Marine_ A Guided Tour Of A Marine Expeditionary Unit Part 11

MPF s.h.i.+p Cla.s.s Characteristics [image]

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The s.h.i.+ps were built to commercial standards, with comfortable accommodations for their small crews. This is important, because they may be deployed for months at remote sites around the world. Each s.h.i.+p has several vehicle/cargo decks, where everything from main battle tanks to cargo containers are stored. These can be rolled off the stern ramp onto a pier, or lifted out by deck cranes. Each MPF s.h.i.+p has a large stowage capacity for fuel and water, and equipment to distill up to 100,000 gallons /377,358 liters of freshwater per day. Finally, each MPSRON has an afloat commodore (usually a senior captain) and staff as the Navy command element.

The MPF conversions took several years to complete, and the s.h.i.+ps a while longer to outfit and equip. Nevertheless, by 1986, they were ready for service. All thirteen were then leased back to the Navy to form three MPSRONs. To support the MPF program, a maintenance facility was established at Blount Island near Jacksonville, Florida. Every thirty months, each s.h.i.+p rotates through Blount Island for a few weeks. All of its equipment and supplies are off-loaded. Then everything is inspected and replaced as required; equipment and vehicles are cleaned and modified to the latest USMC standards. In this way, twelve out of thirteen MPF s.h.i.+ps are always on station with their MPSRONs.

Each squadron is based a few days steaming time from its primary Area of Responsibility (AOR, the diplomatic euphemism for "trouble spot"). Their organizational structure looks like this: The maritime prepositioning s.h.i.+p PFC James Anderson, Jr., PFC James Anderson, Jr., sits alongside at Blount Island near Jacksonville, Fla., prior to her return to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two (MPSRON-2) at Diego Garcia Atoll in the Indian Ocean. sits alongside at Blount Island near Jacksonville, Fla., prior to her return to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two (MPSRON-2) at Diego Garcia Atoll in the Indian Ocean.

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

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MPF s.h.i.+p/Squadron Organization [image]

The Waterman-and AmSea-cla.s.s s.h.i.+ps have roughly the same stowage footprint, while the Maersk-cla.s.s s.h.i.+ps have somewhat less (mostly in the area of containerized cargo). Thus, MPSRON-2 has the five Maersk-cla.s.s Ro-Ro vessels, while MPSRON-1 and -3 each have four of the other types. All vehicles are combat-loaded, fueled, and armed, ready to drive down the stern ramp, directly into battle if necessary.

Just how much stuff does a MPSRON carry? Well, a lot! The following matrix measures the typical loadout for all three MPSRONs. It should be noted that MAGTF equipment and supplies are evenly distributed across the s.h.i.+ps of an MPSRON, so that loss or damage of one s.h.i.+p will not cripple the entire force:

Marine Brigade MAGTAF Personnel/Equipment Matrix [image]

In addition to the equipment stowed on board, there are stocks of rations (lots (lots of MREs!), clothing and individual equipment, fuel and lubricants, construction materials, ammunition, medical and dental supplies, and repair parts. All you need to add is personnel and aircraft. These are flown into a friendly airfield, then "marry up" with the s.h.i.+pborne equipment and supplies. More on this later. of MREs!), clothing and individual equipment, fuel and lubricants, construction materials, ammunition, medical and dental supplies, and repair parts. All you need to add is personnel and aircraft. These are flown into a friendly airfield, then "marry up" with the s.h.i.+pborne equipment and supplies. More on this later.

a.s.sume that a crisis has broken out somewhere in the AOR of an MPSRON, and the national command authorities decide to insert a Marine Brigade MAGTF to stabilize the situation. If a friendly host nation exists (the preferred option), then the MPSRON begins to steam for a port or anchorage where it can unload. If there is no friendly host nation, the next step is a "kick-in-the-door" operation by one of the MEU (SOC)/ARG teams, perhaps with the help of an Army unit like the alert brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. However they are secured, the keys to a successful MPF operation are a ten-thousand-foot/three-thousand-meter runway and a port facility or calm stretch of beach.

Approximately ninety hours prior to the start of unloading, a Navy team flies out to the MPF s.h.i.+ps to help prepare the vehicles and unloading equipment. This includes installing batteries in vehicles and preparing cranes and lighterage. At the same time, ground troops and air units prepare for deployment. The 18,500 Marines deploy on Air Force C-5/17/141 transports, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) airliners, and commercial charter aircraft. The tactical aircraft self deploy with the help of Air Force tanker aircraft, while helicopters are partly disa.s.sembled for s.h.i.+pment on C-5/17/141 transports. All told, it takes about 250 airlift sorties to bring the entire force in, with several dozen additional daily sorties to support the operation once it gets going.

Just prior to the fly-in, the s.h.i.+ps begin unloading. If a port is available, then the vehicles exit off the stern ramps, and their crews take possession and drive them to a.s.sembly areas (or right into combat if the situation is really urgent). Cargo containers are then off-loaded onto trailers or the docks, and the operation is completed. This scenario has been tested in exercises and real-world deployments, and refined down to a science. With a decent port facility, every vehicle can off-load in just eighteen hours, and all the cargo in three days. Following this, the s.h.i.+p remains in harbor only if local fuel and water supplies are not available, or to re-embark everything at the end of the operation.

Things get a little tougher if no port facility is available. To deal with this contingency, called an unload "in-stream," each MPSRON carries landing craft (LCM-8s) and lighterage (floating causeways and barges) to move vehicles and cargo ash.o.r.e. The breakdown of each MPSRON's equipment is shown in the table below:

MPSRON Lighterage/Causeway Equipment [image]

As you might imagine, unloading in-stream is slower than in a port facility. The LCM-8s move heavy vehicles and equipment like tanks and artillery, while the causeways move the rest of the MAGTF's supplies. Also, the stern ramp can be used to launch amphibious tractors like the AAV-7 or AAAV so that they can land under their own power. Under these conditions, it takes about three days to get the vehicles ash.o.r.e, and at least two more days to unload cargo. Each MPF s.h.i.+p is equipped with supply conduits for water and fuel. These floating pipes allow the s.h.i.+ps to stand up to four thousand yards/meters offsh.o.r.e and supply the needs of the MAGTF. This scenario is difficult and dangerous, as it forces the MPF s.h.i.+ps to come close to sh.o.r.e and stay there for the better part of a week. Nevertheless, it may be the only option that puts a sizable entry force into a crisis area.

Since their inception, MPSRONs have been some of the busiest units in the Navy. In the 1990s, MPSRON-2 (based at Diego Garcia) has made three Persian Gulf deployments in response to Iraqi aggression. In 1990, MPSRON-2 delivered the first heavy units and equipment (the 7th MEB and 3rd MAW from California) during Operation Desert s.h.i.+eld. It also provided the first sustained logistical support for Army units flown into Saudi Arabia with almost no supplies or ammunition other than what they carried on their backs. These units drew from the stocks on the MPF s.h.i.+ps, holding the line until follow-on forces and supplies began to arrive in late August 1990. MPSRON-2 deployed to Kuwait in 1994 and 1995, in response to threatening moves by Iraqi forces near Basra. These last two deployments took place less than ten months apart, demonstrating the value of a forward mobile base force like MPF. In addition, individual MPF s.h.i.+ps deployed to support relief and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Somalia. By any standard of success, the MPF has vindicated those who originated the concept some fifteen years ago. At a minimal cost, the U.S. has reversed the downward spiral of crisis-response capability, without requiring permission from foreign governments to conduct operations. It has been quite a bargain.

As we move into the 21st century, the future of maritime prepositioning has never looked better. The Navy/Marine Corps MPF program is going strong and continues to be well funded by Congress. Meanwhile, both the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force have bought their own fleets of prepositioning s.h.i.+ps and are beginning to station them around the world. (Some of the Army MPF forces will share s.p.a.ce at Diego Garcia and Guam with their Navy counterparts.) The Army vessels are larger and have a deeper draft than the Navy MPF s.h.i.+ps, but they were built from the keel up for the job (they are Army-owned rather than leased, like the Navy s.h.i.+ps), and have better vehicle handling facilities. Given the joint nature of military operations these Army and Navy days, it is likely these units will work together in future contingencies.

The future of the Navy MPF program is an open issue. Halfway through their projected thirty-year service life, the leased s.h.i.+ps are in good shape, though it is time to consider eventual replacements. NAVSEA has proposed building a dozen new MPF s.h.i.+ps to replace the existing force around 2015. Another option the Marines are evaluating is called Project Seabase, which would dispense with s.h.i.+ps and build a huge floating base, which could move into a crisis area. With the stowage capacity of an entire MPSRON, it could operate and maintain all of the aircraft and helicopters a.s.signed to the MAGTF. This Mobile Base concept originated with Admiral Bill Owens (the retired Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). He envisioned a series of linked platforms, like those used for oil drilling, that could handle aircraft up to the size of a C-130 Hercules, or even a C-17 Globemaster III. The base's propulsion system would move it at about eight knots, and it would anchor between twenty-five and fifty nm offsh.o.r.e. In this way, the deployed MAGTF would have no need for an airfield and port complex to unload. LCACs, V-22s, and other delivery systems would move units ash.o.r.e, eliminating the need for an MEU (SOC) to make a forcible entry. The problem with this concept is that it would be terribly expensive, probably costing more than a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. A second generation of MPF s.h.i.+ps will probably be the most economical way to sustain our forward-based equipment stocks. Whatever solution is chosen, there can be little doubt that this successful program will continue into the next century. MPF has provided exceptional value to the American taxpayer, and has been a major force in keeping the peace.

The Future: The LPD-17 This chapter has examined s.h.i.+ps that represent an amphibious modernization program conceived over twenty years ago. This program was designed to replace the fleet of amphibious s.h.i.+pping constructed during the 1960s and early 1970s at the height of the Cold War. Despite all of the s.h.i.+pbuilding that we have described thus far, there is still a huge shortfall. This is the cargo footprint currently carried by forty-one s.h.i.+ps of the LST-1179, LKA-113, LSD-36, and LPD-4 cla.s.ses. These s.h.i.+ps, whose average age ranged from twenty-three to twenty-six in 1995, are quickly reaching the end of their service lives. The Navy's answer is a new cla.s.s of twelve s.h.i.+ps, called the LPD-17 cla.s.s, to replace all forty-one s.h.i.+ps that will retire over the next ten years or so.

The LPD-17s will reflect everything the American s.h.i.+pbuilding industry has learned over the last three decades. These twelve s.h.i.+ps (the amphibious "s.h.i.+ps-of the-line" that General Krulak discussed in Chapter 2) will form the insh.o.r.e leg of 21st century ARGs. They will have to be extraordinarily versatile to replace the fleet of older vessels that are going to the sc.r.a.pyard. One measure of this is to compare the tonnage and manning of the old s.h.i.+ps versus the new. The twelve LPD-17s, with a total crew of 5,200 and displacing just 300,000 tons, will replace forty-one s.h.i.+ps with over 13,000 crew and displacing 525,000 tons. Quite a lot to expect from a s.h.i.+p which has not even had its final weapons suite decided. Let's look further.

The Navy views the design of LPD-17 in several ways. Recall the five footprints that I described earlier. The chart below summarizes these in comparison with the LPD-4 cla.s.s they will replace:

LPD-17 vs. LPD-4 [image]

As the chart clearly shows, the LPD-17 cla.s.s will have a significant edge in most of the key footprints that are of concern to the Navy and Marine Corps. Cargo is vastly improved, along with facilities for landing craft and aircraft. While there is a significant decrease in cargo s.p.a.ce, this has been compensated for in the design of the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-cla.s.s Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-cla.s.s (LSD-41/49) landing docks.h.i.+ps. The slight decrease in troop berthing has also been dealt with in the design of other amphibious s.h.i.+ps. The 720 Marine berthing s.p.a.ces provided will be among the most comfortable and s.p.a.cious of any vessel ever built for the Navy. (LSD-41/49) landing docks.h.i.+ps. The slight decrease in troop berthing has also been dealt with in the design of other amphibious s.h.i.+ps. The 720 Marine berthing s.p.a.ces provided will be among the most comfortable and s.p.a.cious of any vessel ever built for the Navy.

About the year 2005, these new s.h.i.+ps will take their place in the ARGs, becoming the standard transport for the seven MEU (SOC) units. The table below shows two notional ARG configurations we might expect to see:

Proposed 21st Century ARG s.h.i.+p Mixes [image]

As you can see, the commanders of an ARG and a MEU (SOC) will get roughly fifty aircraft spots and seven LCACs to support their operations. It should be noted that these two mixes represent minimum ARG capabilities. Other combinations are possible. The LPD-17 will be the insh.o.r.e s.h.i.+p in the ARG, required to go further into harm's way than either the LHA/LHDs or the LSDs. In fact, the LPD-17s will regularly operate about 25 nm/45.7 km offsh.o.r.e, while other s.h.i.+ps in the ARG (the LHAs/LHDs and LSDs) remain 50 to 200 nm/91.4 to 365.8 km out, since their maximum standoff from the target areas is determined by the speed of the LCAC (over 40 kt), and the new MV-22B (over 200 kt). The LPD-17's 25-nm/45.7-km standoff is dictated by the transit speed of the new AAAV. LPD-17 will be the primary platform for the AAAV, while providing facilities for other elements of the ARG and the MEU (SOC). For example, the LPD-17 will be the platform for the MEU (SOC) force of AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters as well as the embarked unit of UAVs. The LPD-17s will also be the lone wolf during "split ARG" operations; functioning as a mini-MEU (SOC), which General Krulak described in Chapter 2. The LPD-17 will become the utility infielder for the 'Gator Navy. Thus, if one of the s.h.i.+ps in the ARG is going to get hit by an enemy attack, the LPD-17 will likely be the target.

The LPD-17 has therefore been designed to be the most defensible and survivable amphibious s.h.i.+p ever built. Structurally, the LPD-17 is going to be the world's toughest wars.h.i.+p per ton. Even the long-ignored threat of mine warfare has been antic.i.p.ated. In the LPD-17 design, NAVSEA has devoted over two hundred tons of structural stiffening to reduce damage from hull "whipping," when an underwater mine goes off nearby. Like Wasp- Wasp-cla.s.s LHDs, the LPD-17 will have a chemical/biological overpressure protection system, improved fire-zone protection, blast-resistant bulkheads, and fragmentation armor topside. The lessons in stealthy shaping gained from the Arleigh Burke Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-cla.s.s destroyers have been applied to the LPD-17. When you study a drawing of the LPD-17, you see that the angles and curves resemble those on the DDG-51, and even the Lockheed F-117A Night Hawk stealth fighter. This is no coincidence; the principles of radar diffraction discussed in (DDG-51)-cla.s.s destroyers have been applied to the LPD-17. When you study a drawing of the LPD-17, you see that the angles and curves resemble those on the DDG-51, and even the Lockheed F-117A Night Hawk stealth fighter. This is no coincidence; the principles of radar diffraction discussed in Fighter Wing Fighter Wing apply to s.h.i.+ps just as well as aircraft. Blankets and coatings of radar-absorbing material will be incorporated into the LPD-17, along with reduced acoustic and infrared signatures. NAVSEA claims that the LPD-17 will have only 1/100th the radar signature of the apply to s.h.i.+ps just as well as aircraft. Blankets and coatings of radar-absorbing material will be incorporated into the LPD-17, along with reduced acoustic and infrared signatures. NAVSEA claims that the LPD-17 will have only 1/100th the radar signature of the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-cla.s.s Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-cla.s.s (LSD-41/49) landing dock s.h.i.+ps. (LSD-41/49) landing dock s.h.i.+ps.

LPD-17 (Notional Configuration) [image]

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A notional top view of the LPD-17 multipurpose amphibious s.h.i.+p. JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER

Another issue is active defensive measures. While the armament package of the LPD-17 cla.s.s is still under study, likely weapons systems have been identified. Up forward, room is allocated for a sixteen-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS), like those on Spruance-cla.s.s Spruance-cla.s.s (DD-963) destroyers, (DD-963) destroyers, Ticonderoga-cla.s.s Ticonderoga-cla.s.s (CG-47) cruisers, (CG-47) cruisers, and Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s and Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s (DDG-51) destroyers. While this would theoretically allow the LPD-17s to fire RIM-66 Standard SAMs and BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, the primary weapons system being considered for the VLS launcher is the new Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). Packaged into four-round launch canisters (for a total of forty-eight ESSM missiles), these will provide the LPD-17 with better anti-air and anti-missile defense than the existing RIM-7 Sea Sparrow. The LPD-17 will probably carry a pair of Ex-31 RAM launchers (each with twenty-one ready missiles) as well as a pair of 20mm CIWS for last-ditch defense against incoming "leaker" missiles and aircraft. Finally, there will probably be a pair of Mk 38 25mm Bushmaster cannon mounts, and mounts for four M2 .50 caliber machine guns to deal with small craft and swimmers (such as enemy frogmen). The LPD-17s will be the most heavily armed amphibious s.h.i.+ps built since World War II. Backing up all this firepower will be a new "Cooperative Engagement Capability" (CEC). When the CEC system is retrofitted to all the s.h.i.+ps in the fleet (aircraft carriers, escorts, amphibs, support s.h.i.+ps, etc.), it will automatically coordinate the employment of every AAW weapon in a group of s.h.i.+ps, right down to the level of point -defense systems like Sea Sparrow and RAM. Backing up the "shooting" defensive systems will be an AN/SLQ-32 (V3) electronic warfare system tied to six Mk 137 SRBOC decoy launchers and an active radar jammer. The LPD-17 will also carry four AN/SLQ-49 "Rubber Duck" decoy launchers, which release an inflatable radar decoy which mimics a s.h.i.+p's radar cross section. With an appropriate escort (such as a DDG-51), the LPD-17 will be very hard to hit and kill. (DDG-51) destroyers. While this would theoretically allow the LPD-17s to fire RIM-66 Standard SAMs and BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, the primary weapons system being considered for the VLS launcher is the new Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). Packaged into four-round launch canisters (for a total of forty-eight ESSM missiles), these will provide the LPD-17 with better anti-air and anti-missile defense than the existing RIM-7 Sea Sparrow. The LPD-17 will probably carry a pair of Ex-31 RAM launchers (each with twenty-one ready missiles) as well as a pair of 20mm CIWS for last-ditch defense against incoming "leaker" missiles and aircraft. Finally, there will probably be a pair of Mk 38 25mm Bushmaster cannon mounts, and mounts for four M2 .50 caliber machine guns to deal with small craft and swimmers (such as enemy frogmen). The LPD-17s will be the most heavily armed amphibious s.h.i.+ps built since World War II. Backing up all this firepower will be a new "Cooperative Engagement Capability" (CEC). When the CEC system is retrofitted to all the s.h.i.+ps in the fleet (aircraft carriers, escorts, amphibs, support s.h.i.+ps, etc.), it will automatically coordinate the employment of every AAW weapon in a group of s.h.i.+ps, right down to the level of point -defense systems like Sea Sparrow and RAM. Backing up the "shooting" defensive systems will be an AN/SLQ-32 (V3) electronic warfare system tied to six Mk 137 SRBOC decoy launchers and an active radar jammer. The LPD-17 will also carry four AN/SLQ-49 "Rubber Duck" decoy launchers, which release an inflatable radar decoy which mimics a s.h.i.+p's radar cross section. With an appropriate escort (such as a DDG-51), the LPD-17 will be very hard to hit and kill.

Program officials at NAVSEA like to call it the "253 s.h.i.+p," because its displacement is around 25,000 tons, and its cargo s.h.i.+p," because its displacement is around 25,000 tons, and its cargo2 and cargo and cargo3 both run around 25,000 ft. The crew and embarked Marines will total around 1,200. The s.h.i.+p will hold a sizable fraction of the ARG's total vehicles, equipment, and supplies. Key features will include: both run around 25,000 ft. The crew and embarked Marines will total around 1,200. The s.h.i.+p will hold a sizable fraction of the ARG's total vehicles, equipment, and supplies. Key features will include: * 1,190 permanent berthing s.p.a.ces.* A fiber-optic computer network using the new super-fast asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) protocol. This replaces tons of copper wire.* A full Landing Force Operations Center, so that the LPD-17 can conduct independent "split ARG" operations.* Over 25,000 cubic feet of cargo stowage s.p.a.ce.* Three full-sized vehicle decks with over 25,000 square feet of vehicle storage s.p.a.ce.* A well deck with room for a pair of LCACs.* A VTOL flight deck with up to four landing spots.* A helicopter hangar with room for two CH-46s, or a single CH-53E or MV-22B As mentioned earlier, the LPD-17 will be among the most comfortable wars.h.i.+ps ever built. This is important when you consider that cruises of over six months are typical of ARG operations. It also will be the first wars.h.i.+p ever designed from the keel up, with facilities for female crew members. This reflects the Navy's "Women at Sea" initiative, and is the biggest cultural change for the Navy since President Truman integrated the armed forces in the late 1940s. Crews of s.h.i.+ps like the amphibs will be between 10% and 25% female. As existing s.h.i.+ps enter their major overhauls, they receive a package of upgrades generically known in the fleet as "Fem Mods." Once they are completed, up to 25% of the crew accommodations can be a.s.signed to women, without disrupting normal s.h.i.+p operations.

As stated earlier, the LPD-17 will be the first U.S. Navy s.h.i.+p with the Women at Sea features designed in from the start. The LPD-17's habitability improvements include: * Berthing in organizational units. For example, the berthing for an entire Marine platoon, including armory and recreation areas, will be together.* Berthing s.p.a.ces for same-s.e.x personnel with attached heads. This will include petty officer/senior non-commissioned officer berthing compartments with only six bunks, and enlisted berthing compartments with just forty-two bunks.* Unis.e.x heads for use by all crew member regardless of their s.e.x. At the time of this writing, no urinals are planned aboard the LPD-17s, though options are still under study. Shower facilities will be segregated.* Medical facilities with heads and examination facilities suitable for both men and women.

While designers and engineers have worked hard to make the LPD-17s good for the people who will be on board, that is not the only customer the Navy has to satisfy. There's the American taxpayer. s.h.i.+ps need to be affordable. Remember, cost overruns are why there are only five LHAs instead of nine. For this reason, LPD-17 program officials are positively vicious about cost containment. On a "per ton" basis, the LPD-17s will be exceptionally economical to build. Current budget projections have the lead s.h.i.+p of the cla.s.s costing $974 million in FY-96 dollars; and later s.h.i.+ps in the cla.s.s are expected to cost between 15% and 20% less. The planned production rate will build the entire cla.s.s of twelve in just eight fiscal years. With the contract going to a single contractor, this should go a long way towards keeping costs under control.

Two teams are competing for the contract. One team has Litton-Ingalls (builder of the LHDs and DDG-51s) and Tenneco-Newport News s.h.i.+pbuilding (nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines), with Hughes GM as the systems integrator. The other team combines General Dynamics-Bath Ironworks (they build DDG-51s) and Avondale (the construction yard for the LSD-41 s/49s), with Loral as systems integrator. The compet.i.tion is already fierce, and given the probable rewards, will become even hotter. Total value of the contract will probably exceed $10 billion. The winning team will be selected in the summer of 1997, with the first unit funded in FY-96, for delivery to the fleet in 2002. After several years of testing, LHD-17 will enter service with an ARG around 2004. Subsequent s.h.i.+ps will be procured, two a year, until all twelve have been built.

At the same time that the Navy is looking at the cost of buying the LPD-17s, it is closely examining the costs of operating them. Not all of the costs are financial. One hidden cost is environmental pollution. No wars.h.i.+p is worth having if it attracts protests every time it goes out to sea. For this reason--and for other, more altruistic ones--the Navy has put major effort into reducing the amount of pollution and waste s.h.i.+ps generate. Current plans have the LPD-17s being powered by medium-speed marine diesels, which are very efficient to operate. But diesels generate pollutants that can damage the ozone layer, so there will be systems to reduce the emission of the LPD-17's power plants. The LPD-17 will also be fitted with several features to reduce adverse environmental impacts. These will include: * Environmental control systems (air-conditioning, refrigeration, etc.) completely free of CFCs that can harm the ozone layer.* Oil-pollution control systems, including an oil/wastewater separator, and no oil drains into the bilges.* A hazardous-materials storage locker, which will allow storage of sixty days worth of such materials. There will be a compactor for the containers.* To reduce the volume of solid waste, there will be a food-waste grinder/pulper. A plastic grinder will be installed, with provisions for storage and recycling of plastic containers.* A series of "Black Water" (sewage) and "Gray Water" (shower runoff, dishwas.h.i.+ng water, etc.) storage tanks, allowing the storage of up to twelve hours worth of such waste, so that sewage dumps can be made in deep water offsh.o.r.e, rather than close insh.o.r.e.

Many of these systems will eventually be retrofitted into older s.h.i.+ps like the Wasp Wasp and the and the Whidbey Island. Whidbey Island. But the LPD-17 will be the first designed from scratch to reflect these new values. Maybe you're thinking that concern for "environmental correctness" outweighed combat capability in the LPD-17's design. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the LPD-17 program manager, Captain Maurice Gauthier, would tell you the Navy is simply coming to the realization that we cannot have a fleet that protects our society and nation while it strangles the planet. Remember that the LPD-17s will probably retire around 2050, long after many of you reading this have pa.s.sed away! Navy/Marine planners have to think a half century or more into the future. But the LPD-17 will be the first designed from scratch to reflect these new values. Maybe you're thinking that concern for "environmental correctness" outweighed combat capability in the LPD-17's design. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the LPD-17 program manager, Captain Maurice Gauthier, would tell you the Navy is simply coming to the realization that we cannot have a fleet that protects our society and nation while it strangles the planet. Remember that the LPD-17s will probably retire around 2050, long after many of you reading this have pa.s.sed away! Navy/Marine planners have to think a half century or more into the future.

A Guided Tour of the 26th MEU (SOC) It had been a rough week for Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady. On June 2nd, 1995, while flying Basher 52, a F-16C Fighting Falcon fighter of the 555th Fighter Squadron (FS) of the 31st Fighter Wing out of Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, his aircraft had been hit by an SA-6 Gainful missile from a Bosnian Serb SAM battery. O'Grady had ejected from the dying aircraft as it fell into the cloud base below, denying his wingman any knowledge of whether he had survived or not. Over the next six days, the young Air Force officer had done a textbook job of escape and evasion, while hoping to reach a friendly aircraft on his rescue radio. Then, the night before, another F-16 from Aviano had finally found him and had stayed overhead until just a short time earlier. After authenticating his true ident.i.ty, the pilot had contacted NATO Allied Forces Southern Region, and told O'Grady to hang tough and there would be someone to get him out soon.

The morning of June 8th, 1995, dawned cool and foggy as O'Grady began his sixth day on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first indication of action came around 6:00 A.M. local time, when a pair of two-seat Marine F/A-18Ds roared over him, fixing his position and setting up top cover for what was about to begin. About this time, the young flyer was probably beginning to wonder just who was coming to get him out. Would it be one of the big MH-53J Pave Low helicopters from the USAF's Special Operations Group escorted by huge AC-130 Combat Talon guns.h.i.+ps? Or would it be a team of Army Rangers, flown in by MH-60K Blackhawks, escorted by AH-60 attack helicopters? Then, the answer came. Through the wet morning fog at around 6:40 A.M. came the familiar "whomp-whomp" sound of twin-bladed helicopters, Marine AH-1W Cobras. Like their menacing namesakes, they surveyed the area around O'Grady, looking for any threat to the rest of the rescue force that was approaching. Overhead, a flight of AV-8B Harrier II attack jets joined the F-18s in covering the operation. Then, after contacting O'Grady on his rapidly dying radio and marking his position with a smoke grenade, they called for the rescue force.

On the ground O'Grady heard the dull roar of helicopters. Big helicopters. Through the wispy ground fog came a pair of Marine CH-53E Super Stallion a.s.sault helicopters, loaded with Marines and Navy corpsmen from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable MEU (SOC). As the first CH-53 flared in for a landing, the 3rd Battalion/8th Marine Regiment's mortar platoon dashed off to set up a security perimeter for the rescue force along with their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gunther. Then, as the second Super Stallion came into land, O'Grady made his move. Wearing a Day-Glo orange "beanie" cap, and clutching his radio and 9mm pistol, he dashed for the second helicopter, and was pulled aboard by the crew chief, Sergeant Scott Pfister. Several minutes later, after retrieving the mortar platoon, Lieutenant Colonel Gunther ordered the two helicopters to lift off and head home.

Inside the second helicopter, O'Grady was being taken care of by more Marines, including the 24th MEU (SOC)'s commander, Colonel Martin Berndt, and his senior NCO, Sergeant Major Angel Castro, Jr. After O'Grady was given some water, part of an MRE, and Colonel Berndt's Gortex parka, he settled in for the ride home. But even this task was to prove an adventure for the young pilot and his rescuers. As the CH-53s and AH-1Ws pa.s.sed near a small town, anti-aircraft and small-arms fire erupted, hitting both transport helicopters. And then three man-portable SA-7 Grail SAMs were fired from below, requiring evasive maneuvering by the four choppers. It didn't take long after that for the airborne task force to break clear of the danger and go "feet wet" over the Adriatic, headed for home aboard the USS Kearsarge Kearsarge (LHD-3). Twenty minutes later, all were safely aboard, and another page had been written into Marine history. (LHD-3). Twenty minutes later, all were safely aboard, and another page had been written into Marine history.

What had saved the young Air Force captain was not a special operations force in the traditional sense. From our experience of movies and television, we tend to think of such forces as supermen, rescuing hostages and "taking down" terrorists in their lairs. Built around clandestine units like the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's SEa-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, these units maintain a low profile and tend to keep out of the public view. The MEU (SOC)s are different. While quite capable, they are not special operations forces per se. On the contrary, they are regular Marine units, drawn from around the Corps, which are given special training to make them capable across a limited but important range of conventional and special operations missions. This distinction is the reason why the MEU (SOC)s have remained independent at a time when most American special operations forces are under the unified command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), located at MacDill AFB near Tampa, Florida.

The story of the MEU (SOC)s is the story of how the Marine Corps has enhanced its ability to make "kickin-the-door" forced entries (i.e. invasions and raids) into enemy territory. This is a lot to ask from just seven battalion-sized units, of which only three or four are deployed on cruise at any particular time. General Krulak likes to call the Marines "the risk force"; the MEU (SOC)s are the diamond-tipped point of that force's spear. As it exists today, the MEU (SOC) can be seen as the evolutionary result of over two millennia of experience in amphibious warfare. More immediately and practically, it is one of the most compact, responsive, and capable military units in the world today, with multiple means of delivering its weapons and personnel onto or even behind an enemy coastline. The MEU (SOC)'s special training gives it versatility across a finite but significant range of possible special missions, including raids, rescues, and security operations. And its ability to plug itself into a variety of "joint" military operations makes it a valuable addition to any military force. Thus, regional CinCs covet a MEU (SOC) whenever they can get one. Finally, because it can be, and usually is, forward-deployed into possible trouble spots along with its own aviation and logistical components, it is fast, mobile, and self-contained. It needs nothing to get the ball rolling on an operation and keep it going for up to fifteen days without external support. So let us look at this unique family of units, and get to know their organizations, missions, and history.

Beginnings: The Road to the MEU (SOC) The beginnings of the MEU (SOC) concept date to just after the end of the Second World War. As early as the late 1940s, the need for forces based close to potential trouble spots was already posing a problem for the U.S. and its Cold War allies. One result was the Marine afloat battalion, which became something of a standard unit in the decades ahead. These were created by using some of the vast amphibious s.h.i.+pping tonnage that had been built up in World War II and a few battalions of the dwindling Marine Corps of the time. Quickly, they began to prove their worth. Each one was a typical Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), with ground, air, and logistical units (or components as they are called), matched together into a fighting team. This turned out to be an excellent idea. In the Taiwan Straits (1957), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1961 and 1962), and the Dominican Republic (1965), the forward-deployed Marine units aboard U.S. Navy s.h.i.+ps were to make themselves felt. Even during the height of the Vietnam War, amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their Marine units aboard prowled the oceans and seas of the world, protecting American interests.

Following the end of the Vietnam war and the rough years of the 1970s, things began to become a bit more regular within the Marine afloat battalions. Redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), they now had a formal headquarters unit, which would then fill out its component parts from regular Marine units from around the Corps. Previously, the units just were thrown together for the duration of their cruise afloat. This move to a formal headquarters structure was more than just cosmetic; it meant that the Corps had begun to consider the MAUs one of their premier MAGTF organizations. Now they would become fully integrated MAGTFs under the command of a full Colonel (O-6), capable of a wider variety of tasks and missions. In fact, with the drawdown of Navy and Marine forces in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration, the compact MAUs aboard their ARGs quickly became the only U.S. military units that could begin to rapidly respond to a crisis around the world.

The coming of the Reagan Administration in 1981 brought the MAUs the opportunity to prove themselves in combat. Initially, the results were decidedly mixed. On the plus side was Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in October 1982. The 22nd MAU provided much of the combat muscle for that operation. Things unfortunately did not go so well for the 24th MAU. Two days before Urgent Fury hit the beaches of Grenada, while it was on "peacekeeping" duty in the war-torn city of Beirut, Lebanon, an Iranian driving a truck bomb wiped out much of the 24th's ground component. Over two hundred Marines were killed in the explosion, which occurred early on a Sunday morning. It today remains one of the worst disasters in U.S. military history, and had a variety of effects on the Marines and their MAUs.

The Beirut disaster and problems in other operations began to show that the Marines had some problems in their combat doctrine. Much like their sister services, who had seen such difficulties following the Vietnam War, the Corps was beginning to experience some serious shortcomings in its ability to carry out even traditional missions like amphibious invasions and raids. Grenada, while successful, had been costly and poorly coordinated. Luckily, the solution to these shortcomings came in the form of a new senior Marine Corps leader, General Alfred M. Gray, who would eventually become the 29th Commandant in 1987. While he was the commander of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), General Gray began his campaign to promote "warfighting" as the primary task of the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s. Much like visionary thinkers in the other services, Gray helped promote the idea that combat was the core ability of the Marines (this earned him the nickname "the warfighter"). What made his effort unusual was that he felt it was not enough just to know how to shoot and blow things up. He urged Marines of all ranks, officer and enlisted, to apply intellectual power as a force multiplier for the Marine ethos. This began to pay immediate benefits. He also promoted the use of the word "expeditionary" to describe the inherent characteristics of Marine units of all sizes. In particular, he pushed renaming the MAUs as MEUs (the E obviously standing for "expeditionary"), to reflect the kinds of missions he wanted the Marine Corps to be ready for.

Along with these intellectual developments, General Gray began to think about the kinds of units that the Marines had formed over the years, and just what kinds of missions each was capable of. One particular kind of mission which had come to be vital in the 1980s was special operations. The failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 had forced all of the services to look at their capabilities in this area. Out of this came a 1983 study that examined what the Marine Corps would need to become a credible player in future low-intensity ("short-of-war") conflicts. Unlike the other services, there was no drive within the USMC to create new and separate special operations units. Instead, it was decided that regular units within the Corps would be given special training prior to a deployment. This would make them "special operations capable" (SOC) across a fixed range of missions and tasks.

In 1984, Marine Corps Headquarters ordered FMFLANT (at the time commanded by General Gray) to put together a program to create a special-operations-capable Marine unit, and deploy it on an ARG for an overseas cruise of some six months duration. General Gray and then-Colonel James Myatt (who eventually rose to the rank of Major General and commanded the 1st Marine Division during Desert Storm), came up with a list of special missions and equipment that they wanted to put into the unit a.s.sembled. Along the way, Gray and Myatt made several key decisions. These included: * FMFLANT would modify one of the MEUs to produce a battalion-sized SOC-capable MAGTF that could carry out the special missions that they had in mind.* They made plans to establish a training and certification program to make sure that every unit would go through a standardized curriculum.* The actual unit, to be called a MEU (SOC), would be given an extra infusion of equipment and personnel to support its expanded mission.

The units for the first MEU (SOC) were taken from a regular MEU, the 26th, preparing for a deployment to the Mediterranean. Personally selected to command the first MEU (SOC) deployment, Colonel Myatt took the 26th out for a six-month cruise in 1986.

Now it should be said that this first MEU (SOC) cruise did not shake the world. The 26th did support the Navy carrier groups that were operating against Libya at the time, and these actions were generally successful. But more importantly, that first MEU (SOC) deployment brought home valuable lessons that were immediately applied to the next cruise, and all the others that followed. Even though actual combat eluded them for the next few years, MEU (SOC)s were nevertheless very active. First combat by a MEU (SOC) occurred on April 18th, 1989, when a strike force of Marines from the 22nd MEU (SOC), was tasked to take part in Operation Preying Mantis. Preying Mantis was a rapid response to the mining, several days earlier, of the USS Samuel B. Roberts Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. The operation was designed to take out several Iranian oil platforms that were being used as targeting bases for attacks against tankers coming down the Gulf. The 22nd, along with several surface-action groups (SAGs) of U.S. wars.h.i.+ps, was tasked to capture and then demolish the platforms, while aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Ten (CVW-10) embarked on USS (FFG-58) by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. The operation was designed to take out several Iranian oil platforms that were being used as targeting bases for attacks against tankers coming down the Gulf. The 22nd, along with several surface-action groups (SAGs) of U.S. wars.h.i.+ps, was tasked to capture and then demolish the platforms, while aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Ten (CVW-10) embarked on USS Enterprise Enterprise (CVN-65) provided cover against Iranian aircraft and s.h.i.+ps. The results were startling. By the end of the day, the oil platforms had been destroyed, and most of the Iranian Navy had either been sunk or disabled. The MEU (SOC) lost one AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter with both of its crew, but it was an impressive combat debut for the new unit, and it went almost unnoticed by the world. (CVN-65) provided cover against Iranian aircraft and s.h.i.+ps. The results were startling. By the end of the day, the oil platforms had been destroyed, and most of the Iranian Navy had either been sunk or disabled. The MEU (SOC) lost one AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter with both of its crew, but it was an impressive combat debut for the new unit, and it went almost unnoticed by the world.

Just fourteen months later, the MEU (SOC)s. .h.i.t their stride, thanks to a rash of crisis situations that erupted in the summer and fall of 1990. The trouble started when a civil war in Liberia escalated. Initially, the 26th MEU (SOC) was sent to handle any possible evacuation of U.S. nationals and emba.s.sy personnel. It had been planned to relieve the 26th with the 22nd MEU (SOC), but the eruption of hostilities in the Persian Gulf in August meant that both units had to stay out to cover both problems. Eventually, the 22nd handled the evacuation, and the 26th went on to support operations in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the 13th MEU (SOC) from the West Coast was rapidly moving into position in the Persian Gulf, supporting maritime embargo operations and acting as a floating reserve for the 1st MEF in Saudi Arabia. Then, in December of 1990, with the eruption of the civil war in Somalia, heliborne Marines from the amphibious group in the Persian Gulf conducted an evacuation from the American emba.s.sy in Mogadishu.

The period following Desert Storm has been a busy one for the MEU (SOC)s. In Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia, they have led the way for American efforts and forces. In the case of our pullout from Mogadishu, they have even covered our withdrawal from a dangerous and risky situation. Given their level of activity over the past ten years, it is amazing that it took the O'Grady rescue to bring them any sort of public notice. Despite the lack of public credit, the MEU (SOC) deployments are going along like clockwork. Originally, the MEU (SOC) effort was limited to just one such unit on each coast, but no more. Because of the desires of the regional CinCs to have at least one of them available for any crisis that might arise, all the MEUs are being given SOC certification before they are deployed on cruise. The O'Grady rescue just highlights the many desirable qualities of these unique units, and provides a jumping off point for our own explorations of them. So follow us, and we'll show you how they work, and are put together.

The MEU (SOC) Concept From early raids on British forts during the Revolutionary War to the emba.s.sy evacuations and rescues of today, when you have trouble that needs to be taken care of good and fast, you call the Marines. Every branch of the military has special operations forces, and these sometimes overlap. So how does a small and underfunded service like the Marine Corps justify such a capability, both from a financial as well as inst.i.tutional point of view? The Marines' answer: a hybrid, dual-purpose special operations/amphibious unit, the MEU (SOC). To repeat, the MEU (SOC) is based upon the concept that given special training and equipment, regular units can be made capable of accomplis.h.i.+ng both their normal duties and extraordinary missions. This notion runs contrary to the "snake-eater" tradition of the many special operations units around the world. For most of these, including the British Special Air Service (SAS), the U.S. Army Delta Force, and the German GSG-9, selection is limited to the physical and mental elite of a particular service. These are highly specialized units, lavishly expensive to create and operate, with a strong focus on hostage rescue and counter-insurgency warfare. Consequently, the leaders of their nations tend to view special operations units with the same kind of restraint and reserve they might have toward nuclear weapons. You only use them when you really need to, and when you do, you open yourself up to an extreme level of political risk. This is the reason why you see such limited use of special operations units, and why so many of them tend to hang around inside their compounds, practicing and waiting.

As a matter of fact, several of the most significant and remarkable special operations missions in history did not not involve actual, purpose-built special operations forces. During World War II, for example, the famous bombing mission on Tokyo by then-Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle and his raiders was accomplished by personnel and aircraft drawn from regular Army Air Corps bomber units. Thanks to several months of special training, as well as special modifications to their B-25 Mitch.e.l.l bombers, they made history on April 18th, 1942, as the first force to bomb j.a.pan during the war. Also in World War II, a regular British unit, given special training and equipment, was responsible for the less well known but equally valorous action at Pegasus Bridge on D-Day. On the night of June 5th/6th, 1944, a specially trained gliderborne unit, Company "D," drawn from the Oxfords.h.i.+re and Buckinghams.h.i.+re Light Infantry (the "Ox and Bucks") of the 6th Airborne Division, conducted a involve actual, purpose-built special operations forces. During World War II, for example, the famous bombing mission on Tokyo by then-Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle and his raiders was accomplished by personnel and aircraft drawn from regular Army Air Corps bomber units. Thanks to several months of special training, as well as special modifications to their B-25 Mitch.e.l.l bombers, they made history on April 18th, 1942, as the first force to bomb j.a.pan during the war. Also in World War II, a regular British unit, given special training and equipment, was responsible for the less well known but equally valorous action at Pegasus Bridge on D-Day. On the night of June 5th/6th, 1944, a specially trained gliderborne unit, Company "D," drawn from the Oxfords.h.i.+re and Buckinghams.h.i.+re Light Infantry (the "Ox and Bucks") of the 6th Airborne Division, conducted a coup de coup de main on a pair of vital bridges over the Orne River and Caen Ca.n.a.l. The tiny force, led by the charismatic Major John Howard, took the bridges and held them until relieved by British commandos coming inland on D-Day. Finally, there was the Entebbe Raid. A Palestinian terrorist group held a number of hostages from a hijacked French Airbus in a terminal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The raid was designed to release and retrieve them. As soon as the crisis started, the Israeli Defense Force formed an ad hoc rescue force out of various regular paratroop units. On July 4th, 1976, after a long flight on a picked force of C-130 Hercules transports, the rescuers a.s.saulted the terminal and freed the hostages with minimal losses--in the process killing most of the terrorists. Again, a clearly defined goal, supported by extremely strong leaders.h.i.+p, led to success in a special operation by "pick up" units with special training. Such units, given the time and training, can achieve wonders. And because they are drawn from regular units, they are cheaper to run and less expensive to risk. main on a pair of vital bridges over the Orne River and Caen Ca.n.a.l. The tiny force, led by the charismatic Major John Howard, took the bridges and held them until relieved by British commandos coming inland on D-Day. Finally, there was the Entebbe Raid. A Palestinian terrorist group held a number of hostages from a hijacked French Airbus in a terminal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The raid was designed to release and retrieve them. As soon as the crisis started, the Israeli Defense Force formed an ad hoc rescue force out of various regular paratroop units. On July 4th, 1976, after a long flight on a picked force of C-130 Hercules transports, the rescuers a.s.saulted the terminal and freed the hostages with minimal losses--in the process killing most of the terrorists. Again, a clearly defined goal, supported by extremely strong leaders.h.i.+p, led to success in a special operation by "pick up" units with special training. Such units, given the time and training, can achieve wonders. And because they are drawn from regular units, they are cheaper to run and less expensive to risk.

The official emblem of the 26th MEU (SOC).

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The MEU (SOC) joins the responsiveness and professionalism of a task-specific special operations force with the costs and success records of specially trained, ad hoc special operations units. Composed of regular units from around the Marine Corps, the MEU (SOC) is a MAGTF based around a reinforced rifle battalion, with the special training and equipment that makes it capable of a limited number of special operations missions. One of the interesting characteristics of MEU (SOC)s is that they are not composed of the same units every time they go out on a cruise. Since they are formed from battalion landing teams (BLTs), medium Marine helicopter squadrons (HMMs), MEU service support groups (MSSGs), and ARGs, the various components can be mixed and matched as required. And since their special operations capability is layered on top of their existing conventional amphibious/heliborne capabilities, the MEU (SOC)s are actually quite a bargain for the taxpayers. Finally, and this may be the greatest benefit of all, they can be forward-deployed and based aboard their own ARG, requiring little or no approval from foreign governments or allies for their use. Given the frustrations that such foreign interference has caused in the past, this probably provides the American national command authorities all the justification required to continue operating and maintaining the seven MEU (SOC)s.

History and Structure: The 26th MEU (SOC) Though the 26th was the first MEU (SOC) to go out on cruise in 1985--it was known then as a MAU (SOC)--the luck of the draw has not been kind to it...if luck means getting involved like other MEU (SOC)s in something flashy. Nevertheless, in the years since it first took the concept out for its first test, the 26th has done yeo-man work. Over the last decade, the 26th has supported evacuation operations from Liberia and been stationed off the coast of Somalia.

Colonel James Battaglini on August 29th, 1995, as he prepared to lead the deployment of the 26th MEU (SOC) to the Mediterranean.

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

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As the 26th was headed into its training and workup cycle in the winter of 1994/95, it acquired a new commanding officer (CO) to act as its brain, father, and caretaker. The new CO, Colonel James R. Battaglini, is an imposing figure; his mere presence in a room, on a deck, or in a landing zone (LZ) is enough to tell you that the boss has arrived and is in charge. A tall, lean man with a hard look in his eyes, Colonel Battaglini loves his Marines more than almost anything else in his life. A native of Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., a graduate of Mount Saint Mary's College, and a holder of two master's degrees (in management and national security studies), he can talk about the merits of satellite communications systems at one moment, and tell you his opinions of nonlethal weapons doctrine in the next. As he rose up the chain in the Corps, he commanded virtually every kind of Marine unit from a reconnaissance platoon to the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment (1/8), during its 1991/92 deployment with the 22nd MEU (SOC). Along the way, he picked up a Bronze Star for valor in combat during Desert Storm. Backing up Colonel Battaglini is his senior enlisted advisor, Sergeant Major W. R. Creech, himself a veteran of over twenty years in the Corps.

What Battaglini and Creech were putting together for a six-month Mediterranean cruise in 1995 was a team built of many interlocking components. Like all other deployed Marine forces, the MEU (SOC) is built along the cla.s.sic MAGTF structure. And like all expeditionary units deployed by the Corps, it has ground, aviation, and logistical components. The essential parts of this structure are: * Command Element (CE) Command Element (CE)--This is a company-sized (28 officers, 186 enlisted) unit which provides the leaders.h.i.+p, command, control, and communications for the entire MEU (SOC). The 26th MEU (SOC) CE is based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

The organization of the 26th MEU (SOC). The three components (ground, air, and support) are standard to all Marine MAGTFs. JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER[image] * * Ground Combat Element (GCE)-- Ground Combat Element (GCE)--The GCE is a reinforced battalion landing team (BLT--54 officers, 1,178 enlisted), designed to fit in the limited s.p.a.ce aboard a three-s.h.i.+p ARG. For the 1995/96 26th MEU (SOC) deployment, the GCE was built around the 2nd BLT of the 6th Marine Regiment (2/6). This unit is part of the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.* Aviation Combat Element (ACE)-- Aviation Combat Element (ACE)--A MEU (SOC) ACE is composed of a reinforced medium Marine helicopter squadron (HMM--55 officers, 263 enlisted), made up of a mix of CH-46 Sea Knights, CH-53E Super Stallions, AH-1W Cobras, UH-1N Iroquois, and AV-8B Harrier IIs. In addition, the MEU (SOC) can be reinforced with a land-based force of KC-130 Hercules airborne tankers. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s ACE is built around HMM-264, which is based at the Marine Corps Air Station at New River, North Carolina (adjacent to Camp Lejeune). The Harrier detachment is drawn from Marine Corps Attack Squadron 231 (VMA-231) at MACS Cherry Point, North Carolina.* Combat Service Support Element (CSSE)-- Combat Service Support Element (CSSE)--The CSSE is a company-sized unit (13 officers, 234 enlisted), composed of a series of eight platoons covering areas such as supply, engineering, transport, maintenance, and medical services. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s CSSE is MEU Service Support Group 26 (MSSG-26), which is also based at Camp Lejeune.

These four elements, the CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE, make up an MEU (SOC) MAGTF like the 26th. In addition, each MEU (SOC) commander gets to tailor the unit's structure to match the planned mission and his own operational style. Frequently, these modifications and additions are based upon suggestions and lessons learned from the MEU (SOC)s ahead of them in the rotation schedule. For example, while the 26th was working up in the summer of 1995, they were taking to heart the lessons from the 22nd MEU (SOC), which had just returned, and Marty Berndt's 24th MEU (SOC), which was then on cruise out in the Mediterranean. Out of the 24th's experiences (such as the O'Grady rescue) came the suggestion that the 26th's ACE be enlarged with additional CH-53E Super Stallion and AH-1W Cobra helicopters, to support possible evacuation operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now let us take a look at each of the 26th MEU (SOC)'s individual complements and see what gives this little unit such a big bite.

Leaders.h.i.+p: The 26th MEU (SOC) Headquarters The Command Element of the 26th MEU (SOC), headed by Colonel Battaglini, is composed of a traditional U.S. military executive staff structure. The Executive Officer, or XO, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher "Fletch" W. Ferguson, Jr., coordinates and supervises the executive staff. In the 26th MEU (SOC), he is also the Commanding Officer of Troops aboard the ARG flags.h.i.+p, and is the Officer in Charge of the Forward Command Element. The MEU (SOC) Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major William Creech, performs those duties which generally pertain to discipline, welfare, conduct, morale, and leaders.h.i.+p of the enlisted personnel. The rest breaks down like this: * S-1-Adjutant: S-1-Adjutant: This is the personnel and administrative section, and is headed by Captain Daniel McDyre. This is the personnel and administrative section, and is headed by Captain Daniel McDyre.* S-2-Intelligence: S-2-Intelligence: Headed by Major Phil Gentile, the MEU (SOC) intelligence section has staff responsibility for matters pertaining to weather, enemy, and terrain within the MEU (SOC)'s area of operations. It determines the intelligence requirements and directs the effort for collection of information. It then processes information into intelligence and disseminates it to those who need to know. It is augmented with the following detachments: Headed by Major Phil Gentile, the MEU (SOC) intelligence section has staff responsibility for matters pertaining to weather, enemy, and terrain within the MEU (SOC)'s area of operations. It determines the intelligence requirements and directs the effort for collection of information. It then processes information into intelligence and disseminates it to those who need to know. It is augmented with the following detachments:* An Interrogator Translator Team detachment that provides enhanced human intelligence support through the interrogation, debriefing, and screening of those personnel with intelligence value.* A Force Imagery Interpreter Unit detachment that provides limited imagery interpretation support.* A Counterintelligence Team detachment that provides counterintelligence support.* A Topographic Platoon detachment that provides limited cartography and terrain-model-building capability.* A Radio Battalion detachment that provides an enhanced capability for signal intelligence collection, a.n.a.lysis, and electronic warfare. A radio reconnaissance team capability is included for advanced tactical employment during selected operations.* S-3--Training and Operations: S-3--Training and Operations: When augmented with the attachments joining the MEU (SOC), this is the largest section in the Command Element. Headed by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lauer, the S-3 has the responsibility for matters pertaining to organization, training, and tactical operations. The S-3 operates the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) aboard the ARG flags.h.i.+p. Upon activation of the MEU, it is augmented with the following attachments: When augmented with the attachments joining the MEU (SOC), this is the largest section in the Command Element. Headed by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lauer, the S-3 has the responsibility for matters pertaining to organization, training, and tactical operations. The S-3 operates the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) aboard the ARG flags.h.i.+p. Upon activation of the MEU, it is augmented with the following attachments:* A Force Reconnaissance Company detachment.* An Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) detachment consisting of two supporting arms liaison teams and a firepower control team.* A detachment from the Marine Air Control Group with a Marine Air Support Squadron detachment and the Low Alt.i.tude Air Defense (LAAD) Battery detachment that provides low-level, close-in air defense. The LAAD battery is composed of two of the new Avenger SAM vehicles. Composed of an HMMWV cha.s.sis with eight Stinger SAMs and a .50-caliber machine gun, it is a potent point-defense a.s.set. In addition, there are three manpack Stinger teams, each of which is transported by an HMMWV.* S-4--Logistics: S-4--Logistics: This is the section responsible for all logistics matters and the combat service support functions of supply, maintenance, embarkation, medical/dental care, pa.s.senger and freight transportation, landing support, material handling, food services, and financial management. The S-4, headed by Major Dennis Arinello, operates the Tactical Logistics Center (TACLOG) aboard the ARG flags.h.i.+p. This is the section responsible for all logistics matters and the combat service support functions of supply, maintenance, embarkation, medical/dental care, pa.s.senger and freight transportation, landing support, material handling, food services, and financial management. The S-4, headed by Major Dennis Arinello, operates the Tactical Logistics Center (TACLOG) aboard the ARG flags.h.i.+p.* S-6--Communications: S-6--Communications: This section plans, coordinates, and operates the communications and automated data-processing systems for the MEU (SOC). Headed by Captain James Dillon, the S-6 supervises cryptographic operations, operates the Landing Force Communications center, provides radio operators for the LFOC, and publishes and disseminates the Communications Electronics Operating Instruction(s) for the MEU (SOC). It includes a Communications Battalion detachment that provides command and control communications for execution of all operations. This section plans, coordinates, and operates the communications and automated data-processing systems for the MEU (SOC). Headed by Captain James Dillon, the S-6 supervises cryptographic operations, operates the Landing Force Communications center, provides radio operators for the LFOC, and publishes and disseminates the Communications Electronics Operating Instruction(s) for the MEU (SOC). It includes a Communications Battalion detachment that provides command and control communications for execution of all operations.

As might be imagined, the MEU (