The Philosophy of Spinoza Part 28

_The Natural Basis of Rational Control_

The greater the number of objects to which an image or emotion is related, the greater is the number of causes by which it can be excited and cherished. All these causes the mind contemplates simultaneously by means of the emotion (by hypothesis), and therefore the more constant is the emotion, or the more frequently does it present itself, and the more does it occupy the mind.

Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common properties of things or what are deduced from them, and consequently are more frequently excited in us; and therefore it is easier for us to contemplate other things together with these which we clearly and distinctly understand than with any others, and consequently it is easier to connect things with these which we clearly and distinctly understand than with any others.

The greater the number of other things with which any image is connected, the more frequently does it present itself. For the greater the number of other things with which an image is connected, the greater is the number of causes by which it may be excited.

There is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct conception and therefore it can cause all the modifications of the body to be related to the idea of G.o.d.

III

_The Function of the Intellectual Order_

The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is to say, which are evil, are evil so far as they hinder the mind from understanding. So long, therefore, as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary to our nature, so long the power of the mind by which it endeavors to understand things is not hindered, and therefore so long does it possess the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing them the one from the other. So long, consequently, do we possess the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect.

Through this power of properly arranging and connecting the modifications of the body we can prevent ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For a greater power is required to restrain emotions which are arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect than is required to restrain those which are uncertain and unsettled. The best thing, therefore, we can do, so long as we lack a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right rule of life, or sure maxims (_dogmata_) of life--to commit these latter to memory, and constantly to apply them to the particular cases which frequently meet us in life, so that our imagination may be widely affected by them, and they may always be ready to hand. For example, amongst the maxims of life we have placed this, that hatred is to be conquered by love or generosity, and is not to be met with hatred in return. But in order that we may always have this prescript of reason in readiness whenever it will be of service, we must think over and often meditate upon the common injuries inflicted by men, and consider how and in what way they may best be repelled by generosity; for thus we shall connect the image of injury with the imagination of this maxim, and it will be at hand whenever an injury is offered to us. If we also continually have regard to our own true profit, and the good which follows from mutual friends.h.i.+p and common fellows.h.i.+p, and remember that the highest peace of mind arises from a right rule of life, and also that man, like other things, acts according to the necessity of Nature, then the injury or the hatred which usually arises from that necessity will occupy but the least part of the imagination, and will be easily overcome: or supposing that the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries is not so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter s.p.a.ce of time than would have been necessary if we had not possessed those maxims on which we had thus meditated beforehand.

Concerning strength of mind, we must reflect in the same way for the purpose of getting rid of fear, that is to say, we must often enumerate and imagine the common dangers of life, and think upon the manner in which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and courage. It is to be observed, however, that in the ordering of our thoughts and images we must always look to those qualities which in each thing are good, so that we may be determined to action always by an emotion of joy.

For example, if a man sees that he pursues glory too eagerly, let him think on its proper use, for what end it is to be followed, and by what means it can be obtained; but let him not think upon its abuse and vanity, and on the inconstancy of men, and things of this sort, about which no one thinks unless through disease of mind. For with such thoughts do those who are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they despair of obtaining the honors for which they are striving; and while they vomit forth rage, wish to be thought wise. Indeed it is certain that those covet glory the most who are loudest in declaiming against its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a peculiarity of the ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are impotent in mind; for we see that a poor and avaricious man is never weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and show to others that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but also the wealth of others. So also a man who has not been well deceived by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women, their faithlessness, and their other oft-proclaimed failing--all of which he forgets as soon as he is taken into favor by his mistress again. He, therefore, who desires to govern his emotions and appet.i.tes from a love of liberty alone will strive as much as he can to know virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with that joy which springs from a true knowledge of them. Least of all will he desire to contemplate the vices of men and disparage men, or to delight in a false show of liberty. He who will diligently observe these things (and they are not difficult), and will continue to practice them, will a.s.suredly in a short s.p.a.ce of time be able for the most part to direct his actions in accordance with the command of reason.

IV

_Summary_

I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies for the emotions, that is to say, everything which the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. It appears therefrom that the power of the mind over the emotions consists--

1. In the knowledge itself of the emotions.

2. In the separation by the mind of the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly.

3. In duration, in which the emotions which are related to objects we understand surpa.s.s those related to objects conceived in a mutilated or confused manner.

4. In the mult.i.tude of causes by which the emotions which are related to the common properties of things or to G.o.d are nourished.

5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its emotions and connect them one with the other.

But that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood, it is to be carefully observed that we call the emotions great when we compare the emotion of one man with that of another, and see that one man is agitated more than another by the same emotion, or when we compare the emotions of one and the same man with one another, and discover that he is affected or moved more by one emotion than by another.

For the power of any emotion is limited by the power of the external cause as compared with our own power. But the power of the mind is limited solely by knowledge, whilst impotence or pa.s.sion is estimated solely by privation of knowledge, or, in other words, by that through which ideas are called inadequate; and it therefore follows that that mind suffers the most whose largest part consists of inadequate ideas, so that it is distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it does, while, on the contrary, that mind acts the most whose largest part consists of adequate ideas, so that although it may possess as many inadequate ideas as the first, it is nevertheless distinguished rather by those which belong to human virtue than by those which are a sign of human impotence. Again, it is to be observed that our sorrows and misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love towards an object which is subject to many changes, and which we can never possess. For no one is troubled or anxious about any object he does not love, neither do wrongs, suspicions, hatreds, etc., arise except from love towards objects of which no one can be truly the possessor.

From all this we easily conceive what is the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge whose foundation is the knowledge itself of G.o.d, possesses over the emotions; the power, namely, by which it is able, in so far as they are pa.s.sions, if not actually to destroy them, at least to make them const.i.tute the smallest part of the mind. Moreover, it begets a love towards an immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers; a love which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common love, but which can always become greater and greater, occupy the largest part of the mind, and thoroughly affect it.

I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to this present life. For any one who will attend to what has been urged will easily be able to see the truth of what I said--that in these few words all the remedies for the emotions are comprehended. It is time, therefore, that I should now pa.s.s to the consideration of those matters which appertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.

CHAPTER XX

OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND

_Human Blessedness: The Intellectual Love of G.o.d_

I

The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of G.o.d to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things; and the more we understand things in this manner, the more we understand G.o.d; and therefore the highest virtue of the mind, that is to say, the power or nature of the mind, or the highest effort, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

The better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of knowledge.

The highest virtue of the mind is to know G.o.d, or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. This virtue is greater the more the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge, and therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge pa.s.ses to the highest human perfection, and consequently is affected with the highest joy, which is accompanied with the idea of himself and his own virtue; and therefore from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind.

The effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise from the second kind of knowledge. This proposition is self-evident. For everything that we clearly and distinctly understand, we understand either through itself or through something which is conceived through itself; or, in other words, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to the third kind of knowledge, cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas, which are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, that is to say, from the second and third kinds of knowledge.

II

Eternity is the very essence of G.o.d, in so far as that essence involves necessary existence. To conceive things therefore under the form of eternity, is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of G.o.d as actually existing things, or in so far as through the essence of G.o.d they involve existence. Therefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and its body under the form of eternity, necessarily has a knowledge of G.o.d, and knows that it is in G.o.d and is conceived through Him.

We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and our delight is accompanied with the idea of G.o.d as its cause.

From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of G.o.d. For from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with the idea of G.o.d as its cause, that is to say, the love of G.o.d, not in so far as we imagine Him as present, but in so far as we understand that He is eternal; and that is what I call the intellectual love of G.o.d.

He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions rejoices, and his joy is attended with the idea of G.o.d, therefore he loves G.o.d, and (by the same reasoning) loves Him better the better he understands himself and his emotions.

This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind, in so far as it is considered, through the nature of G.o.d, as an eternal truth. If there were anything, therefore, contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the truth, and consequently whatever might be able to negate this love would be able to make the true false, which, as is self-evident, is absurd. There exists, therefore, nothing in Nature contrary to this intellectual love, or which can negate it.

III

This love to G.o.d above everything else ought to occupy the mind, for this love is connected with all the modifications of the body, by all of which it is cherished.

The idea of G.o.d which is in us is adequate and perfect, and therefore in so far as we contemplate G.o.d do we act and consequently no sorrow can exist with the accompanying idea of G.o.d; that is to say, no one can hate G.o.d.

Love to G.o.d cannot be turned into hatred. But some may object, that if we understand G.o.d to be the cause of all things, we do for that very reason consider Him to be the cause of sorrow. But I reply, that in so far as we understand the causes of sorrow, it ceases to be a pa.s.sion, that is to say, it ceases to be sorrow; and therefore in so far as we understand G.o.d to be the cause of sorrow do we rejoice.

This love to G.o.d is the highest good which we can seek according to the dictate of reason; is common to all men; and we desire that all may enjoy it. It cannot, therefore, be sullied by the emotion of envy, nor by that of jealousy, but, on the contrary, it must be the more strengthened the more people we imagine to rejoice in it.

It is possible to show in the same manner that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love and able to destroy it, and so we may conclude that this love to G.o.d is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed unless with the body itself. What its nature is, in so far as it is related to the mind alone, we shall see hereafter.

IV

All ideas, in so far as they are related to G.o.d, are true; that is to say, are adequate, and therefore, (by the general definition of the Emotions), G.o.d is free from pa.s.sions. Again, G.o.d can neither pa.s.s to a greater nor to a less perfection, and therefore He cannot be affected with any emotion of joy or sorrow.

He who loves G.o.d cannot strive that G.o.d should love him in return. If a man were to strive after this, he would desire that G.o.d, whom he loves, should not be G.o.d, and consequently he would desire to be sad, which is absurd.