarked above[2103] that the sphere of religion is wholly distinct from that of science (including philosophy and art) and from that of constructive ethics (the determination of rules of conduct), while it is true that the three, being coexistent and original departments of human nature, must influence one another, and must tend to coalesce and be fused into a unitary conception of life. This process goes on in different degrees in different times and places, sometimes one department of thought getting the upper hand and sometimes another, but we cannot suppose that it ever ceases entirely. The relation between religion and its two companions may become clear from a brief survey of the facts given by historical records, this term being used to include all trustworthy sources of information.

THE SCIENTIFIC ELEMENT

+1155+. Man is bound by his const.i.tution to inquire into the nature of things, to seek for the facts of the world, including the human soul.

This search is made by both religion and science, but their procedures are somewhat different. Religion demands only the fact of an ultimate moral ground of the world; science observes all phenomena and endeavors to connect and organize them by a thread of natural causation or invariable sequence; religion looks behind phenomena to what it regards as its source. This source is reached by some process of reasoning, either by acceptance, on grounds held to be satisfactory, of a divine revelation, or by inference from the facts of the world (as the presence of design or of moral order); but, when it is reached, all other facts of science are treated as irrelevant. If, then, science confines itself to the observation of sequences, the relation between the two cannot be one of permanent hostility, since their material is not the same. They clash when an old nonreligious belief, adopted by religion, is confronted by an antagonistic scientific discovery; the first result is a protest, but the mind demands harmony, and religion always ends by accepting a well-attested scientific conclusion,[2104] and bringing it into harmony with its fundamental beliefs.

+1156+. Certain phases in the relations between religion and science may be distinguished, but an earlier or cruder phase may continue to exist alongside of a later and higher one. There is first the time when science based on a recognition of natural laws does not exist. The existing science is then one of imagination, the fanciful application of crude observations to the explanation of all phenomena. The _verae causae_ are supernatural agencies--science and religion are one.

Explanations of phenomena take the form of what we call myths, what the people of the time regard as true histories. There is no place for the conception of miracle; the supernatural agents are all-powerful, one thing is no harder than another, nothing is strange or inexplicable.

There is a crude conception of the unity of G.o.d and the world.

+1157+. The period of the rise and decline of the great national religions and the rise of monotheistic cults (along with which may be included Confucianism and Buddhism) is characterized by a great development of philosophy (in China, India, and Greece) and a beginning of scientific research properly so called (especially in astronomy, physics, medicine, and chemistry, in Greece and by the Moslems of Persia). There is a revolt against the older conception of unity.

Deities are highly personalized, stand outside of the world, and intervene in human affairs at crises. It is the age of miracles--supernatural Powers, by reason of their intimate social relations with their respective communities, are expected to come to their aid in all important matters, and, for most persons, there is no difficulty in holding that they are able to change the course of nature, which is not regarded as being absolutely fixed. In certain philosophical circles, however, this view is rejected, and nature, with its laws, is conceived of as a separate and independent existence, accompanied or not by G.o.ds. Science begins to define the nature of deities, and to limit the sphere of their practical activities--this is a precursor of the fall of the old divinities. The old myths are retained, but they are purified, humanized, and allegorized, and in some cases applied, to new persons and events, according to changes in religious construction.

+1158+. The next phase is the recognition by science of the absolute domination of natural law in the world of phenomena. Religion, when it accepts this view, holds fast to the belief in the ultimate personal moral Force, and conceives of this Force as working and expressing and manifesting itself only in phenomena in accordance with natural law--that is, this law is regarded as the expression of the divine will.

Science is thus given liberty to investigate phenomena to the fullest extent, and religion is freed from the inc.u.mbrance of physical, psychological, and metaphysical theories; the spheres of the two are sharply defined and kept separate. Such a conception is held to differ from "naturalism" or "materialism" in that it recognizes a Power distinct from matter--to differ from what has been called "humanism"

(which makes man the sole power in the world), or from positivism (which regards man as the only worthy object of wors.h.i.+p), in that it ascribes to the will and activity of divine spirit the high position of humanity as the center and explanation of the life of the world--to differ from pantheism in that for it G.o.d is a personal being who enters into relations with a free humanity--and to differ from agnosticism in that it holds that G.o.d may be known from his works.

+1159+. Whatever difficulties may attach to this conception are regarded by its adherents as not insuperable. In all religious systems except Buddhism and Positivism the personality of the ultimate ground of the world is looked on as a necessary datum. In the view under consideration it is held that G.o.d exists for the world in which he expresses himself, as the world exists for him, its source and end. The world, with all its parts and incidents, is conceived of as a sacred thing, consecrated to G.o.d, and ever striving to realize him in itself, and itself in him.

Under the guidance of exacter scientific thought the old crude idea of the unity of the divine and the world is thus transformed into the idea of a unity of will and work. In this conception there is no place for myths, and no need is felt for miracles: histories of the external world and of human society are held to rest on observation of facts, and generally the possibility of miracles is not denied, but they are regarded as unnecessary and improbable--they are thought unnecessary because the conception of the divine character and the religious life are not supposed to be dependent on them, and they are thought improbable because they are held to be not supported by experience. This is the att.i.tude of those persons who accept the conclusions of science; there is, however, great difference of opinion in the religious world on this point.[2105]

+1160+. Certain scientific and philosophical positions discard religion as a department of human life. When it is held that man knows nothing and can know nothing but phenomena, or when, if something is a.s.sumed behind phenomena, it is regarded as too vague to enter into personal relations with men, religion as a force in life becomes impossible. In these cases the two conceptions must stand side by side as enemies till one or the other is proved, to the satisfaction of men, to be untenable.

Meanwhile it appears that one result of scientific investigations has been to delimitate religion by making it clear that, while it belongs as an influence to all life, it cannot include scientific theories as a part of its content--a result that cannot be otherwise than favorable to its development.

THE ETHICAL ELEMENT

+1161+. Conduct has always been a.s.sociated with religion. Supernatural Powers have been regarded as members of the tribe or other society, divine headmen part of whose function it is to see that the existing customs are observed, these customs being ethical as well as ritual.

Even in such low tribes as the Fuegians and the Australians the anger of some Power is supposed to follow violation of law. Instructions to initiates often include moral relations.[2106] The connection of morals with religion in the more advanced peoples is close. In this regard a distinction is to be made between the creation and the adoption and treatment of ethical ideals.

+1162+. Ethical codes are never created by religion but are always adopted by it from current usages and ideas.[2107] Rules respecting the protection of life, property, and the family are found everywhere--they arise out of natural social relations, even the simplest, and grow in definiteness and refinement with the advance of society, so that things at one period lawful, and accepted by religious authorities, are at a later period prohibited.[2108] Kindness to one's fellows is common in the lowest tribes, and in higher civilizations is formulated as a golden rule (Confucius, Book of Tobit, New Testament, and virtually the Egyptian Ptahhotep, the Old Testament Book of Proverbs, Buddha).

Truthfulness, fidelity, and justice have been generally recognized as things to be approved--roughly defined and aimed at in rude communities, more exactly defined and more clearly held up as ideals in higher communities. All these virtues are taken up more or less definitely into religious codes.

+1163+. Less praiseworthy customs and ideas also have been indorsed by religious law. Where s.e.xual license prevails it is made a feature in religious ritual and other ceremonies after it has become a part of social usage and law. It is true that it is generally at first nave, and, being not illegal, is not a violation of rights and not immoral in the sense in which a refined age regards it.[2109] But it tends, even among savages, to become socially bad, and, when it survives into times of higher standards, is a corrupting influence. In this bad form it was sanctioned by religious authorities in Canaan (even at one time among the Hebrews),[2110] Greece, and Syria, and exists to-day in India as an accompaniment of religious wors.h.i.+p. The records of religious cruelty are familiar. Wholesale slaughter, persecution, torture have been abundantly practiced in the name of religion.[2111] Many social inst.i.tutions (such as slavery and polygamy) countenanced by a given age have been adopted in the religious codes of the age. These examples ill.u.s.trate the fact that religion does not undertake to fix the details of ethical conduct--its role is something different. This statement applies to the inst.i.tution of taboo, as is remarked above[2112]--its ritual rules are not moral, and its moral rules are adopted from social usage. It was influential in the organization of society, but not in the way of adding anything to the moral code. In modern economic and other social questions that have an ethical side the details are left to science; religion contents itself with insisting on moral principles as having divine authority, and these principles, as moral, are already recognized by society.

+1164+. Discrepancy between codes and conduct has always existed--few religious persons live up to the standards that they regard as authoritative. This failure concerns not the sincerity of the religious society in setting up its standard, but the conditions regulating actual conduct.

A natural consequence of the coexistence of religion and ethics in human life has been that each has influenced the other. Advance in the purity and clearness of social ethical ideals has had the effect of modifying not only religious codes but also religious dogmas. The old belief (founded on the conception of social solidarity) that a family, tribe, or nation was punished by the deity for the sin of one of its members vanished before the recognition of individual responsibility. The doctrines of eternal punishment and vicarious expiatory suffering are now rejected by some religious bodies and circles as unjust. When they are maintained, it is on the ground that they are not unjust--the appeal is to an ethical principle. Apart from the fact of maintenance or rejection, the tendency is to try all doctrines by moral standards. If they are rejected and yet stand, or seem to stand, in sacred books, then either the statements of the books are interpreted in accordance with the moral standards, or the ethical authority of the books is set aside.

+1165+. The influence of religion on ethics has been in the way not of modifying codes but of enforcing existing ideas and customs and giving an impulse to moral life. It has commonly furnished supernatural sanctions--rewards and punishments in this life or in the other. How far this conception has been effective in restraining men from actual ill-doing, in furthering good conduct, and in developing inward loyalty to the right, may be a question. To answer this question would require such a collection of facts as has never been made and perhaps cannot be made. We can see that the belief in divine rewards and punishments has sometimes been a real power, sometimes seems to have no effect. The character of the sanctions varies with the growth of refinement, advancing from the crude savage and later ideas of physical pains and pleasures to the conception of moral degradation or salvation. The recognition of rewards and punishments for one's self as incentives to good living is not regarded as immoral if they are not made the chief motive--the prevailing view is that it is legitimate to look for results of action, that, however, devotion to right must always be independent of results that affect only the actor. Whatever the general effect of belief in supernatural sanctions, it must be concluded that the existence of morality in the world is not dependent on this belief. The common social motives for practicing justice and kindness are so strong and so persistent that these virtues must always retain a certain supremacy apart from men's religious creeds. The term 'supernatural' is used above in the more usual sense of 'opposed to natural,' but, according to one religious point of view, all things are the direct work of G.o.d, so that there is no difference between 'natural' and 'supernatural,' and the real sanctions of morality are all the conditions of life, external and internal.[2113]

+1166+. The most important elements that religion (though only in its highest form) has introduced into ethics are a grandiose conception of the basis and nature of the moral life, and a tone of tenderness in the att.i.tude toward the deity and toward men. The moral code it regards as the will of G.o.d, conscience as the voice of G.o.d, morality as obedience to G.o.d, all activity as a coworking with G.o.d. n.o.bility is given to the good life by making it a part of the eternal divine purpose of the world. The conception of human life as an essential factor in the const.i.tution and history of the world is common to religion and philosophy, but religion adds the warmth of personal relation with the divine head of the world. Into the philosophical and ethical view of the unity of humanity religion infuses reverence and affection for the individual as being not merely one of the component parts of the ma.s.s but a creature of G.o.d, the object of his loving care, capable of redemption and union with G.o.d. Here again, while there is no addition to the content of the ethical code, there is added intensity of feeling, which may be a spur to action.

+1167+. In the sphere of religion, as in all spheres of human activity, ideas and tendencies are embodied in human personalities by whom they are defined, ill.u.s.trated, and enforced--not only in founders of religious systems and other great leaders of thought, but in lesser everyday persons who commend religion, each to his limited circle, by purity of life. The special ethical figures contributed to history by religion are those of the martyr and the saint. The martyr is one who bears witness pa.s.sively to what he regards as truth at the cost of his life; he thus differs from the hero, who is a man of action. The martyr spirit is found elsewhere than in religious history, but it is in this latter that it has played its special ethical role--divergencies from established faiths always excite peculiarly sharp hostility. When it is pure loyalty to convictions of truth, it is an ethical force of great moment--a permanent inspiration.[2114] It is less valuable when it springs from the hope of personal advantage, when a controlling consideration is the belief that one goes directly from the stake (as Moslem warriors believed they went from death in battle) to celestial happiness. There arose at times (for example, in the Decian and Diocletian persecutions of the third century, and in Cordova in the ninth century, when there was no persecution) a fanatical desire for the honors of martyrdom that had to be checked by the Church leaders.

+1168+. The saint is related to the virtuous man as holiness to virtue.

The difference between them is one not of ethical practice but of motive and sentiment--holiness is virtue consecrated to the deity. The saint, like the martyr, is often an ethical power. When the t.i.tle is given officially as an ecclesiastical honor, it may or may not carry with it moral excellence. In Brahmanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam saints.h.i.+p has sometimes been contaminated with physical and ritual ideas and practices, and so far ceases to have ethical value.[2115]

+1169+. The evil influence of the religious point of view on ethical life has been of the general nature already referred to:[2116] embalming and sanctifying outgrown and injurious social inst.i.tutions; subst.i.tuting form for spirit; encouraging asceticism; drawing sharp lines of demarcation between men on the basis of religious opinions, and so far creating an antisocial spirit.

+1170+. The development of the sense of obligation to do right (conscience) is due to so many different influences that it is hard to say exactly what part any one of these has taken in the process. But obviously religion has been an important factor in the result so far reached. By its distinct connection of the favor of the deity with conduct it has tended to fix attention on the latter and to strengthen the feeling that righteousness is the sovereign thing. Though such regard for right-doing is at first mainly egoistic, it easily becomes an ideal, reverenced for its own sake, and more powerful because it is identified with a person and colored by the sentiments of grat.i.tude and love that religion calls forth. Religion, especially in the earlier forms of society, though not only in them, has been a pedagogue to lead men to the acknowledgment of the supremacy of the moral law. It differs from other such guides in the tone of mingled humility and enthusiasm that it gives to this fealty.

+1171+. As to the existence of moral evil in the world, religion can only regard it as the work of supernatural Powers. In the savage period the question does not come up--moral evil is taken as a part of the nature of things and is not curiously inquired into. In later times it is ascribed to some malevolent spirit or deity who is either independent of the supreme deity (as in certain half-civilized tribes) or is tolerated by him (Angro Mainyu, Satan), or to a subordinate employed by him (lies put into the mouths of prophets by a deity),[2117] or to a quite separate divine Power, not necessarily malevolent (as in some philosophical theories). Religion may adopt some philosophical explanation--as that evil is only failure to reach the good, or only the lower step to which we look back from a greater height, or an inevitable accompaniment of a scheme of life characterized by struggle and intended to recognize the freedom of the will and to develop moral autonomy--but, from its own resources it can only say that it is a thing inexplicable by man, belonging to a divine plan that the devout soul accepts as right because G.o.d has ordained it.

+1172+. The theory of man's native incapacity to do right (total depravity), held by some religious bodies, is antimoral since it denies human freedom. The attempt to modify it by the supposition of divine impartation of moral power is inadequate unless such power is held to be given to every person, and this amounts to an indirect affirmation of freedom and denial of moral impotency. The theory is, however, practically innocuous, being rejected or ignored by the universal consciousness of freedom.

+1173+. To the questions, raised by philosophy, whether the world is essentially good or bad and whether life is worth living, theistic religion gives a simple answer: a perfect G.o.d implies a perfect universe; this answer is germinal and confused in early religion, and is definitely stated only in the higher systems. The great theistic sacred books, Jewish, Christian, Mazdean, and Moslem, all teach that though there are present limitations and sufferings, there is to be a happy issue for the faithful out of all distresses, and the Buddhistic view, though nontheistic, is essentially the same as this; as for other persons, they are sometimes included in a final restoration, when moral evil is to disappear, sometimes are excluded from the happy outcome, but in both cases the scheme of the world is regarded as good. Leaving out of view the question as to the exact interpretation of the facts of life, this optimism is ethically useful as giving cheerfulness and enthusiasm to moral life, with power of enduring ills through the conviction of the ultimate triumph of the right. It may pa.s.s into a stolid dogmatic ignoring or denial of the existence of evil, and then tends to become inhuman and therefore ethically bad.[2118] It is, however, commonly saved from such an unfortunate result by common sense and the instinct of sympathy. And it is so general a conception and its goal is so remote that it cannot be a strong and permanent moral force for most persons--immediate experiences are as a rule more powerful than remote expectations. But, so far as it is a living faith, religious optimism is in the main a healthy ethical factor in life.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] That is, phenomena regarded as special acts of a superhuman Power; in the larger conception of religion all phenomena are at once natural and divine acts.

[2] In early religion they are usually ghosts, beasts, plants, or inanimate objects; rarely living men. Cf.