The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page Volume II Part 2

If in these letters Page seems to lay great stress on the judgment of Great Britain and Europe on American policy, it must be remembered that that was his particular province. One of an Amba.s.sador's most important duties is to transmit to his country the public opinion of the country to which he is accredited. It was Page's place to tell Was.h.i.+ngton what Great Britain thought of it; it was Was.h.i.+ngton's business to formulate policy, after giving due consideration to this and other matters.

_To Edward M. House_

July 21, 1915.

DEAR HOUSE:

I enclose a pamphlet in ridicule of the President. I don't know who wrote it, for my inquiries so far have brought no real information.

I don't feel like sending it to him. I send it to you--to do with as you think best. This thing alone is, of course, of no consequence. But it is symptomatic. There is much feeling about the slowness with which he acts. One hundred and twenty people (Americans) were drowned on the _Lusitania_ and we are still writing notes about it--to the d.a.m.nedest pirates that ever blew up a s.h.i.+p. Anybody who knows the Germans knows, of course, that they are simply playing for time, that they are not going to "come down," that Von Tirpitz is on deck, that they'd just as lief have war with us as not--perhaps had rather--because they don't want any large nation left fresh when the war ends. They'd like to have the whole world bankrupt. There is a fast growing feeling here, therefore, that the American Government is pusillanimous--dallies with 'em, is affected by the German propaganda, etc., etc. Of course, such a judgment is not fair. It is formed without knowing the conditions in the United States. But I think you ought to realize the strength of this sentiment. No doubt before you receive this, the President will send something to Germany that will amount to an ultimatum and there will be at least a momentary change of sentiment here. But looking at the thing in a long-range way, we're bound to get into the war. For the Germans will blow up more American travellers without notice. And by dallying with them we do not change the ultimate result, but we take away from ourselves the s.p.u.n.k and credit of getting in instead of being kicked and cursed in. We've got to get in: they won't play the game in any other way.

I have news direct from a high German source in Berlin which strongly confirms this....

It's a curious thing to say. But the only solution that I see is another _Lusitania_ outrage, which would force war.

W.H.P.

P.S. The London papers every day say that the President will send a strong note, etc. And the people here say, "d.a.m.n notes: hasn't he written enough?" Writing notes hurts n.o.body--changes nothing. The Was.h.i.+ngton correspondents to the London papers say that Burleson, the Attorney-General, and Daniels are Bryan men and are holding the President back.

The prophecy contained in this letter was quickly fulfilled. A week or two after Colonel House had received it, the _Arabic_ was sunk with loss of American life.

Page was taking a brief holiday with his son Frank in Rowsley, Derbys.h.i.+re, when this news came. It was telegraphed from the Emba.s.sy.

"That settles it," he said to his son. "They have sunk the _Arabic_.

That means that we shall break with Germany and I've got to go back to London."

_To Edward M. House_

American Emba.s.sy, London, August 23, 1915.

DEAR HOUSE:

The sinking of the _Arabic_ is the answer to the President and to your letter to me. And there'll be more such answers. You said to me one day after you had got back from your last visit to Berlin: "They are impossible." I think you told the truth, and surely you know your German and you know your Berlin--or you did know them when you were here.

The question is not what we have done for the Allies, not what any other neutral country has done or has failed to do--such comparisons, I think, are far from the point. The question is when the right moment arrives for us to save our self-respect, our honour, and the esteem and fear (or the contempt) in which the world will hold us.

Berlin has the Napoleonic disease. If you follow Napoleon's career--his excuses, his evasions, his inventions, the wild French enthusiasm and how he kept it up--you will find an exact parallel.

That becomes plainer every day. Europe may not be wholly at peace in five years--may be ten.

Hastily and heartily, W.H.P.

I have your note about Willum J.... Crank once, crank always. My son, never tie up with a crank.

W.H.P.

_To Edward M. House_

London, September 2nd, 1915.

DEAR HOUSE:

You write me about pleasing the Allies, the big Ally in particular.

That doesn't particularly appeal to me. We don't owe them anything. There's no obligation. I'd never confess for a moment that we are under any obligation to any of them nor to anybody. I'm not out to "please" anybody, as a primary purpose: that's not my game nor my idea--nor yours either. As for England in particular, the account was squared when she twice sent an army against us--in her folly--especially the last time when she burnt our Capitol.

There's been no obligation since. The obligation is on the other foot. We've set her an example of what democracy will do for men, an example of efficiency, an example of freedom of opportunity. The future is ours, and she may follow us and profit by it. Already we have three white English-speaking men to every two in the British Empire: we are sixty per cent. of the Anglo-Saxons in the world. If there be any obligation to please, the obligation is on her to please us. And she feels and sees it now.

My point is not that, nor is it what we or any other neutral nation has done or may do--Holland or any other. This war is the direct result of the over-polite, diplomatic, standing-aloof, bowing-to-one-another in gold lace, which all European nations are guilty of in times of peace--castes and cla.s.ses and uniforms and orders and such folderol, instead of the proper business of the day. Every nation in Europe knew that Germany was preparing for war. If they had really got together--not mere Hague Sunday-school talk and resolutions--but had really got together for business and had said to Germany, "The moment you fire a shot, we'll all fight against you; we have so many millions of men, so many men-of-war, so many billions of money; and we'll increase all these if you do not change your system and your building-up of armies"--then there would have been no war.

My point is not sentimental. It is:

(1) We must maintain our own self-respect and safety. If we submit to too many insults, _that_ will in time bring Germany against us.

We've got to show at some time that we don't believe, either, in the efficacy of Sunday-School resolves for peace--that we are neither Daughters of the Dove of Peace nor Sons of the Olive Branch, and

(2) About nagging and forever presenting technical legal points as lawyers do to confuse juries--the point is the point of efficiency.

If we do that, we can't carry our main points. I find it harder and harder to get answers now to important questions because we ask so many unimportant and nagging ones.

I've no sentiment--perhaps not enough. My gus.h.i.+ng days are gone, if I ever had 'em. The cutting-out of the "100 years of peace"

oratory, etc., etc., was one of the blessings of the war. But we must be just and firm and preserve our own self-respect and keep alive the fear that other nations have of us; and we ought to have the courage to make the Department of State more than a bureau of complaints. We must learn to say "No" even to a Gawdamighty independent American citizen when he asks an improper or impracticable question. Public Opinion in the United States consists of something more than the threats of Congressmen and the bleating of newspapers; it consists of the judgment of honourable men on courageous and frank actions--a judgment that cannot be made up till action is taken.

Heartily yours, W.H.P.

_To Edward M. House_

American Emba.s.sy, London, Sept. 8, 1915.

(This is not prudent. It is only true--nothing more.)

DEAR HOUSE:

I take it for granted that Dumba[4] is going, of course. But I must tell you that the President is being laughed at by our best friends for his slowness in action. I hardly ever pick up a paper without seeing some sarcastic remark. I don't mean they expect us to come into the war. They only hoped we would be as good as our word--would regard another submarine attack on a s.h.i.+p carrying Americans as an unfriendly act and would send Bernstorff home. Yet the _Arabic_ and now the _Hesperian_ have had no effect in action.

Bernstorff's personal _note to Lansing[5], even as far as it goes, does not bind his Government_.

The upshot of all this is that the President is fast losing in the minds of our best friends here all that he gained by his courageous stand on the Panama tolls. They feel that if he takes another insult--keeps taking them--and is satisfied with Bernstorff's personal word, which is proved false in four days--he'll take anything. And the British will pay less attention to what we say.

That's inevitable. If the American people and the President accept the _Arabic_ and the _Hesperian_ and do nothing to Dumba till the Government here gave out his letter, which the State Department had (and silently held) for several days--then n.o.body on this side the world will pay much heed to anything we say hereafter.

This, as I say, doesn't mean that these (thoughtful) people wish or expect us to go to war. They wish only that we'd prove ourselves as good as the President's word. That's the conservative truth; we're losing influence more rapidly than I supposed it were possible.

Dumba's tardy dismissal will not touch the main matter, which is the rights of neutrals at sea, and keeping our word in action.

Yours sincerely, W.H.P.

P.S. They say it's Mexico over again--watchful waiting and nothing doing. And the feeling grows that Bryan has really conquered, since his programme seems to prevail.

_To Edward M. House_

London, Tuesday night, Sept. 8, 1915.