Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism Part 8

I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen, it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to phenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance of the planets by a musical proportion.

II. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given for the same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain the inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source, while there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or the action of the sun.

III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causes presented do not show any order, as for example, the motion of the stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does not take into account the order that reigns among them.

IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way as phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as the appearance of images in a dark room.

V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree with their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but not with common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atoms like Epicurus, by h.o.m.oeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and form like Aristotle.

VI. Theories are accepted which agree with individual hypotheses, and others equally probable are pa.s.sed by, as Aristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection of vapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory of the universe.

VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only with individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit like Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which was incompatible with the necessity which he advocated.

VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equally inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the attraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some.[2]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 98.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z.

Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but he gives a _resume_ of the general arguments of the Sceptics against aetiology,[1] which has less in common with the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subject by s.e.xtus later,[2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to show [Greek: meden einai aition]. Although the Tropes of Aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so prominent with s.e.xtus, between the signs [Greek: hypomnestika]

and [Greek: endeiktika],[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his argument on the subject with the general a.s.sertion, [Greek: Semeion ouk einai],[4] and proceeds to introduce the logical consequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of the Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the _Hypotyposes_, by s.e.xtus:--"A cause in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhaps not possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogether disagree."[5]

It is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of these Tropes, that Aenesidemus a.s.serts that causality has only a subjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an argument against its real existence, and the same argument is used by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of thought.[6]

Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false and sophistical,[7] but as Maccoll has well said, they are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and are directed against the false method of observing facts through the light of preconceived opinion.[8] They have, however, a stronger critical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency of the thought of Aenesidemus.

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98.

[2] _Hyp._ III. 24-28.

[3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 151.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 96.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 185.

[6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 77.

[7] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 507.

[8] Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 88.

CHAPTER IV.

_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus._

A paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which has given rise to much speculation and many different theories, is the comparison which s.e.xtus makes of Scepticism with the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus.[1] In this paragraph the statement is made that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, because the doctrine that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing.[2] [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon elegon hodon einai ten skeptiken agogen epi ten Herakleiteion philosophian, dioti proegeitai tou tanantia peri to auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As the Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the Herac.l.i.tans come from this to the more positive doctrine that they are in reality so.[3]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 210.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 210.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 210.

This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have affirmed between Scepticism and the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus is earnestly combated by s.e.xtus, who declares that the fact that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but a fact which presents itself to all men, and not to the Sceptics only. No one for instance, whether he be a Sceptic or not, would dare to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to those who have the jaundice, so that Herac.l.i.tus begins from a preconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps to the other schools of philosophy as well.[1] As the statement concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, then Scepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus than to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use common subject matter. "But we are afraid that the Sceptical School not only does not help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, but even hinders that result. Since the Sceptic accuses Herac.l.i.tus of having rashly dogmatised, presenting on the one hand the doctrine of 'conflagration' and on the other that 'contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing.'"[2] "It is absurd, then, to say that this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it conflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the Sceptical School is a path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus."[3]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 211.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 212.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 212.

This is not the only place in the writings of s.e.xtus which states that Aenesidemus at some time of his life was an advocate of the doctrines of Herac.l.i.tus. In no instance, however, where s.e.xtus refers to this remarkable fact, does he offer any explanation of it, or express any bitterness against Aenesidemus, whom he always speaks of with respect as a leader of the Sceptical School. We are thus furnished with one of the most difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem of reconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus of the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus with his position in the Sceptical School.

A comparison with each other of the references made by s.e.xtus and other writers to the teachings of Aenesidemus, and a consideration of the result, gives us two pictures of Aenesidemus which conflict most decidedly with each other. We have on the one hand, the man who was the first to give Pyrrhonism a position as an influential school, and the first to collect and present to the world the results of preceding Sceptical thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche], and perhaps in part their author, and the author of the eight Tropes against aetiology.[1] He develops his Scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor the intellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality.[2] He denied the possibility of studying phenomena as signs of the unknown.[3] He denied all possibility of truth, and the reality of motion, origin and decay. There was according to his teaching no pleasure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good. He denied the possibility of finding out the nature of things, or of proving the existence of the G.o.ds, and finally he declared that no ethical aim is possible.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 180.

[2] Photius 170, B. 12.

[3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 40.

The picture on the other hand, presented to us by s.e.xtus and Tertullian, is that of a man with a system of beliefs and dogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus. In strange contradiction to his a.s.sertion of the impossibility of all knowledge, he advocates a theory that the original substance is air,[1] which is most certainly a dogma, although indeed a deviation from the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus, of which s.e.xtus seemed unconscious, as he says, [Greek: to te on kata ton Herakleiton aer estin, hos physin ho Ainesidemos]. Aenesidemus dogmatised also regarding number and time and unity of the original world-stuff.[2] He seems to have dogmatised further about motion,[3] and about the soul.[4]

If s.e.xtus' language is taken according to its apparent meaning, we find ourselves here in the presence of a system of beliefs which would be naturally held by a follower of the Stoic-Herac.l.i.tan physics,[5] and absolutely inexplicable from the standpoint of a man who advocated so radical a Scepticism as Aenesidemus. s.e.xtus in the pa.s.sage that we first quoted,[6]

expresses great indignation against the idea that Scepticism could form the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, but he does not express surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus personally, or offer any explanation of the apparent contradiction; and while his writings abound in references to him as a respected leader of the Sceptical School, he sometimes seems to include him with the Dogmatics, mentioning him with the [Greek: dogmatikon philosophon].[7] In fact, the task of presenting any consistent history of the development of thought through which Aenesidemus pa.s.sed is such a puzzling one, that Brochard brilliantly remarks that possibly the best att.i.tude to take towards it would be to follow the advice of Aenesidemus himself, and suspend one's judgment altogether regarding it. Is it possible to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as Aenesidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions?

[1] _Adv. Math._ X. 233.

[2] _Adv. Math._ IX. 337; X. 216.

[3] _Adv. Math._ X. 38.

[4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 349.

[5] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 33.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.

[7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; X. 215.

The conjecture that he was first a Herac.l.i.tan Stoic, and later a Sceptic, which might be possible, does not offer any explanation of s.e.xtus' statement, that he regarded Scepticism as a path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus. Nor would it be logical to think that after establis.h.i.+ng the Sceptical School in renewed influence and power, he reverted to the Herac.l.i.tan theories as they were modified by the Stoics. These same theories were the cause of his separation from the Academy, for his chief accusation against the Academy was that it was adopting the dogmatism of the Stoics.[1] The matter is complicated by the fact that Tertullian also attributes to Aenesidemus anthropological and physical teachings that agree with the Stoical Herac.l.i.tan doctrines. It is not strange that in view of these contradictory a.s.sertions in regard to the same man, some have suggested the possibility that they referred to two different men of the same name, a supposition, however, that no one has been able to authoritatively vindicate.

Let us consider briefly some of the explanations which have been attempted of the apparent heresy of Aenesidemus towards the Sceptical School. We will begin with the most ingenious, that of Pappenheim.[2]