Spycraft. Part 16

The team once more transferred the gear, this time into the palace. The nearly three-day trip had left them exhausted and sleep was a priority. However, not four hours later Mark was awakened with urgent news. A man claiming to have important information had come into the courtyard telling a story about explosives buried within the palace. Fighting grogginess and working through an interpreter, Mark engaged the slightly built man dressed in tunic and turban.

Speaking in a calm, deliberate voice the volunteer explained that the retreating Taliban hid explosives in the palace's earthen roof. The explosives, he said, were to be detonated just after sundown that day, at the start of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, the three-day celebration marking the end of Ramadan.

The walk-in seemed credible-so credible that Mark could not suppress the suspicion that he had helped plant the explosives and was now having second thoughts. With the fall of the Taliban, loyalties in the country were s.h.i.+fting daily. The volunteer, who spoke matter-of-factly about explosives possibly only a few meters above their heads, would not have been the first Taliban loyalist to switch sides.

Inside the palace, everything seemed normal with the American and British troops and Afghanis, all involved in their own tasks. More than fifty people were already present, preparing for the Eid festivities, and within hours the a.s.sembly hall would be filled with the princ.i.p.al leaders of the southern third of Afghanistan, guests of the new governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, who was hosting the event.

For experienced OTS officers who had picked through many post-blast scenes, it was easy to imagine the sudden death and destruction from a rooftop blast. Destroying Afghanistan's southern leaders.h.i.+p on a Muslim holy day would be a cruel, audacious act and a devastating blow to the new government and the United States. Delay could prove fatal to the local officials and guests, more than a hundred U.S., Australian, and British military personnel, as well as America's Afghan policy.

Within fifteen minutes of the conversation, Mark made the decision to send one member of the team to the roof. Putting an officer on the roof in daylight was risky. If the building was under surveillance, anyone on the roof was certain to be spotted and a terrorist could decide to detonate ahead of schedule. Mark calculated the risk, taking into account the approaching nightfall and the start of Eid. Both were less than four hours away.

Frank Shumway, a tech experienced in using thermal imaging equipment, was rousted from a sound sleep. After Mark explained the situation, Frank agreed to climb onto the roof. Strapping on a hundred pounds of equipment, including communications gear to keep him in constant contact with the team, Frank would report each movement and every observation. These transmissions would be recorded, and should a detonation occur, by accident or command, the recorded information could provide valuable data for post-blast investigators and future operations.

After navigating the narrow ledge of the perimeter wall that joined the two buildings, Frank climbed a ten-foot ladder to reach the earthen roof above the palace's a.s.sembly hall. Its smooth and hard packed surface showed no signs of recent disturbance, but as soon as he switched on the thermal imager, the results immediately contradicted everything Frank saw through his own eyes.

The small screen identified four distinct "hot spots," each giving a signature of recent excavation. What the human eye cannot see registered clearly on the screen. No matter how well a recently dug hole is refilled and disguised, it will absorb heat at a different rate than an undisturbed area. Foreign objects just below the surface-such as IEDs-can also enhance the thermal signature.

"Four holes are set in an L-shape; one hole is positioned directly above the reception area and the three others run along the lateral axis of the primary a.s.sembly hall," Frank reported. "The imaging also shows a narrow line of disturbed earth from hole to hole, then off toward the edge of the building."

Frank's information bolstered the credibility of the walk-in's report. Should the holes contain even a moderate amount of explosives, the blast would, at minimum, collapse the roof. While the imager could not provide clues to what, if anything, was beneath the surface, the pattern, size, and shape of the hot spots were consistent with what was known of how mines or munitions could be deployed. If the holes concealed an explosive array, the work had been extraordinarily well done.

Satisfied that the roof had been thoroughly imaged and convinced that explosives were likely buried there, Mark recommended to the U.S. officer in command that military personnel and the Afghanistan locals preparing the celebration be ordered to the far side of the compound. The soldiers complied, but the Afghanis declined to evacuate or even suspend their preparations. It was only two hours before dark and guests had already begun to arrive in the reception area.

With the most experience in explosive ordnance disposal of any member of the team, Mark made the next foray onto the roof to probe the hot spots. Information from the walk-in, combined with the hole patterns and a narrow line of disturbed earth running from the holes to the edge of the roof all strongly suggested the explosives were configured in a command detonated array. With command detonation, the four connected charges would be set off with a single signal. Working with the command detonation hypothesis the team prepared a small electric charge to cut the command wire.

The potential for disaster was enormous. The team still had no idea what type of IEDs lay buried inches beneath the surface, whether there was a secondary detonation system, or if they were b.o.o.by-trapped.

As the reception hall rapidly filled with Afghan dignitaries and nightfall approached, Mark took the narrow staircase to the roof and began gently probing around the areas shown on the imager. Several inches underground, his probe hit what felt like steel. He carefully swept the crumbled earth away to expose a small section of the buried object. Using the thermal images as a road map, he continued working slowly and cautiously, and eventually identified an eight-gauge detonator lead wire buried just beneath the surface that connected the four holes and led off to join a tangle of other communications and electrical wires that fed the building from the outside. He had seen enough. There were several explosives beneath the roof linked for command detonation with the signal wire trailing off to some remote place in the war-battered city beyond the compound. He attached the electric cutting charge, gave the signal, and the line was severed.

Mark left the roof just as the sun was setting. Afghan dignitaries were now crowded into the reception hall of the palace oblivious to what was likely thousands of pounds of live explosives only a few feet above their heads. The end of Ramadan was announced as Mark made his way down the narrow staircase and a liberated Kandahar erupted in celebratory gunfire. He could not suppress a smile at the thought that somewhere among the city's celebrants was a terrorist, his finger repeatedly pus.h.i.+ng a b.u.t.ton in vain, wondering why in the name of Allah his best efforts had come to naught.

There had not been time to consider removing whatever munitions lay buried beneath the surface. The palace compound was as secure as possible and Mark reasoned that leaving the munitions buried until the end of Eid carried little risk.

After Eid, an Afghan military de-mining team was brought onto the compound to dig the ordnance out of the roof. Mark estimated that it would take one day per hot spot-four days in all-to safely excavate the explosives. With the Afghan squad a.s.sembled, two OTS team members began a four-hour refresher course in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) procedures and safety. The introductory remarks were never concluded. The senior Afghan officer interrupted to announce that his troops were well prepared for this type of work. No further training was necessary. It was the shortest refresher course in OTS history.

The OTS team watched at a distance as the Afghanis attacked the job with frightening enthusiasm. What Mark had estimated as a four-day job was finished in less than one. Before the day ended, the Afghanis had removed more than 2,200 pounds of hard case explosives, including fifty-five 122mm tank rounds and more than a hundred ant.i.tank mines from the four hot spots. A fifth hot spot turned out to be empty.

The rooftop IED would be cla.s.sified as rudimentary, but what it lacked in sophistication, it compensated for in size. Detonation would have reduced the palace to rubble, killing or injuring everyone inside, and in all likelihood taking out the U.S.-occupied structure across the courtyard.

"We've heard a dozen times from our paramilitary colleagues and the special ops guys that our entire deployment was paid for in full that first day," noted a team member.

A few days later, with the components of the bomb piled up outside the palace as a photo op, the local commander called a press conference to announce the find and the successful defusing. A single bored reporter, along with a photographer, listened politely and took notes, but no story ever appeared.

The walk-in was invited back to the palace to receive a reward. Afghan and U.S. personnel staged a semiformal ceremony. After drinking his tea, he was given $1,000 in hundred-dollar bills. He showed little reaction to the reward money, which he accepted graciously, and then offered a short speech, declaring that his only motivation was to help his country.

The OTS team remained in Afghanistan for another six weeks, clearing hundreds of tons of ordnance from homes and remote hideaways. While hiking the rugged White Mountain range with Delta Force operators, they discovered caches of aging explosives crammed into the man-made caves. In one cave, stockpiles of mortars and mines were packed from floor to ceiling, extending far back into the mountains. A B-52 bombing strike was required to detonate the ma.s.sive cache.

On the outskirts of Kandahar, in the rubble of an al-Qaeda training camp, the team discovered and then destroyed dozens of drums of chemicals used to produce the explosive known as triacetone triperoxide, or TATP. A favorite of suicide bombers, TATP was used by would-be shoe-bomber Richard Reid in his foiled attempt to bring down an airplane in December 2001, and again by terrorists in the July 2005 London bombings. The number of lives they saved may never be known.

Upon their return to the United States, members of the team were awarded the CIA's Intelligence Star for Valor in a ceremony presided over by DCI George Tenet. They became members of an elite cadre of some twenty techs whose courage and service has earned the honor of receiving the Intelligence Star during the fifty-year history of the Office of Technical Service.

SECTION VI.

FUNDAMENTALS OF TRADECRAFT.

The prized OTS "Spyman" statuette was awarded to officers for honorable service while a.s.signed to the OTS technical and engineering laboratory, 1991.

Author's Note by H. Keith Melton: As a young naval officer returning from service in Vietnam in the late 1960s, I continued my interest in the world of espionage. The exploits of famous spies were fascinating, but my engineer's curiosity focused on the more obscure topic of clandestine technology. Many books, almost all produced by nontechnical writers, chronicled noteworthy spy cases, but rarely could I locate details about the gadgets used to secretly photograph doc.u.ments, plant listening devices, and accomplish other amazing feats. I watched the James Bond movies of the era and wondered whether there were such gadgets in the real world or was Q only part of movie magic. Finding the answers to these questions became a pa.s.sion that has consumed the last forty years of my life and led me on treasure hunts around the world. As a young naval officer returning from service in Vietnam in the late 1960s, I continued my interest in the world of espionage. The exploits of famous spies were fascinating, but my engineer's curiosity focused on the more obscure topic of clandestine technology. Many books, almost all produced by nontechnical writers, chronicled noteworthy spy cases, but rarely could I locate details about the gadgets used to secretly photograph doc.u.ments, plant listening devices, and accomplish other amazing feats. I watched the James Bond movies of the era and wondered whether there were such gadgets in the real world or was Q only part of movie magic. Finding the answers to these questions became a pa.s.sion that has consumed the last forty years of my life and led me on treasure hunts around the world.

My quest began in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., and eventually required many trips to Russia, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, Israel, and into Asia and South America. Repeatedly my travels took me to KGB headquarters in Moscow and to the Berlin study of Markus Wolf, legendary head of the East German Intelligence Service (HVA). I became a regular guest of Walter Pforzheimer, the late dean of intelligence bibliophiles and founder of CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection, and through him a lifelong friend of his eventual successor, Hayden Peake, the noted historian, author, and intelligence bibliographer.

Eventually I discovered a commonality among all the world's spy agencies, that each selects its intelligence officers for the ability to recruit and manage agents and not for their technological skills. Only rarely does an operations officer understand the technology inside the spy gear employed in secret operations. For this necessary technical a.s.sistance expertise and creativity, intelligence services created a cadre of specialists known as techs, to support and, at times, even conduct the operational activity.

Techs were usually recruited because they had preexisting knowledge in fields such as photography, radios, electronics, chemistry, woodworking, fabrics, or communications. Techs working for the KGB, HVA, CIA, MOS-SAD, MI6, DGSE, or DGI shared a technical language. Each intelligence service had an internal component dedicated to examining espionage devices captured or recovered from its adversaries. a.n.a.lysis of "foreign finds" could identify the originator of the gadget, provide new technology and techniques, and lead to countermeasures. Over time, many of the technical tools, regardless of the nationality of the service, began to look similar. Commonality of functions resulted in commonality of forms.

In compiling my research, I also discovered that the fundamental work of clandestine intelligence could be grouped into five general categories, and within each grouping, technical support was critical. Photos and ill.u.s.trations of spy gadgets used by various services appear in my previous books, Clandestine Warfare Clandestine Warfare (1988), (1988), OSS Special Weapons and Equipment OSS Special Weapons and Equipment (1992), (1992), CIA Special Weapons and Equipment CIA Special Weapons and Equipment (1993), (1993), The Ultimate Spy Book The Ultimate Spy Book (1996), and (1996), and Ultimate Spy Ultimate Spy (2003). Early in the preparation of this book, the authors faced the dilemma of using tradecraft terminology in the text without having s.p.a.ce to provide a definition and explanation each time the term appeared. The solution has been for me to write a primer that draws together explanations of the essential technical terminology used throughout (2003). Early in the preparation of this book, the authors faced the dilemma of using tradecraft terminology in the text without having s.p.a.ce to provide a definition and explanation each time the term appeared. The solution has been for me to write a primer that draws together explanations of the essential technical terminology used throughout Spycraft. Spycraft.

In this six-chapter section, I have attempted to integrate the gadgets with the doctrine of intelligence that lies behind their development and use. Chapters 20 through 24 describe the five pillars of tradecraft common to all intelligence operations. When merged with the clever devices created by innovative engineers, these pillars distinguish the professional intelligence services from those operations that are performed by quickly apprehended amateur "spies." Chapter 25 summarizes the revolutionary changes that digital technology and a global Internet have brought to each of the pillars.

CHAPTER 20.

a.s.sessment

If one attempt in fifty is successful [for recruitment], your efforts won't have been wasted.

-British turncoat and KGB spy Harold "Kim" Philby, as quoted in The Literary Spy Clandestine intelligence operations using human agents, whether conducted in the eighteenth century by America's Revolutionary War spymaster, General George Was.h.i.+ngton, or in the twenty-first century by Islamic terrorists, have common characteristics. Five categories of recruitment and agent handling are so universal and fundamental that they can be called the "pillars of tradecraft." These are: * a.s.sessment * Cover and disguise * Concealments * Clandestine surveillance * Covert communications Depending on the stage of an operation, one of these disciplines will a.s.sume dominance, and every effort will be made to execute it flawlessly. For the Central Intelligence Agency, OTS had the responsibility to develop and support technical tools for each pillar that would provide U.S. officers and agents with a comparative advantage over their adversaries.

a.s.sessment is the first step in recruiting a spy. Selecting the right target from among the thousands of individuals who could potentially help an intelligence service requires identifying the one or two with the motivation and ability to sustain the double life required by espionage. Sound tradecraft demands more than guesswork.1 Based on the experience OSS had with a.s.sessment and testing procedures, the CIA employed a small group of professionally credentialed psychologists to a.s.sist operations officers in winnowing the prospective recruitment pool and identifying the most "vulnerable" targets. Like their OSS predecessors, the psychologists of OTS employed a variety of a.s.sessment techniques and tests to gain insight into a target's dominant personality traits and potential behavioral responses to specific situations. Based on the experience OSS had with a.s.sessment and testing procedures, the CIA employed a small group of professionally credentialed psychologists to a.s.sist operations officers in winnowing the prospective recruitment pool and identifying the most "vulnerable" targets. Like their OSS predecessors, the psychologists of OTS employed a variety of a.s.sessment techniques and tests to gain insight into a target's dominant personality traits and potential behavioral responses to specific situations.

Recruitment often encompa.s.sed months of patient cultivation by the case officer of a target before moving the contact into a clandestine "handler-agent" relations.h.i.+p. Infrequently, however, recruitment could occur during a five-minute pitch in which an unsuspecting foreign official would be asked, "Would you work with the CIA?" Operational circ.u.mstances determined whether an individual was the subject of extended development or a cold pitch, but in either case, the a.s.sessment conducted before the question was asked loaded the dice in favor of the case officer.2 a.s.sessments provide the CIA with a good sense of the target's likely reaction to a pitch and their long-term value to the CIA. However, under the best of conditions, acceptance of a pitch can never be a.s.sumed and sound a.s.sessments will antic.i.p.ate the possibility of an angry and hostile response. If the pitch goes well, an agent is recruited. If the recruitment offer is rejected, a.s.sessment will have provided information to minimize blowback and operational compromise.

Motivations to become a spy are as complex and varied as human nature itself. Because of unpredictable individual differences and cultural variations among foreign officials identified for recruitment, identifying a target's dominant motivator to conduct espionage became the primary function of the operational psychologists. One grouping of motivations became known as "the MICE model." MICE, the easy-to-remember acronym of money, ideology, coercion, and ego, describes crosscultural characteristics that often translate into vulnerabilities that become a basis for recruitment.

Money holds particular attraction to targets from countries whose culture places high social value on achievement, status, and material possessions.

Ideology becomes a powerful incentive for individuals who hate the political or economic system, which they cannot otherwise escape or oppose.

Coercion represents a negative motivator that could be effective only in selective circ.u.mstances with particular personalities.

Ego frequently motivates acts of espionage by individuals who believe their talents, capabilities, and importance go unrewarded by their employers or unrecognized by professional colleagues.

CIA psychologists found three of the most significant indicators of a willingness to spy were split loyalties (potentially evidenced by extramarital affairs or intense dislike of a supervisor), narcissism (when seen as excessively self-absorbed, arrogant, and vain), and dissidence in parental relations.h.i.+ps. Added to these were contributing circ.u.mstances such as failed careers, marriage problems, infidelity, and substance abuse. Seldom was there a single motivating factor, and most recruitments were based upon a combination of vulnerabilities. Clandestine audio operations became one of the most useful ways to gather unfiltered information about a target's private motivations in unguarded conversations with family and friends. CIA psychologists concluded that for most agents the susceptibility to recruitment and the willingness to act is the highest between ages of thirty-five forty-five, a time of personal reevaluation and mid-life crisis commonly experienced in many cultures.3 In addition to targets who were cold pitched and those who were recruited after development, volunteers const.i.tuted a third pool of potential agents. Some of history's best spies have been volunteers. These individuals, also known as walk-ins, sought out an intelligence service to which they could offer their information or services. Volunteers are treated with caution because many have an exaggerated sense of the value of their information or are seeking an emotional thrill of becoming part of the espionage game.4 More significantly, volunteers could also be dangerous "dangles" or "plants" controlled and directed by a rival intelligence service. If the bait of a dangle is accepted, the hostile service is in a position to run a double-agent operation to either acquire information about the sources, operational methods, targets, and technology of its rival or feed false information to the enemy. More significantly, volunteers could also be dangerous "dangles" or "plants" controlled and directed by a rival intelligence service. If the bait of a dangle is accepted, the hostile service is in a position to run a double-agent operation to either acquire information about the sources, operational methods, targets, and technology of its rival or feed false information to the enemy.

Regardless of how a potential spy came to the attention of the CIA, recruitment occurred only after a favorable judgment was made about an individual's access, motivation, and ability to lead a clandestine existence. The process of evaluation that precedes the decision of whether or not to attempt to recruit a target is called "a.s.sessment."

Two questions are paramount when a.s.sessing a prospective agent. The first is: What access to information of intelligence value does this person have now or will have in the future?

The level and value of an agent's access are determined through questioning, verification of whatever personal bona fides are presented, and evaluation of the initial information the source provides. An individual's official position, social or family contacts, career progression, skills, and the quality of information are all used to confirm the potential agent's level of access. When Aldrich Ames gave the Soviets the names of nearly a dozen active CIA agents in June 1985, his access was confirmed and a willingness to commit espionage demonstrated.5 When the National Security Agency evaluated Victor Sheymov's initial reporting in 1980 on Soviet communications security, the quality of information immediately established Sheymov's access to exceptionally valuable intelligence. The Soviet and U.S. response to Ames and Sheymov demonstrated the willingness of intelligence agencies to move quickly to recruit a volunteer without lengthy a.s.sessment when access to critically important intelligence was demonstrated. When the National Security Agency evaluated Victor Sheymov's initial reporting in 1980 on Soviet communications security, the quality of information immediately established Sheymov's access to exceptionally valuable intelligence. The Soviet and U.S. response to Ames and Sheymov demonstrated the willingness of intelligence agencies to move quickly to recruit a volunteer without lengthy a.s.sessment when access to critically important intelligence was demonstrated.

The second question considered by a recruiter is: Can a prospective agent live the life of a spy and do what is required by the task of espionage? This a.s.sessment requires insights to predict, with reasonable accuracy, the future behavior of the target. Like buying an automobile, expectations and desired outcomes at the time of the initial transaction can sometimes trump reality. If either the automobile or the agent turns sour, the frustration and expense of owning a lemon can turn into disaster. Bringing professional skill and the tools of modern psychology to the process of a.s.sessing the situational behavior and personality of would-be spies, foreign leaders, and current agents became the core work of the OTS operational psychologists.

From its beginning, OTS employed a staff of professional psychologists to conduct operational a.s.sessments of foreign targets. The a.s.sessments were based on the best psychological science available and used both commercial and specially designed psychological tests to evaluate a target's personality, motivation, and apt.i.tude for clandestine work. Raw data for a.s.sessments was acquired from reports of operations officers who observed personal and behavioral traits of targets. The OTS psychologists then applied their expertise to evaluating all of the information gathered on the individual.

The psychologists provided professional personality a.s.sessments of recruitment targets, individuals who volunteered to work with the CIA, and defectors. Depending on the specifics of the case, the a.s.sessments were used for guidance in building a relations.h.i.+p, refining a recruitment pitch, addressing agent-handling problems, minimizing issues at agent termination, preparing for agent resettlement, and framing counterintelligence judgments about a.s.sets. The a.s.sessments were frequently combined with results of polygraph testing administered by the Office of Security for the fullest possible understanding of the subject. Defectors, whose bona fides were in question, such as the high-profile cases of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko and Anatoly Golitsyn, were a.s.sessed by the TSD psychologists both to support both counterintelligence a.n.a.lysis and to a.s.sist officers responsible for resettlement.6 These a.s.sessments could be either direct or indirect depending on whether or not the psychologist could personally interact with the subject. When personal meetings were not possible, a.s.sessments relied on the psychologist's a.n.a.lysis and interpretation of credible, secondary data.

The most complete a.s.sessments included direct personal meetings between the OTS psychologist and the target. For security, these operational meetings usually employed various elements of clandestine tradecraft, including disguise, alias ident.i.ty, and surveillance detection runs. Under normal circ.u.mstances, such meetings with the target were conducted in a manner that did not reveal either the psychologist's true profession or intended purpose.

The psychologists conducted the a.s.sessments in whatever venues could be arranged for meeting with the target. In Germany during the mid-1980s, a leader of a terrorist cell had been an intermittent contact of a case officer, but little progress was made toward recruitment. The question of whether or not to continue recruitment operations against the individual came to OTS. Because the target frequented a nightclub that drew its patrons from the international community, an OTS psychologist was directed to make the nightclub part of her weekend activities. For her disguise, the psychologist chose a "blonde bimbo" look based on knowledge that the target's eye gravitated to every blonde that entered the club.

On a particular Friday evening, the psychologist, with the a.s.sistance of disguise specialists, selected a slinky dress, put on a curly blonde wig, blue-tinted gla.s.ses, rosy pink lipstick, and blue eye shadow. As she walked out of her office, the psychologist pa.s.sed the chief 's secretary offering the standard "Have a good weekend" greeting. The secretary looked up with surprise to ask, "Who are you? Have you signed in?" After a moment of silence, both found amus.e.m.e.nt and appreciation for the superior work of the OTS disguise officers.

At the nightclub, the psychologist observed the movements and interaction of the target and put herself in a location to attract his notice. The ploy worked and the two engaged in a conversation that moved quickly from introductory chitchat to increasingly friendly banter. It was a good night for the psychologist, whose questions were so readily answered that she needed to periodically go to the powder room to jot notes and confirm that her disguise elements were in place. As the evening progressed, so did the personal level of their conversation. The terrorist, clearly enjoying the pursuit of his blonde prey, became increasingly familiar and uncomfortably suggestive with the psychologist. Seated in a dark corner of the nightclub, he leaned very close and whispered a well-practiced line, "I'd just like to run fingers through your blonde curly hair." The psychologist choked back the overwhelming urge to rip off the wig, hand it to the terrorist, and in her silkiest voice reply, "It's all yours if you will stop annoying me now."

A direct a.s.sessment might involve pretext testing or face-to-face interviews with targets. The target would be unaware of the true purpose of the interview since the psychologist would be introduced by the case officer as a friend, colleague, or knowledgeable specialist about a common area of interest. Thereafter, the psychologist would observe and record the target's verbal skills, interaction with the case officer, body language, temperament, and other personality and behavioral characteristics.

The "unexpected" usually became "expected" during the interviews. In support of an operational project with a cooperating service to build a new counterterrorism team, an OTS psychologist posed as the American official who would make the decision on members for the team. Over the course of several days, the psychologist administered a.s.sessment tests to several dozen candidates under the guise of "the final interview."

After the team members had been selected, several additional individuals were nominated to become office manager for the project. As the psychologist talked with a young woman about her interest in the office manager position, it became evident that the candidate had no applicable skills for the work. She could not type, claimed no previous work in an office environment, had never done filing, acted as a receptionist, or exhibited any knowledge of office procedures.

The perplexed psychologist finally blurted the question, "Well, what are you good at?"

"Hijacking airplanes," replied the applicant.

Inquiries about office skills ended, and further questioning by the psychologist confirmed that the woman had been part of the planning and execution of three hijackings. She was recla.s.sified from potential office worker to possible field operative.

In situations that precluded personal interaction, OTS psychologists made discreet observations of targets at a distance. These could often be done during diplomatic receptions, social events, or while seated at an adjoining table in a restaurant. The evaluation of clandestine video or audio surveillance tapes of a target represented another quasidirect a.s.sessment technique. These clandestine observations supported both operations for a.s.sessment of recruitment targets and collection of personality information on foreign leaders.

A daring, but ultimately abandoned, plan for a.s.sessment by discreet observation occurred when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States in 1958. A TSS psychologist was directed to remain at his home on a specific day for a special a.s.signment. The psychologist's residence adjoined an empty field, large enough for a helicopter landing area. When he saw a helicopter land in the field, he was to climb aboard for a ride to Camp David where Khrushchev was scheduled to confer with President Eisenhower. Once at Camp David, the psychologist would be slipped into a closet in the room where the two heads of state were meeting. From a non.o.bvious peephole in the closet door he was to observe the Soviet leader's demeanor, voice inflection, body language, and any other characteristic that might provide insight into his mental and psychological state. The psychologist waited throughout the day, but no helicopter appeared. In the tradition of "need to know," no reason was ever given for scrubbing the operation.

For personality and behavioral a.s.sessment, OTS selected psychological tests and procedures applicable to the target's position, nationality, prospective operational role, and relations.h.i.+p with the case officer. The tools OTS used for a.s.sessment testing fell into three cla.s.ses: commercially available tests that measured intelligence, psychological characteristics, apt.i.tude, interests, and personality traits; modified commercial tests that were adapted for particular operational purposes; and CIA proprietary in-house-developed test and evaluation procedures.

The CIA's primary direct a.s.sessment tool, a largely culturally neutral test, was developed by TSS psychologist John Gittinger in the 1950s. The test questions could be administered openly or covertly by a case officer or psychologist in any language and the responses fed an a.s.sessment method named the Personality a.s.sessment System (PAS).7 Gittinger, who joined the CIA in 1950, had developed his skills as the director of psychological services at the Oklahoma State Mental Hospital in Norman, Oklahoma. By interpreting data derived from patients tested against the Wechsler intelligence scale, Gittinger determined that he could make basic judgments about personality. He eventually collected Wechsler data on 29,000 subjects representing social groups ranging from hobos to fas.h.i.+on models, and businessmen to students. He was an early user of computers for compiling large quant.i.ties of test data to develop comparative relations.h.i.+ps. At the CIA, he refined the methodology and built a mature PAS model. By the time he retired in 1979, Gittinger's conscious emphasis on cross-cultural orientation for a.s.sessments and a demand for systematic, rigorous research-based judgments had become the basis for the CIA's acceptance of operational psychology as a technical tool for agent operations. Gittinger, who joined the CIA in 1950, had developed his skills as the director of psychological services at the Oklahoma State Mental Hospital in Norman, Oklahoma. By interpreting data derived from patients tested against the Wechsler intelligence scale, Gittinger determined that he could make basic judgments about personality. He eventually collected Wechsler data on 29,000 subjects representing social groups ranging from hobos to fas.h.i.+on models, and businessmen to students. He was an early user of computers for compiling large quant.i.ties of test data to develop comparative relations.h.i.+ps. At the CIA, he refined the methodology and built a mature PAS model. By the time he retired in 1979, Gittinger's conscious emphasis on cross-cultural orientation for a.s.sessments and a demand for systematic, rigorous research-based judgments had become the basis for the CIA's acceptance of operational psychology as a technical tool for agent operations.

While Gittinger's system had detractors ranging from those who thought all psychology was suspect to professional peers who questioned the methodology, the PAS proved valuable to case officers involved in operations where time for personal contact with their targets was limited. The PAS results were so strong that the test became the standard method for a.s.sessing and predicting agent motivation and situational behavior. The insight the OTS psychologists provided about foreign targets by interpreting data from the PAS earned them the nickname "the wizards."8 Indirect a.s.sessment involves reviewing all reporting from case officers about a target's personal history, behavior, demeanor, and reactions to his contact with the case officer. All information available from or about the target, including public and private speeches, publications, and letters, as well as news stories and commentary by a.s.sociates or relatives, are factored in. Covert audio or video transcripts, when available, also become a valuable part of the a.s.sessment package. The psychologists apply accepted a.n.a.lytical tools to the material and conduct an internal peer review from staff colleagues with multicultural backgrounds and foreign language skills in addition to their professional credentials. Direct a.s.sessments yielded higher quality and more extensive data for a.n.a.lysis than did indirect a.s.sessments, but the latter were necessary when the subject proved to be inaccessible.

During the Cold War years, when many targets lived in countries with severe travel restrictions, OTS maintained a small staff of handwriting specialists called graphologists.9 Graphology, a discipline more respected in Europe than in the United States, seeks to identify psychological characteristics of an individual based on measurable letter formations and line strokes in handwriting. The graphologists measured three dimensions (the vertical, horizontal, and depth of strokes or letters) for as many as twenty-one different characteristics of writing. Handwriting a.n.a.lysis has demonstrated the ability to distinguish between mentally healthy persons and those with mental illness. The OTS graphologists applied the same methodology to identify essential characteristics of persons who were unidentified, would not agree to a structured a.s.sessment (such as VIPs), were writers of anonymous letters, or were held in captivity. Graphology, a discipline more respected in Europe than in the United States, seeks to identify psychological characteristics of an individual based on measurable letter formations and line strokes in handwriting. The graphologists measured three dimensions (the vertical, horizontal, and depth of strokes or letters) for as many as twenty-one different characteristics of writing. Handwriting a.n.a.lysis has demonstrated the ability to distinguish between mentally healthy persons and those with mental illness. The OTS graphologists applied the same methodology to identify essential characteristics of persons who were unidentified, would not agree to a structured a.s.sessment (such as VIPs), were writers of anonymous letters, or were held in captivity.10 Advocates a.s.serted that by a.n.a.lysis of handwriting, which in graphology is called "brain writing," psychological characteristics and personality traits important to the CIA on otherwise unknown people can be identified.11 Although psychologists disagree on the value of graphology as a stand-alone tool, many Agency operational managers agreed that, as a supplement to direct a.s.sessment or in the absence of direct a.s.sessment opportunities, handwriting a.n.a.lysis done by trained graphologists contributes valuable insight into a target's mental state . Although psychologists disagree on the value of graphology as a stand-alone tool, many Agency operational managers agreed that, as a supplement to direct a.s.sessment or in the absence of direct a.s.sessment opportunities, handwriting a.n.a.lysis done by trained graphologists contributes valuable insight into a target's mental state .12 The best graphological a.n.a.lysis required a page or more of current handwriting for comparison against a similar amount of writing from some years earlier. Rarely did the graphologist have the luxury of being in possession of that much information and at times had to lower his expectations of the science. When presented with a collection of Stalin's doodles after the dictator's meeting with U.S. diplomats in the early 1950s, one TSS graphologist declined to provide a current psychological a.s.sessment. The sketches were clearly depictions of wolves, the graphologist commented, but he could offer nothing more than conjecture as to how those reflected Stalin's mental state.

In another instance, during the summer of 1983 a graphologist was given the handwritten signature of Soviet Communist Party General Secretary (and former director of the KGB) Yuri Andropov. Comparing the recent signature with previous Andropov signatures, the graphologist concluded that the writer had an inflexible commitment to ideological ends and little interest in compromise. At a time when the U.S. government questioned whether Andropov represented a "new, more Western" type of Soviet leader and was uncertain whether his health would limit his tenure as the Soviet head of state, the graphologist added that the handwriting comparisons showed evidence of increasing stress and difficultly in controlling moods. Causes of the stress and the reaction could, she concluded, be related to physical health or pressure of the position or both. In fact, Andropov's subsequent policies did not demonstrate new flexibility and, less than six months later, he died.

More recently, in the early 1990s, a cla.s.sic handwriting a.n.a.lysis occurred when a CIA officer unexpectedly received a folded piece of silk from a fellow paris.h.i.+oner at a Catholic ma.s.s in Rangoon, Burma. The message, whispered the paris.h.i.+oner, had been written by a political prisoner who arranged to have it smuggled out of the heavily guarded prison and intended it to be given to the U.S. government. When the message on silk arrived at Headquarters, an OTS graphologist was asked to a.s.sess the writing but was given no information about the author or the circ.u.mstances of its acquisition. She studied the writing for several days, applying the standard techniques of letter and stroke measurements, and reported: "The writer possesses the genuine humility of those who are truly at peace and genuinely altruistic. Independent and individualistic, the writer is a true visionary . . . extraordinarily idealistic but at the same time sophisticated, manipulative, savvy, and subtle. Peaceful conflict resolution is a forte."

What the graphologist did not know was that her work was playing a key role in a major foreign policy decision. The a.s.sessment request came from a presidential envoy who was considering whether to meet with Burmese prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The meeting eventually occurred and afterward the diplomat credited the a.n.a.lysis with preparing him for an encounter with "a skilled, dynamic leader with keen political instincts and a flair for the dramatic" and, who "through courage and determination had repeatedly faced down the Burmese military and endured." Aung San Suu Kyi received the n.o.bel Peace Prize in 1991 and the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2000.

The introduction to a 1954 national security a.s.sessment prepared for President Eisenhower t.i.tled "Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency" a.s.serted: "If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of 'fair play' must be reconsidered. . . . We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people will be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy." This stark perspective, articulated in a top-secret report prepared by a special study group headed by James H. Doolittle, reflected Was.h.i.+ngton's perceived danger from the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s.

a.s.sessment programs developed by TSS and TSD in response would earn respect and commendation for their operational value from case officers to the most senior Agency officials.13 Yet it was precisely in the effort to understand, predict, and control the response and behavior of operational targets that the CIA has also drawn some of its harshest criticism. In the mid-1970s a series of revelations about secret CIA programs from the 1950s and 1960s created a public image of an organization flooded with research programs on mind control, behavior modification, brainwas.h.i.+ng, hypnosis, and out-of-control drug experimentation. For five years, from 1972 to 1977, CIA Directors Helms, Schlesinger, Colby, Bush, and Turner were compelled to explain and defend programs and activities that management had begun closing down more than ten years earlier. Yet it was precisely in the effort to understand, predict, and control the response and behavior of operational targets that the CIA has also drawn some of its harshest criticism. In the mid-1970s a series of revelations about secret CIA programs from the 1950s and 1960s created a public image of an organization flooded with research programs on mind control, behavior modification, brainwas.h.i.+ng, hypnosis, and out-of-control drug experimentation. For five years, from 1972 to 1977, CIA Directors Helms, Schlesinger, Colby, Bush, and Turner were compelled to explain and defend programs and activities that management had begun closing down more than ten years earlier.

In April 1953 DCI Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, a.s.sistant Deputy Director for Plans, authorized the Technical Services Staff to conduct a supersecret behavioral research program under the code name MKULTRA. Because the research involved recently synthesized drugs and pharmaceuticals (including LSD), the program became the responsibility of TSS's Chemistry Division, headed by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb. In concept, MKULTRA descended from OSS's World War II research and subsequent authorized CIA drug-testing programs Project BLUEBIRD (1950) and Project ARTICHOKE (1951).14 As chief of the OSS R&D organization Stanley Lovell had worked on chemical and biological weapons. After the war, the Army Chemical Corps investigated the effect of drugs on interrogation for both offensive and defensive use. At the same time, the CIA was receiving reports that the Soviets were experimenting with so-called mind-control techniques and drugs with some success. Fear that brainwas.h.i.+ng techniques had been perfected by the Communist Chinese and the North Koreans added impetus to the mission to understand better the science of human behavior. Among the hallucinogenic drugs, LSD held a particular fascination, in part because of reports that the Soviets had shown an interest.

CIA Director Dulles had voiced public alarm over America's limited understanding of how people's thinking could be influenced. Speaking from a prepared text to alumni of his alma mater, Princeton University, at Hot Springs, Virginia, on April 10, 1953, Dulles a.s.serted that the U.S. government had been "driven [by the tensions of the Cold War] to take positive steps to recognize psychological warfare and to play an active role in it." Dulles described a "sinister battle for men's minds" being waged by the Soviets and questioned whether America recognized the magnitude of the problem. He suggested the ongoing conflict be called "brain warfare."

The speech accused the Soviets of attempts at ma.s.s indoctrination of the population of countries they attempted to control and the perversion of minds of selected individuals. Under the latter circ.u.mstances, Dulles commented, a person's brain "becomes a phonograph playing a disc put on its spindle by an outside genius over which it has no control."15 Before the month ended, the DCI had followed up on his public description of the threat by approving the ultrasecret MKULTRA research program. Its intent would be to understand the human mind in order to counter Soviet capabilities for mind control and create tools that could be used by U.S. intelligence officers for agent recruitment and handling. The project would sponsor research and experimentation with any available chemical and biological materials and tap into expertise across the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, pharmaceuticals, and hypnosis. Before the month ended, the DCI had followed up on his public description of the threat by approving the ultrasecret MKULTRA research program. Its intent would be to understand the human mind in order to counter Soviet capabilities for mind control and create tools that could be used by U.S. intelligence officers for agent recruitment and handling. The project would sponsor research and experimentation with any available chemical and biological materials and tap into expertise across the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, pharmaceuticals, and hypnosis.

During its eleven-year existence (1953-1964), MKULTRA remained a tightly compartmentalized Agency program that eventually involved 149 individual subprojects.16 The Technical Services Staff was the logical organizational location for the activity because, before 1962, TSS had the scientific research responsibility for CIA (the letters MK denoted a TSS-managed program). The initial program was aimed primarily at creating new operational defensive capabilities to protect American a.s.sets from Soviet psychological or psychopharmaceutical manipulation. Understanding the effects of drugs and alcohol on human behavior would be a major focus. MKULTRA research and development would also produce a handful of new offensive capabilities involving incapacitating and lethal toxins, which would eventually draw intense unfavorable attention and prove to be of little operational value. The Technical Services Staff was the logical organizational location for the activity because, before 1962, TSS had the scientific research responsibility for CIA (the letters MK denoted a TSS-managed program). The initial program was aimed primarily at creating new operational defensive capabilities to protect American a.s.sets from Soviet psychological or psychopharmaceutical manipulation. Understanding the effects of drugs and alcohol on human behavior would be a major focus. MKULTRA research and development would also produce a handful of new offensive capabilities involving incapacitating and lethal toxins, which would eventually draw intense unfavorable attention and prove to be of little operational value.

After MKULTRA was approved by Dulles, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb reasonedthat any drugs or chemicals developed would be of limited value without a means of covertly administering them. Gottlieb contacted John Mulholland, one of America's best-known and most respected magicians and an expert in sleight of hand, or "close-up" magic, for advice.17 His goal was to engage Mulholland to teach the techniques of magic, especially sleight of hand and misdirection, to case officers for delivering the MKULTRA "potions" to their targets. His goal was to engage Mulholland to teach the techniques of magic, especially sleight of hand and misdirection, to case officers for delivering the MKULTRA "potions" to their targets.18 Mulholland agreed to Gottlieb's request, and proposed an outline for a training manual that would include19: * Background facts to correct erroneous facts about magic and enable a complete novice to "learn to do those things which are required."

* Descriptions of the covert techniques necessary to "deliver" material [chemicals] in a solid, liquid, or gaseous form. Included would be explanations of the necessary skills and instruction on how to learn them.

* Examples and studies to explain how the techniques and mechanical aids could be employed in various operational circ.u.mstances.

Mulholland put the cost of the manual at $3,000 and agreed to write it in a manner to provide total secrecy.20 To protect against the manual falling into the wrong hands, no references were made to "agents" or "operatives"; the intelligence officers were to be called "performers" and covert actions would be referred to as "tricks." To protect against the manual falling into the wrong hands, no references were made to "agents" or "operatives"; the intelligence officers were to be called "performers" and covert actions would be referred to as "tricks."21 His early draft of the manual contained five sections: (1) Underlying basis for the successful performance of tricks, (2) Background of the psychological principles by which they operate, (3) Tricks with loose solids, (4) Tricks with liquids, (5) Tricks by which small objects may be obtained secretly. His early draft of the manual contained five sections: (1) Underlying basis for the successful performance of tricks, (2) Background of the psychological principles by which they operate, (3) Tricks with loose solids, (4) Tricks with liquids, (5) Tricks by which small objects may be obtained secretly.

Mulholland noted: "As sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 were written solely for use by men working alone, the manual needed two further sections. One section would give modified tricks and techniques of performance to be performed by women and the other would describe tricks suitable for two or more people working in collaboration."22 By the winter of 1954, the ma.n.u.script, t.i.tled "Some Operational Applications of the Art of Deception," was complete.23 Mulholland wrote in the introduction: "The purpose of this paper is to instruct the reader so he may learn to perform a variety of acts secretly and undetectably. In short, here are instructions in deception." Mulholland wrote in the introduction: "The purpose of this paper is to instruct the reader so he may learn to perform a variety of acts secretly and undetectably. In short, here are instructions in deception."24 With the first 100-page manual completed, Gottlieb invited Mulholland to work on a new project "on the application of the magician's art to the covert communication of information."25 The work "would involve the application of techniques and principles employed by magicians, mind readers, etc., to communicate information, and the development of new [non-electrical] techniques." The work "would involve the application of techniques and principles employed by magicians, mind readers, etc., to communicate information, and the development of new [non-electrical] techniques."26 In 1956 Gottlieb proposed expanding the scope of Mulholland's work "to make Mr. Mulholland available as a consultant on various problems, [for] TSS and otherwise, as they evolve. These problems concern the application of the magician's technique to clandestine operations, such techniques to include surrept.i.tious delivery of materials, deceptive movements and actions to cover normally prohibited activities, influencing choices and perceptions of other persons, various forms of disguise, covert signaling systems, etc."27 Mulholland's TSS work continued until 1958, when his failing health limited his ability to travel and work .28 The CIA's interest in solving intelligence problems using the skills of the magician, however, continued. In 1959 TSS considered revising and adapting Mulholland's work on "deception techniques (magic, sleight of hand, signals) and on psychic phenomena." The CIA's interest in solving intelligence problems using the skills of the magician, however, continued. In 1959 TSS considered revising and adapting Mulholland's work on "deception techniques (magic, sleight of hand, signals) and on psychic phenomena."29 By 1962 it had become evident to CIA managers that MKULTRA had produced few operationally usable products or new capabilities. A critical 1963 Inspector General report on the value and administration of MKULTRA, combined with little support for the projects from the chiefs of the operational divisions, led to the decision to terminate the program. Before the end of the decade, all questionable subprojects had been closed, leaving only a residue of noncontroversial research contracts in place.30 At the ending of MKULTRA, Gottlieb wrote: .

It has become increasingly obvious over the last several years that the general area [of biological and chemical control of human behavior] had less and less relevance to current complex operations. . . . On the scientific side . . . these materials and techniques are too unpredictable in their effect on individual human beings . . . to be operationally useful. [Operationally] the emerging group of new senior operations officers has shown a discerning and perhaps commendable distaste for utilizing these materials and techniques. They seem to realize that, in addition to moral and ethical considerations, the extreme sensitivity and security constraints of such operations effectively rule them out.31 .

MKULTRA had encompa.s.sed a research area that used new, untested drugs to produce unantic.i.p.ated effects on humans. It had been launched in the interest of national security by a DCI with the a.s.sistance of a senior officer, Richard Helms, who would eventually become DCI. However, in the 1960s, at a time when priorities for national security began to s.h.i.+ft and standards for conducting experiments involving human subjects were evolving, controls over the MKULTRA experiments that might have seemed appropriate in 1953 were judged inadequate.

Ultimately, the CIA was cited for a failure of "command and control" for only two MKULTRA drug experimentation projects, but both were dramatic and tainted every other activity a.s.sociated with the project.32 For several years TSD retained eleven grams of sh.e.l.lfish toxin in CIA-cla.s.sified storage despite a presidential order that all material of this type be destroyed. While the retention represented the inaction of a single officer to comply with the order rather than an organizational effort to defy policy, and although no harm to any individual occurred nor was any use ever made of the toxin, experimental or operational, the fact of its existence several years after the presidential directive reflected poorly on the CIA. In a second area of drug testing on unwitting human subjects, however, TSS's failure to obtain required official approval before conducting an LSD experiment that went horribly bad resulted in decades of personal tragedy, legal entanglements, and official inquiries. For several years TSD retained eleven grams of sh.e.l.lfish toxin in CIA-cla.s.sified storage despite a presidential order that all material of this type be destroyed. While the retention represented the inaction of a single officer to comply with the order rather than an organizational effort to defy policy, and although no harm to any individual occurred nor was any use ever made of the toxin, experimental or operational, the fact of its existence several years after the presidential directive reflected poorly on the CIA. In a second area of drug testing on unwitting human subjects, however, TSS's failure to obtain required official approval before conducting an LSD experiment that went horribly bad resulted in decades of personal tragedy, legal entanglements, and official inquiries.

Dr. Frank Olson, a biochemist and researcher in biological warfare at the U.S. Army facility in Fort Detrick, Maryland, who worked on a MKULTRA subproject, died in New York City on November 25, 1953. He fell to his death from a hotel room window more than ten stories above the street below. Dr. Olson was likely suffering from delayed reactions caused by ingesting LSD several days earlier. The previous week, at a TSS-organized retreat at the Deep Creek Lodge in western Maryland, Olson and several other "researchers" had shared a bottle of Cointreau. The liqueur had been laced with 70 micrograms of LSD without their knowledge.

Due to the political and operational sensitivities of the MKULTRA program, the CIA withheld details of the circ.u.mstances surrounding Dr. Olson's death from Olson's family until they partially surfaced in the 1975 Rockefeller Commission investigation of CIA activities. Subsequently, the 1976 U.S. Senate Church Commission report added substantial additional details on the MKULTRA program to the public record.33 Following the CIA Inspector General's internal report in 1963 and the 1976 Church Report, a third airing of the MKULTRA saga occurred in 1977. A few months after the Church Committee closed its investigation, some 8,000 pages of previously unidentified MKULTRA financial records were discovered in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) inquiry on the project. The newly found doc.u.ments had been filed with contract and financial records at the CIA's Records Center rather than under the MKULTRA project t.i.tle.

These records had escaped the shredder in 1973 following DCI Helms's directive to Gottlieb to destroy all MKULTRA research and operational files, and then were inadvertently missed during the records search in response to the Church Committee.34 Helms described his thinking on ordering destruction of the MKULTRA records in a taped interview with journalist David Frost in May 1978: Helms described his thinking on ordering destruction of the MKULTRA records in a taped interview with journalist David Frost in May 1978: .

It was a conscious decision [to destroy the records] that there were a whole series of things that involved Americans who had helped us with the various aspects of this testing, with whom we had a fiduciary relations.h.i.+p and whose partic.i.p.ation we had agreed to keep secret. Since this was a time when both I and the fellow [presumably a reference to Dr. Gottlieb] who had been in charge of the program were going to retire there was no reason to have the stuff around anymore. We kept faith with the people who had helped us and I see nothing wrong with that. 35 35 .

The 1977 find was reported immediately to the White House and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and congressional interest was rekindled. That year, the SSCI convened a joint hearing with Senator Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health and Science and called DCI Stansfield Turner as the primary witness. Appearing before the committees, Turner testified that the doc.u.ments added little information to what was already known about MKULTRA's methods, experiments, operations, and the breadth of the program. The SSCI agreed, and the joint hearings were concluded after one session.36 However, the redacted materials, subsequently released under FOIA, became the basis for John Marks's However, the redacted materials, subsequently released under FOIA, became the basis for John Marks's The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, a bestselling account of CIA research in the 1950s and 1960s into human behavior. a bestselling account of CIA research in the 1950s and 1960s into human behavior.37 The negative publicity surrounding MKULTRA far exceeded its modest contribution to intelligence and the negative aspects of the program acquired undeserved legendary status in the mind of the public as well as conspiracy theorists. Secret government-sponsored mind-control research, dangerous experiments on unwitting people, covert a.s.sa.s.sination tools, and white-coated chemists mixing unknown concoctions in hidden laboratories produced vivid images in the public's imagination. Virtually none of this was a reality, but more than five decades after Allen Dulles and Richard Helms initiated the ultrasecret program to counter what they believed to be a grave threat to free thought, MKULTRA continues to generate public intrigue and controversy. The officer chosen to carry out the program, Sidney Gottlieb, did what he understood duty demanded, and paid a heavy personal price.

The breadth of Gottlieb'