Kant's Theory of Knowledge Part 12

[34] There could not, of course, be two syntheses, the one being and the other not being upon a principle.

[35] Cf. pp. 168-9.

[36] In view of Kant's subsequent account of the function of the categories it should be noticed that, according to the present pa.s.sage, the conception involved in an act of knowledge is the conception not of an 'object in general', but of 'an object of the particular kind which const.i.tutes the individual whole produced by the combination a whole of the particular kind that it is of', and that, in accordance with this, the self-consciousness involved is not the mere consciousness that our combining activity is identical throughout, but the consciousness that it is an identical activity of a particular kind, e. g. that of counting five units. Cf. pp. 184 fin.-186, 190-2, and 206-7.

Hitherto there has been no mention of an _object_ of knowledge, and since knowledge is essentially knowledge of an object, Kant's next task is to give such an account of an object of knowledge as will show that the processes already described are precisely those which give our representations, i. e. the manifold of sense, relation to an object, and consequently yield knowledge.

He begins by raising the question, 'What do we mean by the phrase 'an object of representations'?'[37] He points out that a phenomenon, since it is a mere sensuous representation, and not a thing in itself existing independently of the faculty of representations, is just not an object. To the question, therefore, 'What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge and therefore distinct from it?' we are bound to answer from the point of view of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, that the object is something in general = _x_, i. e. the thing in itself of which we know only _that_ it is and not _what_ it is. There is, however, another point of view from which we can say something more about an object of representations and the correspondence of our representations to it, viz. that from which we consider what is involved in the thought of the relation of knowledge or of a representation to its object. "We find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it something of necessity, since its object is regarded as that which prevents our cognitions[38] being determined at random or capriciously, and causes them to be determined _a priori_ in a certain way, because in that they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily also, in relation to it, agree with one another, that is to say, they must have that unity which const.i.tutes the conception of an object."[39]

[37] _Vorstellung_ in the present pa.s.sage is perhaps better rendered 'idea', but representation has been retained for the sake of uniformity.

[38] _Erkenntnisse._

[39] A. 104, Mah. 199.

Kant's meaning seems to be this: 'If we think of certain representations, e. g. certain lines[40] or the representations of extension, impenetrability, and shape,[41] as related to an object, e. g. to an individual triangle or an individual body, we think that they must be mutually consistent or, in other words, that they must have the unity of being parts of a necessarily related whole or system, this unity in fact const.i.tuting the conception of an object in general, in distinction from the conception of an object of a particular kind. The latter thought in turn involves the thought of the object of representations as that which prevents them being anything whatever and in fact makes them parts of a system. The thought therefore of representations as related to an object carries with it the thought of a certain necessity, viz. the necessary or systematic unity introduced into the representations by the object.

Hence by an object of representations we mean something which introduces into the representations a systematic unity which const.i.tutes the nature of an object in general, and the relatedness of representations to, or their correspondence with, an object involves their systematic unity.'[42]

[40] Cf. A. 105, Mah. 199.

[41] Cf. A. 106, Mah. 200.

[42] It may be noticed that possession of the unity of a system does not really distinguish 'an object' from any other whole of parts, nor in particular from 'a representation'.

Any whole of parts must be a systematic unity.

Certain points, however, should be noticed. In the _first_ place, Kant is for the moment tacitly ignoring his own theory of knowledge, in accordance with which the object proper, i. e. the thing in itself, is unknowable, and is reverting to the ordinary conception of knowledge as really _knowledge_ of its object. For the elements which are said, in virtue of being related to an object, to agree and to have the unity which const.i.tutes the conception of an object must be elements of an object which we know; for if the a.s.sertion that they agree is to be significant, they must be determinate parts or qualities of the object, e. g. the sides of an individual triangle or the impenetrability or shape of an individual body, and therefore it is implied that we know that the object has these parts or qualities. In the _second_ place, both the problem which Kant raises and the clue which he offers for its solution involve an impossible separation of knowledge or a representation from its object. Kant begins with the thought of a phenomenon as a mere representation which, as mental, and as the representation of an object, is just not an object, and asks, 'What is meant by the object of it?' He finds the clue to the answer in the thought that though a representation or idea when considered in itself is a mere mental modification, yet, when considered as related to an object, it is subject to a certain necessity. In fact, however, an idea or knowledge is essentially an idea or knowledge of an object, and we are bound to think of it as such. There is no meaning whatever in saying that the thought of an idea as related to an object carries with it something of necessity, for to say so implies that it is possible to think of it as unrelated to an object. Similarly there is really no meaning in the question, 'What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge or to an idea?' for this in the same way implies that we can first think of an idea as unrelated to an object and then ask, 'What can be meant by an object corresponding to it?'[43] In the _third_ place, Kant only escapes the absurdity involved in the thought of a mere idea or a mere representation by treating representations either as parts or as qualities of an object. For although he speaks of our cognitions,[44] i. e. of our representations, as being determined by the object, he says that they must agree, i. e. they must have that unity which const.i.tutes the conception of an object, and he ill.u.s.trates representations by the sides of an individual triangle and the impenetrability and shape of an individual body, which are just as 'objective' as the objects to which they relate. The fact is that he really treats a representation not as his problem requires that it should be treated, i. e. as a representation of something, but as something represented,[45] i. e.

as something of which we are aware, viz. a part or a quality of an object. In the _fourth_ place, not only is that which Kant speaks of as related to an object really not a representation, but also--as we see if we consider the fact which Kant has in mind--that to which he speaks of it as related is really not _an_ object but _one and the same object to which another so-called representation is related_. For what Kant says is that representations as related to an object must agree among themselves. But this statement, to be significant, implies that the object to which various representations are related is _one and the same_. Otherwise why should the representations agree? In view, therefore, of these last two considerations we must admit that the real thought underlying Kant's statement should be expressed thus: 'We find that the thought that _two or more parts or qualities of an object_ relate to _one and the same object_ carries with it a certain necessity, since this object is considered to be that which _prevents these parts or qualities which we know it to possess_ from being determined at random, because by being related to _one and the same object_, they must agree among themselves.' The importance of the correction lies in the fact that what Kant is stating is not what he thinks he is stating. He is really stating the implication of the thought that two or more qualities or parts of some object or other, which, as such, already relate to an object, relate to one and the same object. He thinks he is stating the implication of the thought that a representation which in itself has no relation to an object, has relation to an object. And since his problem is simply to determine what const.i.tutes the relatedness to an object of that which in itself is a mere representation, the distinction is important; for it shows that he really elucidates it by an implication respecting something which already has relation to an object and is not a mental modification at all, but a quality or a part of an object.

[43] Cf. pp. 230-3.

[44] _Erkenntnisse._

[45] _Vorgestellt._

Kant continues thus: "But it is clear that, since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations, and the _x_, which corresponds to them (the object), since it is to be something distinct from all our representations, is for us nothing, the unity which the object necessitates can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations."

[I. e. since the object which produces systematic unity in our representations is after all only the unknown thing in itself, viz.

_x_,[46] any of the parts or qualities of which it is impossible to know, that to which it gives unity can be only our representations and not its own parts or qualities. For, since we do not know any of its parts or qualities, these representations cannot be its parts or qualities. Consequently, the unity produced by this _x_ can only be the formal unity of the combination of the manifold in consciousness.[47]] "Then and then only do we say that we know the object," [i. e. we know that the manifold relates to an object[48]]

"if we have produced synthetical unity in the manifold of perception.

But this unity would be impossible, if the perception could not be produced by means of such a function of synthesis according to a rule as renders the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary, and a conception in which the manifold unifies itself possible. Thus we think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines in accordance with a rule by which such a perception can at any time be presented. This _unity of the rule_ determines all the manifold and limits it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible, and the conception of this unity is the representation of the object=_x_, which I think through the aforesaid predicates of a triangle." [I. e., apparently, 'to conceive this unity of the rule is to represent to myself the object _x_, i. e. the thing in itself,[49] of which I come to think by means of the rule of combination.']

[46] Cf. p. 183, note 2.

[47] 'The formal unity' means not the unity peculiar to any particular synthesis, but the character shared by all syntheses of being a systematic whole.

[48] The final sense is the same whether 'object' be here understood to refer to the thing in itself or to a phenomenon.

[49] A comparison of this pa.s.sage (A. 104-5, Mah. 198-9) with A. 108-9, Mah. 201-2 (which seems to reproduce A. 104-5, Mah.

198-9), B. 522-3, M. 309 and A. 250, Mah. 224, seems to render it absolutely necessary to understand by _x_, and by the transcendental object, the thing in itself. Cf. also B.

236, M. 143 ('so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the transcendental meaning thereof, the house is not a thing in itself but only a phenomenon, i. e. a representation of which the transcendental object is unknown'), A. 372, Mah.

247 and A. 379, Mah. 253.

In this pa.s.sage several points claim attention. In the _first_ place, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the second sentence the argument is exactly reversed. Up to this point, it is the thing in itself which produces unity in our representations.

Henceforward it is we who produce the unity by our activity of combining the manifold. The discrepancy cannot be explained away, and its existence can only be accounted for by the exigencies of Kant's position. When he is asking 'What is meant by the object (beyond the mind) corresponding to our representations?' he has to think of the unity of the representations as due to the object. But when he is asking 'How does the manifold of sense become unified?' his view that all synthesis is due to the mind compels him to hold that the unity is produced by us. In the _second_ place, the pa.s.sage introduces a second object in addition to the thing in itself, viz. the phenomenal object, e. g. a triangle considered as a whole of parts unified on a definite principle.[50] It is this object which, as the object that we know, is henceforward prominent in the first edition, and has exclusive attention in the second. The connexion between this object and the thing in itself appears to lie in the consideration that we are only justified in holding that the manifold of sense is related to a thing in itself when we have unified it and therefore know it to be a unity, and that to know it to be a unity is _ipso facto_ to be aware of it as related to a phenomenal object; in other words, the knowledge that the manifold is related to an object beyond consciousness is acquired through our knowledge of its relatedness to an object within consciousness. In the _third_ place, in view of Kant's forthcoming vindication of the categories, it is important to notice that the process by which the manifold is said to acquire relation to an object is ill.u.s.trated by a synthesis on a particular principle which const.i.tutes the phenomenal object an object of a particular kind. The synthesis which enables us to recognize three lines as an object is not a synthesis based on general principles const.i.tuted by the categories, but a synthesis based on the particular principle that the three lines must be so put together as to form an enclosed s.p.a.ce.

Moreover, it should be noticed that the need of a particular principle is really inconsistent with his view that relation to an object gives the manifold the systematic unity which const.i.tutes the conception of an object, or that at least a [Greek: hysteron proteron] is involved.

For if the knowledge that certain representations form a systematic unity justifies our holding that they relate to an object, it would seem that in order to know that they relate to an object we need not know the special character of their unity. Yet, as Kant states the facts, we really have to know the special character of their unity in order to know that they possess systematic unity in general.[51]

_Lastly_, it is easy to see the connexion of this account of an object of representations with the preceding account of the synthesis involved in knowledge. Kant had said that knowledge requires a synthesis of the imagination in accordance with a definite principle, and the recognition of the principle of the synthesis by the understanding. From this point of view it is clear that the aim of the present pa.s.sage is to show that this process yields knowledge of an object; for it shows that this process yields knowledge of a phenomenal object of a particular kind, e. g. of a triangle or of a body, and that this object as such refers to what after all is _the_ object, viz. the thing in itself.

[50] Compare 'The object of our perceptions is merely that something of which the conception expresses such a necessity of synthesis' (A. 106, Mah. 200), and 'An object is that in the conception of which the manifold of a given perception is united' (B. 137, M. 84). Cf. also A. 108, Mah. 201.

[51] Kant's position is no doubt explained by the fact that since the object corresponding to our representations is the thing in itself, and since we only know that this is of the same kind in the case of every representation, it can only be thought of as producing systematic unity, and not a unity of a particular kind. The position is also in part due to the fact that the principles of synthesis involved by the phenomenal object are usually thought of by Kant as the categories; these of course can only contribute a general kind of unity, and not the special kind of unity belonging to an individual object.

The position reached by Kant so far is this. Knowledge, as being knowledge of an object, consists in a process by which the manifold of perception acquires relation to an object. This process again is a process of combination of the manifold into a systematic whole upon a definite principle, accompanied by the consciousness in some degree of the act of combination, and therefore also of the acquisition by the manifold of the definite unity which forms the principle of combination. In virtue of this process there is said to be 'unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold', a phrase which the context justifies us in understanding as a condensed expression for a situation in which (1) the manifold of sense is a unity of necessarily related parts, (2) there is _consciousness_ of this unity, and (3) the consciousness which combines and is conscious of combining the manifold, as being necessarily one and the same throughout this process, is itself a unity.

Kant then proceeds to introduce what he evidently considers the keystone of his system, viz. 'transcendental apperception.'

"There is always a transcendental condition at the basis of any necessity. Hence we must be able to find a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our perceptions, and therefore also of the conceptions of objects in general, consequently also of all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our perceptions; for this object is no more than that something, the conception of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis."

"Now this original and transcendental condition is no other than _transcendental apperception_. The consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in internal sense-perception is merely empirical, always changeable; there can be no fixed or permanent self in this stream of internal phenomena, and this consciousness is usually called _internal sense_ or _empirical apperception_. That which is _necessarily_ to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such by means of empirical data. The condition which is to make such a transcendental presupposition valid must be one which precedes all experience, and makes experience itself possible."

"Now no cognitions[52] can occur in us, no combination and unity of them with one another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of perception, and by relation to which alone all representation of objects is possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall call _transcendental apperception_. That it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity, viz. that of _a priori_ conceptions (s.p.a.ce and time) is only possible by relation of perceptions to it. The numerical unity of this apperception therefore forms the _a priori_ foundation of all conceptions, just as the multiplicity of s.p.a.ce and time is the foundation of the perceptions of the sensibility."[53]

[52] _Erkenntnisse._

[53] A. 106-7, Mah. 200-1.

The argument is clearly meant to be 'transcendental' in character; in other words, Kant continues to argue from the existence of knowledge to the existence of its presuppositions. We should therefore expect the pa.s.sage to do two things: firstly, to show what it is which is presupposed by the 'unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold'[54]; and secondly, to show that this presupposition deserves the t.i.tle 'transcendental apperception'. Unfortunately Kant introduces 'transcendental apperception' after the manner in which he introduced the 'sensibility', the 'imagination' and the 'understanding', as if it were a term with which every one is familiar, and which therefore needs little explanation. To interpret the pa.s.sage, it seems necessary to take it in close connexion with the preceding account of the three 'syntheses' involved in knowledge, and to bear in mind that, as a comparison of pa.s.sages will show, the term 'apperception', which Kant borrows from Leibniz, always has for Kant a reference to consciousness of self or self-consciousness. If this be done, the meaning of the pa.s.sage seems to be as follows:

[54] We should have expected this to have been already accomplished. For according to the account already considered, it is we who by our imagination introduce necessity into the synthesis of the manifold and by our understanding become conscious of it. We shall therefore not be surprised to find that 'transcendental apperception' is really only ourselves as exercising imagination and understanding in a new guise.

'To vindicate the existence of a self which is necessarily one and the same throughout its representations, and which is capable of being aware of its own ident.i.ty throughout, it is useless to appeal to that consciousness of ourselves which we have when we reflect upon our successive states. For, although in being conscious of our states we are conscious of ourselves we are not conscious of ourselves as unchanging. The self as going through successive states is changing, and even if in fact its states did not change, its ident.i.ty would be only contingent; it need not continue unchanged. Consequently, the only course possible is to show that the self-consciousness in question is presupposed in any experience or knowledge. Now it is so presupposed. For, as we have already shown, the relation of representations to an object presupposes one consciousness which combines and unifies them, and is at the same time conscious of the ident.i.ty of its own action in unifying them. This consciousness is the ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold.

It may fairly be called transcendental, because even a conception which relates to s.p.a.ce or time, and therefore is the most remote from sensation, presupposes one consciousness which combines and unifies the manifold of s.p.a.ce and time through the conception, and is conscious of the ident.i.ty of its own action in so doing. It may, therefore, be regarded as the presupposition of _all_ conceiving or bringing a manifold under a conception, and therefore of all knowledge. Consequently, since knowledge is possible, i. e. since the manifold of representations can be related to an object, there must be one self capable of being aware of its own ident.i.ty throughout its representations.'

At this point of Kant's argument, however, there seems to occur an inversion of the thought. Hitherto, Kant has been arguing from the possibility of knowledge to the possibility of the consciousness of our own ident.i.ty. But in the next paragraph he appears to reverse this procedure and to argue from the possibility of self-consciousness to the possibility of knowledge.

"But it is just this transcendental unity of apperception[55] which forms, from all possible phenomena which can be together in one experience, a connexion of them according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible, if the mind in the knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the ident.i.ty of the function whereby it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge.

Consequently, the original and necessary consciousness of the ident.i.ty of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions, i. e. according to rules which not only make them necessarily reproducible, but thereby determine an object for their perception, i. e. determine the conception of something in which they are necessarily connected. For the mind could not possibly think the ident.i.ty of itself in the manifold of its representations, and this indeed _a priori_, if it had not before its eyes the ident.i.ty of its action which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible its connexion according to rules."

[55] Kant seems here and elsewhere to use the phrase 'transcendental unity of apperception' as synonymous with 'transcendental apperception', the reason, presumably, being that transcendental apperception is a unity.

The argument seems indisputably to be as follows: 'The mind is necessarily able to be aware of its own ident.i.ty throughout its manifold representations. To be aware of this, it must be aware of the ident.i.ty of the activity by which it combines the manifold of representations into a systematic whole. Therefore it must be capable of combining, and of being conscious of its activity in combining, all phenomena which can be its representations into such a whole. But this process, from the point of view of the representations combined, is the process by which they become related to an object and so enter into knowledge. Therefore, since we are capable of being conscious of our ident.i.ty with respect to all phenomena which can be our representations, the process of combination and consciousness of combination which const.i.tutes knowledge must be possible with respect to them.' Thus the thought of this and the preceding paragraph seems to involve a circle. First the possibility of self-consciousness is deduced from the possibility of knowledge, and then the possibility of knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness.

An issue therefore arises, the importance of which can be seen by reference to the final aim of the 'deduction', viz. the vindication of the categories. The categories are 'fundamental conceptions which enable us to think objects in general[56] for phenomena'[57]; in other words, they are the principles of the synthesis by which the manifold of sense becomes related to an object. Hence, if this be granted, the proof that the categories are applicable to objects consists in showing that the manifold can be subjected to this synthesis. The question therefore arises whether Kant's real starting-point for establis.h.i.+ng the possibility of this synthesis and therefore the applicability of the categories, is to be found in the possibility of knowledge, or in the possibility of self-consciousness, or in both. In other words, does Kant start from the position that all representations must be capable of being related to an object, or from the position that we must be capable of being conscious of our ident.i.ty with respect to all of them, or from both?

[56] _Objecte uberhaupt_, i. e. objects of any kind in distinction not from objects of a particular kind but from no objects at all.

[57] A. 111, Mah. 204

Prima facie the second position is the more plausible basis for the desired conclusion. On the one hand, it does not seem obvious that the manifold _must_ be capable of being related to an object; for even if it be urged that otherwise we should have only 'a random play of representations, less than a dream'[58], it may be replied, that this might be or might come to be the case. On the other hand, the fact that our representations are ours necessarily seems to presuppose that we are identical subjects of these representations, and recognition of this fact is the consciousness of our ident.i.ty.