The Philosophy of Spinoza Part 11

I know indeed that there are many who think themselves able to demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and freedom of will both pertain to the nature of G.o.d, for they say that they know nothing more perfect which they can attribute to Him than that which is the chief perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive G.o.d as actually possessing the highest intellect, they nevertheless do not believe that He can bring about that all those things should exist which are actually in His intellect, for they think that by such a supposition they would destroy His power. If He had created, they say, all things which are in His intellect, He could have created nothing more, and this, they believe, does not accord with G.o.d's omnipotence; so then they prefer to consider G.o.d as indifferent to all things, and creating nothing except that which He has decreed to create by a certain absolute will. But I think that I have shown with sufficient clearness that from the supreme power of G.o.d, or from His infinite nature, infinite things in infinite ways, that is to say, all things, have necessarily flowed, or continually follow by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. The omnipotence of G.o.d has therefore been actual from eternity, and in the same actuality will remain to eternity. In this way the omnipotence of G.o.d, in my opinion, is far more firmly established.

My adversaries, indeed (if I may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to deny the omnipotence of G.o.d, inasmuch as they are forced to admit that He has in His mind an infinite number of things which might be created, but which, nevertheless, He will never be able to create, for if He were to create all things which He has in His mind, He would, according to them, exhaust His omnipotence and make Himself imperfect. Therefore, in order to make a perfect G.o.d, they are compelled to make Him incapable of doing all those things to which His power extends, and anything more absurd than this, or more opposed to G.o.d's omnipotence, I do not think can be imagined.

Moreover--to say a word, too, here about the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to G.o.d--if intellect and will pertain to His eternal essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men generally use them, for the intellect and will which could const.i.tute His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could be no further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows: If intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, follow the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it be simultaneous in its nature with them, since G.o.d is prior to all things in causality; but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in G.o.d's intellect. Therefore the intellect of G.o.d, in so far as it is conceived to const.i.tute His essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence,--a truth which seems to have been understood by those who have maintained that G.o.d's intellect, will, and power are one and the same thing.

Since, therefore, G.o.d's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence (as we have already shown), it must necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and existence; for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an eternal truth; and therefore with regard to essence the two men may exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must differ. Consequently if the existence of one should perish, that of the other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be likewise destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with regard to its essence and with regard to its existence. But the intellect of G.o.d is the cause both of the essence and existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of G.o.d, so far as it is conceived to const.i.tute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our intellect in anything except the name, which is what we essayed to prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the will, as any one may easily see for himself.

III

All things which are, are in G.o.d and must be conceived through Him and therefore He is the cause of the things which are in Himself. Moreover, outside G.o.d there can be no substance, that is to say (Def. 3), outside Him nothing can exist which is in itself. G.o.d, therefore, is the immanent, but not the transitive cause of all things.

_The Necessity of All Things_

In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner.... That which has not been thus determined by G.o.d cannot determine itself to action. A thing which has been determined by G.o.d to any action cannot render itself indeterminate.

... All things have necessarily followed from the given nature of G.o.d and from the necessity of His nature have been determined to existence and action in a certain manner. If therefore things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined in another manner to action, so that the order of nature would have been different, the nature of G.o.d might then be different to that which it now is, and hence that different nature would necessarily exist, and there might consequently be two or more G.o.ds, which is absurd. Therefore things could be produced by G.o.d in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have been produced.

Since I have thus shown, with greater clearness, than that of noonday light, that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain in a few words what is to be understood by _contingent_, but, firstly, what is to be understood by _necessary_ and _impossible_.

A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence and definition of the thing itself, or from a given efficient cause. In the same way a thing is said to be impossible either because the essence of the thing itself or its definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause exists determinate to the production of such a thing. But a thing cannot be called contingent unless with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if we actually know that it involves no contradiction, and nevertheless we can affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of causes is concealed from us, that thing can never appear to us either as necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or possible.

From what has gone before it clearly follows that things have been produced by G.o.d in the highest degree of perfection, since they have necessarily followed from the existence of a most perfect nature. Nor does this doctrine accuse G.o.d of any imperfection, but, on the contrary, His perfection has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from its contrary would clearly follow, as I have shown above, that G.o.d is not absolutely perfect, since, if things had been produced in any other fas.h.i.+on, another nature would have had to be a.s.signed to Him, different from that which the consideration of the most perfect Being compels us to a.s.sign to Him. I do not doubt that many will reject this opinion as ridiculous, nor will they care to apply themselves to its consideration, and this from no other reason than that they have been in the habit of a.s.signing to G.o.d another liberty widely different from that absolute will which (Def. 7) we have taught. On the other hand, I do not doubt, if they were willing to study the matter and properly to consider the series of our demonstrations, that they would altogether reject this liberty which they now a.s.sign to G.o.d, not only as of no value, but as a great obstacle to knowledge. Neither is there any need that I should here repeat those things which are said [above][12].

But for the sake of those who differ from me, I will here show that although it be granted that will pertains to G.o.d's essence, it follows nevertheless from His perfection that things could be created in no other mode or order by Him. This it will be easy to show if we first consider that which my opponents themselves admit, that it depends upon the decree and will of G.o.d alone that each thing should be what it is, for otherwise G.o.d would not be the cause of all things. It is also admitted that all G.o.d's decrees were decreed by G.o.d Himself from all eternity, for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy would be proved against Him. But since in eternity there is no _when_ nor _before_ nor _after_, it follows from the perfection of G.o.d alone that He neither can decree nor could ever have decreed anything else than that which He has decreed; that is to say, G.o.d has not existed before His decrees, and can never exist without them. But it is said that although it be supposed that G.o.d had made the nature of things different from that which it is, or that from eternity He had decreed something else about Nature and her order, it would not thence follow that any imperfection exists in G.o.d.

But if this be said, it must at the same time be allowed that G.o.d can change His decrees. For if G.o.d had decreed something about Nature and her order other than that which He has decreed--that is to say, if He had willed and conceived something else about Nature--He would necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those which He now has. And if it be allowed to a.s.sign to G.o.d another intellect and another will without any change of His essence and of His perfection, what is the reason why He cannot now change His decrees about creation and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For His intellect and will regarding created things and their order remain the same in relations.h.i.+p to His essence and perfection in whatever manner His intellect and will are conceived.

Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen admit that there is no such thing as an intellect existing potentially in G.o.d, but only an intellect existing actually. But since His intellect and His will are not distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows from this also that if G.o.d had had another intellect actually and another will, His essence would have been necessarily different, and hence, as I showed at the beginning, if things had been produced by G.o.d in a manner different from that in which they now exist, G.o.d's intellect and will, that is to say, His essence (as has been granted), must have been different, which is absurd.

Since, therefore, things could have been produced by G.o.d in no other manner or order, this being a truth which follows from His absolute perfection, there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe that G.o.d was unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect.

But we shall be told that there is no perfection nor imperfection in things, but that that which is in them by reason of which they are perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or evil depends upon the will of G.o.d alone, and therefore if G.o.d had willed He could have effected that that which is now perfection should have been the extreme of imperfection, and _vice versa_. But what else would this be than openly to affirm that G.o.d, who necessarily understands what He wills, is able by His will to understand things in a manner different from that in which He understands them, which, as I have just shown, is a great absurdity? I can therefore turn the argument on my opponents in this way. All things depend upon the power of G.o.d. In order that things may be differently const.i.tuted, it would be necessary that G.o.d's will should be differently const.i.tuted; but G.o.d's will cannot be other than it is as we have lately most clearly deduced from His perfection. Things therefore cannot be differently const.i.tuted.

I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent G.o.d's will, and affirms that all things depend upon G.o.d's good pleasure, is at a less distance from the truth than the opinion of those who affirm that G.o.d does everything for the sake of the Good. For these seem to place something outside of G.o.d which is independent of Him, to which He looks while He is at work as to a model, or at which He aims as if at a certain mark. This is indeed nothing else than to subject G.o.d to fate, the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of Him whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things as well as of their existence. Therefore it is not worth while that I should waste time in refuting this absurdity.

Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain or rather to recall to recollection, what we mean by _natura naturans_ and what by _natura naturata_. For, from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by _natura naturans_ we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, that is to say, G.o.d in so far as He is considered as a free cause. But by _natura naturata_ I understand everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of G.o.d, or of any one of G.o.d's attributes, that is to say, all the modes of G.o.d's attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in G.o.d, and which without G.o.d can neither be nor can be conceived.

... Individual things are nothing but affections or modes of G.o.d's attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate manner.

_General Conclusions_

I have now explained the nature of G.o.d and its properties. I have shown that He necessarily exists; that He is one G.o.d; that from the necessity alone of His own nature He is and acts; that He is, and in what way He is, the free cause of all things; that all things are in Him, and so depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor can be conceived; and, finally, that all things have been predetermined by Him, not indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but from His absolute nature or infinite power.

Moreover, wherever an opportunity was afforded, I have endeavored to remove prejudices which might hinder the perception of the truth of what I have demonstrated; but because not a few still remain which have been and are now sufficient to prove a very great hindrance to the comprehension of the connection of things in the manner in which I have explained it, I have thought it worth while to call them up to be examined by reason. But all these prejudices which I here undertake to point out depend upon this solely: that it is commonly supposed that all things in Nature, like men, work to some end; and indeed it is thought to be certain that G.o.d Himself directs all things to some sure end, for it is said that G.o.d has made all things for man, and man that he may wors.h.i.+p G.o.d.

This, therefore, I will first investigate by inquiring, firstly, why so many rest in this prejudice, and why all are so naturally inclined to embrace it? I shall then show its falsity, and, finally, the manner in which there have arisen from it prejudices concerning _good_ and _evil_, _merit_ and _sin_, _praise_ and _blame_, _order_ and _disorder_, _beauty_ and _deformity_, and so forth. This, however, is not the place to deduce these things from the nature of the human mind. It will be sufficient if I here take as an axiom that which no one ought to dispute, namely, that man is born ignorant of the causes of things, and that he has a desire, of which he is conscious, to seek that which is profitable to him. From this it follows, firstly, that he thinks himself free because he is conscious of his wishes and appet.i.tes, whilst at the same time he is ignorant of the causes by which he is led to wish and desire, not dreaming what they are; and, secondly, it follows that man does everything for an end, namely, for that which is profitable to him, which is what he seeks. Hence it happens that he attempts to discover merely the final causes of that which has happened; and when he has heard them he is satisfied, because there is no longer any cause for further uncertainty. But if he cannot hear from another what these final causes are, nothing remains but to turn to himself and reflect upon the ends which usually determine him to the like actions, and thus by his own mind he necessarily judges that of another.

Moreover, since he discovers, both within and without himself a mult.i.tude of means which contribute not a little to the attainment of what is profitable to himself--for example, the eyes, which are useful for seeing, the teeth for mastication, plants and animals for nourishment, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish, etc.--it comes to pa.s.s that all natural objects are considered as means for obtaining what is profitable. These too being evidently discovered and not created by man, hence he has a cause for believing that some other person exists, who has prepared them for man's use. For having considered them as means it was impossible to believe that they had created themselves, and so he was obliged to infer from the means which he was in the habit of providing for himself that some ruler or rulers of Nature exist, endowed with human liberty, who have taken care of all things for him, and have made all things for his use. Since he never heard anything about the mind of these rulers, he was compelled to judge of it from his own, and hence he affirmed that the G.o.ds direct everything for his advantage, in order that he may be bound to them and hold them in the highest honor. This is the reason why each man has devised for himself, out of his own brain, a different mode of wors.h.i.+ping G.o.d, so that G.o.d might love him above others, and direct all Nature to the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice.

Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superst.i.tion and has driven deep roots into the mind--a prejudice which was the reason why every one has so eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes of things.

The attempt, however, to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is to say, nothing which is not profitable to man), seems to end in showing that Nature, the G.o.ds, and man are alike mad.

Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst so much in Nature that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are injurious, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed that these things happened either because the G.o.ds were angry because of wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins committed in the method of wors.h.i.+ping them; and although experience daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of examples that both the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have not therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier for a man to place these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant, and thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy the whole superstructure and think out a new one. Hence it was looked upon as indisputable that the judgments of the G.o.ds far surpa.s.s our comprehension; and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics, which does not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics, other causes also might be a.s.signed, which it is superfluous here to enumerate, tending to make men reflect upon these universal prejudices, and leading them to a true knowledge of things.

I have thus sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place to explain. There will now be no need of many words to show that Nature has set no end before herself, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions. For I believe that this is sufficiently evident both from the foundations and causes of this prejudice, as well as from all those propositions in which I have shown that all things are begotten by a certain eternal necessity of Nature and in absolute perfection. Thus much, nevertheless, I will add, that this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause it considers as the effect, and _vice versa_. Again, that which is first in Nature it puts last; and, finally, that which is supreme and most perfect it makes the most imperfect. For, pa.s.sing by the first two a.s.sertions as self-evident, it is plain that that effect is the most perfect which is immediately produced by G.o.d, and in proportion as intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it imperfect. But if things which are immediately produced by G.o.d were made in order that He might obtain the end He had in view, then the last things for the sake of which the first exist, must be the most perfect of all.

Again, this doctrine does away with G.o.d's perfection. For if G.o.d works to obtain an end, He necessarily seeks something of which he stands in need. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the end of want and the end of a.s.similation (_finem indigentiae et finem a.s.similationis_), they confess that G.o.d has done all things for His own sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, because before the creation they can a.s.sign nothing excepting G.o.d for the sake of which G.o.d could do anything; and therefore they are necessarily compelled to admit that G.o.d stood in need of and desired those things for which He determined to prepare means. This is self-evident. Nor is it here to be overlooked that the adherents of this doctrine, who have found a pleasure in displaying their ingenuity in a.s.signing the ends of things, have introduced a new species of argument, not the _reductio ad impossible_, but the _reductio ad ignorantiam_, to prove their position, which shows that it had no other method of defense left.

For, by way of example, if a stone had fallen from some roof on somebody's head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this manner that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not fall for that purpose by the will of G.o.d, how could so many circ.u.mstances concur through chance (and a number often simultaneously do concur)? You will answer, perhaps, that the event happened because the wind blew and the man was pa.s.sing that way. But, they will urge, why did the wind blow at that time, and why did the man pa.s.s that way precisely at the same moment? If you again reply that the wind rose then because the sea on the preceding day began to be stormy, the weather hitherto having been calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will urge again--because there is no end of questioning--But why was the sea agitated? why was the man invited at that time? And so they will not cease from asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly to the will of G.o.d, the refuge for ignorance.

So, also, when they behold the structure of the human body, they are amazed; and because they are ignorant of the causes of such art, they conclude that the body was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural or divine art, and has been formed in such a way so that the one part may not injure the other. Hence it happens that the man who endeavors to find out the true causes of miracles, and who desires as a wise man to understand Nature, and not to gape at it like a fool, is generally considered and proclaimed to be a heretic and impious by those whom the vulgar wors.h.i.+p as the interpreters both of Nature and the G.o.ds. For these know that if ignorance be removed, amazed stupidity, the sole ground on which they rely in arguing or in defending their authority, is taken away also. But these things I leave and pa.s.s on to that which I determined to do in the third place.

After man has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for him, he must in everything adjudge that to be of the greatest importance which is most useful to him, and he must esteem that to be of surpa.s.sing worth by which he is most beneficially affected. In this way he is compelled to form those notions by which he explains Nature; such, for instance, as _good_, _evil_, _order_, _confusion_, _heat_, _cold_, _beauty_, and _deformity_, etc.; and because he supposes himself to be free, notions like those of _praise_ and _blame_, _sin_ and _merit_, have arisen. These latter I shall hereafter explain when I have treated of human nature; the former I will here briefly unfold.

It is to be observed that man has given the name _good_ to everything which leads to health and the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d; on the contrary, everything which does not lead thereto he calls _evil_. But because those who do not understand Nature affirm nothing about things themselves, but only imagine them, and take the imagination to be understanding, they therefore, ignorant of things and their nature, firmly believe an _order_ to be in things; for when things are so placed that if they are represented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them, and consequently easily remember them, we call them well arranged; but if they are not placed so that we can imagine and remember them, we call them badly arranged or _confused_. Moreover, since those things are more especially pleasing to us which we can easily imagine, men therefore prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in Nature apart from our own imagination; and they say that G.o.d has created everything in order, and in this manner they ignorantly attribute imagination to G.o.d, unless they mean perhaps that G.o.d, out of consideration for the human imagination, has disposed things in the manner in which they can most easily be imagined. No hesitation either seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number of things are discovered which far surpa.s.s our imagination, and very many which confound it through its weakness. But enough of this.

The other notions which I have mentioned are nothing but modes in which the imagination is affected in different ways, and nevertheless they are regarded by the ignorant as being specially attributes of things, because, as we have remarked, men consider all things as made for themselves, and call the nature of a thing good, evil, sound, putrid, or corrupt, just as they are affected by it. For example, if the motion by which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye conduces to well-being, the objects by which it is caused are called _beautiful_; while those exciting a contrary motion are called _deformed_. Those things, too, which stimulate the senses through the nostrils are called sweet-smelling or stinking; those which act through the taste are called sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid; those which act through the touch, hard or soft, heavy or light; those, lastly, which act through the ears are said to make a noise, sound, or harmony, the last having caused men to lose their senses to such a degree that they have believed that G.o.d even is delighted with it.

Indeed, philosophers may be found who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions beget a harmony.

All these things sufficiently show that every one judges things by the const.i.tution of his brain, or rather accepts the affections of his imagination in the place of things.[13] It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, as we may observe in pa.s.sing, that all those controversies which we see have arisen amongst men, so that at last skepticism has been the result. For although human bodies agree in many things, they differ in more, and therefore that which to one person is good will appear to another evil, that which to one is well arranged to another is confused, that which pleases one will displease another, and so on in other cases which I pa.s.s by both because we cannot notice them at length here, and because they are within the experience of every one. For every one has heard the expressions: So many heads, so many ways of thinking; Every one is satisfied with his own way of thinking; Differences of brains are not less common than differences of taste;--all which maxims show that men decide upon matters according to the const.i.tution of their brains, and imagine rather than understand things.

If men understood things, they would, as mathematics prove, at least be all alike convinced if they were not all alike attracted. We see, therefore, that all those methods by which the common people are in the habit of explaining Nature are only different sorts of imaginations, and do not reveal the nature of anything in itself, but only the const.i.tution of the imagination; and because they have names as if they were ent.i.ties existing apart from the imagination, I call them ent.i.ties not of the reason but of the imagination. All argument therefore, urged against us based upon such notions can be easily refuted.

Many people, for instance, are accustomed to argue thus:--If all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of G.o.d, how is it that so many imperfections have arisen in Nature--corruption, for instance, of things till they stink; deformity, exciting disgust; confusion, evil, crime, etc.? But, as I have just observed, all this is easily answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because they delight or offend the human senses, or because they are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature. But to those who ask why G.o.d has not created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the dictates of reason alone, I give but this answer: Because to Him material was not wanting for the creation of everything, from the highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they sufficed for the production of everything which can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated.

These are the prejudices which I undertook to notice here. If any others of a similar character remain, they can easily be rectified with a little thought by any one.

FOOTNOTES:

[12] Pp. 132-135.

[13] Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object beheld, as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter, or, if our const.i.tution were different, what now appears beautiful to us would seem misshapen and what we now think misshapen we should regard as beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near; thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to G.o.d, are neither ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that G.o.d has created the world so that it might be beautiful is bound to adopt one of the two alternatives: either that G.o.d created the world for the sake of men's pleasure and eyesight, or else that He created men's pleasure and eyesight for the sake of the world. _From a letter to Hugo Boxel_ (1674).

SECOND PART

ON MAN

_The more things the mind knows, the better it understands its own powers and the order of Nature. The better it understands its own powers, so much the more easily can it direct itself and propose rules to itself. The better, also, it understands the order of Nature, the more easily can it restrain itself from what is useless._

SPINOZA.