Decision Points Part 19

With no Democrats on board, I needed strong Republican backing to get a Social Security bill through Congress. I didn't have it. Many younger Republicans, such as Congressman Paul Ryan Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, supported reform. But few in Congress were willing to address such a contentious issue. of Wisconsin, supported reform. But few in Congress were willing to address such a contentious issue.

The collapse of Social Security reform Social Security reform is one of the greatest disappointments of my presidency. Despite our efforts, the government ended up doing exactly what I had warned against: We kicked the problem down the road to the next generation. In retrospect, I'm not sure what I could have done differently. is one of the greatest disappointments of my presidency. Despite our efforts, the government ended up doing exactly what I had warned against: We kicked the problem down the road to the next generation. In retrospect, I'm not sure what I could have done differently.

I made the case for reform as widely and persuasively as I could. I tried hard to reach across the aisle and made a Democratic economist's proposal the crux of my plan. The failure of Social Security reform shows the limits of the president's power. If Congress is determined not to act, there is only so much a president can do.

Inaction had a cost. In the five years since I proposed reform, the Social Security crisis has grown more acute. The projected bankruptcy date has moved from 2042 to 2037. The shortfall in Social Security-the cost of fixing the problem-has grown more than $2 trillion since I raised the issue in 2005. That is more than we spent on the war in Iraq, Medicare modernization, and the Troubled a.s.set Relief Program combined. For anyone concerned about the deficits facing future generations, the failure to reform Social Security ranks among the most expensive missed opportunities of modern times.

She was standing on the doorstep, alone in the rain. She looked tired and scared. A few days earlier, Paula Rendon Paula Rendon had said goodbye to her family in Mexico and boarded a bus bound for Houston. She arrived with no money and no friends. All she had was an address, 5525 Briar Drive, and the names of her new employers, George and Barbara Bush. had said goodbye to her family in Mexico and boarded a bus bound for Houston. She arrived with no money and no friends. All she had was an address, 5525 Briar Drive, and the names of her new employers, George and Barbara Bush.

I was thirteen years old when I opened the door that evening in 1959. Before long, Paula became like a second mother to my younger brothers and sister and me. She worked hard, taking care of our family in Texas and her own in Mexico. Eventually she bought a home and moved her family to Houston. She always says the proudest day of her life came when she saw her grandson graduate from college. As governor and president, I had Paula in mind when I spoke about immigration reform immigration reform. "Family values don't stop at the Rio Grande," I said.

Like Paula, most who left Mexico for the United States came to put food on the table for their families. Many worked backbreaking jobs, picking crops in the field or laying tar on roofs under the Texas sun. Some, like Paula, received permanent work visas. Others came as temporary workers through the Bracero Program Bracero Program. Some crossed the border illegally.

Over the next four decades, the size of America's economy expanded from under $3 trillion to more than $10 trillion. The need for workers skyrocketed. Yet immigration and employment laws were slow to change. The Bracero Program expired in 1964 and was not replaced. The supply of permanent work visas did not rise anywhere near as fast as the demand for labor. With no practical way to enter the country lawfully, increasing numbers of immigrants came illegally.

An underground industry of doc.u.ment forgers and smugglers, known as coyotes, sprang up along the border. They stuffed people in the trunks of cars or left them to walk miles across the searing desert. The number of deaths was appalling. Yet immigrants, many of them determined to feed their families, kept coming.

By the time I ran for president, illegal immigration was a serious problem and getting worse. Our economy needed workers, but our laws were being undermined and human rights were being violated. In my 2000 campaign, I decided to take on the issue. I was confident we could find a rational solution that served our national interests and upheld our values.

My first partner on immigration reform was President Vicente Fox Vicente Fox of Mexico. Vicente and his wife, Marta, were our guests at the first state dinner Laura and I held, on September 5, 2001. I discussed the possibility of creating a temporary worker program that would allow Mexicans to enter the United States lawfully to work a specific job for a fixed period of time. Vicente supported the idea, but he wanted more. He hoped America would legalize all Mexicans in the United States, a policy he called regularization. I made clear that would not happen. I believed amnesty-making illegal immigrants automatic citizens-would undercut the rule of law and encourage further illegal immigration. of Mexico. Vicente and his wife, Marta, were our guests at the first state dinner Laura and I held, on September 5, 2001. I discussed the possibility of creating a temporary worker program that would allow Mexicans to enter the United States lawfully to work a specific job for a fixed period of time. Vicente supported the idea, but he wanted more. He hoped America would legalize all Mexicans in the United States, a policy he called regularization. I made clear that would not happen. I believed amnesty-making illegal immigrants automatic citizens-would undercut the rule of law and encourage further illegal immigration.

Then 9/11 hit, and my most serious concern was that terrorists would slip into our country undetected. I put the idea of a temporary worker program on hold and concentrated on border security. In the four years after 9/11, we worked with Congress to increase funding for border protection by 60 percent, hired more than nineteen hundred new Border Patrol agents, and installed new technology, such as infrared cameras.

In October 2005, I signed a homeland security bill providing an additional $7.5 billion for border enforcement. The bill deepened our investment in technology and intelligence infrastructure at the border. It also funded an increase in bed s.p.a.ce at federal detention facilities near the border, which allowed officials to stop letting the illegal immigrants they arrested return to society-a frustrating practice known as catch and release.

I hoped our focus on security would rea.s.sure the American people that we were serious about stopping illegal immigrants from entering the country. But defensive measures alone would not solve the problem. America's economy was a magnet for the poor and the hopeful. The longest and tallest fence in the world would not stop those determined to provide for their families. A temporary worker program was the solution. If immigrants coming to work could enter the country lawfully, they would not have to sneak across the border. The economy would have a reliable supply of labor. The coyotes and human rights abusers would lose their market. And Border Patrol agents could focus on stopping the criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists.

On May 15, 2006, I gave the first-ever primetime presidential address on immigration. "We're a nation of laws, and we must enforce our laws," I said. "We're also a nation of immigrants, and we must uphold that tradition, which has strengthened our country in so many ways."

I then laid out a five-part plan to reform the immigration system. The first component was a major new investment in border security, including a pledge to double the size of the Border Patrol by the end of 2008 and temporarily deploy six thousand National Guard troops to support the Border Patrol. The second part was the temporary worker program, which would include a tamper-proof identification card. The third was stricter immigration enforcement at businesses, which would reduce exploitation and help slow demand for illegal workers. Fourth was to promote a.s.similation by requiring immigrants to learn English. Finally, I took on the th.o.r.n.i.e.s.t question in the debate: What to do with the approximately twelve million illegal immigrants in the country?

"Some in this country argue that the solution is to deport every illegal immigrant, and that any proposal short of this amounts to amnesty," I said. "I disagree....There is a rational middle ground between granting an automatic path to citizens.h.i.+p for every illegal immigrant and a program of ma.s.s deportation."

I went on to differentiate between illegal immigrants who crossed the border recently and those who had worked in America for many years and put down roots as responsible members of the community. I proposed that illegal immigrants in the latter category be allowed to apply for citizens.h.i.+p after meeting a stringent set of criteria, including paying a fine, making good on back taxes, learning English, and waiting in line behind those who had followed the law.

Ten days after the speech, the Senate pa.s.sed a bill sponsored by Senators Chuck Hagel Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and of Nebraska and Mel Martinez Mel Martinez of Florida that conformed to my outline. But the House, which had been focused on border security alone, couldn't get a comprehensive bill done before the midterm elections in November 2006. Then the Democrats took control of Congress. of Florida that conformed to my outline. But the House, which had been focused on border security alone, couldn't get a comprehensive bill done before the midterm elections in November 2006. Then the Democrats took control of Congress.

Shortly after the 2006 elections, I invited a group of senior lawmakers to the Oval Office. Afterward, I pulled Ted Kennedy Ted Kennedy aside. Unfortunately, our relations.h.i.+p had deteriorated since the days of No Child Left Behind. I knew Ted disagreed with my decision to remove Saddam Hussein. But I was disappointed by his vitriolic speeches, in which he claimed I had "broken the basic bond of trust with the American people," compared me to Richard Nixon, and called Iraq "George Bush's Vietnam." aside. Unfortunately, our relations.h.i.+p had deteriorated since the days of No Child Left Behind. I knew Ted disagreed with my decision to remove Saddam Hussein. But I was disappointed by his vitriolic speeches, in which he claimed I had "broken the basic bond of trust with the American people," compared me to Richard Nixon, and called Iraq "George Bush's Vietnam."

His harsh words were such a contrast to the affable, polite man I'd come to know. I was particularly surprised given that Ted had been on the receiving end of so many nasty political attacks over the years. One of my regrets is that I never sat down with Ted for a talk about the war. I wouldn't have changed his mind, but he was a decent man, and our discussion might have persuaded him to tone down his rhetoric.

I hoped immigration reform immigration reform would provide a chance to rekindle our cooperation. "I think this is something we can get done," I told him at our meeting after the elections. "Let's prove the skeptics wrong again." He agreed. would provide a chance to rekindle our cooperation. "I think this is something we can get done," I told him at our meeting after the elections. "Let's prove the skeptics wrong again." He agreed.

In the spring of 2007, Ted collaborated with Arizona's Republican senators, John McCain John McCain and and Jon Kyl Jon Kyl, on a bill that strengthened border security, created the temporary worker program, and set up a tough but fair path to citizens.h.i.+p for law-abiding immigrants who had been in America for a number of years.

I traveled the country touting the bill, especially its emphasis on border security and a.s.similation. Pa.s.sions ran high on both sides of the issue. As immigrants took jobs across the country, they put pressure on local schools and hospitals. Residents worried about their communities changing. Talk radio hosts and TV commentators warned of a "third world invasion and conquest of America." Meanwhile, a huge crowd of legalization supporters marched through major cities waving Mexican flags, an in-your-face display that offended many Americans.

The mood on the airwaves affected the att.i.tude in Was.h.i.+ngton. Congressmen pledged, "We will not surrender America," and suggested that supporters of reform "wear a scarlet letter A A for 'amnesty.'" On the other side, the chairman of the Democratic Party compared the temporary worker program to "indentured servitude." The head of America's largest labor union labeled the reform bill "anti-family and anti-worker." for 'amnesty.'" On the other side, the chairman of the Democratic Party compared the temporary worker program to "indentured servitude." The head of America's largest labor union labeled the reform bill "anti-family and anti-worker."

At the height of the frenzy, I got a call from Ted Kennedy Ted Kennedy after I'd finished delivering a speech at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. "Mr. President," he said, "you need to call after I'd finished delivering a speech at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. "Mr. President," he said, "you need to call Harry Reid Harry Reid and tell him to keep the Senate in session over the weekend." We believed we were within a vote or two of getting the comprehensive reform bill pa.s.sed, but the Senate was scheduled to break for its Fourth of July recess. Given the importance of the legislation, I thought it would be worthwhile to allow them a little extra time for the bill to pa.s.s. Apparently, Harry Reid did not. and tell him to keep the Senate in session over the weekend." We believed we were within a vote or two of getting the comprehensive reform bill pa.s.sed, but the Senate was scheduled to break for its Fourth of July recess. Given the importance of the legislation, I thought it would be worthwhile to allow them a little extra time for the bill to pa.s.s. Apparently, Harry Reid did not.

If Ted Kennedy couldn't persuade the majority leader of his own party, my odds were not good. I made my pitch, but it was too late. Harry had made his decision. He called a cloture vote, which failed, and then adjourned the Senate. Senators went home and listened to angry const.i.tuents stirred up by the loud voices on radio and TV. By the time they came back to Was.h.i.+ngton, immigration reform was dead. As a result, the coyotes are still in business, immigrants continue to cross the border illegally, and a divisive political issue remains unresolved.

While I am disappointed I didn't sign bills into law, I do not regret taking on Social Security and immigration reform. Our efforts raised public awareness about problems that are not going away. One lesson of history is that it sometimes takes more than one president, even more than one generation, to accomplish a major legislative objective. Lyndon Johnson built on Harry Truman's efforts to create Medicare. I hope our work on Social Security and immigration will provide a foundation for a future president to reform both. At the minimum, I was able to take some of the shock out of the third rail.

If I had it to do over again, I would have pushed for immigration reform, rather than Social Security, as the first major initiative of my second term. Unlike Social Security, immigration reform had bipartisan support. The wildfire of opposition that erupted against immigration reform in 2006 and 2007 might not have raged as hot in 2005. We also would not have had to overcome the tensions caused by escalating violence in Iraq and Hurricane Katrina. Once a successful immigration bill was pa.s.sed, it could have created a sense of momentum that would have made Social Security easier to tackle. Instead, the reverse happened. When Social Security failed, it widened the partisan divide and made immigration reform tougher.

The failure of immigration reform points out larger concerns about the direction of our politics. The blend of isolationism, protectionism, and nativism that affected the immigration debate also led Congress to block free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. I recognize the genuine anxiety that people feel about foreign compet.i.tion. But our economy, our security, and our culture would all be weakened by an attempt to wall ourselves off from the world. Americans should never fear compet.i.tion. Our country has always thrived when we've engaged the world with confidence in our values and ourselves. The same will be true in the twenty-first century.

One way to reduce the influence of the ideological extremes is to change the way we elect our members of Congress. In 2006, only about 45 of 435 House races were seriously contested. Since members in so-called safe districts do not have to worry about challenges from the opposite party, their biggest vulnerability is getting outflanked in their own party. This is especially true in the era of bloggers, who make national targets out of politicians they deem ideologically impure. The result is that members of Congress from both parties tend to drift toward the extremes as insurance against primary challengers.

Our government would be more productive-and our politics more civilized-if congressional districts were drawn by panels of nonpartisan elders instead of partisan state legislatures. This would make for more compet.i.tive general elections and a less polarized Congress. Making the change would require politicians to give up some of their power, never an easy task. But for future presidents looking to tackle a big problem, this would be a worthy one to take on.

One of the most interesting aspects of my time in office was seeing how my philosophy was interpreted differently by different audiences. It was amusing to read newspapers labeling me the most conservative president in history while people on the right denounced me as a conservative apostate. Often they were discussing the same issue. I was an archconservative ideologue for injecting market forces into Medicare and a big-government liberal for creating a prescription drug benefit. I was a heartless conservative for exposing failing schools and a bleeding-heart liberal for spending more money on poor students. It all depended on whom you asked.

I am proud to have signed No Child Left Behind and Medicare modernization, two pieces of legislation that improved life for our citizens and showed that conservative principles of accountability and market-based compet.i.tion are effective ways to get results. I am pleased that the faith-based initiative continues. I am confident Social Security and immigration reform will be a reality some day. No matter what, I am satisfied that we led on the issues that mattered most-and never played small ball.

*The increases in federal education funding were significant, since my budget restrained non-security discretionary spending and eventually held it below the rate of inflation. States continued to contribute the vast majority of education funding-about 92 percent-and that's how it should be.

**My team was led by Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson Tommy Thompson; Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Mark McClellan Mark McClellan; Medicare Administrator Tom Scully Tom Scully; White House staffers Steve Friedman Steve Friedman, Keith Hennessey Keith Hennessey, David Hobbs David Hobbs, and Doug Badger Doug Badger; and OMB expert Jim Capretta Jim Capretta.

***Unfortunately, the trigger provision was later repealed by the Democratically controlled Congress.

****Republicans used 527s, too, but Democrats outraised us three to one, $186.8 million to $61.5 million.

*****The Social Security team was led by Treasury Secretary John Snow John Snow and White House advisers and White House advisers Andy Card Andy Card, Karl Rove, Al Hubbard Al Hubbard, Keith Hennessey Keith Hennessey, and Chuck Blahous Chuck Blahous.

ho's in charge of security in New Orleans New Orleans?" I asked.

My question silenced the raucous discussion in the Air Force One conference room on Friday, September 2, 2005. "The governor is in charge," Mayor Ray Nagin Ray Nagin said, pointing across the dark wood table at Governor said, pointing across the dark wood table at Governor Kathleen Blanco Kathleen Blanco.

Every head pivoted in her direction. The Louisiana governor froze. She looked agitated and exhausted. "I think it's the mayor," she said noncommittally.

Four days had pa.s.sed since Hurricane Katrina smashed into the Gulf Coast. Winds above 120 miles per hour had flattened the Mississippi coastline and driven a wall of water through the levees of New Orleans. Eighty percent of the city, home to more than 450,000 people, had flooded. Reports of looting and violence filled the news.

By law, state and local authorities lead the response to natural disasters, with the federal government playing a supporting role. That approach had worked during the eight hurricanes, nine tropical storms, and more than two hundred tornadoes, floods, wildfires, and other emergencies we had faced since 2001. State and local first responders were in command of the Katrina response in Alabama and Mississippi, where I had visited earlier in the day. But after four days of chaos, it was clear the authorities in Louisiana could not lead.

The initial plan had been for me to land at the New Orleans airport, pick up Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin, and survey the damage on an aerial tour. But on the Marine One flight from Mississippi, we received word that the governor, mayor, and a Louisiana congressional delegation were demanding a private meeting on Air Force One first.

Aboard Air Force One at the New Orleans airport. (Clockwise at table:) Ray Nagin, Mary Landrieu, David Vitter, Mike Chertoff, Bobby Jindal, William Jefferson, and Kathleen Blanco. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The tone started out tense and got worse. The governor and mayor bickered. Everyone blasted the Federal Emergency Management Agency for failing to meet their needs. Congressman Bobby Jindal Bobby Jindal pointed out that FEMA had asked people to email their requests, despite the lack of electricity in the city. I shook my head. "We'll fix it," I said, looking at FEMA Director pointed out that FEMA had asked people to email their requests, despite the lack of electricity in the city. I shook my head. "We'll fix it," I said, looking at FEMA Director Mike Brown Mike Brown. Senator Mary Landrieu Mary Landrieu interrupted with unproductive emotional outbursts. "Would you please be quiet?" I had to say to her at one point. interrupted with unproductive emotional outbursts. "Would you please be quiet?" I had to say to her at one point.

I asked to speak to Governor Blanco privately. We walked out of the conference room, through a narrow pa.s.sageway, and into the small cabin at the front tip of Air Force One. I told her it was clear the state and local response forces had been overwhelmed. "Governor," I pressed, "you need to authorize the federal government to take charge of the response."

She told me she needed twenty-four hours to think it over.

"We don't have twenty-four hours," I snapped. "We've waited too long already."

The governor refused to give an answer.

Next I asked to meet privately with Mayor Nagin. He had spent four days since Katrina holed up in a downtown hotel. He hadn't bathed or eaten a hot meal until he used my shower and ate breakfast on Air Force One. In a radio interview the previous evening, he had vented his frustrations with the federal government. "Get off your a.s.ses and do something," he said, "and let's fix the biggest G.o.dd.a.m.n crisis in the history of this country." Then he broke down in tears. When I met him on the plane, Ray whispered an apology for his outburst and explained that he was exhausted.

I asked the mayor what he thought about federalizing the response. He supported it. "n.o.body's in charge," he said. "We need a clear chain of command." But only the governor could request that the federal government a.s.sume control of the emergency.

By the time the damage had been tallied, Hurricane Katrina ranked as the costliest natural disaster in American history. In truth, it was not a single disaster, but three-a storm that wiped away miles of the Gulf Coast, a flood caused by breaches in the New Orleans levees, and an outbreak of violence and lawlessness in the city.

On one level, the tragedy showed the helplessness of man against the fury of nature. Katrina was an enormously powerful hurricane that struck a part of the country that lies largely below sea level. Even a flawless response would not have prevented catastrophic damage.

The response was not only flawed but, as I said at the time, unacceptable. While there were inspiring acts of selflessness and heroism during and after the storm, Katrina conjures impressions of disorder, incompetence, and the sense that government let down its citizens. Serious mistakes came at all levels, from the failure to order a timely evacuation of New Orleans to the disintegration of local security forces to the dreadful communications and coordination. As the leader of the federal government, I should have recognized the deficiencies sooner and intervened faster. I prided myself on my ability to make crisp and effective decisions. Yet in the days after Katrina, that didn't happen. The problem was not that I made the wrong decisions. It was that I took too long to decide.

I made an additional mistake by failing to adequately communicate my concern for the victims of Katrina. This was a problem of perception, not reality. My heart broke at the sight of helpless people trapped on their rooftops waiting to be rescued. I was outraged by the fact that the most powerful country in the world could not deliver water to mothers holding their dehydrated babies under the baking sun. In my thirteen visits to New Orleans after the storm, I conveyed my sincere sympathy for the suffering and my determination to help residents rebuild. Yet many of our citizens, particularly in the African American community, came away convinced their president didn't care about them.

Just as Katrina was more than a hurricane, its impact was more than physical destruction. It eroded citizens' trust in their government. It exacerbated divisions in our society and politics. And it cast a cloud over my second term.

Soon after the storm, many made up their minds about what had happened and who was responsible. Now that time has pa.s.sed and pa.s.sions have cooled, our country can make a sober a.s.sessment of the causes of the devastation, the successes and failures of the response, and, most important, the lessons to be learned.

I replayed the scene in my mind: The storm damage was extensive. The governor bashed Was.h.i.+ngton for being slow and bureaucratic. The media fixed blame on the White House. Politicians claimed the federal government was out of touch.

The year was 1992, and I watched as Dad endured our family's first bout with natural disaster politics. With the presidential election approaching, Hurricane Andrew Hurricane Andrew had pounded the Florida coast. Governor had pounded the Florida coast. Governor Lawton Chiles Lawton Chiles, a Democrat, and Bill Clinton Bill Clinton's campaign exploited the devastation to claim the federal government had not performed. Their criticism was unfair. Dad had ordered a swift response to the storm. He sent Andy Card Andy Card, then transportation secretary, to live in Florida to oversee the recovery. But once the public had formed a perception that Dad was disengaged, it was hard to reverse it.

As governor of Texas, I managed numerous natural disasters, from fires in Parker County to floods in the Hill Country and Houston to a tornado that tore through the small city of Jarrell. There was never any doubt about the division of labor. Under the Stafford Act, pa.s.sed by Congress in 1988, state and local officials were responsible for leading the initial response. The federal government arrived later, at the state's request. As a governor, that was exactly the way I wanted it.

As president, I became responsible for the other side of the state-federal partners.h.i.+p. I appointed Joe Allbaugh Joe Allbaugh, my chief of staff in the governor's office, to lead FEMA. After 9/11, he sent twenty-five search-and-rescue teams to New York and the Pentagon, the largest such deployment in history. Joe worked effectively with Rudy Giuliani Rudy Giuliani and and George Pataki George Pataki to remove debris, support local fire and police, and deliver billions of dollars to help New York recover. to remove debris, support local fire and police, and deliver billions of dollars to help New York recover.

When I worked with Congress to reorganize the government in 2002, FEMA, an independent agency since 1979, became part of the new Department of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security. I thought it was logical for officials tasked with preventing a terrorist attack to work alongside those preparing to respond. But the move meant a loss of autonomy for FEMA. I don't know if it was the reorganization or his desire to move to the private sector, but Joe Allbaugh Joe Allbaugh decided to leave. He recommended his deputy, Michael Brown, to succeed him. I took his advice. decided to leave. He recommended his deputy, Michael Brown, to succeed him. I took his advice.

The first major test of the new emergency response structure came during the 2004 hurricane season. In the s.p.a.ce of six weeks, four major hurricanes-Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne-battered Florida. It was the first time in almost 120 years that one state had faced that many storms. I made four trips to the state, where I visited residents who had lost their homes in Pensacola, citrus growers in Lake Wales whose crops had been wiped out, and relief workers delivering supplies in Port St. Lucie.

Overall, the four hurricanes caused more than $20 billion in damages, knocked out power to more than 2.3 million residents, and took 128 lives. The toll was immense, yet the loss of life could have been far worse. Florida's governor was a strong chief executive who understood the need for state and local officials to take the lead in disaster response. My brother Jeb declared a state of emergency, established clear lines of communication, and made specific requests to the federal government.

FEMA responded by deploying 11,000 workers across Florida and other affected states, the largest operation in its history. In Florida, FEMA sent 14 million meals, 10.8 million gallons of water, and nearly 163 million pounds of ice. The agency then helped deliver $13.6 billion in emergency relief to suffering people. Mike Brown Mike Brown earned my trust with his performance, and I wasn't the only one. A tough critic, Jeb later told me Mike had done a fine job. earned my trust with his performance, and I wasn't the only one. A tough critic, Jeb later told me Mike had done a fine job.

The effective management of the 2004 hurricanes saved lives and helped victims to rebuild. Having tested our model against four consecutive major hurricanes, we were convinced we could handle anything.

On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, the National Weather Service detected a storm forming over the Bahamas. Initially dubbed Tropical Depression Twelve, it strengthened into a tropical storm and earned a name, Katrina. By August 25, Katrina was a Category One hurricane headed toward South Florida. At 6:30 p.m., Katrina ripped off rooftops with eighty-mile-per-hour winds and dropped more than a foot of rain. Despite orders to evacuate, some people unwisely chose to ride out the storm. Fourteen people lost their lives.

I received regular updates in Crawford, where Laura and I spent much of August. The press called my time away from Was.h.i.+ngton a vacation. Not exactly. I received my daily intelligence briefings at the secure trailer across the street, checked in regularly with advisers, and used the ranch as a base for meetings and travel. The responsibilities of the presidency followed me wherever I went. We had just moved the West Wing twelve hundred miles farther west.

After pummeling South Florida, Katrina charged across the Gulf of Mexico toward Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. My senior aide in Crawford, Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin Joe Hagin, kept me updated on the developments. By Sat.u.r.day, August 27, Katrina was a Category Three. On Sunday, it strengthened into a Category Four and then a Category Five, the most dangerous rating. The National Hurricane Center had also revised its projection of the storm's direction. As of Sat.u.r.day morning, Katrina was headed for New Orleans New Orleans.

With Joe Hagin. White House/Susan Sterner White House/Susan Sterner I knew the city well. New Orleans was about a six-hour drive from Houston, and I had made the trek often in my younger days. I loved the food, culture, and vibrant people of The Big Easy. I was also aware of the city's lurking fear. The locals called it The Big One, the pray-it-never-happens storm that could drown their city.

Anyone who has visited New Orleans can understand their anxiety. The low-lying city is shaped like a crescent bowl. A system of levees and ca.n.a.ls-the rim of the bowl-provides the city's primary flood protection. Built by the Army Corps of Engineers, the levees had a troubled history. When I was governor, I read John Barry John Barry's fascinating book Rising Tide Rising Tide, about the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. After huge rains drove up the height of the river, New Orleans officials persuaded the Louisiana governor to dynamite a levee to the south in hopes of sparing the city. The move devastated two rural parishes, Plaquemines and St. Bernard. Over time, the levees were strengthened, especially after Hurricane Betsy hit in 1965. They held through seven hurricanes over the next forty years.

One lesson of the 2004 Florida hurricanes was that solid preparation before a storm is essential to a successful response. When we learned that Katrina was headed for New Orleans New Orleans, I put FEMA on its highest level of alert. The government prestaged more than 3.7 million liters of water, 4.6 million pounds of ice, 1.86 million meals ready to eat, and 33 medical teams. Taken together, this marked the largest prepositioning of relief supplies in FEMA's history.

The military moved a.s.sets into place as well. Admiral Tim Keating-the head of the new Northern Command, which we created after 9/11 to protect the homeland-deployed disaster-response teams to the Gulf Coast. The Coast Guard put its choppers on alert. More than five thousand National Guard personnel in the affected states stood ready. Guard forces from other states were prepared to answer calls for a.s.sistance. Contrary to later claims, there was never a shortage of Guardsmen available, either because of Iraq or any other reason.

All of this federal activity was intended to support state and local officials. My team, led by Secretary of Homeland Security Mike Chertoff Mike Chertoff-a brilliant lawyer and decent man who had resigned his lifetime appointment as a federal judge to take the job-stayed in close touch with the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Governor Blanco requested an emergency declaration allowing Louisiana to use federal resources to pay for and support her state's disaster-response preparations. Only once in recent history-before Hurricane Floyd in 1999-had a president issued an emergency declaration before a storm made landfall. I signed it Sat.u.r.day night, along with similar declarations for Mississippi and Alabama the next day.

At a briefing with Mike Chertoff. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper

On Sunday morning, the National Hurricane Center described Katrina as "not only extremely intense but also exceptionally large." Mayor Nagin had given instructions for a voluntary evacuation. I knew New Orleans well enough to understand that wouldn't work. People had heard apocalyptic storm warnings for years. Some used them as an excuse to party on Bourbon Street in defiance of the hurricane G.o.ds. Others didn't have the means to evacuate. The evacuation needed to be mandatory, with special arrangements for people who needed help, such as buses to transport those without cars-a step the city never took, leading to the heartbreaking scene of empty New Orleans school buses submerged in an abandoned parking lot.

I called Governor Blanco at 9:14 a.m.

"What's going on in New Orleans?" I asked. "Has Nagin given the mandatory order?"

She said he had not, despite the dire warnings they had received the previous night from Max Mayfield Max Mayfield, the director of the National Hurricane Center. Max later said it was only the second time in his thirty-six-year career he had been anxious enough to call elected officials personally.

"The mayor's got to order people to leave. That's the only way they'll listen," I told Governor Blanco. "Call him and tell him. My people tell me this is going to be a terrible storm."

"They're not going to be able to get everyone out in time," she said. Unfortunately, I knew she was right. But it was better to start now than wait any longer.

"What else do you need from the federal government?" I asked the governor.

She a.s.sured me she had been working closely with my team and had what she needed.

"Are you sure?" I asked.

"Yes, Mr. President, we've got it under control," she said.

"Okay, hang in there," I said, "and call Ray and get him to evacuate, now."