The Naval War of 1812 Part 2

An 18-gun s.h.i.+p had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines-140 in all. Sometimes s.h.i.+ps put to sea without their full complements (as in the case of the first Wasp), but more often with supernumeraries aboard. The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutla.s.ses, and a few axes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, and occasionally rifles.

In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always given the number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary. When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional number simply served to increase the slaughter on board. The Guerriere undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor Java would have been benefited by the presence of a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force. The Penguin and Frolic would have been taken just as surely had the Hornet and Wasp had a dozen men less apiece than they did. The princ.i.p.al case where numbers would help would be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the Chesapeake having fifty more men than the Shannon ought to have been successful; but she was not, because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shannon's crew in other respects. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the number of men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough to manage the guns and perform every other service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken for granted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success. In the engagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained by superiority in courage. The crews of both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched; but had they fought never so bravely they were too unskilful to win. The Chesapeake's crew could hardly be said to lack courage; it was more that they were inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill.

There was but one conflict during the war where the victory could be said to be owing to superiority in pluck. This was when the Neufchatel privateer beat off the boats of the Endymion. The privateersmen suffered a heavier proportional loss than their a.s.sailants, and they gained the victory by sheer ability to stand punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give in tabulated form the force of the three British 38's taken by American 44's (allowing for short weight of metal of latter).

CONSt.i.tUTION. GUERRIeRE. 30 long 24's, 30 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 32's. 16 short 32's, ___________________________ 1 short 18. Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. __________________ real. 684 lbs. Broadside, 556 lbs.

UNITED STATES MACEDONIAN 30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 42's. 2 long 9's, ___________________________ 16 short 32's, Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. 1 short 18. real, 786 lbs. ___________________ Broadside, 547 lbs.

CONSt.i.tUTION JAVA 30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 20 short 32's. 18 short 32's, ____________________________ 1 short 24. Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs. ___________________ real. 654 lbs. Broadside. 576 lbs.

The smallest line-of-battle s.h.i.+p, the 74, with only long 18's on the second deck, was armed as follows:

28 long 32's, 28 " 18's, 6 " 12's. 14 short 32's 7 " 18's

or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 296 from carronades; while the Const.i.tution threw (in reality) 684 lbs., 356 from long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and the United States 102 lbs. more from her carronades. Remembering the difference between long guns and carronades, and considering sixteen of the 74's long 18's as being replaced by 42-pound carronades [Footnote: That this change would leave the force about as it was, can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and John Adams both of which had been armed with 42 pound carronades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18 pounders, these being considered to be formidable: so that the subst.i.tution of 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the force of the 74] (so as to get the metal on the s.h.i.+ps distributed in similar proportions between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 74's broadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from carronades. The United States threw nominally 360 and 486, and the Const.i.tution nominally 360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the former nominally about as three is to two; while the Const.i.tution, if "a line-of-battle s.h.i.+p," was disguised to such a degree that she was in reality of but little more than one half the force of one of the smallest true liners England possessed!

Chapter III

1812

ON THE OCEAN

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the Belvidera-_Cruise of the _Ess.e.x-Captain Hull's cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke-Const.i.tution captures Guerriere-Wasp captures Frolic-Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers-United States captures Macedonian-Const.i.tution captures Java-Ess.e.x starts on a cruise-Summary

At the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 1812, the American navy was but partially prepared for effective service. The Wasp, 18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the Constellation, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, unable to receive a crew for several months to come; the Chesapeake, 38, was lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor; the Adams, 28, was at Was.h.i.+ngton, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate into a corvette. These three cruisers were none of them fit to go to sea till after the end of the year. The Ess.e.x, 32, was in New York harbor, but, having some repairs to make, was not yet ready to put out. The Const.i.tution, 44, was at Annapolis, without all of her stores, and engaged in s.h.i.+pping a new crew, the time of the old one being up. The Nautilus, 14, was cruising off New Jersey, and the other small brigs were also off the coast. The only vessels immediately available were those under the command of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of his own s.h.i.+p, the President, 44, and of the United States, 44, Commodore Decatur, Congress, 38, Captain Smith, Hornet, 18, Captain Lawrence, and Argus, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems marvellous that any nation should have permitted its s.h.i.+ps to be so scattered, and many of them in such an unfit condition, at the beginning of hostilities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were not at that time very numerous or formidable, consisting of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 40, Shannon, 38, Guerriere, 38, Belvidera, 36, Aeolus, 32, Southampton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with a number of corvettes and sloops; their force was, however, strong enough to render it impossible for Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns of Canada or the West Indies. But the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by the Thalia, 36, Capt. Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, Capt. Manners. Its capture or destruction would have been a serious blow, and one which there seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would have to pa.s.s along the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream. Commodore Rodgers had made every preparation, in expectation of war being declared, and an hour after official intelligence of it, together with his instructions, had been received, his squadron put to sea, on June 21st, and ran off toward the south-east [Footnote: Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 1, 1812.] to get at the Jamaica s.h.i.+ps. Having learned from an American brig that she had pa.s.sed the plate fleet four days before in lat. 36 N., long. 67 W., the Commodore made all sail in that direction. At 6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E., which proved to be the British frigate Belvidera, 36, Capt. Richard Byron. [Footnote: Brenton, v. 46.] The latter had sighted some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron some time before, and stood toward them, till at 6.30 she made out the three largest s.h.i.+ps to be frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood of war by a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera now stood away, going N. E. by E., the wind being fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail in chase, the President, a very fast s.h.i.+p off the wind, leading, and the Congress coming next. At noon the President bore S. W., distant 2 3/4 miles from the Belvidera, Nantucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. and 48 miles E [Footnote: Log of Belvidera, June 23, 1812.]. The wind grew lighter, s.h.i.+fting more toward the south-west, while the s.h.i.+ps continued steadily in their course, going N.E. by E. As the President kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared his s.h.i.+p for action, and s.h.i.+fted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounders on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound carronades on the quarter-deck.

At 4:30 [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the President was then 600 yards distant from the Belvidera, half a point on her weather or port quarter.] the President's starboard forecastle bowgun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself; the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired again. These three shots all struck the stern of the Belvidera, killing and wounding nine men,-one of them went through the rudder coat, into the after gun-room, the other two into the captain's cabin. A few more such shots would have rendered the Belvidera's capture certain, but when the President's main-deck gun was discharged for the second time it burst, blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and wounding 16 men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken. This saved the British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a half panic, every gun being at once suspected. In the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with spirit and effect, killing or wounding six men more. Had the President still pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until she closed abreast, which she could probably have done, the Belvidera could still have been taken; but, instead, the former now bore up and fired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, but doing no other damage, while the Belvidera kept up a brisk and galling fire, although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns now broke continually, wounding several of the men, including Captain Byron. The President had lost ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up closer than before, again opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which severely wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack yard, and one or two other spars; [Footnote: James, vi, 119. He says the President was within 400 yards.] but shortly afterward she repeated her former tactics and again lost ground by yawing to discharge another broadside, even more ineffectual than the first. Once more she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed; the single shots from her bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but her raking broadsides none. [Footnote: Lord Howard Dougla.s.s, "Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third edition).] Meanwhile the active crew of the Belvidera repaired every thing as fast as it was damaged, while under the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from her stern guns. [Footnote: James, vi, 118.] Finding that if the President ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Captain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, and started 14 tons of water. The effect of this was at once apparent, and she began to gain; meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants had received had enabled the Congress to close, and when abreast of his consort Captain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short. The Belvidera soon altered her course to east by south, set her starboard studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; and three days afterward reached Halifax harbor.

Lord Howard Dougla.s.s' criticisms on this encounter seem very just. He says that the President opened very well with her bow-chasers (in fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and to have done more execution with these guns than the British with their stern-chasers); but that she lost so much ground by yawing and delivering harmless broadsides as to enable her antagonist to escape. Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost to no purpose, the Commodore would have run alongside his opponent, and the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. On the other hand it must be remembered that it was only the bursting of the gun on board the President, causing such direful confusion and loss, and especially harmful in disabling her commander, that gave the Belvidera any chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether the American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain Byron and his crew do most emphatically deserve praise for the skill with which their guns were served and repairs made, the coolness with which measures to escape were adopted, and the courage with which they resisted so superior a force. On this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as good a seaman and as brave a man as he subsequently proved a humane and generous enemy when engaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake. [Footnote: Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and Hardy-which certainly shone in comparison to some of the rather buccaneering exploits of c.o.c.kburn's followers in Chesapeake Bay.]

This was not a very auspicious opening of hostilities for America. The loss of the Belvidera was not the only thing to be regretted, for the distance the chase took the pursuers out of their course probably saved the plate fleet. When the Belvidera was first made out, Commodore Rodgers was in lat.i.tude 39 26' N., and longitude 71 10' W.; at noon the same day the Thalia and her convoy were in lat.i.tude 39 N., longitude 62 W. Had they not chased the Belvidera the Americans would probably have run across the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the western edge of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 1st.] and on July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in with large quant.i.ties of cocoa-nut sh.e.l.ls, orange peels, etc., which filled every one with great hopes of overtaking the quarry. On July 9th, the Hornet captured a British privateer, in lat.i.tude 45 30' N., and longitude 23 W., and her master reported that he had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; but nothing further was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he cruised toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks home, there being considerable sickness on the s.h.i.+ps. On August 31st he reached Boston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but seven prizes, all merchant-men, and had recaptured one American vessel.

On July 3d the Ess.e.x, 32, Captain David Porter, put out of New York. As has been already explained she was most inefficiently armed, almost entirely with carronades. This placed her at the mercy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at a distance of a few hundred yards; but in spite of Captain Porter's pet.i.tions and remonstrances he was not allowed to change his armament. On the 11th of July at 2 A. M., lat.i.tude 33 N., longitude 66 W., the Ess.e.x fell in with the Minerva, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, each containing about 200 troops, bound from Barbadoes to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order, and, there being a dull moon, the Ess.e.x ran in and cut out transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having taken out the soldiers, Captain Porter stood back to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to come out and fight him; but this the latter would not do, keeping the convoy in close order around him. The transports were all armed and still contained in the aggregate 1,200 soldiers. As the Ess.e.x could only fight at close quarters these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out the Minerva. Her carronades would have to be used at short range to be effective, and it would of course have been folly to run in right among the convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of being boarded by five times as many men as she possessed. The Minerva had three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty men less than the Ess.e.x, which had about 270 men this cruise; on the other hand, her main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it is hard to say whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. She was of the same force as the Southampton whose captain, Sir James Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, but never appointed a meeting-place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in s.h.i.+ps of such radically different armaments, would have been with that captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in making the fight come off at the distance best suited to himself. At long range either the Minerva or Southampton would possess an immense superiority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up within a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, his superiority in weight of metal and number of men would have enabled him to carry either of them. Porter's crew was better trained for boarding than almost any other American commander's; and probably none of the British frigates on the American station, except the Shannon and Tenedos, would have stood a chance with the Ess.e.x in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest mids.h.i.+pmen was one, by name David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who afterward became the first and greatest admiral of the United States. His own words on this point will be read with interest. "Every day," he says, [Footnote: "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal and letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York. 1879.] "the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and single stick. And I may here mention the fact that I have never been on a s.h.i.+p where the crew of the old Ess.e.x was represented but that I found them to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been so thoroughly trained as boarders that every man was prepared for such an emergency, with his cutla.s.s as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the s.h.i.+p's armorer out of a file, and a pistol." [Footnote: James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring the Minerva to action we do not see what could have prevented the Ess.e.x with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter's head." What "prevented the Ess.e.x" was the Minerva's not venturing out of the convoy. Farragut, in his journal writes: "The captured British officers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the Minerva, as they considered her a good match for the Ess.e.x, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify them with pleasure if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So we stood toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and awaited the Minerva, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy, to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commander as a base coward, and expressed their determination to report him to the Admiralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this is not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value of James' sneers.]

On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, which proved to be the British s.h.i.+p-sloop Alert, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men. [Footnote: James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the Naval Archives at Was.h.i.+ngton in the "Captains' Letters" for 1812 (vol. n. No. 182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of the officers and crew of the Alert signed by Captain Laugharne; it contains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the Alert besides those of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel.] As soon as the Ess.e.x discovered the Alert she put out drags astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying to escape by sending a few men aloft to shake out the reefs and make sail. Concluding the frigate to be a merchant-man, the Alert bore down on her; while the Americans went to quarters and cleared for action, although the tompions were left in the guns, and the ports kept closed. [Footnote: "Life of Farragut," p. 16.] The Alert fired a gun and the Ess.e.x hove to, when the former pa.s.sed under her stern, and when on her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape and canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that her shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage. Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as soon as his guns would bear, tompions and all. The Alert now discovered her error and made off, but too late, for in eight minutes the Ess.e.x was along side, and the Alert fired a musket and struck, three men being wounded and several feet of water in the hold. She was disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. Johns. It has been the fas.h.i.+on among American writers to speak of her as if she were "unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is entirely groundless. The Ess.e.x was four times her force, and all that could possibly be expected of her was to do as she did-exchange broadsides and strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The Ess.e.x returned to New York on September 7th, having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men. [Footnote: Before entering New York the Ess.e.x fell in with a British force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is said to have been composed of the Acasta and Shannon, each of fifty guns, and Ringdove, of twenty. James says it was the Shannon, accompanied by a merchant vessel. It is not a point of much importance, as nothing came of the meeting, and the Shannon, alone, with her immensely superior armament, ought to have been a match twice over for the Ess.e.x: although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary escape."]

The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise against the United States, commanded by Philip Vere Broke, of the Shannon, 38, having under him the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron, Africa, 64, Captain John b.a.s.t.a.r.d, and Aeolus. 32, Captain Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off Nantucket, they were joined by the Guerriere, 38, Captain James Richard Dacres. On the 16th the squadron fell in with and captured the United States brig Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. She threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every expedient to escape, but to no purpose. At 3 P.M. of the following day, when the British s.h.i.+ps were abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off sh.o.r.e, a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in the south by east, or windward quarter, standing to the northeast. This was the United States frigate Const.i.tution, 44, Captain Isaac Hull. [Footnote: For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on Cooper; see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi, 133: and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii. 625.] When the war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting a new crew aboard. Having s.h.i.+pped over 450 men (counting officers), he put out of harbor on the 12th of July. His crew was entirely new, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment. [Footnote: In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters." 1812. ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with a s.h.i.+p of war, as many have but lately joined and have never been on an armed s.h.i.+p before. * * * We are doing all that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single-decked s.h.i.+p."] On the 17th, at 2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail, in the northern board, heading to the westward. At 3, the wind being very light, the Const.i.tution made sail and tacked, in 18-1/2 fathoms. At 4, in the N. E., a fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be the Guerriere, The first four s.h.i.+ps bore N. N. W., and were all on the starboard tack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E. N. E. At 6.15 the wind s.h.i.+fted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the American s.h.i.+p to wind-ward. She then wore round with her head to the eastward, set her light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the Guerriere. The two frigates neared one another gradually and at 10 the Const.i.tution began making signals, which she continued for over an hour. At 3.30 A. M. on the 18th the Guerriere, going gradually toward the Const.i.tution on the port tack, and but one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the Belvidera and the other British vessels, and signalled to them. They did not answer the signals, thinking she must know who they were-a circ.u.mstance which afterward gave rise to sharp recriminations among the captains-and Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore Rodgers' squadron, tacked, and then wore round and stood away from the Const.i.tution for some time before discovering his mistake.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Captain Isaac Hull: a miniature by an unknown artist, circa 1807-1812. (Courtesy The New-York Historical Society)]

At 5 A. M. Hull had just enough steerage way on to keep his head to the east, on the starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearing N. E. by N., were the Belvidera and Guerriere and astern the Shannon, Aeolus, and Africa. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow the s.h.i.+p, always going southward. At the same time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got the forecastlechaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the two guns more freedom to work in and also running out, through the cabin windows, two of the long main-deck 24's. The British boats were towing also. At 6 A. M. a light breeze sprang up, and the Const.i.tution set studding-sails and stay-sails; the Shannon opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased when she found she could not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having died away, the Shannon began to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron towing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant Charles Morris suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare rope was bent on to the cables, payed out into the cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on and walked away with the s.h.i.+p, overrunning and tripping the kedge as she came up with the end of the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines and another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pursuers. At 7.30 A. M. a little breeze sprang up, when the Const.i.tution set her ensign and fired a shot at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again and the Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from the southward struck the s.h.i.+p, bringing her to windward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her helm she was brought close up on the port tack. The boats dropped in alongside; those that belonged to the davits were run up, while the others were just lifted clear of water, by purchases on the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they could be used again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam, the Guerriere opened fire; but her shot fell short, and the Americans paid not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm, when Hull had 2000 gallons of water started, and again put out his boats to tow. The Shannon with some of the other boats of the squadron helping her, gained on the Const.i.tution but by severe exertion was again left behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springing up, the Belvidera gained on the other British s.h.i.+ps, and when it fell calm she was nearer to the Const.i.tution than any of her consorts, their boats being put on to her. [Footnote: Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon; but from Marshall's "Naval Biography" we learn that it was the Belvidera. At other times he confuses the Belvidera with the Guerriere. Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately distinguish the names of his pursuers. My account is drawn from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James. ] At 10.30, observing the benefit that the Const.i.tution had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same, bending all his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at the same time by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole as it was run in through the other opposite. Having men from the other frigates aboard, and a lighter s.h.i.+p to work, Captain Byron at 2 P. M. was near enough to exchange bow-and stern-chasers with the Const.i.tution, out of range however. Hull expected to be overtaken, and made every arrangement to try in such case to disable the first frigate before her consorts could close. But neither the Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow very near for fear of having their boats sunk by the American's stern-chasers.

The Const.i.tution's crew showed the most excellent spirit. Officers and men relieved each other regularly, the former s.n.a.t.c.hing their rest any where on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Gradually the Const.i.tution drew ahead, but the situation continued most critical. All through the afternoon the British frigates kept towing and kedging, being barely out of gunshot. At 3 P. M. a light breeze sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals; every puff was watched closely and taken advantage of to the utmost. At 7 in the evening the wind almost died out, and for four more weary hours the worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45 a little breeze struck the frigate, when the boats dropped alongside and were hoisted up, excepting the first cutter. Throughout the night the wind continued very light, the Belvidera forging ahead till she was off the Const.i.tution's lee beam; and at 4 A. M., on the morning of the 19th, she tacked to the eastward, the breeze being light from the south by east. At 4.20 the Const.i.tution tacked also; and at 5.15 the Aeolus, which had drawn ahead, pa.s.sed on the contrary tack. Soon afterward the wind freshened so that Captain Hull took in his cutter. The Africa was now so far to leeward as to be almost out of the race; while the five frigates were all running on the starboard tack with every st.i.tch of canvas set. At 9 A. M. an American merchant-man hove in sight and bore down toward the squadron. The Belvidera, by way of decoy, hoisted American colors, when the Const.i.tution hoisted the British flag, and the merchant vessel hauled off. The breeze continued light till noon, when Hull found he had dropped the British frigates well behind; the nearest was the Belvidera, exactly in his wake, bearing W. N. W. 2 1/2 miles distant. The Shannon was on his lee, bearing N. by W. 1/2 W. distant 3 1/2 miles. The other two frigates were five miles off on the lee quarter. Soon afterward the breeze freshened, and "old Ironsides" drew slowly ahead from her foes, her sails being watched and tended with the most consummate skill. At 4 P. M. the breeze again lightened, but even the Belvidera was now four miles astern and to leeward. At 6.45 there were indications of a heavy rain squall, which once more permitted Hull to show that in seamans.h.i.+p he excelled even the able captains against whom he was pitted. The crew were stationed and every thing kept fast till the last minute, when all was clewed up just before the squall struck the s.h.i.+p. The light canvas was furled, a second reef taken in the mizzen top-sail, and the s.h.i.+p almost instantly brought under short sail. The British vessels seeing this began to let go and haul down without waiting for the wind, and were steering on different tacks when the first gust struck them. But Hull as soon as he got the weight of the wind sheeted home, hoisted his fore and main-top gallant sails, and went off on an easy bowline at the rate of 11 knots. At 7.40 sight was again obtained of the enemy, the squall having pa.s.sed to leeward; the Belvidera, the nearest vessel, had altered her bearings two points to leeward, and was a long way astern. Next came the Shannon; the Guerriere and Aeolus were hull down, and the Africa barely visible. The wind now kept light, s.h.i.+fting occasionally in a very baffling manner, but the Const.i.tution gained steadily, wetting her sails from the sky-sails to the courses. At 6 A. M., on the morning of the 20th the pursuers were almost out of sight; and at 8.15 A. M. they abandoned the chase. Hull at once stopped to investigate the character of two strange vessels, but found them to be only Americans; then, at midday, he stood toward the east, and went into Boston on July 26th.

In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched against five British captains, two of whom, Broke and Byron, were fully equal to any in their navy; and while the latter showed great perseverance, good seamans.h.i.+p, and ready imitation, there can be no doubt that the palm in every way belongs to the cool old Yankee. Every daring expedient known to the most perfect seamans.h.i.+p was tried, and tried with success; and no victorious fight could reflect more credit on the conqueror than this three days' chase did on Hull. Later, on two occasions, the Const.i.tution proved herself far superior in gunnery to the average British frigate; this time her officers and men showed that they could handle the sails as well as they could the guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke and Byron as cleverly as a month later he out-fought Dacres. His successful escape and victorious fight were both performed in a way that place him above any single s.h.i.+p captain of war.

On Aug. 2d the Const.i.tution made sail from Boston [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812.] and stood to the eastward, in hopes of falling in with some of the British cruisers. She was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward Newfoundland, and finally took her station off Cape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burned two brigs of little value. On the 15th she recaptured an American brig from the British s.h.i.+p-sloop Avenger, though the latter escaped; Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in. He then sailed southward, and on the night of the 18th spoke a Salem privateer which gave him news of a British frigate to the south; thither he stood, and at 2 P. M. on the 19th, in lat. 41 30' N. and 55 W., made out a large sail bearing E. S. E. and to leeward, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 30, 1812.] which proved to be his old acquaintance, the frigate Guerriere, Captain Dacres. It was a cloudy day and the wind was blowing fresh from the northwest. The Guerriere was standing by the wind on the starboard tack, under easy canvas; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. James R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812.] she hauled up her courses, took in her top-gallant sails, and at 4.30 backed her main-top sail. Hull then very deliberately began to shorten sail, taking in top-gallant sails, stay-sails, and flying jib, sending down the royal yards and putting another reef in the top-sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three ensigns, when the American also set his colors, one at each mast-head, and one at the mizzen peak.

The Const.i.tution now ran down with the wind nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard tack, and at five o'clock opened with her weather-guns, [Footnote: Log of Guerriere.] the shot falling short, then wore round and fired her port broadside, of which two shot struck her opponent, the rest pa.s.sing over and through her rigging. [Footnote: See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the Const.i.tution's Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. 1, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813). The point is of some little importance because Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsides fell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second went over the s.h.i.+p, except two shot, which came home. The hypothesis of the Guerriere having damaged powder was founded purely on this supposed falling short of the first two broadsides.] As the British frigate again wore to open with her starboard battery, the Const.i.tution yawed a little and fired two or three of her port bow-guns. Three or four times the Guerriere repeated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate broadsides, but with little or no effect, while the Const.i.tution yawed as often to avoid being raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. This continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very far apart when the action began, hardly any loss or damage being inflicted by either party. At 6.00 the Guerriere bore up and ran off under her top-sails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on her port quarter; when the Const.i.tution set her main-top gallant sail and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within half pistol-shot distance on her adversary's port beam. [Footnote: "Autobiography of Commodore Morris" (Annapolis, 1880), p. 164.] Immediately a furious cannonade opened, each s.h.i.+p firing as the guns bore. By the time the s.h.i.+ps were fairly abreast, at 6.20, the Const.i.tution shot away the Guerriere's mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter, knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing the s.h.i.+p round against her helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and the Const.i.tution hardly at all. The latter, finding that she was ranging ahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short round her enemy's bows, [Footnote: Log of Const.i.tution.] delivering a heavy raking fire with the starboard guns and shooting away the Guerriere's main-yard. Then she wore and again pa.s.sed her adversary's bows, raking with her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the Guerriere, dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her bow round till the wind came on her starboard quarter; and so near were the two s.h.i.+ps that the Englishman's bowsprit pa.s.sed diagonally over the Const.i.tution's quarter-deck, and as the latter s.h.i.+p fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the vessels then lay with the Guerriere's starboard bow against the Const.i.tution's port, or lee quarter-gallery. [Footnote: Cooper, in "Putnam's Magazine." i. 475.] The Englishman's bow guns played havoc with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it; but the flames were soon extinguished by Lieutenant Hoffmann. On both sides the boarders were called away; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquished the idea of attacking [Footnote: Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax.] when he saw the crowds of men on the American's decks. Meanwhile, on the Const.i.tution, the boarders and marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running that they could not get on the Guerriere. Both sides suffered heavily from the closeness of the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entire loss on the Const.i.tution occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on the enemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead; Mr. Morris, the first Lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also both leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the same moment wounded by the musketry fire. On the Guerriere the loss was far heavier, almost all the men on the forecastle being picked off. Captain Dacres himself was shot in the back and severely wounded by one of the American mizzen topmen, while he was standing on the starboard forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew [Footnote: James, vi, 144.]; two of the lieutenants and the master were also shot down. The s.h.i.+ps gradually worked round till the wind was again on the port quarter, when they separated, and the Guerriere's foremast and main-mast at once went by the board, and fell over on the starboard side, leaving her a defenseless hulk, rolling her main-deck guns into the water. [Footnote: Brenton, v, 51.] At 6.30 the Const.i.tution hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little distance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and standing and running rigging were much cut up and some of the spars wounded, but a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when Captain Hull stood under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once struck, at 7.00 P. M., [Footnote: Log of the Const.i.tution.] just two hours after she had fired the first shot. On the part of the Const.i.tution, however, the actual fighting, exclusive of six or eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing, occupied less than 30 minutes.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (1): "The Engagement" is the original t.i.tle of this, the first in a series of four paintings of the action done for Captain Hull by Michele F. Corne. (Courtesy US. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (2): "In Action."

The Guerriere's mizzenmast goes down. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (3): "Dropping Astern." The Guerriere's mainmast and foremast follow. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (4): "She Fell in the Sea, A Perfect Wreck." The puff of smoke over the Guerriere's bow is from a gun being fired to leeward to signal her surrender, the customary practice when a vessel no longer had a flag to strike. (Courtesy New Haven Historical Society)]

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have already been referred to. The Const.i.tution had, as already said, about 456 men aboard, while of the Guerriere's crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard the Const.i.tution; deducting 10 who were Americans and would not fight, and adding the 15 killed outright, we get 272; 28 men were absent in prizes.

COMPARATIVE FORCE Comparative Broad- Comparative loss Tons Guns side Men Loss Force Inflicted Const.i.tution 1576 27 684 456 14 1.00 1.00 Guerriere 1338 25 556 272 79 .70 .18

The loss of the Const.i.tution included Lieutenant William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all this loss occurred when the s.h.i.+ps came foul, and was due to the Guerriere's musketry and the two guns in her bridle-ports.

The Guerriere lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, Bartholomew Kent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one mids.h.i.+pman.

The third lieutenant of the Const.i.tution, Mr. George Campbell Read, was sent on board the prize, and the Const.i.tution remained by her during the night; but at daylight it was found that she was in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began removing the prisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon set the Guerriere on fire, and in a quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail for Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. "Captain Hull and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in his official letter, "have treated us like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been taken that we should not lose the smallest trifle."

The British laid very great stress on the rotten and decayed condition of the Guerriere; mentioning in particular that the mainmast fell solely because of the weight of the falling foremast. But it must be remembered that until the action occurred she was considered a very fine s.h.i.+p. Thus, in Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke," it is declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion that she could take a s.h.i.+p in half the time the Shannon could. The fall of the main-mast occurred when the fight was practically over; it had no influence whatever on the conflict. It was also a.s.serted that her powder was bad, but on no authority; her first broadside fell short, but so, under similar circ.u.mstances, did the first broadside of the United States. None of these causes account for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her opponent was of such superior force-nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2-that success would have been very difficult in any event, and no one can doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the British s.h.i.+p was fought; but the execution was very greatly disproportioned to the force. The gunnery of the Guerriere was very poor, and that of the Const.i.tution excellent; during the few minutes the s.h.i.+ps were yard-arm and yard-arm; the latter was not hulled once, while no less than 30 shot took effect on the former's engaged side, [Footnote: Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial.] five sheets of copper beneath the bends. The Guerriere, moreover, was out-manoeuvred; "in wearing several times and exchanging broadsides in such rapid and continual changes of position, her fire was much more harmless than it would have been if she had kept more steady." [Footnote: Lord Howard Dougla.s.s, "Treatise on Naval Gunnery" (London, 1851), p. 454.] The Const.i.tution was handled faultlessly; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to avoid being raked, and then to improve the advantage which the precision and rapidity of his fire had gained. "After making every allowance claimed by the enemy, the character of this victory is not essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine display of seamans.h.i.+p in the approach, extraordinary efficiency in the attack, and great readiness in repairing damages; all of which denote cool and capable officers, with an expert and trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of-war." [Footnote: Cooper, ii. 173.] The disparity of force, 10 to 7, is not enough to account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of course, something must be allowed for the decayed state of the Englishman's masts, although I really do not think it had any influence on the battle, for he was beaten when the main mast fell; and it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the American crew was absolutely new, while the Guerriere was manned by old hands. So that, while admitting and admiring the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamans.h.i.+p of Captain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that the combat showed a marked superiority, particularly in gunnery, on the part of the Americans. Had the s.h.i.+ps not come foul, Captain Hull would probably not have lost more than three or four men; as it was, he suffered but slightly. That the Guerriere was not so weak as she was represented to be can be gathered from the fact that she mounted two more main-deck guns than the rest of her cla.s.s; thus carrying on her main-deck 30 long 18-pounders in battery, to oppose to the 30 long 24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight of shot) long 22's, of the Const.i.tution. Characteristically enough, James, though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enterprise, yet refuses to count the two long eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the Guerriere's main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns were used very effectively, when the s.h.i.+ps got foul, and caused more damage and loss than all of the other main-deck guns put together.

[Ill.u.s.tration: This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris' autobiography and the log of the Guerriere: the official accounts apparently consider "larboard" and "starboard" as interchangeable terms.]

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not to fight against their flag; and in his address to the court-martial mentions, among the reasons for his defeat, "that he was very much weakened by permitting the Americans on board to quit their quarters." Coupling this with the a.s.sertion made by James and most other British writers that the Const.i.tution was largely manned by Englishmen, we reach the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the British s.h.i.+p was defeated because the Americans on board would not fight against their country, and that the American was victorious because the British on board would. However, as I have shown, in reality there were probably not a score of British on board the Const.i.tution.

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate actions, every one must admit that there was a great superiority in force on the side of the victors, and British historians have insisted that this superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a successful resistance. That this was not true, and that the disparity between the combatants was not as great as had been the case in a number of encounters in which English frigates had taken French ones, can be best shown by a few accounts taken from the French historian Troude, who would certainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on March 1, 1799, the English 38-gun 18-pounder frigate Sybille, captured the French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, after an action of two hours and ten minutes. [Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France." O. Troude (Paris, 1868), iv, 171.] In actual weight the shot thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the victorious Const.i.tution or United States. [Footnote: See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.]

There are later examples than this. But a very few years before the declaration of war by the United States, and in the same struggle that was then still raging, there had been at least two victories gained by English frigates over French foes as superior to themselves as the American 44's were to the British s.h.i.+ps they captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the Phoenix, 36, captured the Didon, 40, after 3 1/2 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force being: [Footnote: Ibid., lii, 425.]

PHOENIX DIDON 1318 1418 2 9 2 8 632 736 --------- --------- 21 guns, 444 lbs. 23 guns, 522 lbs.

(nominal; about 600, real) On March 8, 1808, the San Florenzo, 36, captured the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being exactly what it was in the case of the Phoenix and Didon.[Footnote: Ibid., in, 499.] Comparing the real, not the nominal weight of metal, we find that the Didon and Piedmontaise were proportionately of greater force compared to the Phoenix and San Florenzo, than the Const.i.tution was compared to the Guerriere or Java. The French 18's threw each a shot weighing but about two pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of 1812, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a shot over 10 pounds heavier than that thrown by one of the Const.i.tution's spar-deck 32's.

That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18-pounder frigate is shown by the action of the British frigate Eurotas with the French frigate Chlorinde, on Feb. 25, 1814. [Footnote: James, vi, 391.] The first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463 pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French lost 90 and the British 60 men. The action showed that heavy metal was not of much use unless used well.

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory caused in the United States, and the intense annoyance it created in England, it must be remembered that during the past twenty years the Island Power had been at war with almost every state in Europe, at one time or another, and in the course of about two hundred single conflicts between s.h.i.+ps of approximately equal force (that is, where the difference was less than one half), waged against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists, her s.h.i.+ps had been beaten and captured in but five instances. Then war broke out with America, and in eight months five single-s.h.i.+p actions occurred, in every one of which the British vessel was captured. Even had the victories been due solely to superior force this would have been no mean triumph for the United States.

On October 13, 1812, the American 18-gun s.h.i.+p-sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off southeast to get into the track of the West India vessels; on the 16th a heavy gale began to blow, causing the loss of the jib-boom and two men who were on it. The next day the weather moderated somewhat, and at 11.30 P.M., in lat.i.tude 37 N., longitude 65 W., several sail were descried. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' official letter, Nov. 24, 1812.] These were part of a convoy of 14 merchant-men which had quitted the bay of Honduras on September 12th, bound for England, [Footnote: James' History, vi, 158.] under the convoy of the British 18-gun brig-sloop Frolic, of 19 guns and 110 men, Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been dispersed by the gale of the 16th, during which the Frolic's main-yard was carried away and both her top-sails torn to pieces [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812.]; next day she spent in repairing damages, and by dark six of the missing s.h.i.+ps had joined her. The day broke almost cloudless on the 18th (Sunday), showing the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the American s.h.i.+p, still some distance off, as Captain Jones had not thought it prudent to close during the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his antagonists. The Wasp now sent down to her top-gallant yards, close reefed her top-sails, and bore down under short fighting canvas; while the Frolic removed her main-yard from the casks, lashed it on deck, and then hauled to the wind under her boom main-sail and close-reefed foretop-sail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the stranger under her guns, and permit the convoy to escape. At 11.32 the action began-the two s.h.i.+ps running parallel on the starboard tack, not 60 yards apart, the Wasp, firing her port, and the Frolic her starboard, guns. The latter fired very rapidly, delivering three broadsides to the Wasp's two, [Footnote: Cooper, 182.] both crews cheering loudly as the s.h.i.+ps wallowed through the water. There was a very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch and roll heavily. The Americans fired as the engaged side of their s.h.i.+p was going down, aiming at their opponent's hull [Footnote: Miles' Register, in, p. 324.]; while the British delivered their broadsides while on the crests of the seas, the shot going high. The water dashed in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels rolled so that the muzzles of the guns went under. [Footnote: Do.] But in spite of the rough weather, the firing was not only spirited but well directed. At 11.36 the Wasp's maintop-mast was shot away and fell, with its yard, across the port fore and foretop-sail braces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff and mizzentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] It would now have been very difficult to brace any of the yards. But meanwhile the Frolic suffered dreadfully in her hull and lower masts, and had her gaff and head braces shot away.[Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter.] The slaughter among her crew was very great, but the survivors kept at their work with the dogged courage of their race. At first the two vessels ran side by side, but the American gradually forged ahead, throwing in her fire from a position in which she herself received little injury; by degrees the vessels got so close that the Americans struck the Frolic's side with their rammers in loading, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] and the British brig was raked with dreadful effect. The Frolic then fell aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in between the main- and mizzen-rigging of the Wasp and pa.s.sing over the heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standing near the capstan. This forced the Wasp up in the wind, and she again raked her antagonist, Captain Jones trying to restrain his men from boarding till he could put in another broadside. But they could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic's bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted on the hammock cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in the rigging, and one of the mids.h.i.+pmen seizing his coat-tails to help himself up, the lieutenant tumbled back on the deck. At the next swell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which there were already two seamen whom he pa.s.sed on the forecastle. But there was no one to oppose him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt. [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter.] The man at the wheel was still at his post, grim and undaunted, and two or three more were on deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so severely wounded that they could not stand without support. [Footnote: James, vi, 161.] There could be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle lowered the flag at 12.15-just 43 minutes after the beginning of the fight. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] A minute or two afterward both the Frolic's masts went by the board-the foremast about fifteen feet above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew, as already said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every officer was wounded; two of them, the first lieutenant, Charles McKay, and master, John Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over 90 [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and is, of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account makes it 69, and James only 62;] about 30 of whom were killed outright or died later. The Wasp suffered very severely in her rigging and aloft generally, but only two or three shots struck her hull; five of her men were killed-two in her mizzen-top and one in her maintop-mast rigging-and five wounded, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] chiefly while aloft.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Wasp vs. Frolic: a contemporary painting by Thomas Birch, believed to have been done for the Wasp's captain, James Biddle. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)]

The two vessels were practically of equal force. The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had merely converted her into a brigantine, and, as the roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight under very short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully compensated for by her superiority in metal. She had been desperately defended; no men could have fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and his crew. On the other hand, the Americans had done their work with a coolness and skill that could not be surpa.s.sed; the contest had been mainly one of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly superior judgment and accuracy with which they fired. Both officers and crew had behaved well; Captain Jones particularly mentions Lieutenant Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service, persisted in remaining on deck throughout the engagement.

The Wasp was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 32-pound carronades; the Frolic with 2 long 6's, 16 32-pound carronades, and 1 s.h.i.+fting 12-pound carronade.