Their Finest Hour Part 19

23.VII.40.

Where is the South African Union Brigade of ten thousand men? Why is it playing no part in the Middle East? We have agreed today to send further reinforcements of Hurricanes and other modern aircraft to the South African Air Force. What is happening to the concert of the campaign in the Middle East? What has been done by the Committee of Ministers I recently set up? Now that large naval operations are contemplated in the Mediterranean, it is all the more essential that the attack on the Italian position in Abyssinia should be pressed and concerted by all means. Make sure I have a report about the position, which I can consider on Thursday morning.

I felt an acute need of talking over the serious events impending in the Libyan Desert with General Wavell himself. I had hot met this distinguished officer, on whom so much was resting, and I asked the Secretary of State for War to invite him over for a week for consultation when an opportunity could be found. He arrived on August 8. He toiled with the Staffs and had several long conversations with me and Mr. Eden. The command in the Middle East at that time comprised an extraordinary amalgam of military, political, diplomatic, and administrative problems of extreme complexity. It took more than a year of ups and downs for me and my colleagues to learn the need of dividing the responsibilities of the Middle East between a Commander-in-Chief, a Minister of State, and an Intendant-General to cope with the supply problem. While not in full agreement with General Wavell's use of the resources at his disposal, I thought it best to leave him in command. I admired his fine qualities, and was impressed with the confidence so many people had in him.

The discussions, both oral and written, were severe. As usual I put my case in black and white.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for General Wavell.

10.VIII.40.

I am very much obliged to you for explaining to me so fully the situation in Egypt and Somaliland. We have yet to discuss the position in Kenya and Abyssinia. I mentioned the very large forces which you have in Kenya, namely, the Union Brigade of six thousand white South Africans, probably as fine material as exists for warfare in s.p.a.cious countries; the East African settlers, who should certainly amount to two thousand men, thoroughly used to the country; the two West African Brigades, brought at much inconvenience from the West Coast, numbering six thousand; at least two brigades of King's African Rifles (K.A.R.); the whole at least twenty thousand men there may be more. Why should these all stand idle in Kenya waiting for an Italian invasion to make its way across the very difficult distances from Abyssinia to the south, or preparing themselves for a similar difficult inroad into Abyssinia, which must again entail long delays, while all the time the fate of the Middle East, and much else, may be decided at Alexandria or on the Ca.n.a.l?Without, of course, knowing the exact conditions locally, I should suppose that a reasonable disposition would be to hold Kenya with the settlers and the K.A.R., and delay any Italian advance southward, it being so much easier to bring troops round by sea than for the Italians to make their way overland. Thus we can always reinforce them unexpectedly and swiftly. This would allow the Union Brigade and the two West African Brigades to come round at once into the Delta, giving you a most valuable reinforcement in the decisive theatre at the decisive moment. What is the use of having the command of the sea if it is not to pa.s.s troops to and fro with great rapidity from one theatre to another? I am sure I could persuade General s.m.u.ts to allow this movement of the Union Brigade. Perhaps you will let me have your views on this by tomorrow night, as time is so short.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for General Wavell.

12.VIII.40.

1. I am not at all satisfied about the Union Brigade and the West African Brigade in Kenya. These forces as now disposed would play no part in the critical attacks now being developed against Egypt, Khartoum, and Somaliland. It is always considered a capital blemish on military operations that large bodies of troops should be standing idle while decisions are reached elsewhere. Without further information, I cannot accept the statement that the South African Brigade is so far untrained that it cannot go into action. The Natal Carbineers were much further advanced in training before the war than our British Territorials, and they have presumably been embodied since the declaration. I cannot see why the Union Brigade as a whole should be considered in any way inferior to British Territorial units. Anyhow, they are certainly good enough to fight Italians. I have asked for full particulars of their embodiment and training in each case.2. I do not consider that proper use is being made of the large forces in Palestine. The essence of the situation depends on arming the Jewish colonists sufficiently to enable them to undertake their own defence, so that if necessary for a short time the whole of Palestine can be left to very small British forces. A proposal should be made to liberate immediately a large portion of the garrison, including the Yeomanry Cavalry Division. I do not understand why the Australians and New Zealanders who have been training in Palestine for at least six months should be able to provide only one brigade for service in Egypt. How many of them are there, and what are the facts of their training? These men were brought at great expense from Australia, having been selected as the first volunteers for service in Europe. Many of them had previous military training, and have done nearly a year's training since the war broke out. How disgraceful it would be if owing to our mishandling of this important force only one brigade took part in the decisive operations for the defence of Egypt!3. The two West African brigades could certainly be brought to Khartoum via Port Soudan. It is a very good policy to mix native units from various sources, so that one lot can be used to keep the other in discipline. These two brigades ought to be moved immediately to the Soudan, so that the Indian Division can be used in Egypt or Somaliland as soon as it arrives. I do not know why these brigades were taken away from West Africa, if the only use to be made of them was to garrison Kenya.4. Let me have a return of the white settlers of military age in Kenya. Are we to believe they have not formed any local units for the defence of their own province? If not, the sooner they are made to realise their position the better. No troops ought to be in Kenya at the present time other than the settlers and the K.A.R. Considering the risks and trouble we are taking to reinforce Egypt from home, it cannot be accepted that forces on the spot should not be used to the highest capacity at the critical moment.5. Let me have a full account of the two British divisions in the Delta. It is misleading to think in divisions in this area, nor can any plea that they are not properly equipped in every detail be allowed to prejudice the employment of these fine Regular troops.6. Surely the statement that the enemy's armoured forces and vehicles can move just as easily along the desert as along the coastal road requires further examination. This might apply to caterpillar vehicles, but these would suffer severely if forced to make long journeys over the rocky and soft deserts. Anyhow, wheeled transport would be hampered in the desert unless provided with desert-expanded india-rubber tyres of a special type. Are the Italian vehicles so fitted, and to what extent?7. What arrangements have been made to "depotabilise" 1 1 for long periods any wells or water supplies we do not require for ourselves? Has a store of delayed-action fuzes been provided for mines in roadways which are to be abandoned? Make sure that a supply of the longest delayed-action fuzes, i.e., up to at least a fortnight (but I hope they run longer now), are sent to Egypt by the first s.h.i.+p to go through. Examine whether it is not possible to destroy the asphalt of the tarmac road as it is abandoned by chemical action of heavy petroleum oil, or some other treatment. for long periods any wells or water supplies we do not require for ourselves? Has a store of delayed-action fuzes been provided for mines in roadways which are to be abandoned? Make sure that a supply of the longest delayed-action fuzes, i.e., up to at least a fortnight (but I hope they run longer now), are sent to Egypt by the first s.h.i.+p to go through. Examine whether it is not possible to destroy the asphalt of the tarmac road as it is abandoned by chemical action of heavy petroleum oil, or some other treatment.8. Let me have a statement in full and exact detail of all units in the Middle East, including Polish and French volunteers and arrivals.I should be glad to discuss all these points tonight.

As a result of the Staff discussions on August 10, Dill, with Eden's ardent approval, wrote me that the War Office were arranging to send immediately to Egypt one cruiser tank battalion of fifty-two tanks, one light tank regiment (fifty-two tanks), and one infantry tank battalion of fifty tanks, together with forty-eight anti-tank guns, twenty Bofors light anti-aircraft, forty-eight twenty-five-pounder field guns, five hundred Bren guns, and two hundred and fifty anti-tank rifles, with the necessary ammunition. These would start as soon as they could be loaded. The only question open was whether they should go round the Cape or take a chance through the Mediterranean. I pressed the Admiralty hard, as will be seen in a later chapter, for direct convoy through the Mediterranean. Much discussion proceeded on this latter point. Meanwhile, the Cabinet approved the embarkation and despatch of the armoured force, leaving the final decision about which way they should go till the convoy approached Gibraltar. This option remained open to us till August 26, by which time we should know a good deal more about the imminence of any Italian attack. No time was lost. The decision to give this blood-transfusion while we braced ourselves to meet a mortal danger, was at once awful and right. No one faltered.

The following directive, which we had thrashed out together, was finally drafted by me, and the Cabinet approved it without amendment in accord with the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

16.VIII.40.

(General directive for Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.)1. A major invasion of Egypt from Libya must be expected at any time now. It is necessary, therefore, to a.s.semble and deploy the largest possible army upon and towards the western frontier. All political and administrative considerations must be set in proper subordination to this.2. The evacuation of Somaliland is enforced upon us by the enemy, but is none the less strategically convenient. All forces in or a.s.signed to Somaliland should be sent to Aden, to the Soudan via Port Soudan, or to Egypt, as may be thought best.3. The defence of Kenya must rank after after the defence of the Soudan. There should be time after the crisis in Egypt and the Soudan is pa.s.sed to reinforce Kenya by sea and rail before any large Italian expedition can reach the Tana River. We can always reinforce Kenya faster than Italy can pa.s.s troops thither from Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland. the defence of the Soudan. There should be time after the crisis in Egypt and the Soudan is pa.s.sed to reinforce Kenya by sea and rail before any large Italian expedition can reach the Tana River. We can always reinforce Kenya faster than Italy can pa.s.s troops thither from Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland.4. Accordingly either the two West African Brigades or two brigades of the K.A.R. should be moved forthwith to Khartoum. General s.m.u.ts is being asked to allow the Union Brigade, or a large part of it, to move to the Ca.n.a.l Zone and the Delta for internal security purposes. Arrangements should be made to continue their training. The Admiralty are being asked to report on s.h.i.+pping possibilities in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.5. In view of the increased air attack which may be expected in the Red Sea following upon the Italian conquest of British Somaliland, the air reinforcement of Aden becomes important.6. The two brigades, one of Regulars and the other Australian, which are held ready in Palestine should now move into the Delta in order to clear the Palestine communications for the movement of further reserves, as soon as they can be equipped for field service or organised for internal security duties.7. However, immediately three or four regiments of British cavalry, without their horses, should take over the necessary duties in the Ca.n.a.l Zone, liberating the three Regular battalions there for general reserve of the Field Army of the Delta.8. The rest of the Australians in Palestine, numbering six battalions, will thus [also] be available at five days' notice to move into the Delta for internal security or other emergency employment. The Polish Brigade and the French Volunteer Unit should move to the Delta from Palestine as may be convenient and join the general reserve.9. The movement of the Indian division now embarking or in transit should be accelerated to the utmost. Unless some of the troops evacuated from Somaliland and not needed for Aden are found sufficient to reinforce the Soudan, in addition to reinforcements from Kenya, this whole division, as is most desirable, should proceed to Suez to join the Army of the Delta [later called the Army of the Nile]. In addition to the above, at least three batteries of British artillery, although horse-drawn, must be embarked immediately from India for Suez. Admiralty to arrange transport.10. Most of the above movements should be completed between September 15 and October 1, and on this basis the Army of the Delta should comprise: (1) The British Armoured Force in Egypt.(2) The four British battalions at Mersa Matruh, the two at Alexandria, and the two in Cairo total, eight.(3) The three battalions from the Ca.n.a.l Zone.(4) The reserve British Brigade from Palestine total, fourteen British Regular infantry battalions.(5) The New Zealand Brigade.(6) The Australian Brigade from Palestine.(7) The Polish Brigade.(8) Part of the Union Brigade from East Africa.(9) The Fourth Indian Division now in rear of Mersa Matruh.(10) The new Indian division in transit.(11) The eleven thousand men in drafts arriving almost at once at Suez.(12) All the artillery (one hundred and fifty guns) now in the Middle East or en route en route from India. from India.(13) The Egyptian Army so far as it can be used for field operations.

11. The above should const.i.tute by October 1, at the latest thirty-nine battalions, together with the armoured forces; a total of 56,000 men and 212 guns. This is exclusive of internal security troops.

(Part II)12. It is hoped that the armoured brigade from England of three regiments of tanks will be pa.s.sed through the Mediterranean by the Admiralty. If this is impossible, their arrival round the Cape may be counted upon during the first fortnight in October. The arrival of this force in September must be deemed so important as to justify a considerable degree of risk in its transportation.

(Part III) Tactical employment of the above force: Tactical employment of the above force:13. The Mersa Matruh position must be fortified completely and with the utmost speed. The sector held by the three Egyptian battalions must be taken over by three British battalions, making the force h.o.m.ogeneous. This must be done even if the Egyptian Government wish to withdraw the artillery now in the hands of these three battalions. The possibility of reinforcing by sea the Mersa Matruh position and cutting enemy communications, once they have pa.s.sed by on their march to the Delta, must be studied with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. Alternatively a descent upon the communications at Sollum or farther west may be preferred.14. All water supplies between Mersa Matruh and the Alexandria defences must be rendered "depotable." 2 2 A special note on this is attached. No attempt should be made to leave small parties to defend the wells near the coast in this region. The 4th Indian Division should withdraw upon Alexandria when necessary or be taken off by sea. The road from Sollum to Mersa Matruh, and still more the tarmac road from Mersa Matruh to Alexandria, must be rendered impa.s.sable, as it is abandoned, by delayed-action mines or by chemical treatment of the asphalt surface. A special note on this is attached. No attempt should be made to leave small parties to defend the wells near the coast in this region. The 4th Indian Division should withdraw upon Alexandria when necessary or be taken off by sea. The road from Sollum to Mersa Matruh, and still more the tarmac road from Mersa Matruh to Alexandria, must be rendered impa.s.sable, as it is abandoned, by delayed-action mines or by chemical treatment of the asphalt surface.15. A main line of defence to be held by the whole Army of the Delta, with its reserves suitably disposed, must be prepared (as should long ago have been done) from Alexandria along the edge of the cultivated zone and irrigation ca.n.a.ls of the Delta. For this purpose the strongest concrete and sandbag works and pillboxes should be built or completed from the sea to the cultivated zone and the main irrigation ca.n.a.l. The pipeline forward of this line should be extended as fast as possible. The Delta zone is the most effective obstacle to tanks of all kinds, and can be lightly held by sandbag works to give protection to Egypt and form a very strong extended flank for the Alexandria front. A broad strip, four or five miles wide, should be inundated from the flood waters of the Nile, controlled at a.s.souan. Amid or behind this belt a series of strong posts armed with artillery should be constructed.16. In this posture, then, the Army of the Delta will await the Italian invasion. It must be expected that the enemy will advance in great force, limited only, but severely, by the supply of water and petrol. He will certainly have strong armoured forces in his right hand to contain and drive back our weaker forces unless these can be reinforced in time by the armoured regiment from Great Britain. He will mask, if he cannot storm, Mersa Matruh. But if the main line of the Delta is diligently fortified and resolutely held, he will be forced to deploy an army whose supply of water, petrol, food, and ammunition will be difficult. Once the army is deployed and seriously engaged, the action against his communications, from Mersa Matruh, by bombardment from the sea, by descent at Sollum, or even much farther west, would be a deadly blow to him.17. The campaign for the defence of the Delta, therefore, resolves itself into: strong defence with the left arm from Alexandria inland, and a reaching-out with the right hand, using sea-power upon his communications. strong defence with the left arm from Alexandria inland, and a reaching-out with the right hand, using sea-power upon his communications. At the same time it is hoped that the [our] reinforcements [acting] from Malta will hamper the sending of further reinforcements Italian or German from Europe into Africa. At the same time it is hoped that the [our] reinforcements [acting] from Malta will hamper the sending of further reinforcements Italian or German from Europe into Africa.18. All this might be put effectively in train by October 1, provided we are allowed the time. provided we are allowed the time. If not, we must do what we can. All trained or Regular units, whether fully equipped or not, must be used in defence of the Delta. All armed white men and also Indian or foreign units must be used for internal security. The Egyptian Army must be made to play its part in support of the Delta front, thus leaving only riotous crowds to be dealt with in Egypt proper. If not, we must do what we can. All trained or Regular units, whether fully equipped or not, must be used in defence of the Delta. All armed white men and also Indian or foreign units must be used for internal security. The Egyptian Army must be made to play its part in support of the Delta front, thus leaving only riotous crowds to be dealt with in Egypt proper.Pray let the above be implemented and be ready to discuss it in detail with me at 4.30 P.M P.M., August 16.

With this General Wavell returned to Cairo in the third week of August.

I now have to record a small but at the time vexatious military episode. The Italians, using vastly superior forces, drove us out of Somaliland. This story requires to be told.

Until December, 1939, our policy in a war with Italy was to evacuate Somaliland; but in that month General Ironside, C.I.G.S., declared for defence of the territory, and in the last resort to hold Berbera. Defences were to be prepared to defend the Tug Argen Gap through the hills. One British battalion (the Black Watch), two Indian, and two East African battalions, with the Somaliland Camel Corps and one African light battery, with small detachments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft units, were gathered by the beginning of August. General Wavell on July 21 telegraphed to the War Office that withdrawal without fighting would be disastrous for our influence, and that Somaliland might be a valuable base for further offensive action. Fighting began during his visit to London, and he told the Middle East Ministerial Committee that, although the strategic disadvantages of the loss of Somaliland would be slight, it would be a blow to our prestige.

The Italians entered British Somaliland on August 3 with three battalions of Italian infantry, fourteen of colonial infantry, two groups of pack artillery, and detachments of medium tanks, light tanks, and armoured cars. These large forces advanced upon us on August 10, and a new British commander, General G.o.dwin Austen, arrived on the night of the 11th. In his instructions he had been told, "Your task is to prevent any Italian advance beyond the main position.... You will take the necessary steps for withdrawal if necessary." Fighting took place on the 12th and 13th, and one of our four key-positions was captured from us after heavy artillery bombardment. On the night of the 15th, General G.o.dwin Austen determined to withdraw. This, he said, "was the only course to save us from disastrous defeat and annihilation." The Middle East Headquarters authorised evacuation, and this was successfully achieved under a strong rearguard of the Black Watch.

I was far from satisfied with the tactical conduct of this affair, which remains on record as our only defeat at Italian hands. At this particular moment, when formidable events impended in Egypt and when so much depended on our prestige, the rebuff caused injury far beyond its strategic scale. There was much jubilation in Italy, and Mussolini exulted in the prospects of his attack on the Nile Valley. General Wavell, however, defended the local commander, affirming that the fighting had been severe.

In view of the great business we had together, I did not press my view further either with the War Office or with General Wavell.

Our information at this time showed a rapid increase in the Italian forces in Albania and a consequent menace to Greece. As the German preparations for the invasion of Britain grew in scale and became more evident, it would have been particularly inconvenient to lessen our bombing attack on the German and Dutch river mouths and French ports, where barges were being collected. I had formed no decision in my own mind about moving bomber squadrons away from home. It is often wise, however, to have plans worked out in detail. Strange as it may seem, the Air Force, except in the air, is the least mobile of all the Services. A squadron can reach its destination in a few hours, but its establishment, depots, fuel, spare parts, and workshops take many weeks, and even months, to develop.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to C.A.S. and General Ismay.

28.VIII.40.

Pray let me have proposals for moving at least four heavy bombing squadrons to Egypt in addition to anything now in progress. These squadrons will operate from advanced bases in Greece as far as may be convenient should Greece be forced into the war by Italy. They would refuel there before attacking Italy. Many of the finest targets, including the Italian Fleet, will be open to such attacks. It is better to operate from Greece, should she come in, than from Malta in its present undefended state. The report should be brief, and should simply show the method, the difficulties, and the objectives, together with a time-table. It is not necessary to argue the question of policy, which will be decided by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Making the best plan possible will not commit the Air Ministry or anyone else to the adoption of the plan, but every effort is to be made to solve its difficulties.

I cannot better end this chapter than by the report I gave of the situation in August to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

This followed up my message of June 16.

Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

11.VIII.40.

The combined Staffs are preparing a paper on the Pacific situation, but I venture to send you in advance a brief foreword. We are trying our best to avoid war with j.a.pan, both by conceding on points where the j.a.panese military clique can perhaps force a rupture, and by standing up where the ground is less dangerous, as in arrests [by the j.a.panese] of individuals. I do not think myself that j.a.pan will declare war unless Germany can make a successful invasion of Britain. Once j.a.pan sees that Germany has either failed or dares not try, I look for easier times in the Pacific. In adopting against the grain a yielding policy towards j.a.panese threats, we have always in mind your interests and safety.Should j.a.pan nevertheless declare war on us, her first objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Dutch East Indies. Evidently the United States would not like this. What they would do we cannot tell. They give no undertaking of support, but their main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the j.a.panese Admiralty. In this first phase of an Anglo-j.a.panese war we should, of course, defend Singapore, which if attacked which is unlikely ought to stand a long siege. We should also be able to base on Ceylon a battle cruiser and a fast aircraft-carrier, which with all the Australian and New Zealand cruisers and destroyers, which would return to you, would act as a very powerful deterrent upon the hostile raiding cruisers.We are about to reinforce with more first-cla.s.s units the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. This fleet could, of course, at any time be sent through the Ca.n.a.l into the Indian Ocean, or to relieve Singapore. We do not want to do this, even if j.a.pan declares war, until it is found to be vital to your safety. Such a transference would entail the complete loss of the Middle East, and all prospect of beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be gone. We must expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the near future, and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet is needed to help in repelling them. If these attacks succeed, the Eastern Fleet would have to leave the Mediterranean either through the Ca.n.a.l or by Gibraltar. In either case a large part of it would be available for your protection. We hope, however, to maintain ourselves in Egypt, and to keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the first phase of an Anglo-j.a.panese war, should that occur. No one can lay down beforehand what is going to happen. We must just weigh events from day to day, and use our available resources to the utmost.A final question arises: whether j.a.pan, having declared war, would attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand with a considerable army. We think this very unlikely, first, because j.a.pan is absorbed in China, secondly, would be gathering rich prizes in the Dutch East Indies, and, thirdly, would fear very much to send an important part of her fleet far to the southward, leaving the American Fleet between it and home. If, however, contrary to prudence and self-interest, j.a.pan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet to a.s.sure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and sacrifice every interest, except only the defence and feeding of this island, on which all depends, and would proceed in good time to your aid with a fleet able to give battle to any j.a.panese force which could be placed in Australian waters, and able to parry any invading force, or certainly cut its communications with j.a.pan.We hope, however, that events will take a different turn. By gaining time with j.a.pan the present dangerous situation may be got over. We are vastly stronger here at home than when I cabled to you in May. We have a large army now beginning to be well equipped. We have fortified our beaches. We have a strong reserve of mobile troops, including our Regular Army and Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian contingents, with several armoured divisions or brigades ready to strike in counter-attack at the head of any successful lodgment. We have ferried over from the United States their grand aid of nearly a thousand guns and six hundred thousand rifles with ammunition complete. Relieved of the burden of defending France, our Army is becoming daily more powerful and munitions are gathering. Besides this, we have the Home Guard of 1,500,000 men, many of them war veterans, and most with rifles or other arms.The Royal Air Force continues to show that same individual superiority over the enemy on which I counted so much in my cable to you of June 16. Yesterday's important action in the Channel showed that we could attack against odds of three to one, and inflict losses of three and a half to one. Astounding progress has been made by Lord Beaverbrook in output of the best machines. Our fighter and bomber strength is nearly double what it was when I cabled you, and we have a very large reserve of machines in hand. I do not think the German Air Force has the numbers or quality to overpower our air defences.The Navy increases in strength each month, and we are now beginning to receive the immense programme started at the declaration of war. Between June and December, 1940, over five hundred vessels, large and small, but many most important, will join the Fleet. The German Navy is weaker than it has ever been. Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Gneisenau Gneisenau are both in dock damaged, are both in dock damaged, Bismarck Bismarck has not yet done her trials, has not yet done her trials, Tirpitz Tirpitz is three months behind is three months behind Bismarck. Bismarck. There are available now in this critical fortnight, after which the time for invasion is getting very late, only one pocket-battles.h.i.+p, a couple of eight-inch There are available now in this critical fortnight, after which the time for invasion is getting very late, only one pocket-battles.h.i.+p, a couple of eight-inch Hippers, Hippers, two light cruisers, and perhaps a score of destroyers. To try to transport a large army, as would now be needed for success, across the seas virtually without escort in the face of our Navy and air force, only to meet our powerful military force on sh.o.r.e, still more to maintain such an army and nourish its lodgments with munitions and supplies, would be a very unreasonable act. On the other hand, if Hitler fails to invade and conquer Britain before the weather breaks, he has received his first and probably fatal check. two light cruisers, and perhaps a score of destroyers. To try to transport a large army, as would now be needed for success, across the seas virtually without escort in the face of our Navy and air force, only to meet our powerful military force on sh.o.r.e, still more to maintain such an army and nourish its lodgments with munitions and supplies, would be a very unreasonable act. On the other hand, if Hitler fails to invade and conquer Britain before the weather breaks, he has received his first and probably fatal check.We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction of our power to defend ourselves successfully, and to persevere through the year or two that may be necessary to gain victory.

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7.

The Mediterranean Pa.s.sage

The New Situation - France Out, Italy In - Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria - Successful Action off Calabria - Increasing Naval Burdens - Mediterranean Inhibitions - My Minute of July 12 and the First Sea Lord's Reply - My Minute of July 15 - Admiral Cunningham's Views on Sending Reinforcements Through the Mediterranean - The First Sea Lord's Minute of July 23 - The Plan for "Operation Hats" - My Efforts to Send the Tanks Through the Mediterranean - My Minute of August 13 - Failure to Persuade the Admiralty - Conduct of "Operation Hats" - Successful Daring - Need for Bombarding Vessels - My Telegram to Admiral Cunningham of September 8 - Hard Efforts to Succour Malta Air Defence - Admiral Somerville's Excursions - The Takoradi Route to Egypt Opened - A Vital Trickle - Malta Still in the Foreground.

UNTIL THE F FRENCH COLLAPSE the control of the Mediterranean had been shared between the British and French Fleets. At Gibraltar we had maintained a small force of cruisers and destroyers watching the Straits. In the Eastern Basin lay our Mediterranean Fleet, based on Alexandria. This had been reinforced earlier in the year, when the Italian att.i.tude became menacing, to a force of four battles.h.i.+ps, seven cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, one aircraft-carrier, and twelve submarines. The French Mediterranean Fleet comprised five capital s.h.i.+ps, one aircraft-carrier, fourteen cruisers, and many smaller s.h.i.+ps. Now France was out and Italy was in. The numerically powerful Italian Fleet included six battles.h.i.+ps, including two of the latest type the control of the Mediterranean had been shared between the British and French Fleets. At Gibraltar we had maintained a small force of cruisers and destroyers watching the Straits. In the Eastern Basin lay our Mediterranean Fleet, based on Alexandria. This had been reinforced earlier in the year, when the Italian att.i.tude became menacing, to a force of four battles.h.i.+ps, seven cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, one aircraft-carrier, and twelve submarines. The French Mediterranean Fleet comprised five capital s.h.i.+ps, one aircraft-carrier, fourteen cruisers, and many smaller s.h.i.+ps. Now France was out and Italy was in. The numerically powerful Italian Fleet included six battles.h.i.+ps, including two of the latest type (Littorios), (Littorios), mounting fifteen-inch guns, but two of the older s.h.i.+ps were being reconstructed and were not immediately ready for service. Besides this, their Fleet comprised nineteen modern cruisers, seven of which were of the eight-inch-gun type, one hundred and twenty destroyers and torpedo-boats, and over a hundred submarines. mounting fifteen-inch guns, but two of the older s.h.i.+ps were being reconstructed and were not immediately ready for service. Besides this, their Fleet comprised nineteen modern cruisers, seven of which were of the eight-inch-gun type, one hundred and twenty destroyers and torpedo-boats, and over a hundred submarines.

In addition a strong Italian Air Force was ranged against us. So formidable did the situation appear at the end of June that Admiralty first thoughts contemplated the abandonment of the Eastern Mediterranean and concentration at Gibraltar. I resisted this policy, which, though justified on paper by the strength of the Italian Fleet, did not correspond to my impressions of the fighting values, and also seemed to spell the doom of Malta. It was resolved to fight it out at both ends. On July 3 the Chiefs of Staffs prepared a paper about the Mediterranean in which they stressed the importance of the Middle East as a war theatre, but recognised that for the time being our policy must be generally defensive. The possibility of a German attack on Egypt must be taken seriously but so long as the Fleet could be retained in the Eastern Mediterranean our existing forces were enough to deal with purely local attack.

We have seen how, at the end of June, Force H was const.i.tuted at Gibraltar under Admiral Somerville. It comprised the Hood, Resolution, Hood, Resolution, and and Valiant, Valiant, the carrier the carrier Ark Royal, Ark Royal, two cruisers, and eleven destroyers. With this we had done the deed at Oran. In the Eastern Mediterranean we found in Admiral Andrew Cunningham an officer of the highest qualities and dauntless character. Immediately upon the Italian declaration of war, he put to sea in search of the enemy. The Royal Air Force attacked Tobruk and sank the old Italian cruiser two cruisers, and eleven destroyers. With this we had done the deed at Oran. In the Eastern Mediterranean we found in Admiral Andrew Cunningham an officer of the highest qualities and dauntless character. Immediately upon the Italian declaration of war, he put to sea in search of the enemy. The Royal Air Force attacked Tobruk and sank the old Italian cruiser San Giorgio. San Giorgio. The Fleet bombarded Bardia from the sea. Submarines on both sides were active, and we destroyed ten of the enemy for the loss of three of our own from deep mining before the end of June. The Fleet bombarded Bardia from the sea. Submarines on both sides were active, and we destroyed ten of the enemy for the loss of three of our own from deep mining before the end of June.

On July 8, whilst covering the pa.s.sage of a convoy from Malta to Alexandria, Admiral Cunningham became aware of the presence of powerful Italian forces. It was evident from the intensity of Italian air attacks that the enemy also was engaged in an important operation, and we now know that they planned to lead the British Admiral into an area where he could be subjected to concentrated attack by the full weight of the Italian Air Force and submarines. Admiral Cunningham at once seized the initiative, and, despite his inferiority in numbers, boldly turned to interpose his fleet between the enemy and their base.

On the following day contact was made and an action at long range ensued, in which one enemy battles.h.i.+p and two cruisers were hit without any damage being suffered by the British Fleet. The enemy refused to stand and fight, and, thanks to his superior speed, was able to escape, pursued by Admiral Cunningham to a point within twenty-five miles of the Italian mainland. Throughout this and the next two days the intense air attacks continued without success, and the convoy, though frequently bombed, reached Alexandria safely. This spirited action established the ascendancy of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean and Italian prestige suffered a blow from which it never recovered. Ten days later the Sydney, Sydney, an Australian cruiser, with a British destroyer flotilla, sank an Italian cruiser. Our first contacts with the new enemy were therefore by no means discouraging. an Australian cruiser, with a British destroyer flotilla, sank an Italian cruiser. Our first contacts with the new enemy were therefore by no means discouraging.

The burdens which lay upon the Admiralty at this time were, however, heavy in the extreme. The invasion danger required a high concentration of flotillas and small craft in the Channel and North Sea. The U-boats, which had by August begun to work from Biscayan ports, took severe toll of our Atlantic convoys without suffering many losses themselves. Until now the Italian fleet had never been tested. The possibility of a j.a.panese declaration of war, with all that it would bring upon our Eastern Empire, could never be excluded from our thoughts. It is therefore not strange that the Admiralty viewed with the deepest anxiety all risking of wars.h.i.+ps in the Mediterranean, and were sorely tempted to adopt the strictest defensive at Gibraltar and Alexandria. I, on the other hand, did not see why the large numbers of s.h.i.+ps a.s.signed to the Mediterranean should not play an active part from the outset. Malta had to be reinforced both with air squadrons and troops. Although all commercial traffic was rightly suspended, and all large troop convoys to Egypt must go round the Cape, I could not bring myself to accept the absolute closure of the inland sea. Indeed I hoped that by running a few special convoys we might arrange and provoke a trial of strength with the Italian Fleet. I hoped that this might happen, and Malta be properly garrisoned and equipped with airplanes and A.A. guns before the appearance, which I already dreaded, of the Germans in this theatre. All through the summer and autumn months I engaged in friendly though tense discussion with the Admiralty upon this part of our war effort.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

12.VII.40.

I thought that Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious might well go to the Mediterranean and exchange with might well go to the Mediterranean and exchange with Ark Ark Royal. Royal. In this case In this case Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious could take perhaps a good lot of Hurricanes to Malta. As we have a number of Hurricanes surplus at the moment, could not the Malta Gladiator pilots fly the Hurricanes themselves? This would not diminish our flying strength in this country. could take perhaps a good lot of Hurricanes to Malta. As we have a number of Hurricanes surplus at the moment, could not the Malta Gladiator pilots fly the Hurricanes themselves? This would not diminish our flying strength in this country.The operation against Lulea [in the Baltic] has become less important now that the Germans have control of all the French and Belgian orefields. We must look to the Mediterranean for action.You were going to let me have your plan for exchanging destroyers of more endurance with the Mediterranean flotilla. Could I have this with dates?

To this Admiral Pound replied through the First Lord the same day: We have now gained experience of the air conditions in the Western Mediterranean and as soon as the present operation on which the Eastern Fleet is employed is completed, we shall know pretty well what we are faced with in the Eastern Mediterranean.There is no doubt that both Force H and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet work under a grave disadvantage inasmuch as it is not possible to give them fighter protection, as we do in the North Sea when s.h.i.+ps are in the bombing area.At the moment we are faced with the immediate problem of getting aircraft and A-A guns to Malta, and aircraft to Alexandria. I am not at all certain that the risk of pa.s.sing a s.h.i.+p with all these available stores through the Mediterranean is not too great, and that it might not be better to accept the delay of sending her round the Cape.There is also the question of Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious to be considered, but this need not be settled immediately as she must first come home to embark a full complement of Fulmar fighters. to be considered, but this need not be settled immediately as she must first come home to embark a full complement of Fulmar fighters.Arrangements arc being made to replace some of the destroyers at Gibraltar by others with longer endurance, but the date on which they leave will probably be dependent on the escorting of the s.h.i.+p I have referred to above to Gibraltar.

Prime Minister to the First Sea Lord.

15.VII.40.

1. It is now three weeks since I vetoed the proposal to evacuate the Eastern Mediterranean and bring Admiral Cunningham's fleet to Gibraltar. I hope there will be no return to that project. Anyone can see the risk from air attack which we run in the Central Mediterranean. From time to time and for sufficient objects this risk will have to be faced. Wars.h.i.+ps are meant to go under fire. Our position would be very different if I had been a.s.sisted in my wish in October of last year to reconstruct the Royal Sovereign Royal Sovereign cla.s.s with heavy anti-aircraft armour on their decks at a cost to their speed through increased bulging. The difficulties which were presented at every stage were such as to destroy this proposal, and we are no further on than we were a year ago. If we had the cla.s.s with heavy anti-aircraft armour on their decks at a cost to their speed through increased bulging. The difficulties which were presented at every stage were such as to destroy this proposal, and we are no further on than we were a year ago. If we had the Royal Sovereigns Royal Sovereigns armoured, and their guns c.o.c.ked up, or some of them, we could a.s.sault the Italian coasts by bombardment with comparative impunity. armoured, and their guns c.o.c.ked up, or some of them, we could a.s.sault the Italian coasts by bombardment with comparative impunity.1 The various Boards of Admiralty which preceded this war altogether underrated the danger of air attack, and authorised sweeping statements to Parliament on the ability of s.h.i.+ps of war to cope with it. Now there is a tendency to proceed to the other extreme, and consider it wrong to endanger His Majesty's s.h.i.+ps by bringing them under air bombardment, as must from time to time be necessary in pursuance of operations.... The various Boards of Admiralty which preceded this war altogether underrated the danger of air attack, and authorised sweeping statements to Parliament on the ability of s.h.i.+ps of war to cope with it. Now there is a tendency to proceed to the other extreme, and consider it wrong to endanger His Majesty's s.h.i.+ps by bringing them under air bombardment, as must from time to time be necessary in pursuance of operations....It may be taken for certain that the scale of the enemy's air attack will increase in the Mediterranean as the Germans come there.2. It becomes of high and immediate importance to build up a very strong anti-aircraft defence at Malta, and to base several squadrons of our best fighter aircraft there. This will have to be done under the fire of the enemy. I should be glad to know the full scale of defence which was proposed in various papers I have seen. The emplacements should be made forthwith. I understand that a small consignment of A.A. guns and Hurricanes is now being procured, and that the main equipment is to follow later. It may well be possible at the end of this month to detach the larger consignment from our home defence. The urgent first consignment should reach Malta at the earliest moment. The stores may be divided between several s.h.i.+ps, so as to avoid losing all if one is. .h.i.t. The immense delay involved in pa.s.sing these s.h.i.+ps round the Cape cannot be accepted. So far as Malta is concerned, it is not seen how the dangers will be avoided by this detour, the voyage from Alexandria to Malta being, if anything, more dangerous than the voyage from Gibraltar to Malta.3. Ill.u.s.trious. Ill.u.s.trious. Considering that in the North Sea and Atlantic we are on the defensive and that no one would propose to bring Considering that in the North Sea and Atlantic we are on the defensive and that no one would propose to bring Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious into the narrow waters north and south of Dover, where we have already good sh.o.r.e-based aircraft, our aircraft-carriers in home waters will be able to operate some distance from the enemy's coast. In the Mediterranean, on the other hand, we must take the offensive against Italy, and endeavour especially to make Malta once again a Fleet base for special occasions. into the narrow waters north and south of Dover, where we have already good sh.o.r.e-based aircraft, our aircraft-carriers in home waters will be able to operate some distance from the enemy's coast. In the Mediterranean, on the other hand, we must take the offensive against Italy, and endeavour especially to make Malta once again a Fleet base for special occasions. Ill.u.s.trious, Ill.u.s.trious, with her armoured deck, would seem to be better placed in the Mediterranean, and the with her armoured deck, would seem to be better placed in the Mediterranean, and the Ark Royal Ark Royal in the home theatre. The delays in bringing in the home theatre. The delays in bringing Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious into service have been very great, and I should be glad to know when the into service have been very great, and I should be glad to know when the Fulmar Fulmar [fast fighter aircraft] will be embarked and she be ready to exchange with [fast fighter aircraft] will be embarked and she be ready to exchange with Ark Royal. Ark Royal.4. I am very glad that arrangements will be made to send out destroyers of longer radius to Gibraltar, and to bring home the short-radius vessels to the Narrow Seas.

Meanwhile Admiralty policy had again been most carefully scrutinised, and on July 15 the intention to maintain a strong force in the Eastern Mediterranean was reiterated in a signal to the Commander-in-Chief. This message stated that in the East the chief British task would be to destroy the enemy naval forces, although they had a numerical preponderance. In the West, Force H would control the western exit from the Mediterranean and undertake offensive operations against the coast of Italy. I was in general agreement with this strong policy. The Commander-in-Chief was invited to say what heavy s.h.i.+ps he considered necessary for the two forces and if redistribution were thought desirable, to advise whether the exchange should take place through the Mediterranean or round the Cape.

In reply he asked that both the Valiant Valiant and the and the Barham Barham should join him. This would give him four battles.h.i.+ps with the best available gun-range and speed. He could then dispense with the should join him. This would give him four battles.h.i.+ps with the best available gun-range and speed. He could then dispense with the Royal Sovereign Royal Sovereign as with her poor deck protection and inferior speed she was a constant source of anxiety. Furthermore, he required two carriers, including the as with her poor deck protection and inferior speed she was a constant source of anxiety. Furthermore, he required two carriers, including the Ill.u.s.trious, Ill.u.s.trious, and two eight-inch cruisers. He agreed with the First Sea Lord that in the Western Mediterranean a force comprising the and two eight-inch cruisers. He agreed with the First Sea Lord that in the Western Mediterranean a force comprising the Hood Hood and the and the Ark Royal Ark Royal with either one or two "R" cla.s.s battles.h.i.+ps would meet requirements. With these forces he considered that the Mediterranean could be dominated and the Eastern basin held indefinitely, provided that Malta was adequately protected by fighters and that his resources at Alexandria were built-up. In conclusion he said: "By carrying out a concerted movement it should be possible to pa.s.s reinforcements through the Mediterranean, but it would probably be desirable to do it all in one operation." with either one or two "R" cla.s.s battles.h.i.+ps would meet requirements. With these forces he considered that the Mediterranean could be dominated and the Eastern basin held indefinitely, provided that Malta was adequately protected by fighters and that his resources at Alexandria were built-up. In conclusion he said: "By carrying out a concerted movement it should be possible to pa.s.s reinforcements through the Mediterranean, but it would probably be desirable to do it all in one operation."

We thus reached a considerable measure of agreement in our talks at the Admiralty. It was common ground between us that Admiral Cunningham's fleet should be reinforced by a battles.h.i.+p, an aircraft carrier and two cruisers, and at the same time the opportunity should be taken to run a convoy of store s.h.i.+ps to Malta from Alexandria. from Alexandria. Thereafter on July 23 the First Sea Lord in the course of a Minute to the First Lord and me said: Thereafter on July 23 the First Sea Lord in the course of a Minute to the First Lord and me said: Full consideration has been given as to whether it is possible to pa.s.s through the Mediterranean, not only the additional fighting s.h.i.+ps which are being added to the Eastern Mediterranean force, but also merchant vessels containing spare ammunition for the Fleet; high-angle guns for Malta: and aircraft for Malta and the Middle East. The Commander-in-Chief is definitely of the opinion that under existing conditions it will be unsound to attempt to pa.s.s through the Central Mediterranean merchant vessels containing valuable cargoes, as if one or more s.h.i.+ps were damaged in such a way as to reduce their speed, it would be necessary to scuttle them. I am entirely in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief.

Thus it came about that the plan for the important operation which followed under the code name "Hats" did not include provision for the pa.s.sage of merchant s.h.i.+ps. None the less with the full support of Admiral Cunningham it challenged the Italian Fleet and Air Force in the Central Mediterranean. I was now well content with the main decisions which the Admiralty were taking, and hoped that they might lead to a trial of strength. All preparations therefore went forward.

A few weeks later the bold and far-reaching step of the War Cabinet, with the full agreement of the Chiefs of Staff, to send nearly half our best available tanks to Egypt in spite of the invasion menace raised the question of the Mediterranean pa.s.sage again and in a sharper way. I was of course in full accord with sending the tanks, but I feared that if they went round the Cape they might arrive too late for the battle on which the fate of Egypt depended. The First Sea Lord was at first inclined to run the risk, but on further study he thought it would complicate operation "Hats," which now held the centre of the Admiralty stage. It involved sending at least two fast mechanical transport s.h.i.+ps (16 knots) from Gibraltar to Malta, and this was regarded as more dangerous than sending them by the route from Alexandria. This led to further discussion.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

11.VIII.40.

I cannot accept this proposal [i.e., to use the Cape route for sending the tanks to Egypt], which deprives us of invaluable resources [fifty Infantry tanks or "I" tanks] during a most critical period, without making them available for the Middle East at the moment when they are most needed there. I must ask the Admiralty to make further proposals and overcome the difficulties. If necessary, could not the personnel be distributed among the destroyers, a larger force of destroyers being sent through from Force "H" to the Eastern Mediterranean, and returned thereafter in the same way as the six destroyers are now being sent westward by Admiral Cunningham?There is no objection to the 3d Hussars (the personnel of a tank regiment) going by the Cape, as General Wavell can make temporary arrangements for manning [the tanks] in the meanwhile, so long as he gets their light tanks. I am prepared to risk the fifty Infantry tanks in the Mediterranean, provided their personnel is distributed among H.M. s.h.i.+ps; but there can be no question of them or their personnel going by the Cape, thus making sure they are out of everything for two months. The personnel sent through the Mediterranean must be cut down to essentials, the balance going round.Pray let me have further proposals by tomorrow (Monday).

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

13.VIII.40.

1. Just before the French went out of the war, Admiral Darlan bombarded Genoa in full daylight without any Asdic destroyer protection, or any aircraft protection, and returned to Toulon unscathed. The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet has three times advanced to the centre of the Mediterranean and returned to Alexandria with only one s.h.i.+p Gloucester Gloucester hit by one bomb. A few weeks ago a fast and a slow convoy were conducted uninjured from Malta to Alexandria two days of their voyage being beset by Italian aircraft. hit by one bomb. A few weeks ago a fast and a slow convoy were conducted uninjured from Malta to Alexandria two days of their voyage being beset by Italian aircraft.2. The Admiralty now propose to send six destroyers from Alexandria to meet Force "H." These destroyers, which will certainly be detected from the air, will be within air-attacking distance of the very numerous, fast Italian cruiser forces in their home bases. This movement should be rightly condemned as hazardous in the extreme but for the just estimation in which Italian naval enterprise is held by C.-in-C. Mediterranean and the Admiralty.3. We are now told that it is too dangerous for the powerful forces we shall have in motion in the near future to carry through to the Eastern Mediterranean two M.T. [mechanical transport] s.h.i.+ps steaming in company at only fifteen knots. Yet at the same time we are asked to spend vast sums fortifying a large part of the western coasts of Britain against what the Admiralty declare is a possible invasion by twelve thousand men embarked and s.h.i.+pped [from the River] Gironde [or from] St. Nazaire, who are to be sent to their destination without any wars.h.i.+p protection of any kind. If it is held to be a feasible operation to move twelve thousand men unescorted onto the Irish or British western coasts in the face of the full British sea-power, can this be reconciled with the standard of danger-values now adopted in the Mediterranean?4. No one can see where or when the main attack on Egypt will develop. It seems, however, extremely likely that if the Germans are frustrated in an invasion of Great Britain or do not choose to attempt it, they will have great need to press and aid the Italians to the attack of Egypt. The month of September must be regarded as critical in the extreme.5. In these circ.u.mstances it is very wrong that we should attempt to send our armoured brigade round the Cape, thus making sure that during September it can play no part either in the defence of England or Egypt.6. I request that the operation of pa.s.sing at least two M.T. s.h.i.+ps through with the Eastern reinforcements may be re-examined. The personnel can be distributed in the wars.h.i.+ps, and it is a lesser risk, from the point of view of the general war, to pa.s.s the M.T. s.h.i.+ps through the Mediterranean than to have the whole armoured brigade certainly out of action going round the Cape. So long as the personnel are properly distributed among the wars.h.i.+ps, I am prepared to take the full responsibility for the possible loss of the armoured vehicles.

I was not able to induce the Admiralty to send the armoured brigade, or at least their vehicles, through the Mediterranean. I was both grieved and vexed at this. Though my friends.h.i.+p for Admiral Pound and confidence in his judgment were never affected, sharp argument was maintained. The professional responsibility was his, and no naval officer with whom I ever worked would run more risks than he. We had gone through a lot together. If he would not do it, no one else would. If I could not make him, no one else could. I knew the Admiralty too well to press them or my great friend and comrade, Pound, or the First Lord, for whom I had high esteem, beyond a certain point. My relations with the Admiralty were too good to be imperilled by a formal appeal to the Cabinet against them.

When on August 15, I brought the question before the Cabinet finally I said that I had hoped to persuade the Admiralty to fit the two armoured regiments into "Operation Hats." If the tank-units proceeded through the Mediterranean they would arrive in Alexandria about September 5; if by the Cape about three weeks later. However the Chief of the Imperial General Staff did not consider that an attack in force by the Italians was imminent, and this was also General Wavell's view. Having done my utmost in favour of the short cut, I thought that the War Cabinet ought not to take the responsibility of overruling the judgment of the commanders, and I acquiesced in the longer voyage round the Cape with regret. The Chiefs of Staff however prepared an alternative plan for the short cut should the position in the Middle East suddenly worsen before "Operation Hats" was actually launched. Two fast M.T. s.h.i.+ps carrying Cruiser and "I" tanks would accompany the naval forces through the Mediterranean. The decision was to be taken before the reinforcements pa.s.sed Gibraltar. In the event reports received from the Middle East were not considered to justify putting the alternative plan into force, and the whole convoy continued on its way round the Cape.