Kant's Theory of Knowledge Part 16

[29] B. 162, M. 99.

[30] B. 139-42, M. 87-8. Cf. 209, note 3, and pp. 281-2.

We may now turn to Kant's thought of knowledge as a process of synthesis. When Kant speaks of synthesis, the kind of synthesis of which he usually is thinking is that of spatial elements into a spatial whole; and although he refers to other kinds, e. g. of units into numbers, and of events into a temporal series, nevertheless it is the thought of spatial synthesis which guides his view. Now we must in the end admit that the spatial synthesis of which he is thinking is really the _construction_ or _making_ of spatial objects in the literal sense. It would be rightly ill.u.s.trated by making figures out of matches or spelicans, or by drawing a circle with compa.s.ses, or by building a house out of bricks. Further, if we extend this view of the process of which Kant is thinking, we have to allow that the process of synthesis in which, according to Kant, knowledge consists is that of making or constructing parts of the physical world, and in fact the physical world itself, out of elements given in perception.[31] The deduction throughout presupposes that the synthesis is really _manufacture_, and Kant is at pains to emphasize the fact. "The order and conformity to law in the phenomena which we call _nature_ we ourselves introduce, and we could not find it there, if we or the nature of our mind had not originally placed it there."[32] He naturally rejoices in the manufacture, because it is just this which makes the categories valid. If knowing is really making, the principles of synthesis must apply to the reality known, because it is by these very principles that the reality is made. Moreover, recognition of this fact enables us to understand certain features of his view which would otherwise be inexplicable. For if the synthesis consists in literal construction, we are able to understand why Kant should think (1) that in the process of knowledge the mind _introduces_ order into the manifold, (2) that the mind is limited in its activity of synthesis by having to conform to certain principles of construction which const.i.tute the nature of the understanding, and (3) that the manifold of phenomena must possess affinity. If, for example, we build a house, it can be said (1) that we introduce into the materials a plan or principle of arrangement which they do not possess in themselves, (2) that the particular plan is limited by, and must conform to, the laws of spatial relation and to the general presuppositions of physics, such as the uniformity of nature, and (3) that only such materials are capable of the particular combination as possess a nature suitable to it. Moreover, if, for Kant, knowing is really making, we are able to understand two other prominent features of his view. We can understand why Kant should lay so much stress upon the 'recognition' of the synthesis, and upon the self-consciousness involved in knowledge. For if the synthesis of the manifold is really the making of an object, it results merely in the existence of the object; knowledge of it is still to be effected. Consequently, knowledge of the object only finds a place in Kant's view by the _recognition_ (on the necessity of which he insists) of the manifold as combined on a principle. This recognition, which Kant considers only an element in knowledge, is really the knowledge itself. Again, since the reality to be known is a whole of parts which we construct on a principle, we know that it is such a whole, and therefore that 'the manifold is related to one object', because, and only because, we know that we have combined the elements on a principle.

Self-consciousness therefore _must_ be inseparable from consciousness of an object.

[31] It is for this reason that the mathematical ill.u.s.trations of the synthesis are the most plausible for his theory. While we can be said to construct geometrical figures, and while the construction of geometrical figures can easily be mistaken for the apprehension of them, we cannot with any plausibility be said to construct the physical world.

[32] A. 125, Mah. 214. Cf. the other pa.s.sages quoted pp.

211-12.

The fundamental objection to this account of knowledge seems so obvious as to be hardly worth stating; it is of course that knowing and making are not the same. The very nature of knowing presupposes that the thing known is already made, or, to speak more accurately, already exists.[33] In other words, knowing is essentially the discovery of what already is. Even if the reality known happens to be something which we make, e. g. a house, the knowing it is distinct from the making it, and, so far from being identical with the making, presupposes that the reality in question is already made. Music and poetry are, no doubt, realities which in some sense are 'made' or 'composed', but the apprehension of them is distinct from and presupposes the process by which they are composed.

[33] Cf. Ch. VI.

How difficult it is to resolve knowing into making may be seen by consideration of a difficulty in the interpretation of Kant's phrase 'relation of the manifold to an object', to which no allusion has yet been made. When it is said that a certain manifold is related to, or stands[34] in relation to, an object, does the relatedness referred to consist in the fact that the manifold is combined into a whole, or in the fact that we are conscious of the combination, or in both? If we accept the first alternative we must allow that, while relatedness to an object implies a process of synthesis, yet the relatedness, and therefore the synthesis, have nothing to do with knowledge. For the relatedness of the manifold to an object will be the combination of the elements of the manifold as parts of an object constructed, and the process of synthesis involved will be that by which the object is constructed. This process of synthesis will have nothing to do with knowledge; for since it is merely the process by which the object is constructed, knowledge so far is not effected at all, and no clue is given to the way in which it comes about. If, however, we accept the second alternative, we have to allow that while relatedness to an object has to do with knowledge, yet it in no way implies a process of synthesis. For since in that case it consists in the fact that we are conscious of the manifold as together forming an object, it in no way implies that the object has been produced by a process of synthesis.

Kant, of course, would accept the third alternative. For, firstly, since it is knowledge which he is describing, the phrase 'relatedness to an object' cannot refer simply to the _existence_ of a combination of the manifold, and of a process by which it has been produced; its meaning must include _consciousness_ of the combination. In the second place, it is definitely his view that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves.[35] Moreover, it is just with respect to this connexion between the synthesis and the consciousness of the synthesis that his reduction of knowing to making helps him; for to make an object, e. g.

a house, is to make it consciously, i. e. to combine materials on a principle of which we are aware. Since, then, the combining of which he speaks is really making, it seems to him impossible to combine a manifold without being aware of the nature of the act of combination, and therefore of the nature of the whole thereby produced.[36] But though this is clearly Kant's view, it is not justified. In the first place, 'relatedness of the manifold to an object' ought not to refer _both_ to its combination in a whole _and_ to our consciousness of the combination; and in strictness it should refer to the former only. For as referring to the former it indicates a relation of the manifold _to the object_, as being the parts of the object, and as referring to the latter it indicates a relation of the manifold _to us_, as being apprehended by us as the parts of the object. But two relations which, though they are of one and the same thing, are nevertheless relations of it to two different things, should not be referred to by the same phrase. Moreover, since the relatedness is referred to as relatedness to an object, the phrase properly indicates the relation of the manifold to an object, and not to us as apprehending it. Again, in the second place, Kant cannot successfully maintain that the phrase is primarily a loose expression for our consciousness of the manifold as related to an object, and that since this implies a process of synthesis, the phrase may fairly include in its meaning the thought of the combination of the manifold by us into a whole. For although Kant a.s.serts--and with some plausibility--that we can only apprehend as combined what we have ourselves combined, yet when we consider this a.s.sertion seriously we see it to be in no sense true.

[34] A. 109, Mah. 202.

[35] B. 130, M. 80.

[36] To say that 'combining', in the sense of making, _really_ presupposes consciousness of the nature of the whole produced, would be inconsistent with the previous a.s.sertion that even where the reality known is something made, the knowledge of it presupposes that the reality is already made.

Strictly speaking, the activity of combining presupposes consciousness not of the whole which we _succeed_ in producing, but of the whole which we _want_ to produce.

It may be noted that, from the point of view of the above argument, the activity of combining presupposes actual consciousness of the act of combination and of its principle, and does not imply merely the possibility of it. Kant, of course, does not hold this.

The general conclusion, therefore, to be drawn is that the process of synthesis by which the manifold is said to become related to an object is a process not of knowledge but of construction in the literal sense, and that it leaves knowledge of the thing constructed still to be effected. But if knowing is obviously different from making, why should Kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing into making? Three reasons may be given.

In the first place, the very question, 'What does the process of knowing consist in?' at least suggests that knowing can be resolved into and stated in terms of something else. In this respect it resembles the modern phrase '_theory_ of knowledge'. Moreover, since it is plain that in knowing we are active, the question is apt to a.s.sume the form, 'What do we _do_ when we know or think?' and since one of the commonest forms of doing something is to perform a physical operation on physical things, whereby we effect a recombination of them on some plan, it is natural to try to resolve knowing into this kind of doing, i. e. into making in a wide sense of the word.

In the second place, Kant never relaxed his hold upon the thing in itself. Consequently, there always remained for him a reality which existed in itself and was not made by us. This was to him the fundamental reality, and the proper object of knowledge, although unfortunately inaccessible to _our_ faculties of knowing. Hence to Kant it did not seriously matter that an inferior reality, viz. the phenomenal world, was made by us in the process of knowing.

In the third place, it is difficult, if not impossible, to read the _Deduction_ without realizing that Kant failed to distinguish knowing from that formation of mental imagery which accompanies knowing. The process of synthesis, if it is even to seem to const.i.tute knowledge and to involve the validity of the categories, must really be a process by which we construct, and recognize our construction of, an individual reality in nature out of certain physical data.

Nevertheless, it is plain that what Kant normally describes as the process of synthesis is really the process by which we construct an imaginary picture of a reality in nature not present to perception, i. e. by which we imagine to ourselves what it would look like if we were present to perceive it. This is implied by his continued use of the terms 'reproduction' and 'imagination' in describing the synthesis. To be aware of an object of past perception, it is necessary, according to him, that the object should be _re_produced.

It is thereby implied that the object of our present awareness is not the object of past perception, but a mental image which copies or reproduces it. The same implication is conveyed by his use of the term 'imagination' to describe the faculty by which the synthesis is effected; for 'imagination' normally means the power of making a mental image of something not present to perception, and this interpretation is confirmed by Kant's own description of the imagination as 'the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in perception'.[37] Further, that Kant really fails to distinguish the construction of mental imagery from literal construction is shown by the fact that, although he insists that the formation of an image and reproduction are both necessary for knowledge, he does not consistently adhere to this. For his general view is that the elements combined and recognized as combined are the original data of sense, and not reproductions of them which together form an image, and his instances imply that the elements retained in thought, i. e. the elements of which we are aware subsequently to perception, are the elements originally perceived, e. g. the parts of a line or the units counted.[38] Moreover, in one pa.s.sage Kant definitely describes certain _objects_ of _perception_ taken together as an _image_ of that 'kind' of which, when taken together, they are an instance. "If I place five points one after another, . . . . . this is an image of the number five."[39] Now, if it be granted that Kant has in mind normally the process of imagining, we can see why he found no difficulty in the thought of knowledge as construction. For while we cannot reasonably speak of making _an object of knowledge_, we can reasonably speak of making _a mental image_ through our own activity, and also of making it in accordance with the categories and the empirical laws which presuppose them. Moreover, the ease with which it is possible to take the imagining which accompanies knowing for knowing[40]--the image formed being taken to be the object known and the forming it being taken to be the knowing it--renders it easy to transfer the thought of construction to the knowledge itself. The only defect, however, under which the view labours is the important one that, whatever be the extent to which imagination must accompany knowledge, it is distinct from knowledge. To realize the difference we have only to notice that the process by which we present to ourselves in imagination realities not present to perception presupposes, and is throughout guided by, the knowledge of them. It should be noted, however, that, although the process of which Kant is normally thinking is doubtless that of constructing mental imagery, his real view must be that knowledge consists in constructing a world out of the data of sense, or, more accurately, as his instances show, out of the objects of isolated perceptions, e. g. parts of a line or units to be counted.

Otherwise the final act of recognition would be an apprehension not of the world of nature, but of an image of it.

[37] B. 152, M. 93; cf. also Mah. 211, A. 120.

[38] Cf. A. 102-3, Mah. 197-8. The fact is that the appeal to reproduction is a useless device intended by Kant--and by 'empirical psychologists'--to get round the difficulty of allowing that in the apprehension (in memory or otherwise) of a reality not present to perception, we are really aware of the reality. The difficulty is in reality due to a sensationalistic standpoint, avowed or unavowed, and the device is useless, because the a.s.sumption has in the end to be made, covertly or otherwise, that we are really aware of the reality in question.

[39] B. 179, M. 109. Cf. the whole pa.s.sage B. 176-81, M.

107-10 (part quoted pp. 249-51), and p. 251.

[40] Cf. Locke and Hume.

'This criticism,' it may be said, 'is too sweeping. It may be true that the process which Kant describes is really making in the literal sense and not knowing, but Kant's mistake may have been merely that of thinking of the wrong kind of synthesis. For both ordinary language and that of philosophical discussion imply that synthesis plays some part in knowledge. Thus we find in ordinary language the phrases '_putting_ 2 and 2 _together_' and '2 and 2 _make_ 4'. Even in philosophical discussions we find it said that a complex conception, e. g. gold, is a _synthesis_ of simple conceptions, e. g. yellowness, weight, &c.; that in judgement we _relate_ or _refer_ the predicate to the subject; and that in inference we _construct_ reality, though only mentally or ideally. Further, in any case it is by thinking or knowing that the world comes to be _for us_; the more we think, the more of reality there is for us. Hence at least the world _for us_ or _our_ world is due to our activity of knowing, and so is in some sense made by us, i. e. by our relating activity.'

This position, however, seems in reality to be based on a simple but illegitimate transition, viz. the transition to the a.s.sertion that in knowing we relate, or combine, or construct from the a.s.sertion that in knowing we recognize as related, or combined, or constructed--the last two terms being retained to preserve the parallelism.[41] While the latter a.s.sertion may be said to be true, although the terms 'combined'

and 'constructed' should be rejected as misleading, the former a.s.sertion must be admitted to be wholly false, i. e. true in no sense whatever. Moreover, the considerations adduced in favour of the position should, it seems, be met by a flat denial of their truth or, if not, of their relevance. For when it is said that _our_ world, or the world _for us_, is due to our activity of thinking, and so is in some sense _made_ by us, all that should be meant is that our _apprehending_ the world as whatever we apprehend it to be _presupposes_ activity on our part. But since the activity is after all only the activity itself of apprehending or knowing, this a.s.sertion is only a way of saying that apprehending or knowing is not a condition of mind which can be produced in us _ab extra_, but is something which we have to do for ourselves. Nothing is implied to be made. If anything is to be said to be made, it must be not our world but our activity of apprehending the world; but even we and our activity of apprehending the world are not related as maker and thing made. Again, to speak of a complex conception, e. g. gold, and to say that it involves a synthesis of simple conceptions by the mind is mere 'conceptualism'. If, as we ought to do, we replace the term 'conception' by 'universal', and speak of gold as a synthesis of universals, any suggestion that the mind performs the synthesis will vanish, for a 'synthesis of universals' will mean simply a connexion of universals. All that is mental is our apprehension of their connexion. Again, in judgement we cannot be said to _relate_ predicate to subject. Such an a.s.sertion would mean either that we relate a conception to a conception, or a conception to a reality[42], or a reality to a reality; and, on any of these interpretations, it is plainly false. To retain the language of 'relation' or of 'combination' at all, we must say that in judgement we recognize real elements as related or combined. Again, when we infer, we do not construct, ideally or otherwise. 'Ideal construction'[43] is a contradiction in terms, unless it refers solely to mental imagining, in which case it is not inference. Construction which is not 'ideal', i. e. literal construction, plainly cannot const.i.tute the nature of inference; for inference would cease to be inference, if by it we made, and did not apprehend, a necessity of connexion. Again, the phrase '2 and 2 _make_ 4' does not justify the view that in some sense we 'make' reality. It of course suggests that 2 and 2 are not 4 until they are added, i. e. that the addition makes them 4.[44] But the language is only appropriate when we are literally making a group of 4 by physically placing 2 pairs of bodies in one group. Where we are counting, we should say merely that 2 and 2 _are_ 4. Lastly, it must be allowed that the use of the phrase 'putting two and two together', to describe an inference from facts not quite obviously connected, is loose and inexact. If we meet a dog with a blood-stained mouth and shortly afterwards see a dead fowl, we may be said to put two and two together and to conclude thereby that the dog killed the fowl. But, strictly speaking, in drawing the inference we do not put anything together. We certainly do not put together the facts that the mouth of the dog is blood-stained and that the fowl has just been killed. We do not even put the premises together, i. e. our apprehensions of these facts. What takes place should be described by saying simply that seeing that the fowl is killed, we also remember that the dog's mouth was stained, and then apprehend a connexion between these facts.

[41] Cf. Caird, i. 394, where Dr. Caird speaks of 'the distinction of the activity of thought from the matter which it _combines or recognizes as combined_ in the idea of an object'. (The italics are mine.) The context seems to indicate that the phrase is meant to express the truth, and not merely Kant's view.

[42] Cf. the account of judgement in Mr. Bradley's _Logic_.

[43] Cf. the account of inference in Mr. Bradley's _Logic_.

[44] Cf. Bradley, _Logic_, pp. 370 and 506.

The fact seems to be that the thought of synthesis in no way helps to elucidate the nature of knowing, and that the mistake in principle which underlies Kant's view lies in the implicit supposition that it is possible to elucidate the nature of knowledge by means of something other than itself. Knowledge is _sui generis_ and therefore a 'theory'

of it is impossible. Knowledge is simply knowledge, and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge.[45]

[45] Cf. p. 124.

CHAPTER X

THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES

As has already been pointed out,[1] the _a.n.a.lytic_ is divided into two parts, the _a.n.a.lytic of Conceptions_, of which the aim is to discover and vindicate the validity of the categories, and the _a.n.a.lytic of Principles_, of which the aim is to determine the use of the categories in judgement. The latter part, which has now to be considered, is subdivided into two. It has, according to Kant, firstly to determine the sensuous conditions under which the categories are used, and secondly to discover the _a priori_ principles involved in the categories, as exercised under these sensuous conditions, such, for instance, as the law that all changes take place according to the law of cause and effect. The first problem is dealt with in the chapter on the 'schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding', the second in the chapter on the 'system of all principles of the pure understanding'.

[1] p. 141.

We naturally feel a preliminary difficulty with respect to the existence of this second part of the _a.n.a.lytic_ at all. It seems clear that if the first part is successful, the second must be unnecessary.

For if Kant is in a position to lay down that the categories must apply to objects, no special conditions of their application need be subsequently determined. If, for instance, it can be laid down that the category of quant.i.ty must apply to objects, it is implied either that there are no special conditions of its application, or that they have already been discovered and shown to exist. Again, to a.s.sert the applicability of the categories is really to a.s.sert the existence of principles, and in fact of just those principles which it is the aim of the _System of Principles_ to prove. Thus to a.s.sert the applicability of the categories of quant.i.ty and of cause and effect is to a.s.sert respectively the principles that all objects of perception are extensive quant.i.ties, and that all changes take place according to the law of cause and effect. The _Deduction of the Categories_ therefore, if successful, must have already proved the principles now to be vindicated; and it is a matter for legitimate surprise that we find Kant in the _System of Principles_ giving proofs of these principles which make no appeal to the _Deduction of the Categories_.[2] On the other hand, for the existence of the account of the schematism of the categories Kant has a better show of reason. For the conceptions derived in the _Metaphysical Deduction_ from the nature of formal judgement are in themselves too abstract to be the conceptions which are to be shown applicable to the sensible world, since all the latter involve the thought of time. Thus, the conception of cause and effect derived from the nature of the hypothetical judgement includes no thought of time, while the conception of which he wishes to show the validity is that of necessary succession in time. Hence the conceptions discovered by a.n.a.lysis of formal judgement have in some way to be rendered more concrete in respect of time. The account of the schematism, therefore, is an attempt to get out of the false position reached by appealing to Formal Logic for the list of categories. Nevertheless, the mention of a sensuous condition under which alone the categories can be employed[3] should have suggested to Kant that the transcendental deduction was defective, and, in fact, in the second version of the transcendental deduction two paragraphs[4]

are inserted which take account of this sensuous condition.

[2] The cause of Kant's procedure is, of course, to be found in the unreal way in which he isolates conception from judgement.

[3] B. 175, M. 106.

[4] B. ---- 24 and 26, M. ---- 20 and 22.

The beginning of Kant's account of schematism may be summarized thus: 'Whenever we subsume an individual object of a certain kind, e. g.

a plate, under a conception, e. g. a circle, the object and the conception must be h.o.m.ogeneous, that is to say, the individual must possess the characteristic which const.i.tutes the conception, or, in other words, must be an instance of it. Pure conceptions, however, and empirical perceptions, i. e. objects of empirical perception, are quite heterogeneous. We do not, for instance, perceive cases of cause and effect. Hence the problem arises, 'How is it possible to subsume objects of empirical perception under pure conceptions?' The possibility of this subsumption presupposes a _tertium quid_, which is h.o.m.ogeneous both with the object of empirical perception and with the conception, and so makes the subsumption mediately possible. This _tertium quid_ must be, on the one side, intellectual and, on the other side, sensuous. It is to be found in a 'transcendental determination of time', i. e. a conception involving time and involved in experience. For in the first place this is on the one side intellectual and on the other sensuous, and in the second place it is so far h.o.m.ogeneous with the category which const.i.tutes its unity that it is universal and rests on an _a priori_ rule, and so far h.o.m.ogeneous with the phenomenon that all phenomena are in time[5].

Such transcendental determinations of time are the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding.' Kant continues as follows:

[5] It may be noted that the argument here really fails. For though phenomena as involving temporal relations, might possibly be said to be instances of a transcendental determination of time, the fact that the latter agrees with the corresponding category by being universal and _a priori_ does not const.i.tute it h.o.m.ogeneous with the category, in the sense required for subsumption, viz. that it is an instance of or a species of the category.

"The schema is in itself always a mere product of the imagination.

But since the synthesis of the imagination has for its aim no single perception, but merely unity in the determination of the sensibility, the schema should be distinguished from the image. Thus, if I place five points one after another, . . . . . this is an image of the number five. On the other hand, if I only just think a number in general--no matter what it may be, five or a hundred--this thinking is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image a group (e. g. a thousand), in conformity with a certain conception, than the image itself, an image which, in the instance given, I should find difficulty in surveying and comparing with the conception. Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to supply its image to a conception, I call the schema of this conception."