The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 20

The Governours and Presidents of the several States at the time of the ratification of this Const.i.tution shall continue in office in the same manner and with the same powers as if they had been appointed pursuant to the first section of this article.

The officers of the Militia in the several States may be appointed under the authority of the U. States; the Legislature whereof may authorize the Governors or Presidents of States to make such appointments with such restrictions as they shall think proper.

ARTICLE IX

-- 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States.

-- 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or Representative unless at the time of his election he be a Citizen and inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen; provided that he shall not be deemed to be disqualified by a temporary absence from the State.

-- 3. No person ent.i.tled by this Const.i.tution to elect or to be elected President of the United States, or a Senator or Representative in the Legislature thereof, shall be disqualified but by the conviction of some offence for which the law shall have previously ordained the punishment of disqualification. But the Legislature may by law provide that persons holding offices under the United States or either of them shall not be eligible to a place in the a.s.sembly or Senate, and shall be during their continuance in office suspended from sitting in the Senate.

-- 4. No person having an office or place of trust under the United States shall without permission of the Legislature accept any present emolument office or t.i.tle from any foreign Prince or State.

-- 5. The Citizens of each State shall be ent.i.tled to the rights privileges and immunities of Citizens in every other State; and full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of another.

-- 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be found in another shall be delivered up on the application of the State from which they fled.

-- 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of another, or by the junction of two or more States, without the concurrent consent of the Legislatures of the United States and of the States concerned. The Legislature of the United States may admit new States into the Union.

-- 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to guarantee to each State a Republican form of Government, and to protect each State as well against domestic violence as foreign invasion.

-- 9. All Treaties, Contracts and engagements of the United States of America under the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, shall have equal validity under this Const.i.tution.

-- 10. No State shall enter into a Treaty, Alliance, or contract with another, or with a foreign power without the consent of the United States.

-- 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States and of each State, and all officers Executive & Judicial of the one and of the other shall take an oath or affirmation to support the Const.i.tution of the United States.

-- 12. This Const.i.tution may receive such alterations and amendments as may be proposed by the Legislature of the United States, with the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both Houses, and ratified by the Legislatures of, or by Conventions of deputies chosen by the people in, two thirds of the States composing the Union.

ARTICLE X

This Const.i.tution shall be submitted to the consideration of Conventions in the several States, the members whereof shall be chosen by the people of such States respectively under the direction of their respective Legislatures. Each Convention which shall ratify the same, shall appoint the first representatives and Senators from such State according to the rule prescribed in the ---- -- of the ---- article.

The representatives so appointed shall continue in office for one year only. Each Convention so ratifying shall give notice thereof to the Congress of the United States, transmitting at the same time a list of the Representatives and Senators chosen. When the Const.i.tution shall have been duly ratified, Congress shall give notice of a day and place for the meeting of the Senators and Representatives from the several States; and when these or a majority of them shall have a.s.sembled according to such notice, they shall by joint ballot, by plurality of votes, elect a President of the United States; and the Const.i.tution thus organized shall be carried into effect.--_Mad. MSS._

"Col: Hamilton did not propose in the Convention any plan of a Const.i.tution. He had sketched an outline which he read as part of a speech; observing that he did not mean it as a proposition, but only to give a more correct view of his ideas.

"Mr. Patterson regularly proposed a plan which was discussed & voted on."--Madison to John Quincy Adams, Montpellier, Nov. 2, 1818, _Dept. of State MSS._, Miscellaneous Letters.

Committee rose & the House Adjourned.

TUESDAY JUNE 19^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE ON THE PROPOSITIONS OF M^R PATTERSON,--[90]

[90] This was the last session of the Convention in Committee of the Whole.

The subst.i.tute offered yesterday by M^r d.i.c.kenson being rejected by a vote now taken on it; Con. N. Y. N. J. Del. ay. Ma.s.s. P^a V. N. C. S. C.

Geo. no. Mary^d divided M^r Patterson's plan was again at large before the Committee.

M^r Madison. Much stress has been laid by some gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention to propose any other than a _federal_ plan. To what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a _federal_ plan would support this objection. One characteristic, was that in a _federal_ Government, the power was exercised not on the people individually; but on the people _collectively_, on the _States_. Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances the amendments to it proposed by M^r Patterson, must operate immediately on individuals. The other characteristic was, that a _federal_ Gov^t derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connect^t & Rh. Island, the delegates to Cong^s were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at large; and the plan of M^r P. intended no change in this particular.

It had been alledged (by M^r Patterson), that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts?

does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal Union as a.n.a.lagous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it cannot be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the breach of _any_ article by _any_ of the parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is _implied_ in the compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indefinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circ.u.mstance shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as a.n.a.lagous to the social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Const.i.tution for the whole, which the Gentl^n from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we consider the federal Union as a.n.a.lagous not to the Social compacts among individual men: but to the conventions among individual States, What is the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and even that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of Confederation? So far from it that there is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N.

Jersey herself; by which she _expressly refused_ to comply with a Const.i.tutional requisition of Cong^s and yielded no farther to the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without pa.s.sing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now stands.

Proceeding to the consideration of M^r Patterson's plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1. to preserve the Union. 2. to provide a Governm^t that will remedy the evils felt by the States both in their united and individual capacities. Examine M^r P'^s plan, & say whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.

1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Cong^s contain complaints already, from almost every Nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrouled as ever.

2. Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves, as well as in every other confederated republic antient and modern. By the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Cong^s.

Yet in several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them. In like manner no two or more States can form among themselves any treaties &c. without the consent of Cong^s. Yet Virg^a & Mary^d in one instance--Pen^a & N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. No State again can of right raise troops in time of peace without the like consent. Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the most scrupulous observance. Has not Ma.s.s^{ts}, notwithstanding, the most powerful member of the Union, already raised a body of troops? Is she not now augmenting them, without having even deigned to apprise Cong^s of Her intention? In fine--Have we not seen the public land dealt out to Con^t to bribe her acquiescence in the decree const.i.tutionally awarded ag^{st} her claim on the territory of Pen^a: for no other possible motive can account for the policy of Cong^s in that measure?--If we recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole. He then reviewed the Amphyctionic & Achaean confederacies among the antients, and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns, tracing their a.n.a.logy to the U. States in the const.i.tution and extent of their federal authorities--in the tendency of the particular members to usurp on these authorities, and to bring confusion & ruin on the whole.--He observed that the plan of Mr. Pat[er]son, besides omitting a controul over the States as a general defence of the federal prerogatives was particularly defective in two of its provisions. 1. Its ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the _legislatures_. It could not therefore render the acts of Cong^s in pursuance of their powers, even legally _paramount_ to the acts of the States. 2. It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only--even in the criminal cases enumerated. The necessity of any such provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the State tribunals, of what avail c^d an appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides in most if not all of the States, the Executives have by their respective _Const.i.tutions_, the right of pard^g. How could this be taken from them by a _legislative_ ratification only?

3. Will it prevent trespa.s.ses of the States on each other? Of these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virg^a & Maryland which gave a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the Citizens of other States are ent.i.tled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper money & other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States relatively to one another being each of them either Debtor or Creditor; The creditor States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating Acts on the subject which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the tranquillity of the Union. The plan of M^r Paterson, not giving even a negative on the Acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects ag^{st} each other.

4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the States themselves?

The insurrections in Ma.s.s^{ts} admonished all the States of the danger to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of M^r P. contained no provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point.

According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous. According to fact & experience, a minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for the majority. 1. If the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill & habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the remaining two thirds. 2.

one third of those who partic.i.p.ate in the choice of rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons may be more ready to join the standard of sedition than that of established Government. 3.

where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.

5. Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to the particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the political system of the U. S. it is proper to take into view those which prevail within the States individually as well as those which affect them collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the whole; and there is great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full share in the motives which produced the present Convention. Under this head he enumerated and animadverted on 1. the multiplicity of the laws pa.s.sed by the several States. 2. the mutability of their laws. 3. the injustice of them. 4. the impotence of them: observing that M^r Patterson's plan contained no remedy for this dreadful cla.s.s of evils, and could not therefore be received as an adequate provision for the exigencies of the Community.

6. Will it secure the Union ag^{st} the influence of foreign powers over its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: Among the Achaeans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the members of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia--And in the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of M^r Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the will of the particular States, left the door open for the like pernicious Machinations among ourselves.

7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to M^r Patterson's plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them.

In the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if they were willing to bear this burthen, no others had a right to complain. As far as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a representation, by which the public business was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress would satisfy every one that the public business had been frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most frequently unrepresented in Cong^s were not the larger States. He reminded the Convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State the burden of maintaining a Representation in Cong^s. During a considerable period of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in whom alone before the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen & Resident of Pen^a and held an office in his own State incompatible with an appointment from it to Cong^s. During another period, the same State was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penn^a and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been intended to avoid the burden of supporting Delegates from their own State. But whatever might have been y^e cause, was not in effect the vote of one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it?

In the 2^d place the coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He ill.u.s.trated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb w^{ch} could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.

8. He begged them to consider the situation in which they would remain in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful; but it would be prudent to submit to the task of examining it at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be the more readily embraced. Let the Union of the States be dissolved, and one of two consequences must happen. Either the States must remain individually independent & sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed among them. In the first event would the small States be more secure ag^{st} the ambition & power of their larger neighbours, than they would be under a General Government pervading with equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part ag^{st} every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would confederate with them on the principle of the present Confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or that they would exact less severe concessions from the smaller States, than are proposed in the scheme of M^r Randolph?

The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by both the gentlemen from N. Jersey, (M^r Brearly and M^r Patterson) that it would not be _just to allow Virg^a_ which was 16 times as large as Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was that it would not be _safe for Delaware_ to allow Virg^a 16 times as many votes. The expedient proposed by them was that all the States should be thrown into one ma.s.s and a new part.i.tion be made into 13 equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities existing in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of the different States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe (K. of France) directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic Ministers (M^r Neckar) that any age has produced, to equalize in some points only the different usages & regulations of the different provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and repart.i.tion of the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional representation to be real; would not a particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole community, and equally effectual for their own safety. If N.

Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in which case they would necessarily form a junction with their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty by the Const.i.tution to form such a junction whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither the inconveniency, nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would be lessened by confining it to themselves.--The prospect of many new States to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If they should come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants. If they sh^d be ent.i.tled to vote according to their proportions of inhabitants, all would be right & safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.[91]

[91] "Mr. d.i.c.kinson supposed that there were good regulations in both. Let us therefore contrast the one with the other, and consolidate such parts of them as the committee approve."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 140.

On a question for postponing generally the 1^{st} proposition of M^r Patterson's plan, it was agreed to: N. Y. & N. J. only being no.

On the question moved by M^r King whether the Co[~m]itee should rise & M^r Randolph's proposition be reported without alteration, which was in fact a question whether M^r R's should be adhered to as preferable to those of M^r Patterson;

Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.

M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Copy of the Resol^{ns} of Mr. R. as altered in Com^e and reported to the House.

(Of M^r Randolph's plan as reported from the Co[~m]ittee)--the 1.

propos: "that a Nat^l Gov^t ought to be established consisting &c."

being taken up in the House.