Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law Part 5

The golden mean is G.o.d's delight: Extremes are hateful in His sight.

Hold by the mean, and glorify Nor anarchy nor slavery.

Characteristic of Socrates was his _irony_, or way of understating himself, in protest against the extravagant professions of the Sophists. In the reckoning of the Pythagoreans, the Infinite, the Unlimited, or Unchecked, was marked as evil, in opposition to good, which was the Limited. From thence, Plato, taking up his parable, writes: "The G.o.ddess of the Limit, my fair Philebus, seeing insolence and all manner of wickedness breaking loose from all limit in point of gratification and gluttonous greed, established a law and order of limited being; and you say this restraint was the death of pleasure; I say it was the saving of it." Going upon the tradition of his countrymen, upon their art and philosophy, their poetry, eloquence, politics, and inmost sentiment, Aristotle formulated the law of moral virtue, to hold by the _golden mean_, as discerned by the prudent in view of the present circ.u.mstances, between the two extremes of excess and defect.

6. There is only one object on which man may throw himself without reserve, his last end, the adequate object of his happiness, G.o.d. G.o.d is approached by faith, hope, and charity; but it belongs not to philosophy to speak of these supernatural virtues. There remains to the philosopher the natural virtue of religion, which is a part of justice. Religion has to do with the inward act of veneration and with its outward expression. To the latter the rule of the mean at once applies. Moderation in religion is necessary, so far as externals are concerned. Not that any outward a.s.siduity, pomp, splendour, or costliness, can be too much in itself, or anything like enough, to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d with, but it may be too much for our limited means, which in this world are drawn on by other calls. But our inward veneration for G.o.d and desire to do Him honour, can never be too intense: "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." (Ecclus. xliii. 33.)

7. The rule of the mean, then, is a human rule, for dealing with men, and with human goods considered as means. It is a Greek rule: for the Greeks were of all nations the fondest admirers of man and the things of man. But when we ascend to G.o.d, we are out among the immensities and eternities. The vastness of creation, the infinity of the Creator,--there is no mode or measure there. In those heights the Hebrew Psalmist loved to soar. Christianity, with its central dogma of the Incarnation, is the meeting of Hebrew and Greek. That mystery clothes the Lord G.o.d of hosts with the measured beauty, grace, and truth, that man can enter into. But enough of this. Enough to show that the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is a highly suggestive and wide-reaching doctrine beyond the sphere of Morals. It throws out one great branch into Art, another into Theology.

8. The vicious extremes, on this side and on that of a virtue, are not always conterminous with the virtue itself, but sometimes another and more excellent virtue intervenes; as in giving we may pa.s.s from justice to liberality, and only through pa.s.sing the bounds of liberality, do we arrive at the vicious extreme of prodigality. So penitential fasting intervenes between temperance in food and undue neglect of sustenance. But it is to be noted that the _central virtue_, so to speak, as justice, sobriety, chast.i.ty, is for all persons on all occasions: the more excellent _side-virtue_, as liberality, or total abstinence, is for special occasions and special cla.s.ses of persons.

_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., II., ii., 6, 7; _ib_., II., cc. 6-9; Hor., _Odes_, II., 10; Ruskin, _Modern Painters_, p. 3, s. i., c. x.

SECTION V.--_Of Cardinal Virtues_.

1. The enumeration of cardinal virtues is a piece of Greek philosophy that has found its ways into the catechism. Prudence, justice, fort.i.tude, and temperance are mentioned by Plato as recognised heads of virtue. They are recognised, though less clearly, by Xenophon, reporting the conversations of Socrates. It does not look as though Socrates invented the division: he seems to have received it from an earlier source, possibly Pythagoras. They are mentioned in Holy Scripture (Wisdom viii., 7, which is however a Greek book), and Proverbs viii., 14. They make no figure in the philosophies of India and China.

2. The cardinal virtues are thus made out.--Virtue is a habit that gives a man readiness in behaving according to the reason that is in him. Such a habit may be fourfold. (a) It may reside in the reason, or intellect itself, enabling it readily to discern the reasonable thing to do, according to particular circ.u.mstances as they occur. That habit is the virtue of _prudence_. (b) It may reside in the rational appet.i.te, otherwise called the will, disposing a man to act fairly and reasonably in his dealings with other men. That is _justice_. (c) It may reside in the irrational, or sensitive, appet.i.te, and that to a twofold purpose; (a) to restrain the said appet.i.te in its concupiscible part from a wanton and immoderate eagerness after pleasure; that is _temperance_: (b) to incite the said appet.i.te in its irascible part not to shrink from danger, where there is reason for going on in spite of danger; that is _fort.i.tude_.

3. Plato compares the rational soul in man to a charioteer, driving two horses: one horse representing the concupiscible, the other the irascible part of the sensitive appet.i.te. He draws a vivid picture of the resistance of the concupiscible part against reason, how madly it rushes after lawless pleasure, and how it is only kept in restraint by main force again and again applied, till gradually it grows submissive. This submissiveness, gradually acquired, is the virtue of temperance. Clearly the habit dwells in the appet.i.te, not in reason: in the horse, not in the charioteer. It is that habitual state, which in a horse we call _being broken in_.

The concupiscible appet.i.te is _broken in_ to reason by temperance residing within it. Plato lavishes all evil names on the steed that represents the concupiscible part. But the irascible part, the other steed, has its own fault, and that fault twofold, sometimes of over-venturesomeness, sometimes of shying and turning tail. The habit engendered, in the irascible part, of being neither over-venturesome nor over-timorous, but going by reason, is termed fort.i.tude. [Footnote 6]

[Footnote 6: It will help an Englishman to understand Plato's comparison, if instead of _concupiscible part_ and _irascible part_, we call the one steed Pa.s.sion and the other Pluck. Pluck fails, and Pa.s.sion runs to excess, till Pluck is formed to fort.i.tude, and Pa.s.sion to temperance.]

4. As the will is the rational appet.i.te, the proper object of which is rational good, it does not need to be prompted by any habit to embrace rational good in what concerns only the inward administration of the agent's own self. There is no difficulty in that department, provided the sensitive appet.i.te be kept in hand by fort.i.tude and temperance.

But where there is question of external relations with other men, it is not enough that the sensitive appet.i.te be regulated, but a third virtue is necessary, the habit of justice, to be planted in the will, which would otherwise be too weak to attend steadily to points, not of the agent's own good merely, but of the good of other men.

5. Thus we have the four cardinal virtues: prudence, a habit of the intellect; temperance, a habit of the concupiscible appet.i.te; fort.i.tude, a habit of the irascible appet.i.te; and justice, a habit of the will. Temperance and Fort.i.tude in the Home Department; Justice for Foreign Affairs; with Prudence for Premier. Or, to use another comparison, borrowed from Plato, prudence is the health of the soul, temperance its beauty, fort.i.tude its strength, and justice its wealth.

_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ae, q. 61, art. 2, in corp.; _ib_., q. 56, art. 4, in corp., ad 1-3; _ib_., q. 56, art. 6, in corp., ad 1, 3; _ib_., q. 59, art. 4, in corp., ad 2; Plato, _Laws_, 631 B, C.

SECTION VI.--_Of Prudence_.

1. Prudence is _right reason applied to practice_, or more fully it may be defined, the habit of intellectual discernment that enables one to hit upon the golden mean of moral virtue and the way to secure that mean. Thus prudence tells one what amount of punishment is proper for a particular delinquent, and how to secure his getting it. It is to be observed that prudence does not will the golden mean in question, but simply indicates it. To will and desire the mean is the work of the moral virtue concerned therewith: as in the case given it is the work of vindictive justice.

2. From the definition of moral virtue above given (c. v., s. iv., n.

4, p. 79), it is clear that no moral virtue can come into act without prudence: for it is the judgment of the prudent man that must define in each case the _golden mean_ in relation to ourselves, which every moral virtue aims at. Thus, without prudence, fort.i.tude pa.s.ses into rashness, vindictive justice into harshness, clemency into weakness, religion into superst.i.tion.

3. But may not one with no prudence to guide him hit upon the _golden mean_ by some happy impulse, and thus do an act of virtue? We answer, he may do a good act, and if you will, a virtuous act, but not an act of virtue, not an act proceeding from a pre-existent habit in the doer. The act is like a good stroke made by chance, not by skill; and like such a stroke, it cannot be readily repeated at the agent's pleasure. (See c. v., s. i., n. 4, p. 66; and Ar., _Eth_., II., iv., 2.)

4. Prudence in its essence is an intellectual virtue, being a habit resident in the understanding: but it deals with the subject-matter of the moral virtues, pointing out the measure of temperance, the bounds of fort.i.tude, or the path of justice. It is the habit of intellectual discernment that must enlighten every moral virtue in its action.

There is no virtue that goes blundering and stumbling in the dark.

5. He is a prudent man, that can give counsel to others and to himself in order to the attainment of ends that are worthy of human endeavour.

If unworthy ends are intended, however sagaciously they are pursued, that is not prudence. We may call it _sagacity_, or _shrewdness_, being a habit of ready discernment and application of means to ends.

Napoleon I. was conspicuous for this sagacity. It is the key to success in this world. But prudence discovers worthy ends only, and to them only does it provide means. The intellect is often blinded by pa.s.sion, by desire and by fear, so as not to discern the proper end and term to make for in a particular instance and a practical case.

The general rules of conduct remain in the mind, as that, "In anger be mindful of mercy:" but the propriety of mercy under the present provocation drops out of sight. The intellect does not discern the golden mean of justice and mercy in relation to the circ.u.mstances in which the agent now finds himself. In other words, the habit of prudence has failed; and it has failed because of the excess of pa.s.sion. Thus prudence is dependent on the presence of the virtues that restrain pa.s.sion, namely, fort.i.tude and temperance. A like argument would hold for the virtue of justice, that rectifies inordinate action in dealing with another. The conclusion is, that as the moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, so neither can prudence exist without them: for vice corrupts the judgment of prudence.

6. Hence we arrive at a settlement of the question, whether the virtues can be separated, or whether to possess one is to possess all.

We must distinguish between the rudimentary forms of virtue and the perfect habit. The rudimentary forms certainly can exist separate: they are a matter of temperament and inherited const.i.tution: and the man whom nature has kindly predisposed to benevolence, she has perhaps very imperfectly prepared for prudence, fort.i.tude, or sobriety. But one perfect habit of any one of the four cardinal virtues, acquired by repeated acts, and available at the call of reason, involves the presence, in a matured state, of the other three habits also. A man who acts irrationally upon one ground, will behave irrationally on other grounds also: or if his conduct be rational there, it will not be from regard for reason, but from impulse, temperament, or from some other motive than the proper motive of the virtue which he seems to be exercising.

_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ae, q. 54, art. 4; _ib_., q. 58, art. 5, in corp.; _ib_., 2a 2ae, q. 47, art. 7, 12, 13; Ar., _Eth_., VI., v.; _ib_., VI., xii., 9, 10; _ib_., VI., xiii., 6; St. Francis of Sales, _Of the Love of G.o.d_, bk. xi., c. vii.

SECTION VII.--_Of Temperance_.

1. Temperance is a virtue which regulates by the judgment of reason those desires and delights which attend upon the operations whereby human nature is preserved in the individual and propagated in the species. Temperance is the virtue contrary to the two deadly sins of Gluttony and l.u.s.t. As against the former, it represents Abstinence, or moderation in solid food, and Sobriety, which is moderation in drink.

As against the latter, it is the great virtue of Chast.i.ty. The student must bear in mind that, to a philosopher, Temperance does not mean Total Abstinence, and Abstinence is quite independent of Fridays and flesh-meat. Temperance then is made up of Abstinence, Sobriety, and Chast.i.ty.

Aristotle writes: "Cases of falling short in the taking of pleasure, and of people enjoying themselves less than they ought, are not apt to occur: for such insensibility is not human: but if there be any one to whom nothing is pleasant, and all comes alike in the matter of taste, he must be far from the state and condition of humanity: such a being has no name, because he is nowhere met with." This is true, because where there is question of a virtue, such as Temperance, resident in the concupiscible appet.i.te, we are not concerned with any sullenness or moroseness of will, nor with any scrupulosity or imbecility of judgment, refusing to gratify the reasonable cravings of appet.i.te, but with the habitual leaning and lie of the appet.i.te itself. Now the concupiscible appet.i.te in every man, of its own nature, leans to its proper object of delectable good. No virtue is requisite to secure it from too little inclination that way: but to restrain the appet.i.te from going out excessively to delight is the function, and the sole function, of Temperance. The measure of restraint is relative, as the golden mean is relative, and varies with different persons and in view of different ends. The training of the athlete is not the training of the saint.

3. Besides the primary virtue of Temperance, and its subordinate species (enumerated above, n. 1), certain other virtues are brought under Temperance in a secondary sense, as observing in easier matters that moderation and self-restraint which the primary virtue keeps in the matter that is most difficult of all. St. Thomas calls these _potential parts_ of Temperance. There is question here of what is most difficult to man as an animal, not of what is most difficult to him as a rational being. To rational man, as such, ambition is harder to restrain than sensuality: which is proved by the fact that fewer men, who have any ambition in them, do restrain that pa.s.sion than those who restrain the animal propensities that are common to all. But to man as an animal (and vast numbers of the human race rise little above the animal state), it is hardest of all things to restrain those appet.i.tes that go with the maintenance and propagation of flesh and blood. These then are the proper matter of Temperance: other virtues, potential parts of Temperance, restrain other cravings which are less animal. Of these virtues the most noticeable are humility, meekness, and modesty. [Footnote 7]

[Footnote 7: This is St. Thomas's arrangement, placing Humility under Temperance. The connection of Humility with Magnanimity, and thereby with Fort.i.tude, is indicated pp. 100, 101.]

4. There is a thirst after honour and preeminence, arising from self-esteem, and prevalent especially where there is little thought of G.o.d, and scant reverence for the present majesty of heaven. A man who thinks little of his Maker is great in his own eyes, as our green English hills are mountains to one who has not seen the Alpine heights and snows. Apart from the consideration of G.o.d there is no humility; and this is why Aristotle, who treats of virtues as they minister to the dealings of man with man, makes no mention of this virtue. There are certain outward manifestations in words, acts, and gestures, the demeanour of a humble man, which is largely identified with modesty and with submission to others as representing G.o.d.

5. Modesty is that outward comportment, style of dress, conversation, and carriage, which indicates the presence of Temperance, "set up on holy pedestal" (Plato, _Phaedr_., 254 B) in the heart within.

6. Meekness is moderation in anger, and is or should be the virtue of all men. Clemency is moderation in punishment, and is the virtue of men in office, who bear the sword or the rod.

7. As regards the vices opposite to Temperance, an important distinction is to be drawn between him who sins by outburst of pa.s.sion and him whose very principles are corrupt. [Footnote 8] The former in doing evil acknowledges it to be evil, and is p.r.o.ne to repent of it afterwards: the latter has lost his belief in virtue, and his admiration for it: he drinks in iniquity like water, with no after-qualms; he glories in his shame. The former is reclaimable, the latter is reprobate: his intellect as well as his heart is vitiated and gone bad. If there were no miracles, he would be a lost man: but G.o.d can work miracles in the moral as in the physical order: in that there is hope for him.

[Footnote 8: See the note in _Aquinas Ethicus_, Vol. I., pp. 170, 171.]

8. A nation need not be virtuous in the great bulk of her citizens, to be great in war and in dominion, in laws, in arts, and in literature: but the bulk of the people must possess at least the sense and appreciation of virtue in order to such national greatness. When that sense is lost, the nation is undone and become impotent, for art no less than for empire. Thus the Greece of Pericles and of Phidias fell, to be "living Greece no more."

9. As in other moral matters, no hard and fast line of division exists between sinning from pa.s.sion and sinning on principle, but cases of the one shade into cases of the others, and by frequent indulgence of pa.s.sion principle is brought gradually to decay.

_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth._, III., x.; St. Thos., 2a 2ae, q. 141, art. 2; _ib._, q. 141, art. 3, in corp.; _ib._, q. 142, art. 1; _ib._, q. 143, art. 1, in corp., ad 2, 3; _ib._, q. 161, art. 1, ad 5; _ib._, q. 161, art. 2, in corp.; _ib._, q. 161, art. 6, in corp., ad 1; _ib._, q.

157, art. 1, in corp., ad 3; _ib_, q. 156, art. 3; Ar., _Eth._, VII., viii.

SECTION VIII.--_Of Fort.i.tude_.

1. As Temperance is a curb, restraining animal nature in the pursuit of the good to which it goes out most eagerly, namely, life and the means of its continuance, so Fort.i.tude also is a curb, withholding that nature from irrational flight from the evil which it most dreads.

Aristotle tells us what that evil is: "Most dreadful of all things is death, for it is the limit, and for the dead man there appears to be no further good nor evil left." (_Eth._, III, vi., b.) Death is truly the limit to human existence: for, though the soul be immortal, the being of flesh and blood, that we call man, is dissolved in death, and, apart from supernatural hope of the resurrection, extinct for ever. Death therefore is the direst of all evils in the animal economy; and as such, is supremely abhorred by the sensitive appet.i.te, which is the animal part of man. Fort.i.tude moderates this abhorrence and fear by the dictate of reason. Reason shows that there are better things than life, and things worse than death, for man in his spiritual capacity as an intellectual and immortal being.

2. Fort.i.tude is a mean between Cowardice and Rashness, to which opposite extremes we are carried by the contrary pa.s.sions of Fear and Daring respectively. Fort.i.tude thus is a two-sided virtue, moderating two opposite tendencies: while Temperance is one-sided, moderating Desire alone. Life, rationally considered, bears undoubtedly a high value, and is not to be lightly thrown away, or risked upon trivial or ign.o.ble objects. The brave man is circ.u.mspect in his ventures, and moderate in his fears, which implies that he does fear somewhat. He will fear superhuman visitations, as the judgments of G.o.d. He will dread disgrace, and still more, sin. He will fear death in an unworthy cause. And even in a good cause, it has well been said: "The truly brave man is not he who fears no danger, but the man whose mind subdues the fear, and braves the danger that nature shrinks from." The Duke of Marlborough is said to have quaked in the saddle as he rode into action, saying: "This poor body trembles at what the mind within is about to do." Fort.i.tude then is the virtue that restrains fear and regulates venturesomeness by the judgment of reason, in danger especially of a grand and glorious death.

3. To the ancients, there was no grander object of devotion than the State, their native city: no direr misfortune than its dissolution, or the loss of its self-government: no n.o.bler death than to die in arms in its defence. As old Tyrtaeus sang: