Kant's Theory of Knowledge Part 18

[8] Cf. p. 257 note.

[9] B. 210, M. 128.

[10] B. 208, M. 126. The italics are mine. Cf. from the same pa.s.sage, "Phenomena contain, over and above perception, the materials for some object (through which is represented something existing in s.p.a.ce and time), i. e. they contain the real of sensation as a merely subjective representation of which we can only become conscious that _the subject is affected_, and which we relate _to an object in general_."

(The italics are mine.)

[11] Cf. pp. 94-100.

In the second place, Kant expressly allows that in this antic.i.p.ation we succeed in discovering _a priori_ a characteristic of sensation, although sensation const.i.tutes that empirical element in phenomena, which on Kant's general view cannot be apprehended _a priori_.

"Nevertheless, this antic.i.p.ation of sense-perception must always be somewhat surprising to an inquirer who is used to transcendental reflection, and is thereby rendered cautious. It leads us to feel some misgiving as to whether the understanding can antic.i.p.ate such a synthetic proposition as that respecting the degree of all that is real in phenomena, and consequently respecting the possibility of the internal distinction of sensation itself, if we abstract from its empirical quality. There remains, therefore, a problem not unworthy of solution, viz. 'How can the understanding p.r.o.nounce synthetically and _a priori_ upon phenomena in this respect, and thus antic.i.p.ate phenomena even in that which is specially and merely empirical, viz.

that which concerns sensations?'"[12] But although Kant recognizes that the antic.i.p.ation is surprising, he is not led to revise his general theory, as being inconsistent with the existence of the antic.i.p.ation. He indeed makes an attempt[13] to deal with the difficulty; but his solution consists not in showing that the antic.i.p.ation is consistent with his general theory--as he should have done, if the theory was to be retained--but in showing that, in the case of the degree of sensation, we do apprehend the nature of sensation _a priori_.

[12] B. 217, M. 131; cf. B. 209, M. 127.

[13] B. 217-18, M. 132.

Strangely enough, Hume finds himself face to face with what is in principle the same difficulty, and treats it in a not dissimilar way.

"There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allow'd, that the several distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds, which are convey'd by the hearing, are really different from each other, tho' at the same time resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this shou'd be deny'd, 'tis possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be plac'd before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; tho' the instance is so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim."[14]

[14] Hume, _Treatise_, Bk. I, Part 1, -- 1.

CHAPTER XII

THE a.n.a.lOGIES OF EXPERIENCE

Each of the three categories of relation, i. e. those of substance and accident, of cause and effect, and of interaction between agent and patient involves, according to Kant, a special principle, and these special principles he calls 'a.n.a.logies of experience'. They are stated thus:[1] (1) In all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent, and its quant.i.ty in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (2) All changes take place according to the law of the connexion of cause and effect. (3) All substances, so far as they can be perceived in s.p.a.ce as coexistent, are in complete interaction. The justification of the term _a.n.a.logy_ of experience is as follows. In mathematics an a.n.a.logy is a formula which a.s.serts the equality of two _quant.i.tative_ relations, and is such that, if three of the terms are given, we can discover the fourth, e. g. if we know that _a_ : _b_ = _c_ : _d_, and that _a_ = 2, _b_ = 4, _c_ = 6 we can discover that _d_ = 12. But in philosophy an a.n.a.logy is the a.s.sertion of the equality of two _qualitative_ relations and is such that, if three of the terms are given, we can discover, not the fourth, but only the relation of the third to the fourth, though at the same time we are furnished with a clue whereby to search for the fourth in experience. In this philosophical sense, the principles involved in the categories of relation are a.n.a.logies. For instance, the principles of causality can be stated in the form 'Any known event _X_ is to _some other_ event _Y_, whatever it be, as effect to cause'; so stated, it clearly informs us not of the character of _Y_ but only of the fact that there must be a _Y_, i. e. a necessary antecedent, though at the same time this knowledge enables us to search in experience for the special character of _Y_.

[1] The formulation of them in the first edition is slightly different.

The principles to be established relate to the two kinds of temporal relation apprehended in the world of nature, viz. coexistence and succession. The _method_ of proof, which is to be gathered from the proofs themselves rather than from Kant's general remarks[2] on the subject, is the same in each case. Kant expressly rejects any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions', e. g. any attempt to show that the very conception of change presupposes the thought of an identical subject of change.[3] The proof is transcendental in character, i. e. it argues that the principle to be established is a condition of the possibility of _apprehending_ the temporal relation in question, e. g. that the existence of a permanent subject of change is presupposed in any _apprehension_ of change. It a.s.sumes that we become aware of sequences and coexistences in the world of nature by a process which begins with a succession of mere perceptions, i. e.

perceptions which are so far not the perceptions of a sequence or of a coexistence or indeed of anything;[4] and it seeks to show that this process involves an appeal to one of the principles in question--the particular principle involved depending on the temporal relation apprehended--and consequently, that since we do apprehend this temporal relation, which, as belonging to the world of nature, must be distinct from any temporal relation of our perceptions, the principle appealed to is valid.

[2] B. 218-24, M. 132-6; and B. 262-5, M. 159-61.

[3] B. 263-4, M. 160-1; B. 289, M. 174-5.

[4] This a.s.sumption is of course a.n.a.logous to the a.s.sumption which underlies the _Transcendental Deduction of the Categories_, that knowledge begins with the successive origination in us of isolated data of sense.

The proof of the first a.n.a.logy is given somewhat differently in the first edition, and in a pa.s.sage added in the second. The earlier version, which is a better expression of the att.i.tude underlying Kant's general remarks on the a.n.a.logy, is as follows:

"Our _apprehension_ of the manifold of a phenomenon is always successive, and is therefore always changing. By it alone, therefore, we can never determine whether this manifold, as an object of experience, is coexistent or successive, unless there lies at the base of it something that exists _always_, that is, something _enduring_ and _permanent_, of which all succession and coexistence are nothing but so many ways (_modi_ of time) in which the permanent exists. Only in the permanent, then, are time relations possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time); i. e. the permanent is the _substratum_ of the empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all time-determination is possible. Permanence expresses in general time, as the persisting correlate of all existence of phenomena, of all change, and of all concomitance.... Only through the permanent does _existence_ in different parts of the successive series of time gain a _quant.i.ty_ which we call _duration_. For, in mere succession, existence is always vanis.h.i.+ng and beginning, and never has the least quant.i.ty. Without this permanent, then, no time relation is possible. Now, time in itself cannot be perceived[5]; consequently this permanent in phenomena is the substratum of all time-determination, and therefore also the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of sense-perceptions, that is, of experience, and in this permanent all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode of the existence of that which endures and is permanent. Therefore in all phenomena the permanent is the object itself, i. e. the substance (_phenomenon_); but all that changes or can change belongs only to the way in which this substance or substances exist, consequently to their determinations."[6]

"Accordingly since substance cannot change in existence, its quant.i.ty in nature can neither be increased nor diminished."[7] The argument becomes plainer if it be realized that in the interval between the two editions, Kant came to think that the permanent in question was matter or bodies in s.p.a.ce.[8] "We find that in order to give something _permanent_ in perception corresponding to the conception of _substance_ (and thereby to exhibit the objective reality of this conception), we need a perception _in s.p.a.ce_ (of matter), because s.p.a.ce alone has permanent determinations, while time, and consequently everything which is in the internal sense, is continually flowing."[9]

[5] _Wahrgenommen._

[6] A. 182-4 and B. 225-7, M. 137-8. This formulation of the conclusion is adapted only to the form in which the first a.n.a.logy is stated in the first edition, viz. "All phenomena contain the permanent (_substance_) as the object itself and the changeable as its mere determination, i. e. as a way in which the object exists." Hence a sentence from the conclusion of the proof added in the second edition is quoted to elucidate Kant's meaning; its doctrine is as legitimate a conclusion of the argument given in the first edition as of that peculiar to the second.

[7] B. 225, M. 137.

[8] Cf. Caird, i. 541-2.

[9] B. 291, M. 176 (in 2nd ed. only). Cf. B. 277 fin.-278 init., M. 168 (in 2nd ed. only).

Kant's thought appears to be as follows: 'Our apprehension of the manifold consists of a series of successive acts in which we apprehend its elements one by one and in isolation. This apprehension, therefore, does not enable us to determine that its elements are temporally related either as successive or as coexistent.[10] In order to determine this, we must apprehend the elements of the manifold as related to something permanent. For a succession proper, i. e. a change, is a succession of states or determinations of something permanent or unchanging. A mere succession which is not a succession of states of something which remains identical is an unconnected series of endings and beginnings, and with respect to it, 'duration', which has meaning with regard to changes, i. e. successions proper, has no meaning at all. Similarly, coexistence is a coexistence of states of two permanents. Hence, to apprehend elements of the manifold as successive or coexistent, we must apprehend them in relation to a permanent or permanents. Therefore, to apprehend a coexistence or a succession, we must perceive something permanent. But this permanent something cannot be time, for time cannot be perceived. It must therefore be a permanent in phenomena; and this must be the object itself or the substance of a phenomenon, i. e. the substratum of the changes which it undergoes, or that of which the elements of the manifold are states or modifications.[11] Consequently, there must be a permanent substance of a phenomenon, and the quant.i.ty of substances taken together must be constant.'

[10] The account of the first a.n.a.logy as a whole makes it necessary to think that Kant in the first two sentences of the proof quoted does not mean exactly what he says, what he says being due to a desire to secure conformity with his treatment of the second and third a.n.a.logies. What he _says_ suggests (1) that he is about to discuss the implications, not of the process by which we come to apprehend the manifold as temporally related in one of the two ways possible, i. e.

either as successive or as coexistent, but of the process by which we decide whether the relation of the manifold which we already know to be temporal is that of succession or that of coexistence, and (2) that the necessity for this process is due to the fact that our _apprehension_ of the manifold is always successive. The context, however, refutes both suggestions, and in any case it is the special function of the processes which involve the second and third a.n.a.logies to determine the relations of the manifold as that of succession and that of coexistence respectively.

[11] Cf. B. 225, M. 137 (first half).

Now, if Kant's thought has been here represented fairly, it is open to the following comments. In the first place, even if his position be right in the main, Kant should not introduce the thought of the _quant.i.ty_ of substance, and speak of the quant.i.ty as constant. For he thereby implies that in a plurality of substances--if such a plurality can in the end be admitted--there may be total extinction of, or partial loss in, some, if only there be a corresponding compensation in others; whereas such extinction and creation would be inconsistent with the nature of a substance.[12] Even Kant himself speaks of having established the impossibility of the origin and extinction of substance.[13]

[12] I owe this comment to Professor Cook Wilson.

[13] B. 232-3, M. 141 fin.

In the second place, it is impossible to see how it can be legitimate for Kant to speak of a permanent substratum of change at all.[14] For phenomena or appearances neither are nor imply the substratum of which Kant is thinking. They might be held to imply ourselves as the identical substratum of which they are successive states, but this view would be irrelevant to, if not inconsistent with, Kant's doctrine. It is all very well to _say_ that the substratum is to be found in matter, i. e. in bodies in s.p.a.ce,[15] but the a.s.sertion is incompatible with the phenomenal character of the world; for the sensations or appearances produced in us by the thing in itself cannot be successive states of bodies in s.p.a.ce. In the third place, in spite of Kant's protests against any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions', such a proof really forms the basis of his thought. For if the argument is to proceed not from the nature of change as such but from the possibility of perceiving change, it must not take into account any implications of the possibility of perceiving change which rest upon implications of the nature of change as such. Yet this is what the argument does. For the reason really given for the view that the apprehension of change involves the apprehension of the manifold as related to a permanent substratum is that a change, as such, implies a permanent substratum. It is only because change is held to imply a substratum that we are said to be able to apprehend a change only in relation to a substratum. Moreover, shortly afterwards, Kant, apparently without realizing what he is doing, actually uses what is, on the very face of it, the dogmatic method, and in accordance with it develops the implications of the perception of change. "Upon this permanence is based the justification of the conception of _change_.

Coming into being and peris.h.i.+ng are not changes of that which comes to be or perishes. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object. Hence everything which changes _endures_ and only its _condition changes_.... Change, therefore, can be perceived only in substances, and absolute coming to be or peris.h.i.+ng, which does not concern merely a determination of the permanent, cannot be a possible perception."[16] Surely the fact that Kant is constrained in spite of himself to use the dogmatic method is some indication that it is the right method. It is in reality impossible to make any discoveries about change, or indeed about anything, except by consideration of the nature of the thing itself; no study of the conditions under which it can be apprehended can throw any light upon its nature.[17] Lastly, although the supposition is not so explicit as the corresponding supposition made in the case of the other a.n.a.logies, Kant's argument really a.s.sumes, and a.s.sumes wrongly, the existence of a process by which, starting with the successive apprehension of elements of the manifold in isolation, we come to apprehend them as temporally related.

[14] The term 'permanent' is retained to conform to Kant's language. Strictly speaking, only a state of that which changes can be said to persist or to be permanent; for the substratum of change is not susceptible of any temporal predicates. Cf. p. 306.

[15] B. 291, M. 176.

[16] B. 230-1, M. 176.

[17] Cf. pp. 300-1.

The deduction of the second and third a.n.a.logies argues that the principles of causality and reciprocal action are involved respectively in the processes by which we become aware of successions and of coexistences in the world of nature. From this point of view it would seem that the first a.n.a.logy is a presupposition of the others, and that the process which involves the first is presupposed by the process which involves the others. It would seem that it is only upon the conclusion of a process by which, beginning with the successive apprehension of elements of the manifold in isolation, we come to apprehend them as _either_ successive or coexistent elements in the world of nature, that there can arise a process by which we come to decide _whether_ the specific relation is that of succession or of coexistence. For if the latter process can take place independently of the former, i. e. if it can start from the successive apprehension of the manifold, the former process will be unnecessary, and in that case the vindication of the first a.n.a.logy will be invalid. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between Kant's nominal and his actual procedure. Though he nominally regards the first a.n.a.logy as the presupposition of the others,[18] he really does not. For he does not in fact treat the process which involves the validity of the first a.n.a.logy as an antecedent condition of the processes which involve the validity of the others. On the contrary, the latter processes begin _ab initio_ with the mere successive apprehension of the manifold, i. e. they begin at a stage where we are not aware of any relation in the physical world at all; and Kant, in his account of them, nowhere urges that they involve the first a.n.a.logy.[19]

[18] Cf. B. 229, M. 140; B. 232-3, M. 141-2; and Caird, i.

545 and ff.

[19] This is not disproved by B. 247-51, M. 150-2, which involves a different conception of cause and effect.

Moreover, just because Kant does not face the difficulties involved in the thought of a process which begins in this way until he comes to vindicate causality, it is only when we come to this vindication that we realize the real nature of his deduction of the a.n.a.logies, and, in particular, of that of the first.

Kant, prompted no doubt by his desire to answer Hume, treats the principle of causality very fully. The length of the discussion, however, is due not so much to the complication of the argument as to Kant's desire to make his meaning unmistakable; his account consists mainly in a repet.i.tion of what is substantially the same argument no less than five times. Hence it will suffice to consider those pa.s.sages which best express Kant's meaning. At the same time, the prominence of the principle of causality in Kant's theory, and in the history of philosophy generally, and also the way in which Kant's treatment of it reveals the true nature of his general position, makes it necessary to consider these pa.s.sages in some detail.

Hume had denied that we are justified in a.s.serting any causal connexion, i. e. any necessity of succession in the various events which we perceive, but even this denial presupposed that we do apprehend particular sequences in the world of nature, and therefore that we succeed in distinguis.h.i.+ng between a sequence of events in nature and a mere sequence of perceptions, such as is also to be found when we apprehend a coexistence of bodies in s.p.a.ce. Kant urges, in effect, that this denial renders it impossible to explain, as we should be able to do, the possibility of making the distinction in question, which even the denial itself presupposes that we make.

Holding, with Hume, that in all cases of perception what we are directly aware of is a succession of perceptions, he contends that it is necessary to explain how in certain cases we succeed in pa.s.sing from the knowledge of our successive perceptions to the knowledge of a succession in what we perceive. How is it that we know, when, as we say, we see a boat going down stream, that there is a succession in what we perceive, and not merely a succession in our perception of it, as is the case when, as we say, we see the parts of a house? Hume, according to Kant, cannot answer this question; he has only the right to say that in all cases we have a succession of perceptions; for in reality an answer to the question will show that the acquisition of this knowledge involves an appeal to the principle of causality.

Since, then, we do in fact, as even Hume implicitly allowed, succeed in distinguis.h.i.+ng between a succession in objects in nature and a succession in our apprehension of them, the law of causality must be true. "It is only under this presupposition (i. e. of causality) that even the experience of an event is possible."[20]

[20] B. 240, M. 146. For the general view, cf. Caird, i.

556-61.