The Memorabilia Part 21

Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their respective uses--the former is well and the latter ill adapted.

Aristip. Do you mean to a.s.sert that the same things may be beautiful and ugly?

Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when ill adapted for the same.

Similarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that "the same house must be at once beautiful and useful"--I could not help feeling that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to be built." He investigated the matter thus:

(12) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 488; "Cla.s.sical Review," vii. 262.

Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13) will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as possible?" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would be:

(13) Or, "the ideal house"; lit. "a house as it should be."

(14) See below, IV. vi. 15.

"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter, is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained a.s.sent, "Now, supposing a house to have a southern aspect, suns.h.i.+ne during winter will steal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade, will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his goods with the greatest security."

(15) Or, "porticoes" or "collonades."

Paintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one of more joy (17) than they confer.

(16) See "Econ." ix. 2; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 298 A; "Rep." 529; Becker, "Charicles," 268 (Engl. trans.)

(17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or "poetical" = "joyance." See "Hiero,"

vi. 1.

The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a glad thing for the wors.h.i.+pper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)

(18) e.g. the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands the temple of Phygaleia. Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 1372, {Pallados khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.

(19) See Vitruvius, i. 7, iv. 5, ap. Schneid. ad loc.; W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 338.

IX

Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by learning and practice the natural apt.i.tude may always be strengthened towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or Thracians would not venture to take s.h.i.+eld and spear and contend with Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to their light s.h.i.+elds and javelins, or against Scythians without some weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike is to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve distinction.

(1) Or, "When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Can courage be taught?'" and for this problem see IV. vi. 10, 11; "Symp." ii. 12; Plat. "Lach."; "Protag." 349; "Phaedr." 269 D; K.

Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.; Grote, "Plato," i. 468 foll., ii. 60; Jowett, "Plato," i. 77, 119; Newman, op. cit. i. 343.

(2) Or, "against Thracians with light s.h.i.+elds and javelins, or against Scythians with bows and arrows"; and for the national arms of these peoples respectively see Arist. "Lysistr." 563; "Anab." III.

iv. 15; VI. VII. pa.s.sim.

Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so, Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).

(4)

(3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.

(4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered the wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things base." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man who not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc., in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat.

"Charm."

And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and self-controlled?"--"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor self-controlled.

(5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1; "Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider them wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."

(6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."

He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue, are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot, but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.

On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom; not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself, yet something very like it. The ma.s.s of men no doubt hold a different language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the ma.s.s of mankind are ignorant, they do not p.r.o.nounce him "mad"; (8) but a like aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who imagined himself too tall to pa.s.s under a gateway of the Long Wall without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of pa.s.sion in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is ent.i.tled madness.

(7) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 346; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.

(8) Or, "they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who are all abroad," etc. See Comte, "Pos. Pol." i. 575; ii. 373 (Engl.

trans.)

In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy--that is not envy; but, as he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained.

"I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind." (9)

(9) Or, "a man in his senses... a simpleton"; for the sentiment L.

Dind. cf. Isocr. "ad Demonic." 7 D.

In answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that most men do something: (10) for instance, the dice player, (11) the gambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if they like, turn and do something better; but n.o.body has leisure to turn from the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no leisure, he does but ill in that.

(10) See above, I. ii. 57; and in ref. to these definitions, K. Joel, op. cit. p. 347 foll.

(11) For "dice-playing" see Becker, "Charicl." 354 (Engl. trans.); for "buffoonery," ib. 98; "Symp."

(To pa.s.s to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said) who hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street, (12) or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence or by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge (13) how to rule.

Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he proceeded to point out by instances that in a s.h.i.+p the ruler or captain is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the s.h.i.+powner himself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter of husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the patient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete going through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in any matter needing attention and care will either attend to this matter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he mistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot, or will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this expert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.

(12) Tom, d.i.c.k, and Harry (as we say).

(13) The {episteme}. See above, III. v. 21; Newman, op. cit. i. 256.

And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women are the rulers of men--and why? because they have the knowledge of the art, and men have not.

And if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power not to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: "Pray, how has he the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who disobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he disobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume, and falling into error, be punished." And to the suggestion that the tyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his answer was: "Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go scot free, or suffer a mere slight and pa.s.sing loss? Is he more likely to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compa.s.s his own swift destruction?" (14)

(14) Or, "Is that to choose the path of safety, think you? Is it not rather to sign his own death-warrent?" L. Dind. cf. Hesiod, "Works and Days," 293. See Newman, op. cit. i. 393-397.

When some one asked him: "What he regarded as the best pursuit or business (15) for a man?" he answered: "Successful conduct"; (16) and to a second question: "Did he then regard good fortune as an end to be pursued?"--"On the contrary," he answered, "for myself, I consider fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, (17) and those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do well."

(15) Or, "the n.o.blest study."

(16) {eupraxia, eu prattein}--to do well, in the sense both of well or right doing, and of welfare, and is accordingly opposed to {eutukhia}, mere good luck or success. Cf. Plat. "Euthyd." 281 B.

(17) Lit. "well-doing"; and for the Socratic view see Newman, op. cit.

i. 305, 401.