Spycraft. Part 27

25 The Liberia Official Gazette. The Liberia Official Gazette.

26 Helms, Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, A Look over My Shoulder, 93. 93.

27 Ibid., 95. Ibid., 95.

28 Ibid., 99. Rosters containing the names of the fabricators, known as "burn lists," were circulated among the Allied intelligence services as a means of limiting the damage caused by the perpetrators and maintaining integrity of intelligence information. Fifty years later, similar mechanisms, called "watch lists," were created to identify terrorists, while unverifiable, but seeming plausible "hoax" data manufactured by unknown sources permeated the Internet. Ibid., 99. Rosters containing the names of the fabricators, known as "burn lists," were circulated among the Allied intelligence services as a means of limiting the damage caused by the perpetrators and maintaining integrity of intelligence information. Fifty years later, similar mechanisms, called "watch lists," were created to identify terrorists, while unverifiable, but seeming plausible "hoax" data manufactured by unknown sources permeated the Internet.

29 Ibid.,110. Ibid.,110.

30 Managhan, Managhan, Trends in African Forgeries, Trends in African Forgeries, 13. 13.

31 Peter Deriabin, Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror Watchdogs of Terror (New Roch.e.l.le, NY: Arlington House, 1972), 94. (New Roch.e.l.le, NY: Arlington House, 1972), 94.

32 James Ridgeway, James Ridgeway, Blood in the Face Blood in the Face (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1990), 30, 32. (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1990), 30, 32.

33 Ibid., 32. Ibid., 32.

34 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 6. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 6.

35 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6. U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6.

36 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 65. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 65.

37 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6. U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6.

38 Ibid., 22. Ibid., 22.

39 Ibid., 18. Ibid., 18.

40 Kalugin, Kalugin, The First Directorate, The First Directorate, 137. 137.

41 David A. Crown, "Political Forgeries in the Middle East," David A. Crown, "Political Forgeries in the Middle East," Studies in Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 10. 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 10.

42 Ibid. Ibid.

43 Ibid., 9. Ibid., 9.

44 Managhan, Managhan, Trends in African Forgeries, Trends in African Forgeries, 14. 14.

45 Ibid., 12. Ibid., 12.

46 Ibid., 11. Ibid., 11.

47 Ibid. Ibid.

48 Ibid., 211. Ibid., 211.

49 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 69. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 69.

50 The Journal of Intelligence History The Journal of Intelligence History (1:1, 2001), 62. (1:1, 2001), 62.

51 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the s.h.i.+eld, The Sword and the s.h.i.+eld, 238. 238.

52 Ibid., 224. Ibid., 224.

53 Ibid. Ibid.

54 David A. Spetrino, "Aids Disinformation," David A. Spetrino, "Aids Disinformation," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 32:4, Central Intelligence Agency, 1988, 10.

55 Ibid., 11. Ibid., 11.

56 Ibid. Ibid.

57 Ibid., 9. Ibid., 9.

58 Ibid., 12. Ibid., 12.

59 The Was.h.i.+ngton Post The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, January 25, 2005.

60 Ibid. Ibid.

61 Markus Wolf Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), 289. (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), 289.

62 Ibid. Ibid.

63 Ibid., 290. Wolf writes, "We left [Sudan] in 1971 and never returned." Ibid., 290. Wolf writes, "We left [Sudan] in 1971 and never returned."

64 Crown interview. Crown interview.

65 Soon after the a.s.sa.s.sinations, a variety of credible reports surfaced that linked the late PLO Chairman, Ya.s.sir Arafat, directly to the killings of Noel and Moore. However, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in 1986 that it lacked the evidence to bring an indictment against Arafat and argued further that if such evidence existed the potential for compromise of national security information would likely preclude it from being disclosed. See: David A. Korn, Soon after the a.s.sa.s.sinations, a variety of credible reports surfaced that linked the late PLO Chairman, Ya.s.sir Arafat, directly to the killings of Noel and Moore. However, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in 1986 that it lacked the evidence to bring an indictment against Arafat and argued further that if such evidence existed the potential for compromise of national security information would likely preclude it from being disclosed. See: David A. Korn, a.s.sa.s.sination in Khartoum a.s.sa.s.sination in Khartoum (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), 245-247. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), 245-247.

66 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). "Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel," Chapter 3, 1. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). "Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel," Chapter 3, 1.

67 Ibid., 22. Ibid., 22.

68 Crown interview. Crown interview.

69 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel," Chapter 3, 1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel," Chapter 3, 1.

70 "Redbook 1986" booklet published by OTS. "Redbook 1986" booklet published by OTS.

71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel," Chapter 3, 1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel," Chapter 3, 1.

72 Ibid. Ibid.

73 Ibid., 12. Ibid., 12.

74 Ibid., 22. Ibid., 22.

CHAPTER NINETEEN.

1 Walter Laqueur, Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Ma.s.s Destruction The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Ma.s.s Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-5. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-5.

2 Ibid., 11. Ibid., 11.

3 Concise Dictionary of World History, Concise Dictionary of World History, 336. 336.

4 Jessica Stern, Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Ma.s.sachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6. (Cambridge, Ma.s.sachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6.

5 Ibid., 13. Ibid., 13.

6 Ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel combine to produce an explosive of the type used in the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center and again in April 1995 against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel combine to produce an explosive of the type used in the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center and again in April 1995 against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

CHAPTER TWENTY.

1 The importance and difficulty of selecting the "right" people for intelligence missions was one of the important lessons the CIA learned from OSS. The OSS recruitment experience was compiled and published by the OSS a.s.sessment Staff in The importance and difficulty of selecting the "right" people for intelligence missions was one of the important lessons the CIA learned from OSS. The OSS recruitment experience was compiled and published by the OSS a.s.sessment Staff in a.s.sessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services a.s.sessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948). (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948).

2 Jerrold M. Post, "The Anatomy of Treason," Jerrold M. Post, "The Anatomy of Treason," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 19:2 Central Intelligence Agency, 1975, 37.

3 Ibid., 36. Ibid., 36.

4 OSS found this to be an immediate problem. Since recruiters for OSS were not allowed to name the organization for which the individual would be working and did not know in what capacity the recruit would be working, the "pitch" talked about "mysterious, exciting overseas a.s.signments." This attracted "the bored, the pathologically adventuresome, the neurotically inclined to danger, and psychopaths." The latter have a particular ability to make good short-term impressions. Structured a.s.sessment attempted to identify and weed out those who would be a danger to themselves, others, and the mission. See: Donald W. MacKinnon, "The OSS a.s.sessment Program," OSS found this to be an immediate problem. Since recruiters for OSS were not allowed to name the organization for which the individual would be working and did not know in what capacity the recruit would be working, the "pitch" talked about "mysterious, exciting overseas a.s.signments." This attracted "the bored, the pathologically adventuresome, the neurotically inclined to danger, and psychopaths." The latter have a particular ability to make good short-term impressions. Structured a.s.sessment attempted to identify and weed out those who would be a danger to themselves, others, and the mission. See: Donald W. MacKinnon, "The OSS a.s.sessment Program," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 23:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1979, 22-23.

5 David Wise, David Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for 4.6 million Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for 4.6 million (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 114. (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 114.

6 Golytsin, a KGB major in the First Chief Directorate, defected in December 1961. Nosenko, a Soviet security officer, defected in 1964. Both had access to sensitive counterintelligence information about worldwide Soviet operations. They offered explosive and contradictory information particularly surrounding the KGB's relations.h.i.+p with Lee Harvey Oswald and the a.s.sa.s.sination of President Kennedy. See: Ranelagh, Golytsin, a KGB major in the First Chief Directorate, defected in December 1961. Nosenko, a Soviet security officer, defected in 1964. Both had access to sensitive counterintelligence information about worldwide Soviet operations. They offered explosive and contradictory information particularly surrounding the KGB's relations.h.i.+p with Lee Harvey Oswald and the a.s.sa.s.sination of President Kennedy. See: Ranelagh, The Agency The Agency, 404-409, 563-568, and Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, Wilderness of Mirrors, 151-158, 173-176, for detailed accounts of the two cases. 151-158, 173-176, for detailed accounts of the two cases.

7 See: J. F. Winne and J. W. Gittinger, "An Introduction to the Personality a.s.sessment System," See: J. F. Winne and J. W. Gittinger, "An Introduction to the Personality a.s.sessment System," Journal of Clinical Psychology. Journal of Clinical Psychology. Monograph Supplement No. 38, April 1973. The PAS as used by OTS was an adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale that had been developed by psychologist David Wechsler. Measurements along the PAS scale were designed to predict an individual's behavior in various situations. Monograph Supplement No. 38, April 1973. The PAS as used by OTS was an adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale that had been developed by psychologist David Wechsler. Measurements along the PAS scale were designed to predict an individual's behavior in various situations.

8 To OTS officers and many "old hands" in operations, Jeffrey Richelson's work, To OTS officers and many "old hands" in operations, Jeffrey Richelson's work, The Wizards of Langley, The Wizards of Langley, on the history of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology, incorrectly bestows the wizard t.i.tle on engineers and scientists. Ask a case officer or a tech, "Who are the wizards?" and he or she will likely reply, "Those are the shrinks in OTS." on the history of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology, incorrectly bestows the wizard t.i.tle on engineers and scientists. Ask a case officer or a tech, "Who are the wizards?" and he or she will likely reply, "Those are the shrinks in OTS."

9 In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, requirements for graphological operational a.s.sessments decreased to the point that the service no longer required a full-time staff in OTS. Graphology has, nevertheless, been growing as a personnel service for U.S. companies for applicant screening and job interviews. See: "Deciphering the Handwriting on the Wall," In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, requirements for graphological operational a.s.sessments decreased to the point that the service no longer required a full-time staff in OTS. Graphology has, nevertheless, been growing as a personnel service for U.S. companies for applicant screening and job interviews. See: "Deciphering the Handwriting on the Wall," Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, October 17, 2004. October 17, 2004.

10 James Van Stappen, "Graphological a.s.sessment in Action," James Van Stappen, "Graphological a.s.sessment in Action," Studies in Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, 3:4, Central Intelligence Agency, 1959, 49-58. 3:4, Central Intelligence Agency, 1959, 49-58.

11 Keith Layc.o.c.k, "Handwriting a.n.a.lysis as an a.s.sessment Aid," Keith Layc.o.c.k, "Handwriting a.n.a.lysis as an a.s.sessment Aid," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence (Was.h.i.+ngton, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1959) vol 3:3 (1959), 27. (Was.h.i.+ngton, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1959) vol 3:3 (1959), 27.

12 E. A. Rundquist, "The a.s.sessment of Graphology," E. A. Rundquist, "The a.s.sessment of Graphology," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 3:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1959, 45-51.

13 Former DDP and DCI Richard Helms in Former DDP and DCI Richard Helms in A Look over My Shoulder, A Look over My Shoulder, 426, commented that the studies "proved a useful extension of the routine diplomatic and military reporting." Former DDO and DCI William Colby in 426, commented that the studies "proved a useful extension of the routine diplomatic and military reporting." Former DDO and DCI William Colby in Honorable Men-My Life in the CIA Honorable Men-My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 335, cited "psychological advice on how to handle alien agents" as an important TSD capability. OTS deployed psychologists to field bases to support requirements at CIA offices throughout the world. At Headquarters OTS devoted one or more full-time operational psychologists to handle the caseloads in high demand operational components such as the Soviet and Far East Divisions and the Counterterrorism Center. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 335, cited "psychological advice on how to handle alien agents" as an important TSD capability. OTS deployed psychologists to field bases to support requirements at CIA offices throughout the world. At Headquarters OTS devoted one or more full-time operational psychologists to handle the caseloads in high demand operational components such as the Soviet and Far East Divisions and the Counterterrorism Center.

14 John Waller, "The Myth of the Rogue Elephant Interred," John Waller, "The Myth of the Rogue Elephant Interred," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 22:2 Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 6.

15 Allen Dulles, "Brain Warfare," speech to the National Alumni Conference of the Graduate Council of Princeton University, Hot Springs, VA, April 10, 1953. Allen Dulles, "Brain Warfare," speech to the National Alumni Conference of the Graduate Council of Princeton University, Hot Springs, VA, April 10, 1953.

16 See: DCI Stansfield Turner's 1977 testimony. The DCI grouped MKULTRA's 149 subprojects into three categories: (1) Research into behavior modification, drug acquisition, and testing and clandestine administration of drugs; (2) financial and cover mechanisms for each of the subprojects; (3) subprojects, of which there were thirty-three, funded under the MKULTRA umbrella but unrelated to behavioral modification, drugs, or toxins. Polygraph research and control of animal activity were examples offered. The process to completely phase out all of the MKULTRA projects required several years. See: DCI Stansfield Turner's 1977 testimony. The DCI grouped MKULTRA's 149 subprojects into three categories: (1) Research into behavior modification, drug acquisition, and testing and clandestine administration of drugs; (2) financial and cover mechanisms for each of the subprojects; (3) subprojects, of which there were thirty-three, funded under the MKULTRA umbrella but unrelated to behavioral modification, drugs, or toxins. Polygraph research and control of animal activity were examples offered. The process to completely phase out all of the MKULTRA projects required several years.

17 Michael Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy: The Clandestine World of John Mulholland," Michael Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy: The Clandestine World of John Mulholland," Genii: The Conjurorsi Magazine Genii: The Conjurorsi Magazine. April 2001, see: http://www. frankolsonproject.org/Articles/Mulholland.html 18 Ibid. Ibid.

19 Letter to Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 4-29, April 20, 1953. Letter to Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 4-29, April 20, 1953.

20 Ibid. Ibid.

21 Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy." Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy."

22 Mulholland letter to Sidney Gottlieb, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 19-2, November 11, 1953. Mulholland letter to Sidney Gottlieb, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 19-2, November 11, 1953.

23 Memorandum for the Record, Memorandum for the Record, Project MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Project MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-46, October 1, 1954. Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-46, October 1, 1954.

24 Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy." Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy."

25 Memorandum for the Record, Memorandum for the Record, Project MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Project MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-46, October 1, 1954. Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-46, October 1, 1954.

26 Memorandum for the Record, Memorandum for the Record, Definition of a Task under MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Definition of a Task under MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-39, August 25, 1955. Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-39, August 25, 1955.

27 Memorandum for the Record, Memorandum for the Record, MKULTRA, Subproject 34, MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-29, June 20, 1956. Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 34-29, June 20, 1956.

28 Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy." Edwards, "The Sphinx and the Spy."

29 Memorandum for the Record, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 8312, March 26, 1959. Memorandum for the Record, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA doc.u.ment 8312, March 26, 1959.

30 In 1962, Dr. Gottlieb, who had been Chief of R&D for TSD, was promoted to Deputy Chief/TSD under Seymour Russell. Richard Krueger replaced Dr. Gottlieb as Chief of R&D for TSD but was not initially briefed on any of the MKULTRA projects, which continued to report to Gottlieb. Following the IG report, however, Krueger was "read into the program" and developed a process for phasing out over three years all remaining projects. Three years were required to close down the projects through orderly steps that would not expose the covert relations.h.i.+ps or compromise the security of the partic.i.p.ating inst.i.tutions and individuals as well as fulfill government contractual obligations to the parties. In 1962, Dr. Gottlieb, who had been Chief of R&D for TSD, was promoted to Deputy Chief/TSD under Seymour Russell. Richard Krueger replaced Dr. Gottlieb as Chief of R&D for TSD but was not initially briefed on any of the MKULTRA projects, which continued to report to Gottlieb. Following the IG report, however, Krueger was "read into the program" and developed a process for phasing out over three years all remaining projects. Three years were required to close down the projects through orderly steps that would not expose the covert relations.h.i.+ps or compromise the security of the partic.i.p.ating inst.i.tutions and individuals as well as fulfill government contractual obligations to the parties.

31 Marks, Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, 219.

32 Waller, "The Myth of the Rogue Elephant Interred," 6-7. Waller, "The Myth of the Rogue Elephant Interred," 6-7.

33 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Foreign and Military Intelligence Final Report, Book 1. Foreign and Military Intelligence Final Report, Book 1. 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., April 26, 1976. 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., April 26, 1976.

34 The new MKULTRA records were potentially explosive for two separate reasons. First, the fact that they had not been discovered when sought by the Church Committee investigation could have pointed to a CIA "cover-up." Second, the additional records had the potential for containing significantly new information about MKULTRA experiments and operational plans. Despite the hundreds of thousands of words written about MKULTRA, most of the CIA's doc.u.mentation about the program was destroyed in 1972-1973 at the direction of DCI Richard Helms. As recounted to the author by a TSD officer who was involved with the destruction, Dr. Gottlieb returned to TSD headquarters in late 1972 or early 1973 and advised his senior staff that the Director has ordered all MKULTRA records destroyed. It was a verbal order; there would be no memo. There followed some discussion about the advisability of destroying all records, particularly the doc.u.mentation of research procedures and scientific results. Gottlieb responded that the directive had been unambiguous-all the records were to be destroyed. In the following days, MKULTRA project and operational records held by TDS were systematically shredded. Subsequently, remaining doc.u.mentary information about MKULTRA has been subject to numerous FOIA requests and released to the public with some redactions of information judged to require continued cla.s.sification. The new MKULTRA records were potentially explosive for two separate reasons. First, the fact that they had not been discovered when sought by the Church Committee investigation could have pointed to a CIA "cover-up." Second, the additional records had the potential for containing significantly new information about MKULTRA experiments and operational plans. Despite the hundreds of thousands of words written about MKULTRA, most of the CIA's doc.u.mentation about the program was destroyed in 1972-1973 at the direction of DCI Richard Helms. As recounted to the author by a TSD officer who was involved with the destruction, Dr. Gottlieb returned to TSD headquarters in late 1972 or early 1973 and advised his senior staff that the Director has ordered all MKULTRA records destroyed. It was a verbal order; there would be no memo. There followed some discussion about the advisability of destroying all records, particularly the doc.u.mentation of research procedures and scientific results. Gottlieb responded that the directive had been unambiguous-all the records were to be destroyed. In the following days, MKULTRA project and operational records held by TDS were systematically shredded. Subsequently, remaining doc.u.mentary information about MKULTRA has been subject to numerous FOIA requests and released to the public with some redactions of information judged to require continued cla.s.sification.

35 Center for the Study of Intelligence, "An Interview with Richard Helms," Center for the Study of Intelligence, "An Interview with Richard Helms," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 25:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1981, 21.

36 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and the Sub Committee on Human Resources, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and the Sub Committee on Human Resources, Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification. Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification. 95th Congress, 1st Sess., August 3, 1977. 95th Congress, 1st Sess., August 3, 1977.

37 See: Marks, See: Marks, The Search for the 'Manchurian Candidate The Search for the 'Manchurian Candidate, for a detailed account of the CIA research into human behavior based on official doc.u.ments decla.s.sified under the Freedom of Information Act and released after publication of the 1975 Rockefeller Commission and 1976 Church Committee reports.

38 Bart Barnes, "Obituary, Sidney Gottlieb," Bart Barnes, "Obituary, Sidney Gottlieb," Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, March 11, 1999, B.05. The opening sentence of the obituary identifies Gottlieb as "the former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's technical services division who in the '60s directed CIA mind-control experiments, including the administration of drugs and LSD to unwitting humans . . ." Not mentioned is that the experimentation cited was authorized, limited, and ended by the mid-'50s. March 11, 1999, B.05. The opening sentence of the obituary identifies Gottlieb as "the former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's technical services division who in the '60s directed CIA mind-control experiments, including the administration of drugs and LSD to unwitting humans . . ." Not mentioned is that the experimentation cited was authorized, limited, and ended by the mid-'50s.

39 Ted Gup, "The Coldest Warrior," Ted Gup, "The Coldest Warrior," The Was.h.i.+ngton Post Magazine, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post Magazine, December 16, 2001. December 16, 2001.

40 Center for the Studies of Intelligence, "An Interview with Former General Counsel John S. Warner," Center for the Studies of Intelligence, "An Interview with Former General Counsel John S. Warner," Studies in Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 49. 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 49.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE.

1 Interview with Carl A. Strahle. Strahle was one of the printers in the London OSS doc.u.ment shop. See also Christof Mauch, Interview with Carl A. Strahle. Strahle was one of the printers in the London OSS doc.u.ment shop. See also Christof Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler The Shadow War Against Hitler (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 179ff, and Persico, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 179ff, and Persico, Piercing the Reich, Piercing the Reich, 23-26. Casey would become Director of Central Intelligence in 1981. 23-26. Casey would become Director of Central Intelligence in 1981.

2 The "intelligence division," "graphic arts reproduction division," and the "furnis.h.i.+ngs and equipment division" each produced ident.i.ty-related materials. The other three original TSS divisions were organized to support agent communications, audio surveillance, and research and development. The "intelligence division," "graphic arts reproduction division," and the "furnis.h.i.+ngs and equipment division" each produced ident.i.ty-related materials. The other three original TSS divisions were organized to support agent communications, audio surveillance, and research and development.