The Essential Writings Of Machiavelli Part 4

In Rome after the Tarquins16 were expelled there seemed to exist a wonderful accord between the plebeians and the Senate. The n.o.bles seemed to have laid down their pride and taken up the popular cause and were supported by everyone, even the lowliest. But this was a ruse, and the motivation of the n.o.bles remained hidden, nor was the reason for it apparent as long as the Tarquins, whom the n.o.bles feared, were alive. The n.o.bles felt that mistreating the plebeians would draw the plebeians closer to the Tarquins, and so the n.o.bles conducted themselves toward the plebeians outward with respect. But no sooner were the Tarquins dead than the n.o.bles' fear vanished and they began spewing at the plebeians all the venom concealed in their hearts, attacking them in every way they could. were expelled there seemed to exist a wonderful accord between the plebeians and the Senate. The n.o.bles seemed to have laid down their pride and taken up the popular cause and were supported by everyone, even the lowliest. But this was a ruse, and the motivation of the n.o.bles remained hidden, nor was the reason for it apparent as long as the Tarquins, whom the n.o.bles feared, were alive. The n.o.bles felt that mistreating the plebeians would draw the plebeians closer to the Tarquins, and so the n.o.bles conducted themselves toward the plebeians outward with respect. But no sooner were the Tarquins dead than the n.o.bles' fear vanished and they began spewing at the plebeians all the venom concealed in their hearts, attacking them in every way they could.17 This bears testimony to what I said before, that men never do good except out of necessity. This bears testimony to what I said before, that men never do good except out of necessity.

But where choice is overabundant and one has recourse to every freedom, everything is soon beset by confusion and disorder. It is said that hunger and poverty make man industrious, and that laws make him good, but that laws are not necessary when things work well on their own accord without them. When these good customs are missing, however, then laws become vital. With the Tarquins gone-the fear of whom had kept the n.o.bility in check-it was necessary to find a new order that would have the same effect that the Tarquins had had while they were alive. Thus, after many uproars, and clashes between the plebeians and the n.o.bility, the tribunes were created for the security of the plebeians. These tribunes were of such standing and reputation that they were always able to act as mediators between the plebeians and the Senate, and to curb the arrogance of the n.o.bles.

16. Tarquin the Proud, who according to tradition reigned from 534 to 510 Tarquin the Proud, who according to tradition reigned from 534 to 510 BCE BCE, was the last of the seven legendary kings of Rome.17. Livy (Book II, chapter 21) writes: "This year is notable for the news of Tarquin's death. [...] The news delighted the patricians and delighted the plebeians. But the patricians' happiness went out of control. Up to that time they had treated the plebeians with great deference, but now their leaders began to inflict injustice upon them." Livy (Book II, chapter 21) writes: "This year is notable for the news of Tarquin's death. [...] The news delighted the patricians and delighted the plebeians. But the patricians' happiness went out of control. Up to that time they had treated the plebeians with great deference, but now their leaders began to inflict injustice upon them."

CHAPTER FOUR.

ON HOW DISCORD BETWEEN THE PLEBEIANS AND THE R ROMAN S SENATE MADE THE R ROMAN R REPUBLIC FREE AND POWERFUL.

I do not want to pa.s.s over the tumults that occasionally arose in Rome between the time the last Tarquin king died and the time the tribunes were created. I would also like to say a few things against the opinion of those who hold that Rome was an unruly republic beset by so much confusion that if good fortune and military skill had not made up for its defects, it would have been inferior to all other republics. I cannot deny that Fortune and the army were reasons for the power of Rome, but it seems clear to me that those who are of the opinion that Rome was unruly do not realize that where there is a good army there must also be good inst.i.tutions, and this only rarely occurs where there is no good fortune. But let us proceed to the other aspects of Rome. I say that those who censure the discord between the n.o.bles and the plebeians are blaming things that played a foremost part in keeping Rome free, and that they consider only the tumult and shouts engendered by such disorder rather than the good results they generate. Nor do they consider how in the body of every republic there are two different humors-that of the people and that of the n.o.bles-and that all the laws that are pa.s.sed in favor of liberty arise from their discord, as can easily be seen to have happened in Rome. From the era of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of more than three hundred years, the clashes in Rome rarely resulted in exiles and even more rarely in bloodshed.18 Nor can one judge these clashes as detrimental, or the republic divided. In all that time, in its periods of strife, it did not send more than nine or ten citizens into exile, executed very few, and did not force many to pay fines. Nor can one reasonably claim that Rome was a republic in disarray when there are so many examples of excellence: because good examples arise from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those clashes which so many rashly condemn. If one examines the outcome of these clashes, one will find that they did not result in exile or violence against the common good, but in laws and inst.i.tutions that benefited civic liberty. Some might say that the means were extreme and almost savage, seeing the populace gathered to shout against the Senate, the Senate against the people, everyone running riot through the streets, closing the shops, the plebeian ma.s.ses leaving Rome-things that frighten even those who only read about them. I would like to propose that every city has to have methods that allow the populace to give vent to their ambitions, above all those cities that want to engage their populace in important matters. Rome had such a method. When the populace wanted to obtain a law, they either caused unrest as mentioned above, or refused to enlist to go to war, so that to placate them Rome had to satisfy them in some way. The desires of a free populace are rarely dangerous to liberty, because the danger arises either from a populace being oppressed or from the suspicion that they might be oppressed. Where these fears were false, there was the remedy of the public a.s.semblies at which some good man could rise and make a speech demonstrating that they were mistaken. And as Cicero says, the populace, though ignorant, are capable of understanding the truth, and readily acquiesce when they are told the truth, by a man worthy of trust. Nor can one judge these clashes as detrimental, or the republic divided. In all that time, in its periods of strife, it did not send more than nine or ten citizens into exile, executed very few, and did not force many to pay fines. Nor can one reasonably claim that Rome was a republic in disarray when there are so many examples of excellence: because good examples arise from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those clashes which so many rashly condemn. If one examines the outcome of these clashes, one will find that they did not result in exile or violence against the common good, but in laws and inst.i.tutions that benefited civic liberty. Some might say that the means were extreme and almost savage, seeing the populace gathered to shout against the Senate, the Senate against the people, everyone running riot through the streets, closing the shops, the plebeian ma.s.ses leaving Rome-things that frighten even those who only read about them. I would like to propose that every city has to have methods that allow the populace to give vent to their ambitions, above all those cities that want to engage their populace in important matters. Rome had such a method. When the populace wanted to obtain a law, they either caused unrest as mentioned above, or refused to enlist to go to war, so that to placate them Rome had to satisfy them in some way. The desires of a free populace are rarely dangerous to liberty, because the danger arises either from a populace being oppressed or from the suspicion that they might be oppressed. Where these fears were false, there was the remedy of the public a.s.semblies at which some good man could rise and make a speech demonstrating that they were mistaken. And as Cicero says, the populace, though ignorant, are capable of understanding the truth, and readily acquiesce when they are told the truth, by a man worthy of trust.19 One should therefore criticize the Roman government more moderately, and realize that the many good results that came out of that republic could only have been brought about by the best causes. And if the discord was the reason for the creation of the tribunes, it deserves the highest praise, because, besides affording the populace a role in the government, the tribunes were formed to guard Roman liberty, as will be shown in the following chapter.

18. Tarquin the Proud, the last king of Rome, was deposed in 510 Tarquin the Proud, the last king of Rome, was deposed in 510 BCE BCE. The Gracchi brothers were influential statesmen and reformers. The elder, Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius Gracchus, was killed in 133 BCE BCE, his brother, Caius Semp.r.o.nius Gracchus, in 121 BCE BCE.19. In In De amicitia (On Friends.h.i.+p) De amicitia (On Friends.h.i.+p) XXV, Cicero writes: "A public a.s.sembly, though composed of inexperienced men, nevertheless will be able to judge the difference between a mere flatterer and untrustworthy citizen seeking popularity, and a man of principle, standing, and solidity." XXV, Cicero writes: "A public a.s.sembly, though composed of inexperienced men, nevertheless will be able to judge the difference between a mere flatterer and untrustworthy citizen seeking popularity, and a man of principle, standing, and solidity."

CHAPTER FIVE.

ON WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURE IN THE HANDS OF THE POPULACE OR OF THE n.o.bLES, AND WHETHER THOSE SEEKING TO ACQUIRE OR THOSE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN HAVE GREATER CAUSE TO SOW DISCORD.

Among the most important inst.i.tutions set up by the wise founder of a state is legislation to protect liberty. Living in freedom will last for a greater or lesser time depending on how well founded that freedom is. In every state there are n.o.bles and populace, and so the question arises in whose hands it would be best to place the protection of liberty. In ancient Sparta, as in modern Venice, it was placed in the hands of the n.o.bles, while in Rome it was placed in the hands of the plebeians. Therefore it will be useful to examine which of these states made the better choice. If we look at the reasons for these choices, there is something to be said for both sides. But if we examine the results, one would choose the side of the n.o.bles, as Sparta's and Venice's liberty lasted longer than that of Rome.

As for the reasons for these choices, let me first argue the case of the Romans, and say that the protection of liberty ought to be given to those who have less desire to usurp it. For without doubt, if one considers the respective aims of the n.o.bles and the populace, one sees in the former a strong desire to dominate, and in the latter merely a desire not to be dominated.20 Consequently, the populace have a stronger will to live free, having less hope to usurp freedom than the n.o.bles. Thus if the populace are setup as the protector of liberty, it is reasonable to conclude that they will take better care of it. Not being able to seize power themselves, they will not permit others to seize it. Consequently, the populace have a stronger will to live free, having less hope to usurp freedom than the n.o.bles. Thus if the populace are setup as the protector of liberty, it is reasonable to conclude that they will take better care of it. Not being able to seize power themselves, they will not permit others to seize it.

On the other hand, the defenders of the Spartan and Venetian model will counter that he who places the protection of liberty in the hands of the n.o.bles does two good things. First, it satisfies the n.o.bles' aspiration to rule, and with that power in their hands they consequently play a larger part in the state and have more reason to be satisfied. Second, it removes authority from the plebeians with their restless spirits, which are the cause of infinite discord and upheaval in a state and certain to reduce the n.o.bility to despair, which over time brings bad results. The defenders of the Spartan and Venetian model cite Rome itself as an example: The tribunes of the plebeians acquired so much authority that they were no longer content with one consul being a plebeian, but wanted both to be. Achieving that, the tribunes then demanded the office of censor, the office of praetor, and all the other positions of power in the city, and it was this same pa.s.sion that before long drove them to venerate any man capable of a.s.saulting the n.o.bility. This gave rise to the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome.21 But in fact, whoever weighs both sides might be in doubt as to which side he would choose to be the protector of such liberty, not knowing which humor would be more injurious in a state: the humor that seeks to preserve the rank and offices it already holds, or the humor that seeks to gain that which it does not have. Yet examining everything carefully, one will come to the following conclusion: One is considering either a state that is striving toward an empire, like Rome, or a state content to maintain itself as it is. In the first case, the state has to do exactly as Rome did, and in the second it can follow the example of Venice and Sparta, for reasons I shall explain in the following chapter.

But let us discuss which men are most injurious to a state: those who desire to acquire, or those afraid of losing what they have acquired. I propose that once Marcus Menenius was made dictator, and Marcus Fulvius his Master of the Horse (both were plebeians), in order to investigate conspiracies against Rome that had arisen in Capua, they were also given authority by the people to seek out those men in Rome who, through ambition and illegal means, strove to gain the consuls.h.i.+p or other high positions in the city22 In the n.o.bility's eyes such authority had been given to the dictator against them, and they began spreading the rumor throughout Rome that it was not the n.o.bles who were seeking these high positions out of ambition and illegal means, but men from the plebeian ranks, who, unable to rely upon their birth and skill, were seeking to acquire the highest ranks through illegal means. In the n.o.bility's eyes such authority had been given to the dictator against them, and they began spreading the rumor throughout Rome that it was not the n.o.bles who were seeking these high positions out of ambition and illegal means, but men from the plebeian ranks, who, unable to rely upon their birth and skill, were seeking to acquire the highest ranks through illegal means.23 They particularly accused the dictator. Their accusation was brought with such force that the dictator, Menenius, gave an oration in which he complained about the calumnies which the n.o.bles had launched against him and laid down his office, submitting himself to the judgment of the populace. His case was deliberated and he was absolved: at which point the question arose, who was more ambitious, he who wants to maintain what he has or he who wants to acquire what he does not have, as it is easy enough for either aspiration to be the reason for the greatest discord. Nevertheless, in most cases the discord is caused by those who possess, because the fear of losing generates in them the same desires as those who wish to acquire. Men do not feel their possessions secure if they do not also acquire the possessions of others. And the more they possess, the more power and capacity they have to cause turmoil. Furthermore, their improper and covetous behavior ignites in the hearts of those who do not possess the urge to avenge themselves and rob those who do, gaining the wealth and honors that they see so badly misused by others. They particularly accused the dictator. Their accusation was brought with such force that the dictator, Menenius, gave an oration in which he complained about the calumnies which the n.o.bles had launched against him and laid down his office, submitting himself to the judgment of the populace. His case was deliberated and he was absolved: at which point the question arose, who was more ambitious, he who wants to maintain what he has or he who wants to acquire what he does not have, as it is easy enough for either aspiration to be the reason for the greatest discord. Nevertheless, in most cases the discord is caused by those who possess, because the fear of losing generates in them the same desires as those who wish to acquire. Men do not feel their possessions secure if they do not also acquire the possessions of others. And the more they possess, the more power and capacity they have to cause turmoil. Furthermore, their improper and covetous behavior ignites in the hearts of those who do not possess the urge to avenge themselves and rob those who do, gaining the wealth and honors that they see so badly misused by others.

20. This idea is echoed in This idea is echoed in The Prince The Prince, chapter 9: "One acquires this princ.i.p.ality through the favor of either the people or the n.o.bles, because in every city there are two opposing humors. This arises from the fact that the n.o.bles want to command and oppress the people, but the people do not want to be commanded or oppressed by the n.o.bles."21. Gaius Marius was a Roman general of plebeian background who was first elected consul in 107 Gaius Marius was a Roman general of plebeian background who was first elected consul in 107 BCE BCE. Many of his reforms led to the fall of the republic.22. The dictator was a chief magistrate with absolute authority, elected for six months during great emergencies. The Master of the Horse a.s.sisted the dictator in managing the state. Gaius Maenius (not Marcus Menenius) became dictator, with Marcus Folius (not Fulvius) as his Master of the Horse. Livy describes these incidents in Book IX, chapter 26. The dictator was a chief magistrate with absolute authority, elected for six months during great emergencies. The Master of the Horse a.s.sisted the dictator in managing the state. Gaius Maenius (not Marcus Menenius) became dictator, with Marcus Folius (not Fulvius) as his Master of the Horse. Livy describes these incidents in Book IX, chapter 26.23. Livy (Book IX, chapter 26) writes: "The n.o.bility, not only those who were being accused, but all the n.o.bles, protested that the charge should not be brought against the patricians to whom the path to honors was always open, unless it was obstructed by intrigue, but against plebeian upstarts." Livy (Book IX, chapter 26) writes: "The n.o.bility, not only those who were being accused, but all the n.o.bles, protested that the charge should not be brought against the patricians to whom the path to honors was always open, unless it was obstructed by intrigue, but against plebeian upstarts."

CHAPTER SIX.

ON WHETHER A FORM OF GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE BEEN SET UP IN R ROME THAT COULD HAVE REMOVED THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE S SENATE.

We have discussed the effects of the clashes and conflicts between the populace and the Senate. Since these continued until the time of the Gracchi,24 leading to the end of liberty in Rome, one might have wished that Rome had attained its greatness without such enmities. But it seems relevant to consider whether a government that was able to remove such clashes could have been inst.i.tuted in Rome. To examine this, one must look at the states that managed to remain free for a long time without enmities and clashes, and see what form of government they had, and whether one could have set up such a government in Rome. There are ancient Sparta and modern Venice, both of which I have already touched on. Sparta set up a king and a small senate to govern it, leading to the end of liberty in Rome, one might have wished that Rome had attained its greatness without such enmities. But it seems relevant to consider whether a government that was able to remove such clashes could have been inst.i.tuted in Rome. To examine this, one must look at the states that managed to remain free for a long time without enmities and clashes, and see what form of government they had, and whether one could have set up such a government in Rome. There are ancient Sparta and modern Venice, both of which I have already touched on. Sparta set up a king and a small senate to govern it,25 while Venice did not organize its government by ranks, but rather under a single appellation: All those with the right to enter the administration were called gentlemen. This system was given to the Venetians more by chance than by the wisdom of their legislator. They were confined to those little islands on which the city now stands, for the reasons I have already mentioned, and as the Venetians had grown to such a number, they needed laws if they wanted to live together, and so they set up a form of government. They often convened in councils to deliberate on matters concerning the city and when it seemed that they had enough members in their councils to form a vital civic system, they closed the doors to all further newcomers to Venice, preventing them from partic.i.p.ating in their government. while Venice did not organize its government by ranks, but rather under a single appellation: All those with the right to enter the administration were called gentlemen. This system was given to the Venetians more by chance than by the wisdom of their legislator. They were confined to those little islands on which the city now stands, for the reasons I have already mentioned, and as the Venetians had grown to such a number, they needed laws if they wanted to live together, and so they set up a form of government. They often convened in councils to deliberate on matters concerning the city and when it seemed that they had enough members in their councils to form a vital civic system, they closed the doors to all further newcomers to Venice, preventing them from partic.i.p.ating in their government.26 Then, once enough inhabitants were excluded from government, the men of the government acquired a standing and were called gentlemen, while the others were called commoners. This system could arise and maintain itself without discord because when it originally came into being, everyone living in Venice was made part of the government, and so n.o.body could complain. Those who arrived later found the government established and closed, and so did not have cause or opportunity to spark turmoil. There was no cause because nothing had been taken from them, and there was no opportunity because whoever was ruling held them in check and did not call upon them in matters in which they could end up gaining power. Furthermore, those who later came to settle in Venice were not many, not enough in number to cause an imbalance between those who governed and those who were governed. The proportion of gentlemen to commoners was either equal or greater, so Venice could set up this kind of state and keep it united. Then, once enough inhabitants were excluded from government, the men of the government acquired a standing and were called gentlemen, while the others were called commoners. This system could arise and maintain itself without discord because when it originally came into being, everyone living in Venice was made part of the government, and so n.o.body could complain. Those who arrived later found the government established and closed, and so did not have cause or opportunity to spark turmoil. There was no cause because nothing had been taken from them, and there was no opportunity because whoever was ruling held them in check and did not call upon them in matters in which they could end up gaining power. Furthermore, those who later came to settle in Venice were not many, not enough in number to cause an imbalance between those who governed and those who were governed. The proportion of gentlemen to commoners was either equal or greater, so Venice could set up this kind of state and keep it united.

Sparta, as I have already mentioned, was governed by a king and a small senate. It managed to maintain itself for such a long time because it had few citizens, and did not accept immigrants. Sparta had also adopted and observed the laws of Lycurgus, which took away all cause for discord, and the Spartans managed to live united for a long time. The laws of Lycurgus brought more equality in wealth and less equality in rank. Hence there was equality in poverty, and the populace were not as politically ambitious, since the positions of power in the city were open to so few citizens and were kept from the populace, nor did the n.o.bles ever give them reason to desire these positions by treating them badly. This stability arose from the kings of the Spartans, who, being called into office and placed in the midst of that n.o.bility, had no better way to hold on to their office than by keeping the populace secure from harm. The result was that the populace neither feared nor desired power; and since they neither had power nor feared that of the n.o.bles, the struggle they would have had with the n.o.bility and the causes for clashes did not arise, and they could live in harmony for a long time. But two princ.i.p.al matters brought about this harmony: first, Sparta had few inhabitants and so could be governed by a few, and second, by not accepting foreigners into their state, they did not have occasion either to adulterate themselves or to grow to such an extent that the state would become unrulable by the few who governed it.

Considering all these matters, it is clear that the Roman legislators, if they wanted Rome to remain as peaceful as the states I have mentioned, had to do one of two things: either not use the plebeians in war, like the Venetians, or not open their doors to foreigners, like the Spartans. The Romans, however, did both, which gave the plebeians power, helped them grow in number, and gave them infinite occasion to cause turmoil. But had the state of Rome become more peaceful it would have become weaker, as this would have blocked the path to the greatness it achieved. In other words, had Rome removed the causes of turmoil, it would have also removed the causes for its growth. If one looks carefully this pattern can be observed in all human affairs: One can never remove one problem without another one's arising.27 If you strive to make a populace numerous and armed in order to build a large empire, you end up unable to control it as you wish; if you keep it small or disarmed you can control it, but if you acquire new dominions you will be unable to keep them, or they will become so weak that you will fall prey to whoever attacks you. So in all our deliberations we should consider where the fewest drawbacks lie and choose the best solution, because there is no choice that is entirely clear and certain. Rome, therefore, like Sparta, could have created a prince for life and a small senate; but unlike Sparta, Rome could not have avoided expanding the number of its citizens, as it wanted to create a large empire. This would have meant that the king for life and the small senate would have been of little benefit to Rome as far as its harmony was concerned. If you strive to make a populace numerous and armed in order to build a large empire, you end up unable to control it as you wish; if you keep it small or disarmed you can control it, but if you acquire new dominions you will be unable to keep them, or they will become so weak that you will fall prey to whoever attacks you. So in all our deliberations we should consider where the fewest drawbacks lie and choose the best solution, because there is no choice that is entirely clear and certain. Rome, therefore, like Sparta, could have created a prince for life and a small senate; but unlike Sparta, Rome could not have avoided expanding the number of its citizens, as it wanted to create a large empire. This would have meant that the king for life and the small senate would have been of little benefit to Rome as far as its harmony was concerned.

Therefore, anyone wis.h.i.+ng to set up a republic from the start should first consider whether his aim is to expand his dominion and power, like Rome, or to remain within strict limits. In the first case, he has to follow the model of Rome and allow the tumult and popular discord to the extent that he can; because without a great number of men, and well-armed ones, a state can never grow, or if it does, it will be unable to maintain itself. In the second case, the founder of a republic can set it up following the model of Sparta or Venice; but because expansion is poison to such states, he who sets them up has to do his utmost to hinder them from acquiring territory. Such territorial acquisitions, when a state is weak, will be its utter ruin. This is what happened in Sparta and Venice. The former, having subjugated almost all of Greece, showed its weak foundation in a minor incident: When Pelopidas28 sparked a rebellion in Thebes, other cities followed suit, and the Spartan state was destroyed. Similarly, Venice had occupied a large part of Italy-most of it not through war but through money and ingenuity-and yet the moment it had to prove its strength, it lost all its territories in a single day sparked a rebellion in Thebes, other cities followed suit, and the Spartan state was destroyed. Similarly, Venice had occupied a large part of Italy-most of it not through war but through money and ingenuity-and yet the moment it had to prove its strength, it lost all its territories in a single day29 Therefore I propose that the way to create a republic that will last a long time is to set it up like Sparta or Venice, and to found it in a strong location and with such power that n.o.body would consider it easily subjugated, but on the other hand not allow it to become so large that it would instill fear in its neighbors. This way, a state can prevail for a long time, since one makes war on a state for two reasons: in order to subjugate it, or out of fear that one might be subjugated by it. The model I have proposed above will almost entirely remove these reasons, because if it is difficult to conquer a state (since I presuppose its defense would be skillfully devised), it would be rare or out of the question for someone to set his sights on acquiring it. If the state remains within its own borders, and experience demonstrates that it does not harbor ambitions of expansion, n.o.body will declare war on it out of fear, and even less so if it has a const.i.tution or laws that prohibit expansion. I have no doubt that if such a balance could be kept it would lead to a proper living according to law and the true tranquillity of a city. But as all affairs of this world are in motion and will not remain fixed, they must either rise or fall, and many endeavors to which reason will not induce you, necessity will. If one has set up a republic that is able to maintain itself without expanding, but necessity leads it to expand, one will see its foundations crumble under it, and it will quickly come to ruin. And yet, if the heavens smile upon it and it never has to wage war, idleness might make this republic effeminate or divided. These two problems together, or each by itself, can be enough reason for the republic's ruin. Therefore, since it is not possible, in my opinion, to find a balance or to maintain a middle way, in setting up a republic one must think of the most honorable choices, and set it up in such a way that even if necessity induces it to expand, it will be able to conserve what it has acquired.

But to return to my first argument: I believe that it is necessary to follow the inst.i.tutions of Rome and not those of other states, because I do not believe it is possible to find a middle way. One must tolerate the kinds of clashes that arose in Rome between the populace and the Senate, regarding them as a necessary ill on Rome's road to greatness. Beyond the other reasons I have submitted, which demonstrate that the authority of the tribunes was necessary for the protection of liberty, one can easily see the benefit that states derive from the power of public indictment, which was granted, among other things, to the tribunes, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

24. The reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic, opening the way to imperial Rome. The reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic, opening the way to imperial Rome.25. In fact, Sparta had In fact, Sparta had two two kings, who were elected as lifetime co-rulers. The Spartan senate, or kings, who were elected as lifetime co-rulers. The Spartan senate, or gerousia gerousia, was made up of twenty-eight elders.26. In 1297, Venice's Maggior Consiglio (Greater Council) excluded all non-aristocrats from political power. In 1297, Venice's Maggior Consiglio (Greater Council) excluded all non-aristocrats from political power.27. See also See also The Prince The Prince, chapter 21: "It is in the nature of things that you can never escape one setback without running into another. Wisdom consists of knowing how to recognize the respective qualities of the setbacks and choosing the lesser evil."28. Pelopidas freed Thebes from Spartan occupation in 379 Pelopidas freed Thebes from Spartan occupation in 379 BCE BCE, which Plutarch describes in Parallel Lives Parallel Lives in his chapter on Pelopidas. in his chapter on Pelopidas.29. In the Battle of Agnadello in 1509, Venice suffered a total defeat by the French king Louis XII and lost all its cities on the Italian mainland. In the Battle of Agnadello in 1509, Venice suffered a total defeat by the French king Louis XII and lost all its cities on the Italian mainland.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH PUBLIC INDICTMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN A REPUBLIC TO KEEP IT FREE.

The most useful and necessary authority that can be granted to inst.i.tutions entrusted with the protection of the republic's liberty is the ability of indicting publicly or before some magistrate or council, citizens who in some way have offended the public. Such inst.i.tutions have two very useful results. First, citizens, out of fear of being indicted, will not attempt anything against the state; if they do, they are immediately persecuted regardless of who they are. Second, it is a way to provide an outlet for the humors that arise in different ways within cities against particular citizens. When these humors do not have a lawful outlet they seek one that is unlawful, which can bring the whole state to ruin. Therefore, nothing makes a republic more stable and firm than to be set up so that the change in such humors that agitate it have an outlet that is regulated by the laws.

This can be demonstrated by many examples, but best of all by what Livy writes of Coriola.n.u.s.30 The Roman n.o.bility had been angered because in their view the plebeians had too much power through the creation of the tribunes, who protected them. At that time there was a great scarcity of provisions in Rome, and while the Senate had sent to Sicily for grain, Coriola.n.u.s, who was hostile to the popular faction, advised that the time had come to punish the plebeians and take back the authority that they had seized from the n.o.bility. The plebeians, Coriola.n.u.s advised, should be kept hungry, and the grain should not be distributed among them. When this reached the ears of the populace, such anger flared up against Coriola.n.u.s that the crowd would have lynched him as he came out of the Senate had the tribunes not summoned him to argue his case. This incident reinforces what I have said above: How useful and necessary it is for the laws of a republic to provide an outlet for the anger that the ma.s.ses feel toward a single citizen. When these legal means do not exist, the ma.s.ses will resort to illegal means, which without doubt have far worse results than the former. The Roman n.o.bility had been angered because in their view the plebeians had too much power through the creation of the tribunes, who protected them. At that time there was a great scarcity of provisions in Rome, and while the Senate had sent to Sicily for grain, Coriola.n.u.s, who was hostile to the popular faction, advised that the time had come to punish the plebeians and take back the authority that they had seized from the n.o.bility. The plebeians, Coriola.n.u.s advised, should be kept hungry, and the grain should not be distributed among them. When this reached the ears of the populace, such anger flared up against Coriola.n.u.s that the crowd would have lynched him as he came out of the Senate had the tribunes not summoned him to argue his case. This incident reinforces what I have said above: How useful and necessary it is for the laws of a republic to provide an outlet for the anger that the ma.s.ses feel toward a single citizen. When these legal means do not exist, the ma.s.ses will resort to illegal means, which without doubt have far worse results than the former.

When a citizen is punished by legal means, even if he is wronged, little or no unrest follows, because the law is enforced without private or foreign forces that ruin the state's freedom. Order is upheld with public forces and laws that have precise boundaries, which they do not transgress and so ruin the state. I feel that the example of Coriola.n.u.s from ancient times should suffice, as anyone can judge what harm would have befallen the Roman Republic had he been lynched in a riot. Once private citizens harm other private citizens, the harm generates fear, and fear seeks defense, for which partisans are secured, who then cause factions in states, and factions lead to the destruction of these states. But as the matter has been mediated by those who have public authority, all the harm that might have come from controlling it with private authority falls away.

We have seen in our own times the disorder that ensued in the Florentine Republic when the mult.i.tude could not vent its anger against one of its citizens within the boundaries of the law, as happened in the era when Francesco Valori ruled the city like a prince.31 Many in Florence saw him as a man of unbridled ambition who strove to transcend the law through audacity and violence, but there was no way to resist him except by starting a faction that would oppose his. As he had nothing to fear unless illegal steps were taken against him, he began surrounding himself with supporters. In the meantime, those who opposed him had no legal means of countering him, and so they turned to illegal means, finally resorting to arms. Had they been able to oppose him with legal means, his authority would have been destroyed with harm done to him alone, but having to destroy his authority by illegal means, his opponents did harm not only to him, but also to many outstanding citizens. In support of this conclusion I could also add another incident that occurred in Florence, involving Piero Soderini. Many in Florence saw him as a man of unbridled ambition who strove to transcend the law through audacity and violence, but there was no way to resist him except by starting a faction that would oppose his. As he had nothing to fear unless illegal steps were taken against him, he began surrounding himself with supporters. In the meantime, those who opposed him had no legal means of countering him, and so they turned to illegal means, finally resorting to arms. Had they been able to oppose him with legal means, his authority would have been destroyed with harm done to him alone, but having to destroy his authority by illegal means, his opponents did harm not only to him, but also to many outstanding citizens. In support of this conclusion I could also add another incident that occurred in Florence, involving Piero Soderini.32 This, too, came about solely because there were no inst.i.tutions in the republic through which one could indict the ruthless ambition of powerful citizens, as it is not sufficient to indict a powerful citizen before eight judges in a republic: This, too, came about solely because there were no inst.i.tutions in the republic through which one could indict the ruthless ambition of powerful citizens, as it is not sufficient to indict a powerful citizen before eight judges in a republic:33 There have to be many judges, because the few always look out for the interests of the few. Had such inst.i.tutions existed, the citizens could have indicted Soderini if he had comported himself badly, and so have given vent to their anger without calling in the Spanish army; and had Soderini not comported himself badly, the citizens would not have dared indict him, out of fear of ending up indicted themselves. This way, the forces that were the occasion for the scandal would have been removed. There have to be many judges, because the few always look out for the interests of the few. Had such inst.i.tutions existed, the citizens could have indicted Soderini if he had comported himself badly, and so have given vent to their anger without calling in the Spanish army; and had Soderini not comported himself badly, the citizens would not have dared indict him, out of fear of ending up indicted themselves. This way, the forces that were the occasion for the scandal would have been removed.

It can therefore be concluded that whenever we see a faction in a city calling in foreign forces, we can be certain that this arises from the city's bad system, which has no inst.i.tutions within its walls providing a legal outlet for the malignant humors that arise in man. This problem can be fully antic.i.p.ated by establis.h.i.+ng a system of bringing indictments before a large number of judges and giving these indictments weight. In Rome this system was so well set up that in the many conflicts between the plebeians and the Senate, neither the Senate nor the plebeians nor any private citizen ever considered using foreign forces. They had the remedy at home, and so were not compelled to seek it abroad.

Though the examples I have cited furnish ample proof of this, I would like to add another that Livy relates in his Histories Histories. In Chiusi, the foremost city of Etruria in those days, a chief magistrate raped one of the sisters of a certain Arunte, who, unable to avenge himself because of the rank and position of the rapist, turned to the Gauls, who were ruling present-day Lombardy, and encouraged them to come to Chiusi with their army arguing that they could avenge him to their advantage.34 Had Arunte been able to avenge himself through the inst.i.tutions of the city he would not have sought the help of the barbarian forces. But as useful as such indictments are in a republic, false accusations are harmful, as I shall discuss in the following chapter. Had Arunte been able to avenge himself through the inst.i.tutions of the city he would not have sought the help of the barbarian forces. But as useful as such indictments are in a republic, false accusations are harmful, as I shall discuss in the following chapter.

30. Gaius Marcius Coriola.n.u.s is a legendary figure believed to have lived in the fifth century Gaius Marcius Coriola.n.u.s is a legendary figure believed to have lived in the fifth century BCE BCE. Livy describes this episode in Book II, chapters 3335.31. Francesco Valori was one of the main political figures involved in the ousting of the Medici from Florence and the restoration of a republican government influenced by the ideas of the radical Dominican prior Girolamo Savonarola. Valori was murdered shortly before Savonarola's execution in 1498. Francesco Valori was one of the main political figures involved in the ousting of the Medici from Florence and the restoration of a republican government influenced by the ideas of the radical Dominican prior Girolamo Savonarola. Valori was murdered shortly before Savonarola's execution in 1498.32. In 1502 Piero Soderini had been elected Gonfalonier for life in Florence, but in 1512 he was deposed by the Medici with the help of a Spanish army. Soderini had been Machiavelli's patron. In 1502 Piero Soderini had been elected Gonfalonier for life in Florence, but in 1512 he was deposed by the Medici with the help of a Spanish army. Soderini had been Machiavelli's patron.33. Otto di guardia Otto di guardia, eight Florentine magistrates who administered justice.34. In fact Livy (Book V, chapter 33) writes: "Arruns's wife had been seduced by an Etruscan prince whose tutor Arruns was. But since the prince was an influential young man, Arruns could not get justice without seeking help from abroad. In revenge, he led the Gauls across the Alps and encouraged them to attack Clusium." In fact Livy (Book V, chapter 33) writes: "Arruns's wife had been seduced by an Etruscan prince whose tutor Arruns was. But since the prince was an influential young man, Arruns could not get justice without seeking help from abroad. In revenge, he led the Gauls across the Alps and encouraged them to attack Clusium."

CHAPTER EIGHT.

AS USEFUL AS PUBLIC INDICTMENTS ARE TO STATES, FALSE ACCUSATIONS ARE HARMFUL.

Furius Camillus's brilliance in liberating Rome from the oppression of the Gauls35 made the Roman citizens cede to him without feeling that they were losing standing or rank. Manlius Capitolinus, however, could not bear to see such honor and glory awarded to Furius Camillus. He himself had saved the Capitol, and felt that he had done as much for the protection of Rome as Camillus had, and that he was in no way inferior to him in feats of military glory. He was filled with envy and rankled by Camillus's glory. As Manlius Capitolinus could not sow discord among the senators, he turned to the plebeians, spreading dark rumors, including one that the treasure that had been gathered for the Gauls, but then had not been given to them, had been seized by private citizens: If this treasure could be regained, it could be used for the public good, relieving the plebeians of taxes or private debts. made the Roman citizens cede to him without feeling that they were losing standing or rank. Manlius Capitolinus, however, could not bear to see such honor and glory awarded to Furius Camillus. He himself had saved the Capitol, and felt that he had done as much for the protection of Rome as Camillus had, and that he was in no way inferior to him in feats of military glory. He was filled with envy and rankled by Camillus's glory. As Manlius Capitolinus could not sow discord among the senators, he turned to the plebeians, spreading dark rumors, including one that the treasure that had been gathered for the Gauls, but then had not been given to them, had been seized by private citizens: If this treasure could be regained, it could be used for the public good, relieving the plebeians of taxes or private debts.36 These words had a great effect on the plebeians, and they began causing turmoil in the city. The Senate saw the gravity of the situation and elected a dictator to look into the matter and put a stop to the violence that Manlius was unleas.h.i.+ng. The dictator immediately summoned him to be confronted before the public, the dictator standing among the n.o.bles, Manlius among the plebeians. He ordered Manlius to reveal who, according to him, had seized that treasure, since the Senate was as eager to know as the plebeians. Manlius evaded the question, saying that there was no need for him to inform the Senate of what it already knew. As a result, the dictator had him imprisoned. These words had a great effect on the plebeians, and they began causing turmoil in the city. The Senate saw the gravity of the situation and elected a dictator to look into the matter and put a stop to the violence that Manlius was unleas.h.i.+ng. The dictator immediately summoned him to be confronted before the public, the dictator standing among the n.o.bles, Manlius among the plebeians. He ordered Manlius to reveal who, according to him, had seized that treasure, since the Senate was as eager to know as the plebeians. Manlius evaded the question, saying that there was no need for him to inform the Senate of what it already knew. As a result, the dictator had him imprisoned.

It is to be noted from this incident from Livy how detestable false accusations are in free states or in any other form of society, and that no legislation to repress such false accusations should be neglected. In fact, there is no better system for eliminating false accusations than providing ample opportunity for public indictments, because just as indictments are beneficial to a state, false accusations are harmful. The difference between the two types is that false accusations need neither witnesses nor proof to substantiate them: Anybody can falsely accuse anybody else, but not everyone can be lawfully indicted, as public indictments need proof and circ.u.mstances that demonstrate the truth of the charge. Men are publicly indicted before magistrates, the people, and the councils, while they are falsely accused in town squares and market stalls. Calumny is more common where there are fewer opportunities for public indictments and where the states are not as well set up to receive them in their judicature. Therefore, a founder of a state must plan the legislature in such a way that any citizen can indict any other citizen without fear or deference to rank, and once the charges have been made and have been carefully looked into, false accusers must be severely punished. And the false accuser cannot complain if he is punished, as he could have made his accusations by lawful means rather than in spreading calumnies in market squares. Whenever this system is not well set up, clashes and disorder always follow, because calumnies provoke but do not punish citizens, and the provoked have their minds set on retaliation, as they hate rather than fear the things being said against them.

As I have already mentioned, the system of public indictment was set up well in Rome, but badly here in Florence. And just as in Rome this inst.i.tution did much good, in Florence its absence did much harm. Whoever reads the history of Florence will see how much calumny in every era was perpetrated on those of its citizens who were employed in the important affairs of the city. Of one man they said that he had stolen money from the state, of another that he had been unsuccessful in a military campaign because he had been bribed, and that another had done this or that misdeed out of ruthless ambition. Hatred surged from all sides, leading to division; division led to factions, and factions led to ruin. Had there been inst.i.tutions in Florence for bringing indictments against citizens and punis.h.i.+ng false accusers, the infinite scandals would not have continued. Those citizens who were either condemned or acquitted would not have been able to harm the city, and there would have been fewer men indicted than falsely accused, for it is easier, as I have said, to accuse a man falsely than to indict him officially. Among the devices used by a citizen to achieve greatness have been calumnies, for leveling false accusations against powerful citizens who have opposed a man's appet.i.te for power can be very effective. When the false accuser takes the part of the populace, and confirms their bad opinion of the powerful citizen, he wins them to his side. I could cite many examples, but will limit myself to one. The Florentine army was on a campaign against the city of Lucca under the command of Giovanni Guicciardini, who was its commissary37 Lucca did not fall, either because of Guicciardini's bad leaders.h.i.+p or his bad fortune, and yet, whichever the case might have been, he was held culpable, as it was said that he had been bribed by the Luccans. This calumny was promoted by his enemies and almost drove Guicciardini to the brink of desperation. Lucca did not fall, either because of Guicciardini's bad leaders.h.i.+p or his bad fortune, and yet, whichever the case might have been, he was held culpable, as it was said that he had been bribed by the Luccans. This calumny was promoted by his enemies and almost drove Guicciardini to the brink of desperation.38 He put himself in the hands of the Captain of the People in order to clear his name, He put himself in the hands of the Captain of the People in order to clear his name,39 but even so, he never managed to clear himself entirely, as there was no system in Florence for him to do this. Much indignation resulted among Guicciardini's friends, who were for the most part men of great influence and wanted to bring about a change in Florence. This incident, along with others like it, grew to such an extent that the ruin of the republic ensued. but even so, he never managed to clear himself entirely, as there was no system in Florence for him to do this. Much indignation resulted among Guicciardini's friends, who were for the most part men of great influence and wanted to bring about a change in Florence. This incident, along with others like it, grew to such an extent that the ruin of the republic ensued.

Hence Manlius Capitolinus was a false accuser, and not a legitimate one, and in his case the Romans demonstrated precisely how false accusers must be punished. Calumniators have to be turned into public accusers, and where the accusation proves to be true, either they must not be punished or they must be recompensed, but in cases where the accusation proves false, they must be punished in the way Manlius was.

35. Marcus Furius Camillus (d. 365 Marcus Furius Camillus (d. 365 BCE BCE) was a Roman general, statesman, and five-time dictator of Rome. His greatest triumph was the conquest of the Etruscan city of Veii (also discussed in chapter 55 below). Later Romans celebrated him as the second founder of Rome after the Gauls sacked the city in 396 BCE BCE. Machiavelli is discussing the events described by Livy in Book VI.36. Livy (Book VI, chapter 14) writes: "[Manlius] delivered speeches in his house as if he were haranguing the Senate. Unconcerned about truth or falsehood, he insinuated that the treasure that had been collected for the Gauls had been sequestered by the senators, who were not content with seizing public lands, but also wanted to embezzle public funds. With this treasure the populace could be freed of its debts." See also chapter 24, in which Machiavelli further discusses Manlius Capitolinus's sedition. Livy (Book VI, chapter 14) writes: "[Manlius] delivered speeches in his house as if he were haranguing the Senate. Unconcerned about truth or falsehood, he insinuated that the treasure that had been collected for the Gauls had been sequestered by the senators, who were not content with seizing public lands, but also wanted to embezzle public funds. With this treasure the populace could be freed of its debts." See also chapter 24, in which Machiavelli further discusses Manlius Capitolinus's sedition.37. Giovanni Guicciardini (c. 13851435) was the commissary of the Florentine army that attacked Lucca in 1430, which at the time was under the rule of Pagolo Guinigi, who is mentioned in pa.s.sing in Giovanni Guicciardini (c. 13851435) was the commissary of the Florentine army that attacked Lucca in 1430, which at the time was under the rule of Pagolo Guinigi, who is mentioned in pa.s.sing in The Life of Castruccio Castracani: The Life of Castruccio Castracani: "Lucca, which remained under his family's rule [the Guinigi] until the reign of his great-great-grandson Pagolo." "Lucca, which remained under his family's rule [the Guinigi] until the reign of his great-great-grandson Pagolo."38. Giovanni Guicciardini was an opponent of the faction of Cosimo de' Medici, who was exiled in 1433 but managed to seize power again the following year. Giovanni Guicciardini was an opponent of the faction of Cosimo de' Medici, who was exiled in 1433 but managed to seize power again the following year.39. The Capitano del Popolo was the magistracy in charge of leading the military forces of the populace and ensuring that justice was done to wronged members. The Capitano del Popolo was the magistracy in charge of leading the military forces of the populace and ensuring that justice was done to wronged members.

CHAPTER NINE.

ON THE NECESSITY TO ACT ALONE IF ONE WISHES TO FOUND A STATE OR ENTIRELY REFORM ITS OLD INSt.i.tUTIONS.

Some might argue that I have gone too deeply into Roman history without having yet discussed its founders or military and religious inst.i.tutions. As I do not want to keep in suspense any readers who wish to hear something about this, I will first say that many might judge it a bad example that a founder of a state, such as Romulus, would first have killed his brother, and then consented to the death of t.i.tus Tatius, the Sabine, whom he had chosen as co-ruler of the Kingdom of Rome.40 The reader will judge from this that the citizens of such a state might follow the example of their prince and harm those who oppose their own ambition and desire for power. This opinion would be correct, if one did not consider the aim that led Romulus to these murders. The reader will judge from this that the citizens of such a state might follow the example of their prince and harm those who oppose their own ambition and desire for power. This opinion would be correct, if one did not consider the aim that led Romulus to these murders.

It is a general rule that rarely, if ever, has a republic or kingdom been set up well from the beginning, or had its old inst.i.tutions entirely reformed, unless this was done by a single man. In fact, it is necessary that one man alone give it form. Its organization must depend entirely on his ideas. But the prudent organizer of a republic who does not seek to benefit himself but rather the people, not his own heirs but his whole state, must do his utmost to keep all the power to himself. Nor will a wise man ever reproach him for acting outside the law in order to set up a kingdom or establish a republic. While his actions might accuse him, the result excuses him, and when the result is good, as it was in the case of Romulus, the result will always justify his actions. Only the man who is violent in order to ruin things should be reproached, not the man who is violent in seeking to repair things. The founder of a state must be prudent and skillful enough not to leave his power for another to inherit, because as men are more p.r.o.ne to evil than to good, his successor might use with greed what the founder used with skill. A single man might be capable of establis.h.i.+ng a state, but the state established tends not to last long if it remains on the shoulders of one man, while it does last when it remains under the control of many and relies on many to maintain it. For just as many men are not able to establish something from the start, as they are unable to recognize the good in it since they all hold conflicting opinions, once they do recognize the good they will not let go of it. It is clear that Romulus was one ruler who deserves to be pardoned for the death of his brother and his co-ruler. What he did was for the common good and not for his own ambition, as he immediately set up a senate which he always consulted, making decisions with the senate's views in mind. If one weighs the authority that Romulus reserved for himself, one sees that he only kept for himself the power to command the armies when war had been declared, and to convene the senate. This was apparent when Rome became free after the Tarquins41 were driven out and the Romans did not reform any of the old inst.i.tutions, except that in place of a king for life there were two annual consuls. This proves that all the original inst.i.tutions of Rome were more fitting for a free state than an absolute and tyrannical one. were driven out and the Romans did not reform any of the old inst.i.tutions, except that in place of a king for life there were two annual consuls. This proves that all the original inst.i.tutions of Rome were more fitting for a free state than an absolute and tyrannical one.

One could give countless examples to support the matters I have written about above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and republics, who could make laws for the common good because they had seized absolute power. But I would like to pa.s.s over them, as they are well known, and put forward only one, not so renowned, but worthy of consideration by those who might wish to be the legislators of good laws. Agis, King of Sparta, wanted to return the Spartans to the boundaries that the laws of Lycurgus had set for them, for it seemed to him that they had deviated from these laws, and that Sparta had consequently lost much of its ancient prowess, and also strength and power. But the Spartan ephors42 killed Agis during his initial endeavors, since they perceived him to be a man who wanted to establish a tyranny. But Cleomenes became king after him, and he was resolved to follow Agis's example, after he found Agis's memoirs and writings in which his thoughts and intentions were clearly described. Cleomenes, too, realized that he could not help Sparta if he did not become the sole authority. He recognized that men being ambitious, he would not be able to do good for the many against the will of the few. Waiting for an opportune moment, he had all the ephors killed, and anyone else who might oppose him. Then he reformed all the laws of Lycurgus. This decision would have resuscitated Sparta and afforded Cleomenes a reputation comparable to that of Lycurgus had there not been the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of the other Greek states. After Cleomenes's reforms, the Macedonians attacked, and as he was inferior in strength and finding himself without allies, he was defeated. And so his design, though just and praiseworthy, remained incomplete. killed Agis during his initial endeavors, since they perceived him to be a man who wanted to establish a tyranny. But Cleomenes became king after him, and he was resolved to follow Agis's example, after he found Agis's memoirs and writings in which his thoughts and intentions were clearly described. Cleomenes, too, realized that he could not help Sparta if he did not become the sole authority. He recognized that men being ambitious, he would not be able to do good for the many against the will of the few. Waiting for an opportune moment, he had all the ephors killed, and anyone else who might oppose him. Then he reformed all the laws of Lycurgus. This decision would have resuscitated Sparta and afforded Cleomenes a reputation comparable to that of Lycurgus had there not been the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of the other Greek states. After Cleomenes's reforms, the Macedonians attacked, and as he was inferior in strength and finding himself without allies, he was defeated. And so his design, though just and praiseworthy, remained incomplete.43 Having considered all these things, I conclude that in setting up a republic it is necessary to act alone, and that Romulus deserves pardon, not blame, for the deaths of Remus and t.i.tus Tatius.

40. Livy (Book I, chapter 14) writes: "Romulus is said to have been less distressed at [Tatius's murder] than he should have been, either because of the suspicion inherent in joint sovereignty, or because he thought that Tatius had deserved his fate." Livy (Book I, chapter 14) writes: "Romulus is said to have been less distressed at [Tatius's murder] than he should have been, either because of the suspicion inherent in joint sovereignty, or because he thought that Tatius had deserved his fate."41. Tarquin the Proud, who according to tradition reigned from 534 to 510 Tarquin the Proud, who according to tradition reigned from 534 to 510 BCE BCE, was the last of the seven legendary kings of Rome.42. The ephors were a group of five magistrates who, with the kings, formed the executive branch of the Spartan state. The ephors were a group of five magistrates who, with the kings, formed the executive branch of the Spartan state.43. Plutarch describes these incidents in a section on Agis and Cleomenes in Plutarch describes these incidents in a section on Agis and Cleomenes in Parallel Lives Parallel Lives.

CHAPTER TEN.

ON HOW THE FOUNDERS OF A REPUBLIC OR KINGDOM ARE AS MUCH TO BE LAUDED AS FOUNDERS OF A TYRANNY ARE TO BE REBUKED.

Among all the men who are praised, those praised most highly are the founders and heads of religions. Following close