Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism Part 9

Pappenheim claims that s.e.xtus was not referring to Aenesidemus himself in these statements which he joins with his name. In the most important of these, the one quoted from the _Hypotyposes_,[3] which represents Aenesidemus as claiming that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, the expression used is [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], and in many of the other places where s.e.xtus refers to the dogmatic statements of Aenesidemus, the expression is either [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], or [Greek: Ainesidemos kath'

Herakleiton], while when s.e.xtus quotes Aenesidemus to sustain Scepticism, he uses his name alone.

[1] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 16.

[2] _Die angebliche Herac.l.i.tismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos_, Berlin 1889.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.

Pappenheim thinks that s.e.xtus' conflict was not with the dead Aenesidemus, who had lived two centuries before him, but with his own contemporaries. He also seeks to prove that s.e.xtus could not have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus from any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by the ancients, nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which could well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Diogenes mentions any such book.

Pappenheim also makes much of the argument that s.e.xtus in no instance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part of Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his alleged teachings, but in referring to him personally he always speaks of him with great respect.

Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic of s.e.xtus was against contemporaries, those who accepted the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus in consequence of, or in some connection with, the teachings of Aenesidemus. He entirely ignores the fact that there is no trace of any such school or sect in history, calling themselves followers of "Aenesidemus according to Herac.l.i.tus,"

but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in Alexandria at the time of s.e.xtus, where so many different sects were found. s.e.xtus use Aenesidemus' name in four different ways:--alone, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], and in one instance [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon kath' Herakleiton].[1]

[1] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8.

Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries against whom s.e.xtus directed his arguments had written a book ent.i.tled [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], to prove the harmony between Aenesidemus and Herac.l.i.tus, and that it was from this book that s.e.xtus quoted the dogmatic statements which he introduced with that formula. He claims, further, that the pa.s.sage quoted from _Hypotyposes I._ even, is directed against contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs of the harmony between Aenesidemus and Herac.l.i.tus on the connection of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the Sceptics: "Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same thing," with the apparent deduction from this, that "Contrary predicates in reality apply to the same thing." s.e.xtus wishes, according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and s.e.xtus does not report Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrines of Herac.l.i.tus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor consequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, these dogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Sceptics while they accepted the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus. s.e.xtus naturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preserve Pyrrhonism pure.

Brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of Aenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question.[1]

He starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which we shall consider later, that Aenesidemus had pa.s.sed through one change of opinion already when he severed his connection with the New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such a change has already made us familiar with, he adds a third.

Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different beliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims that such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is logical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem from the perusal of s.e.xtus, suddenly changed his basis, but rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The Sceptic says, "Contradictory predicates are apparently applicable to the same thing," and Aenesidemus accepts the Herac.l.i.tan result--"Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing." From s.e.xtus' report, Aenesidemus would seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus. He does not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it incomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would naturally ask, "Whence come these contradictory appearances?"

After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he doubts. The system of Herac.l.i.tus offers a solution, and he accepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the soul because they are an expression of reality.

[1] Brochard _Op. cit._ 272.

As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he does not find that the statement of Herac.l.i.tus disproves this, but rather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existence of science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it.

Brochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus should have been a follower of Herac.l.i.tus than that Protagoras was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion, Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory predicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of the foundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him a Sceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves his rank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School.

Coming now to the opinion of Zeller,[1] we find that he advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of s.e.xtus.

The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simple fact that s.e.xtus had not understood Aenesidemus; and as Tertullian and s.e.xtus agree in this misconception of the views of Aenesidemus, they must have been misled by consulting a common author in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what Aenesidemus said of Herac.l.i.tus with his own opinion. Zeller maintains that the expression so often repeated by s.e.xtus--[Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton]--shows that some one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Herac.l.i.tus'

doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many authorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justify his quotations from Herac.l.i.tus, he had possibly given a short abstract of Herac.l.i.tus' teachings; and the misconception advocated by Zeller and found both in Tertullian and s.e.xtus, refers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted from Aenesidemus, and is a misconception due to some earlier author, who had given a false impression of the meaning of Aenesidemus in quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about Herac.l.i.tus. That is to say, Herac.l.i.tus was cla.s.sed by Aenesidemus only among those who prepared the way for Scepticism, just as Diogenes[2] mentions many philosophers in that way; and that Sora.n.u.s[3] and s.e.xtus both had the same misunderstanding can only be explained by a mistake on the part of the authority whom they consulted.

[1] Zeller _Op. cit._ III, pp. 31-35; _Grundriss der Geschichte der Griechischen Phil._ p. 263.

[2] Diog. Laert. IX. 11, 71-74.

[3] Tertullian.

This explanation, however, makes s.e.xtus a very stupid man.

Aenesidemus' books were well known, and s.e.xtus would most certainly take the trouble to read them. His reputation as an historian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes calls his books [Greek: ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla kallista].[1] Furthermore, that s.e.xtus used Aenesidemus' own books we know from the direct quotation from them in regard to Plato,[2] which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus[3] and his own.

[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 222.

[3] Following the Greek of Bekker.

s.e.xtus' references to Aenesidemus in connection with Herac.l.i.tus are very numerous, and it is absurd to suppose that he would have trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authority on such a subject. Even were it possible that s.e.xtus did not refer directly to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not admit, even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly could not all have misrepresented him. We must remember that s.e.xtus was at the head of the School, and had access to all of its literature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and if he had indeed made it, his contemporaries must surely have discovered it before Diogenes characterised his books as [Greek: kallista]. Whatever may be said against the accuracy of s.e.xtus as a general historian of philosophy, especially in regard to the older schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance respecting the school of which he was at that time the head.

The opinion of Ritter on this subject is that Aenesidemus must have been a Dogmatic.[1] Saisset contends[2] that Aenesidemus really pa.s.sed from the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus to that of Pyrrho, and made the statement that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus to defend his change of view, although in his case the change had been just the opposite to the one he defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticism always follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples, Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, who was a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss the absurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked would involve an _a priori_ construction of history. There is no apparent reason for Saisset's conjecture in regard to Aenesidemus, for it is exactly the opposite of what s.e.xtus has reported. Strange to say, Saisset himself remarks in another place that we owe religious respect to any text, and that it should be the first law of criticism to render this.[3] Such respect to the text of s.e.xtus, as he himself advocates, puts Saisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of the question.

[1] Ritter, _Op. cit._ p. 280. Book IV.

[2] Saisset, _Op. cit._ p. 206.

[3] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 206.

Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in the two views presented of the theories of Aenesidemus, nor do they think that s.e.xtus has misrepresented them. They rather maintain, that in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates regarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease to be a Sceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates are applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are only applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. The Herac.l.i.tism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as he understood the statement, that "Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing," only in the phenomenal sense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same for all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that are the same for all.[2] As Protagoras, the disciple of Herac.l.i.tus, declared the relative character of sensations, that things exist only for us, and that their nature depends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing.

[1] Natorp _Op. cit._ 115, 122.

[2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; Hirzel _Op. cit._ p. 95.

This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do with the word [Greek: huparchein], in the statement that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing; while in the pa.s.sage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common phenomena to be true ones, we have the word [Greek: alethe], so that this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very strange use of the word [Greek: huparchein].

All of these different views of the possible solution of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of men who have given much thought to this and other closely Belated subjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one of them, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a consistent view of the att.i.tude of Aenesidemus.

First, in regard to the Greek expression [Greek: hoi peri] in connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases so much of his argument. All Greek scholars would agree that the expression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any teacher, but [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literally translated, "Aenesidemus and his followers." It is noticeable, however, in the writings of s.e.xtus that he uses the expression [Greek: hoi peri] often for the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this in the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as [Greek: hoi peri ton Platona kai Demokriton][2] and [Greek: hoi peri ton Arkesilaon],[3] and accordingly we have no right to infer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has an exceptional significance. It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or it may signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers.

[1] Pappenheim _Op. cit._ p. 21.

[2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 6.

[3] _Adv. Math._ VII. 150.

In reply to Zeller's position, that s.e.xtus and Tertullian have misunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote from some common author who misrepresents him, we would admit that such a misunderstanding might be possible where s.e.xtus gives long explanations of Herac.l.i.tus' teachings, beginning with quoting Aenesidemus, and continuing in such a way that it is not always possible to distinguish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; but such a misunderstanding certainly cannot be a.s.serted in regard to the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, for the reasons previously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whose solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical, _i.e._, that Aenesidemus had necessarily already pa.s.sed through two phases of philosophical belief. It is possible to admit a gradual evolution of thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in either case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the Academy is an argument against, rather than in favor of a change on his part, and was caused by the well-known change in the att.i.tude of the Academy.

Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were taken directly from the Academy, belonging to those doctrines advocated in the Academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendency introduced by Antiochus. In fact, s.e.xtus himself claims a close relation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.[1]

Aenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy, and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in Pyrrhonism, and cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge a Sceptic of s.e.xtus' time.

It seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries which elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and s.e.xtus, the standpoint of judgment in the Sceptical School had greatly changed. An example ill.u.s.trating this change we find in a comparison of the presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with that of s.e.xtus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably one of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,[2] while s.e.xtus, in regard to all of these men, opposes the idea that they were Sceptics.[3] Diogenes also calls Herac.l.i.tus a Sceptic, and even Homer,[4] and quotes sceptical sayings from the Seven Wise Men;[5] he includes in the list of Sceptics, Archilochus, Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippocrates,[6] and, furthermore, says that Theodosius, probably one of the younger Sceptics, objected to the name 'Pyrrhonean' on the ground that Pyrrho was not the first Sceptic.[7]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 232.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 17-72.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 213-214; I. 223-225.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 71.

[5] Diog. IX. 11, 71.

[6] Diog. IX. 11, 71-73.

[7] Diog. IX. 11. 70.

We have given the testimony from many sources to the effect that before the time of s.e.xtus the Empirical School of Medicine was considered identical with Scepticism, although not so by s.e.xtus himself. From all of these things we may infer a narrowing of the limits of Pyrrhonism in the time of s.e.xtus.