The Gathering Storm Part 18

After this sombre interlude, of the gravity of which we were all conscious, we came back to the Scandinavian tangle. The Prime Minister explained the position with clarity. We had landed thirteen thousand men at Namsos and Andalsnes without loss. Our forces had pushed forward farther than had been expected. On finding that the direct attack on Trondheim would demand a disproportionate amount of naval force, it had been decided to make a pincer movement from the north and south instead. But in the last two days these new plans had been rudely interrupted by a heavy air attack on Namsos. As there had been no anti-aircraft fire to oppose them, the Germans had bombed at will. Meanwhile, all German naval vessels at Narvik had been destroyed. But the German troops there were strongly fortified, so that it had not yet been possible to attack them by land. If our first attempt did not succeed, it would be renewed.

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About Central Norway, Mr. Chamberlain said that the British Command were anxious to reinforce the troops who had gone there, to protect them against the German advance from the south, and to co-operate subsequently in the capture of Trondheim. It was already certain that reinforcements would be required. Five thousand British, seven thousand French, three thousand Poles, three British mechanised battalions, one British light-tank battalion, three French light divisions, and one British Territorial division were to be available in the near future. The limitation would not be the number of troops provided, but the number that could be landed and maintained in the country. M. Reynaud said that four French light divisions would be sent.

I now spoke for the first time at any length in these conferences, pointing out the difficulties of landing troops and stores in the face of enemy aircraft and U-boats. Every single s.h.i.+p had to be convoyed by destroyers, every landing-port continuously guarded by cruisers or destroyers, not only during the landing, but till ack-ack guns could be mounted ash.o.r.e. So far the Allied s.h.i.+ps had been extraordinarily lucky and had sustained very few hits. The tremendous difficulties of the operation would be understood. Although thirteen thousand men had now been safely landed, the Allies had as yet no established bases, and were operating inland with weak and slender lines of c.u.mmunication, practically unprovided with artillery or supporting aircraft. Such was the position in Central Norway.

At Narvik the Germans were less strong, the port far less exposed to air attack, and once the harbour had been secured, it would be possible to land at a very much faster rate. Any forces which could not be landed at ports farther south should go to Narvik. Among the troops a.s.signed to the Narvik operation, or indeed in Great Britain, there were none able to move across country in heavy snow. The task at Narvik would be not only to free the harbour and the town, nor even to clear the whole district of Germans, but to advance up the railway to the Swedish frontier in strength commensurate with any further German designs. It was the considered view of the British Command that this could be done without slowing down the rate of landing at other ports beyond the point to which it was already restricted by the difficulties described.

We were all in full agreement on the unpleasantness of our plight and the little we could do at the moment to better it. The Supreme War Council agreed that the immediate military objectives should be: (a) The capture of Trondheim, and(b) the capture of Narvik, and the concentration of an adequate Allied force on the Swedish frontier.

The next day we talked about the dangers to the Dutch and Belgians and their refusal to take any common measures with us. We were very conscious that Italy might declare war upon us at any time, and various naval measures were to be concerted in the Mediterranean between Admiral Pound and Admiral Darlan. To this meeting General Sikorski also was invited. He declared his ability to const.i.tute a force of a hundred thousand men within a few months. Active steps were also being taken to recruit a Polish division in the United States.

At this meeting it was agreed also that if Germany invaded Holland the Allied armies should at once advance into Belgium without further approaches to the Belgian Government; and that the R.A.F. could bomb the German marshalling-yards and the oil refineries in the Ruhr.

When we got back from the Conference, I was so much concerned at the complete failure, not only of our efforts against the enemy, but of our method of conducting the war, that I wrote as follows to the Prime Minister: Being anxious to sustain you to the best of my ability, I must warn you that you are approaching a head-on smash in Norway.I am very grateful to you for having at my request taken over the day-to-day management of the Military Co-ordination [Committee], etc. I think I ought, however, to let you know that I shall not be willing to receive that task back from you without the necessary powers. At present no one has the power. There are six Chiefs [and Deputy Chiefs] of the Staff, three Ministers, and General Ismay, who all have a voice in Norwegian operations (apart from Narvik). But no one is responsible for the creation and direction of military policy except yourself. If you feel able to bear this burden, you may count upon my unswerving loyalty as First Lord of the Admiralty. If you do not feel you can bear it, with all your other duties, you will have to delegate your powers to a deputy who can concert and direct the general movement of our war action, and who will enjoy your support and that of the War Cabinet unless very good reason is shown to the contrary.

Before I could send it off, I received a message from the Prime Minister saying that he had been considering the position of Scandinavia and felt it to be unsatisfactory. He asked me to call on him that evening at Downing Street after dinner to discuss the whole situation in private.

I have no record of what pa.s.sed at our conversation, which was of a most friendly character. I am sure I put the points in my unsent letter, and that the Prime Minister agreed with their force and justice. He had every wish to give me the powers of direction for which I asked, and there was no kind of personal difficulty between us. He had, however, to consult and persuade a number of important personages, and it was not till May 1 that he was able to issue the following note to the Cabinet and those concerned.

May 1 1, 1940. 1940.I have been examining, in consultation with the Ministers in charge of the service departments, the existing arrangements for the consideration and decision of defence questions, and I circulate for the information of my colleagues a memorandum describing certain modifications which it has been decided to make in these arrangements forthwith. The modifications have been agreed to by the three Service Ministers. With the approval of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Major-General H. L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O., has been appointed to the post of Senior Staff Officer in charge of the Central Staff which, as indicated in the memorandum, is to be placed at the disposal of the First Lord. Major-General Ismay has been nominated, while serving in this capacity, an additional member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. N. C.

Defence OrganisationIn order to obtain a greater concentration of the direction of the war, the following modifications of present arrangements will take effect.The First Lord of the Admiralty will continue to take the chair at all meetings of the Military Co-ordination Committee at which the Prime Minister does not preside himself, and in the absence of the Prime Minister will act as his deputy at such meetings on all matters delegated to the Committee by the War Cabinet.He will be responsible on behalf of the Committee for giving guidance and directions to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and for this purpose it will be open to him to summon that Committee for personal consultation at any time when he considers it necessary.The Chiefs of Staff will retain their responsibility for giving their collective views to the Government and, with their respective staffs, will prepare plans to achieve any objectives indicated to them by the First Lord on behalf of the Military Co-ordination Committee, and will accompany their plans by such comments as they consider appropriate.The Chiefs of Staff, who will in their individual capacity remain responsible to their respective Ministers, will at all times keep their Ministers informed of their conclusions.Where time permits, the plans of the Chiefs of Staff, with their comments and any comments by the First Lord, will be circulated for approval to the Military Co-ordination Committee, and unless the Military Co-ordination Committee is authorised by the War Cabinet to take final decision, or in the case of disagreement on the Military Co-ordination Committee, circulated to the War Cabinet.In urgent cases it may be necessary to omit the submission of plans to a formal meeting of the Committee, but in such cases the First Lord will no doubt find means of consulting the Service Ministers informally, and in the case of dissent, the decision will be referred to the Prime Minister.In order to facilitate the general plan outlined above and to afford a convenient means of maintaining a close liaison between the First Lord and the Chiefs of Staff, the First Lord will be a.s.sisted by a suitable central staff (distinct from the Admiralty Staff) under a senior staff officer who will be an additional member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

I accepted this arrangement, which seemed a marked improvement. I could now convene and preside over the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, without whom nothing could be done, and I was made responsible formally "for giving guidance and direction" to them. General Ismay, the senior staff officer in charge of the Central Staff, was placed at my disposal as my staff officer and representative, as my staff officer and representative, and in this capacity was made a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I had known Ismay for many years, but now for the first time we became hand-and-glove, and much more. Thus the Chiefs of Staff were to a large extent made responsible to me in their collective capacity, and as a deputy of the Prime Minister I could nominally influence with authority their decisions and policies. On the other hand, it was only natural that their primary loyalties should be to their own Service Ministers, who would have been less than human if they had not felt some resentment at the delegation of a part of their authority to one of their colleagues. Moreover, it was expressly laid down in the memorandum that my responsibilities were to be discharged and in this capacity was made a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I had known Ismay for many years, but now for the first time we became hand-and-glove, and much more. Thus the Chiefs of Staff were to a large extent made responsible to me in their collective capacity, and as a deputy of the Prime Minister I could nominally influence with authority their decisions and policies. On the other hand, it was only natural that their primary loyalties should be to their own Service Ministers, who would have been less than human if they had not felt some resentment at the delegation of a part of their authority to one of their colleagues. Moreover, it was expressly laid down in the memorandum that my responsibilities were to be discharged on behalf of on behalf of the Military Co-ordination Committee. I was thus to have immense responsibilities, without effective power in my own hands to discharge them. Nevertheless, I had a feeling that I might be able to make the new organisation work. It was destined to last only a week. But my personal and official connection with General Ismay and his relation to the Chiefs of Staff Committee was preserved unbroken and unweakened from May 1, 1940, to July 27, 1945, when I laid down my charge. the Military Co-ordination Committee. I was thus to have immense responsibilities, without effective power in my own hands to discharge them. Nevertheless, I had a feeling that I might be able to make the new organisation work. It was destined to last only a week. But my personal and official connection with General Ismay and his relation to the Chiefs of Staff Committee was preserved unbroken and unweakened from May 1, 1940, to July 27, 1945, when I laid down my charge.

It is now necessary to recount the actual course of the fighting for Trondheim. Our northern force from Namsos was eighty miles from the town; and our southern force from Andalsnes was one hundred and fifty miles away. The central attack through the fiord ("Hammer") had been abandoned, partly through fear of its cost and partly through hopes of the flanking movements. Both these movements now failed utterly. The Namsos force, commanded by Carton de Wiart, hastened forward in accordance with his instructions against the Norwegian snow and the German air. A brigade reached Verdal, fifty miles from Trondheim, at the head of the fiord, on the nineteenth. It was evident to me, and I warned the staffs, that the Germans could send in a single night a stronger force by water from Trondheim to chop them. This occurred two days later. Our troops were forced to withdraw some miles to where they could hold the enemy. The intolerable snow conditions, now sometimes in thaw, and the fact that the Germans who had come across the inner fiord were like us dest.i.tute of wheeled transport, prevented any serious fighting on the ground; and the small number of scattered troops plodding along the road offered little target to the unresisted air power. Had Carton de Wiart known how limited were the forces he would have, or that the central attack on Trondheim had been abandoned a vital point of which our staff machinery did not inform him he would no doubt have made a more methodical advance. He acted in relation to the main objective as it had been imparted to him.

In the end, nearly everybody got back exhausted, chilled, and resentful to Namsos, where the French Cha.s.seur Brigade had remained; and Carton de Wiart, whose opinion on such issues commanded respect, declared that there was nothing for it but evacuation. Preparations for this were at once made by the Admiralty. On April 28, the evacuation of Namsos was ordered. The French contingent would re-embark before the British, leaving some of their ski troops to work with our rear guard. The probable dates for leaving were the nights of the first and second of May. Eventually the withdrawal was achieved in a single night. All the troops were re-embarked on the night of the third, and were well out to sea when they were sighted by the German air reconnaissance at dawn. From eight o'clock in the morning to three in the afternoon, wave after wave of enemy bombers attacked the wars.h.i.+ps and the transports. We were lucky that no transport was. .h.i.t, as no British air forces were available to protect the convoy. The French destroyer Bison, Bison, and H.M.S. and H.M.S. Afridi, Afridi, which carried our rear guard, were "sunk fighting to the end." which carried our rear guard, were "sunk fighting to the end."

A different series of misfortunes befell the troops landed at Andalsnes; but here at least we took our toll of the enemy. In response to urgent appeals from General Ruge, the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier Morgan's 148th Infantry Brigade had hastened forward as far as Lillehammer. Here it joined the tired-out battered Norwegian forces whom the Germans, in the overwhelming strength of three fully equipped divisions, were driving before them along the road and railway from Oslo towards Dombas and Trondheim. Severe fighting began. The s.h.i.+p carrying Brigadier Morgan's vehicles, including all artillery and mortars, had been sunk, but his young Territorials fought well with their rifles and machine-guns against the German vanguards, who were armed not only with 5.9 howitzers, but many heavy mortars and some tanks. On April 24, the leading battalion of the 15th Brigade arriving from France reached the crumbling front. General Paget, who commanded these regular troops, learned from General Ruge that the Norwegian forces were exhausted and could fight no more until they had been thoroughly rested and re-equipped. He, therefore, a.s.sumed control, brought the rest of this brigade into action as fast as they arrived, and faced the Germans with determination in a series of spirited engagements. By the adroit use of the railway, which fortunately remained unbroken, Paget extricated his own troops, Morgan's Brigade, which had lost seven hundred men, and some Norwegian units. For one whole day the bulk of the British force hid in a long railway tunnel fed by their precious supply train, and were thus completely lost to the enemy and his all-seeing air. After fighting five rear-guard actions, in several of which the Germans were heavily mauled, and having covered over a hundred miles, he reached the sea again at Andalsnes. This small place, like Namsos, had been flattened out by bombing; but by the night of May 1, the 15th Brigade, with what remained of Morgan's 148th Brigade, had been taken on board British cruisers and destroyers and reached home without further trouble. General Paget's skill and resolution during these days opened his path to high command as the war developed.

A forlorn, gallant effort to give support from the air should be recorded. The only landing-"ground" was the frozen lake of Lesjeskogen, forty miles from Andalsnes. There a squadron of Gladiators, flown from the Glorious, Glorious, arrived on April 24. They were at once heavily attacked. The Fleet air arm did their best to help them; but the task of fighting for existence, of covering the operations of two expeditions two hundred miles apart, and of protecting their bases, was too much for a single squadron. By April 26, it could fly no more. Long-range efforts by British bombers, working from England, were also unavailing. arrived on April 24. They were at once heavily attacked. The Fleet air arm did their best to help them; but the task of fighting for existence, of covering the operations of two expeditions two hundred miles apart, and of protecting their bases, was too much for a single squadron. By April 26, it could fly no more. Long-range efforts by British bombers, working from England, were also unavailing.

Our withdrawal enforced by local events had conformed to the decision already taken by the War Cabinet on the advice of the Military Co-ordination Committee with the Prime Minister presiding. We had all come to the conclusion that it was beyond our power to seize and hold Trondheim. Both claws of the feeble pincers were broken. Mr. Chamberlain announced to the Cabinet that plans must be made for evacuating our forces both from Namsos and Andalsnes, though we should in the meanwhile continue to resist the German advance. The Cabinet was distressed at these proposals, which were, however, inevitable.

In order to delay to the utmost the northward advance of the enemy towards Narvik, we were now sending special companies raised in what was afterwards called "Commando" style, under an enterprising officer, Colonel Gubbins, to Mosjoen, one hundred miles farther up the coast. I was most anxious that a small part of the Namsos force should make their way in whatever vehicles were available along the coastal road to Grong. Even a couple of hundred would have sufficed to fight small rear-guard actions. From Grong they would have to find their way on foot to Mosjoen. I hoped by this means to gain the time for Gubbins to establish himself so that a stand could be made against the very small numbers which the enemy could as yet send there. I was repeatedly a.s.sured that the road was impa.s.sable. General Ma.s.sy from London sent insistent requests. It was replied that even a small party of French Cha.s.seurs, with their skis, could not traverse this route. "It was [seemed] evident," wrote General Ma.s.sy a few days later in his dispatch, "that if the French Cha.s.seurs could not retire along this route, the Germans could not advance along it.... This was an error, as the Germans have since made full use of it and have advanced so rapidly along it that our troops in Mosjoen have not had time to get properly established, and it is more than likely that we shall not be able to hold the place." This proved true. The destroyer Ja.n.u.s Ja.n.u.s took a hundred Cha.s.seurs Alpins and two light A.A. guns round by sea, but they left again before the Germans came. took a hundred Cha.s.seurs Alpins and two light A.A. guns round by sea, but they left again before the Germans came.

We have now pursued the Norwegian campaign to the point where it was overwhelmed by gigantic events. The superiority of the Germans in design, management, and energy were plain. They put into ruthless execution a carefully prepared plan of action. They comprehended perfectly the use of the air arm on a great scale in all its aspects. Moreover, their individual ascendancy was marked, especially in small parties. At Narvik a mixed and improvised German force, barely six thousand strong, held at bay for six weeks some twenty thousand Allied troops, and though driven out of the town lived to see them depart. The Narvik attack, so brilliantly opened by the Navy, was paralysed by the refusal of the military commander to run what was admittedly a desperate risk. The division of our resources between Narvik and Trondheim was injurious to both our plans. The abandonment of the central thrust on Trondheim wears an aspect of vacillation in the British High Command for which, not only the experts, but the political chiefs who yielded too easily to their advice, must bear a burden. At Namsos there was a muddy waddle forward and back. Only in the Andalsnes expedition did we bite. The Germans traversed in seven days the road from Namsos to Mosjoen, which the British and French had declared impa.s.sable. At Bodo and Mo, during the retreat of Gubbins' force to the north, we were each time just too late, and the enemy, although they had to overcome hundreds of miles of rugged, snow-clogged country, drove us back in spite of gallant episodes. We, who had the command of the sea and could pounce anywhere on an undefended coast, were outpaced by the enemy moving by land across very large distances in the face of every obstacle. In this Norwegian encounter, our finest troops, the Scots and Irish Guards, were baffled by the vigour, enterprise, and training of Hitler's young men.

We tried hard, at the call of duty, to entangle and embed ourselves in Norway. We thought Fortune had been cruelly against us. We can now see that we were well out of it. Meanwhile, we had to comfort ourselves as best we might by a series of successful evacuations. Failure at Trondheiml Stalemate at Narvikl Such in the first week of May were the only results we could show to the British nation, to our Allies, and to the neutral world, friendly or hostile. Considering the prominent part I played in these events and the impossibility of explaining the difficulties by which we had been overcome, or the defects of our staff and governmental organisation and our methods of conducting war, it was a marvel that I survived and maintained my position in public esteem and parliamentary confidence. This was due to the fact that for six or seven years I had predicted with truth the course of events, and had given ceaseless warnings, then unheeded but now remembered.

"Twilight War" ended with Hitler's a.s.sault on Norway. It broke into the glare of the most fearful military explosion so far known to man. I have described the trance in which for eight months France and Britain had been held while all the world wondered. This phase proved most harmful to the Allies. From the moment when Stalin made terms with Hitler, the Communists in France took their cue from Moscow and denounced the war as "an imperialist and capitalist crime against democracy." They did what they could to undermine morale in the Army and impede production in the workshops. The morale of France, both of her soldiers and her people, was now in May markedly lower than at the outbreak of war.

Nothing like this happened in Britain, where Soviet-directed Communism, though busy, was weak. Nevertheless, we were still a Party Government, under a Prime Minister from whom the Opposition was bitterly estranged, and without the ardent and positive help of the trade-union movement. The sedate, sincere, but routine character of the Administration did not evoke that intense effort, either in the governing circles or in the munition factories, which was vital. The stroke of catastrophe and the spur of peril were needed to call forth the dormant might of the British nation. The tocsin was about to sound.

16.

Norway: The Final Phase

Immediate a.s.sault on Narvik Abandoned - The Landings in May - General Auchinleck Appointed to the Chief Military Command - The Capture of the Town, May 28 - 28 - The Battle in France Dominates All - Evacuation - The Homeward Convoys - Apparition of the German Battle Cruisers - The Loss of the "Glorious" and "Ardent" - The Story of the "Acasta" - Air Attack on German s.h.i.+ps at Trondheim - One Solid Result - The German Fleet Ruined. The Battle in France Dominates All - Evacuation - The Homeward Convoys - Apparition of the German Battle Cruisers - The Loss of the "Glorious" and "Ardent" - The Story of the "Acasta" - Air Attack on German s.h.i.+ps at Trondheim - One Solid Result - The German Fleet Ruined.

IN DEFIANCE OF CHRONOLOGY, it is well to set forth here the end of the Norwegian episode.

After April 16, Lord Cork was compelled to abandon the idea of an immediate a.s.sault. A three hours' bombardment on April 24, carried out by the battles.h.i.+p Warspite Warspite and three cruisers, was not effective in dislodging the garrison. I had asked the First Sea Lord to arrange for the replacement of the and three cruisers, was not effective in dislodging the garrison. I had asked the First Sea Lord to arrange for the replacement of the Warspite Warspite by the less valuable by the less valuable Resolution, Resolution, which was equally useful for bombarding purposes. Meanwhile, the arrival of French and Polish troops, and still more the thaw, encouraged Lord Cork to press his attack on the town. The new plan was to land at the head of the fiord beyond Narvik and thereafter to attack Narvik across Rombaks Fiord. The 24th Guards Brigade had been drawn off to stem the German advance from Trondheim: but by the beginning of May, three battalions of Cha.s.seurs Alpins, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, four Polish battalions, and a Norwegian force of about thirty-five hundred men were available. The enemy had for their part been reinforced by portions of the 3d Mountain Division, which had either been brought by air from southern Norway or smuggled in by rail from Sweden. which was equally useful for bombarding purposes. Meanwhile, the arrival of French and Polish troops, and still more the thaw, encouraged Lord Cork to press his attack on the town. The new plan was to land at the head of the fiord beyond Narvik and thereafter to attack Narvik across Rombaks Fiord. The 24th Guards Brigade had been drawn off to stem the German advance from Trondheim: but by the beginning of May, three battalions of Cha.s.seurs Alpins, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, four Polish battalions, and a Norwegian force of about thirty-five hundred men were available. The enemy had for their part been reinforced by portions of the 3d Mountain Division, which had either been brought by air from southern Norway or smuggled in by rail from Sweden.

The first landing, under General Mackesy, took place on the night of May 12/13 at Bjerkvik, with very little loss. General Auchinleck, whom I had sent to command all the troops in Northern Norway, was present and took charge the next day. His instructions were to cut off the iron-ore supplies and to defend a foothold in Norway for the King and his Government. The new British commander naturally asked for very large additions to bring his force up to seventeen battalions, two hundred heavy and light anti-aircraft guns, and four squadrons of airplanes. It was only possible to promise about half these requirements.

But now tremendous events became dominant. On May 24, in the crisis of shattering defeat, it was decided, with almost universal agreement, that we must concentrate all we had in France and at home. The capture of Narvik had, however, to be achieved both to ensure the destruction of the port and to cover our withdrawal. The main attack on Narvik across Rombaks Fiord was begun on May 27 by two battalions of the Foreign Legion and one Norwegian battalion under the able leaders.h.i.+p of General Bethouart. It was entirely successful. The landing was effected with practically no loss and the counter-attack beaten off. Narvik was taken on May 28. The Germans, who had so long resisted forces four times their strength, retreated into the mountains, leaving four hundred prisoners in our hands.

We now had to relinquish all that we had won after such painful exertions. The withdrawal was in itself a considerable operation, imposing a heavy burden on the Fleet, already fully extended by the fighting both in Norway and in the Narrow Seas. Dunkirk was upon us, and all available light forces were drawn to the south. The battle fleet must itself be held in readiness to resist invasion. Many of the cruisers and destroyers had already been sent south for anti-invasion duties. The Commander-in-Chief had at his disposal at Scapa the capital s.h.i.+ps Rodney, Valiant, Renown, Rodney, Valiant, Renown, and and Repulse. Repulse. These had to cover all contingencies. These had to cover all contingencies.

Good progress in evacuation was made at Narvik, and by June 8 all the troops, French and British, amounting to twenty-four thousand men, together with large quant.i.ties of stores and equipment, were embarked and sailed in three convoys without hindrance from the enemy, who indeed now amounted on sh.o.r.e to no more than a few thousand scattered, disorganised, but victorious individuals. During these last days valuable protection was afforded against the German air force, not only by naval aircraft, but by a sh.o.r.e-based squadron of Hurricanes. This squadron had been ordered to keep in action till the end, destroying their aircraft if necessary. However, by their skill and daring these pilots performed the unprecedented feat their last of flying their Hurricanes on board the carrier Glorious, Glorious, which sailed with the which sailed with the Ark Royal Ark Royal and the main body. and the main body.

To cover all these operations, Lord Cork had at his disposal, in addition to the carriers, the cruisers Southampton Southampton and and Coventry Coventry and sixteen destroyers, besides smaller vessels. The cruiser and sixteen destroyers, besides smaller vessels. The cruiser Devons.h.i.+re Devons.h.i.+re was meanwhile embarking the King of Norway and his staff from Tromso, and was therefore moving independently. Lord Cork informed the Commander-in-Chief of his convoy arrangements, and asked for protection against possible attack by heavy s.h.i.+ps. Admiral Forbes dispatched the was meanwhile embarking the King of Norway and his staff from Tromso, and was therefore moving independently. Lord Cork informed the Commander-in-Chief of his convoy arrangements, and asked for protection against possible attack by heavy s.h.i.+ps. Admiral Forbes dispatched the Valiant Valiant on June 6, to meet the first convoy of troops.h.i.+ps and escort it north of the Shetlands and then return to meet the second. Despite all other preoccupations he had intended to use his battle cruisers to protect the troops.h.i.+ps. On June 5, reports had reached him of two unknown s.h.i.+ps apparently making for Iceland, and later of an enemy landing there. He, therefore, felt compelled to send his battle cruisers to investigate these reports, which proved to be false. Thus, on this unlucky day our available forces in the North were widely dispersed. The movement of the Narvik convoys and their protection followed closely the method pursued without mishap during the past six weeks. It had been customary to send transports and wars.h.i.+ps, including aircraft carriers, over this route, with no more than anti-submarine escort. No activity by German heavy s.h.i.+ps had hitherto been detected. Now, having repaired the damage they had suffered in the earlier encounters, they suddenly appeared off the Norwegian coast. on June 6, to meet the first convoy of troops.h.i.+ps and escort it north of the Shetlands and then return to meet the second. Despite all other preoccupations he had intended to use his battle cruisers to protect the troops.h.i.+ps. On June 5, reports had reached him of two unknown s.h.i.+ps apparently making for Iceland, and later of an enemy landing there. He, therefore, felt compelled to send his battle cruisers to investigate these reports, which proved to be false. Thus, on this unlucky day our available forces in the North were widely dispersed. The movement of the Narvik convoys and their protection followed closely the method pursued without mishap during the past six weeks. It had been customary to send transports and wars.h.i.+ps, including aircraft carriers, over this route, with no more than anti-submarine escort. No activity by German heavy s.h.i.+ps had hitherto been detected. Now, having repaired the damage they had suffered in the earlier encounters, they suddenly appeared off the Norwegian coast.

The battle cruisers Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Gneisenau, Gneisenau, with the cruiser with the cruiser Hipper Hipper and four destroyers, left Kiel on June 4, with the object of attacking s.h.i.+pping and bases in the Narvik area and thus providing relief for what was left of their landed forces. No hint of our intended withdrawal reached them till June 7. On the news that British convoys were at sea, the German Admiral decided to attack them. Early the following morning, the eighth, he caught a tanker with a trawler escort, an empty troops.h.i.+p and four destroyers, left Kiel on June 4, with the object of attacking s.h.i.+pping and bases in the Narvik area and thus providing relief for what was left of their landed forces. No hint of our intended withdrawal reached them till June 7. On the news that British convoys were at sea, the German Admiral decided to attack them. Early the following morning, the eighth, he caught a tanker with a trawler escort, an empty troops.h.i.+p Orama, Orama, and the hospital s.h.i.+p and the hospital s.h.i.+p Atlantis. Atlantis. He respected the immunity of the He respected the immunity of the Atlantis. Atlantis. All the rest were sunk. That afternoon the All the rest were sunk. That afternoon the Hipper Hipper and the destroyers returned to Trondheim, but the battle cruisers, continuing their search for prey, were rewarded when at 4 and the destroyers returned to Trondheim, but the battle cruisers, continuing their search for prey, were rewarded when at 4 P.M P.M. they sighted the smoke of the aircraft carrier Glorious, Glorious, with her two escorting destroyers, the with her two escorting destroyers, the Acasta Acasta and and Ardent. Ardent. The The Glorious Glorious had been detached early that morning to proceed home independently owing to shortage of fuel, and by now was nearly two hundred miles ahead of the main convoy. This explanation is not convincing. The had been detached early that morning to proceed home independently owing to shortage of fuel, and by now was nearly two hundred miles ahead of the main convoy. This explanation is not convincing. The Glorious Glorious had enough fuel to steam at the speed of the convoy. All should have kept together. had enough fuel to steam at the speed of the convoy. All should have kept together.

The action began about 4.30 P.M P.M. at over twenty-seven thousand yards. At this range the Glorious, Glorious, with her four-inch guns, was helpless. Efforts were made to get her torpedo-bombers into the air, but before this could be done, she was. .h.i.t in the forward hangar, and a fire began which destroyed the Hurricanes and prevented torpedoes being got up from below for the bombers. In the next half-hour she received staggering blows which deprived her of all chance of escape. By 5.20 she was listing heavily, and the order was given to abandon s.h.i.+p. She sank about twenty minutes later. with her four-inch guns, was helpless. Efforts were made to get her torpedo-bombers into the air, but before this could be done, she was. .h.i.t in the forward hangar, and a fire began which destroyed the Hurricanes and prevented torpedoes being got up from below for the bombers. In the next half-hour she received staggering blows which deprived her of all chance of escape. By 5.20 she was listing heavily, and the order was given to abandon s.h.i.+p. She sank about twenty minutes later.

Meanwhile, her two destroyers behaved n.o.bly. Both made smoke in an endeavour to screen the Glorious, Glorious, and both fired their torpedoes at the enemy before being overwhelmed. The and both fired their torpedoes at the enemy before being overwhelmed. The Ardent Ardent was soon sunk. The story of the was soon sunk. The story of the Acasta, Acasta, now left alone at hopeless odds, has been told by the sole survivor, Leading-Seaman C. Carter: now left alone at hopeless odds, has been told by the sole survivor, Leading-Seaman C. Carter: On board our s.h.i.+p, what a deathly calm, hardly a word spoken, the s.h.i.+p was now steaming full speed away from the enemy, then came a host of orders, prepare all smoke floats, hose-pipes connected up, various other jobs were prepared, we were still steaming away from the enemy, and making smoke, and all our smoke floats had been set going. The Captain then had this message pa.s.sed to all positions: "You may think we are running away from the enemy, we are not, our chummy s.h.i.+p [Ardent] has sunk, the has sunk, the Glorious Glorious is sinking, the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all." We then altered course into our own smoke-screen. I had the order stand by to fire tubes 6 and 7, we then came out of the smokescreen, altered course to starboard firing our torpedoes from port side. It was then I had my first glimpse of the enemy, to be honest it appeared to me to be a large one [s.h.i.+p] and a small one, and we were very close, I fired my two torpedoes from my tubes [aft], the foremost tubes fired theirs, we were all watching results. I'll never forget that cheer that went up; on the port bow of one of the s.h.i.+ps a yellow flash and a great column of smoke and water shot up from her. We knew we had hit, personally I could not see how we could have missed so close as we were. The enemy never fired a shot at us, I feel they must have been very surprised. After we had fired our torpedoes we went back into our own smoke-screen, altered course again to starboard. "Stand by to fire remaining torpedoes"; and this time as soon as we poked our nose out of the smoke-screen, the enemy let us have it. A sh.e.l.l hit the engine-room, killed my tubes' crew, I was blown to the after end of the tubes, I must have been knocked out for a while, because when I came to, my arm hurt me; the s.h.i.+p had stopped with a list to port. Here is something, believe it or believe it not, I climbed back into the control seat, I see those two s.h.i.+ps, I fired the remaining torpedoes, no one told me to, I guess I was raving mad. G.o.d alone knows why I fired them, but I did. The is sinking, the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all." We then altered course into our own smoke-screen. I had the order stand by to fire tubes 6 and 7, we then came out of the smokescreen, altered course to starboard firing our torpedoes from port side. It was then I had my first glimpse of the enemy, to be honest it appeared to me to be a large one [s.h.i.+p] and a small one, and we were very close, I fired my two torpedoes from my tubes [aft], the foremost tubes fired theirs, we were all watching results. I'll never forget that cheer that went up; on the port bow of one of the s.h.i.+ps a yellow flash and a great column of smoke and water shot up from her. We knew we had hit, personally I could not see how we could have missed so close as we were. The enemy never fired a shot at us, I feel they must have been very surprised. After we had fired our torpedoes we went back into our own smoke-screen, altered course again to starboard. "Stand by to fire remaining torpedoes"; and this time as soon as we poked our nose out of the smoke-screen, the enemy let us have it. A sh.e.l.l hit the engine-room, killed my tubes' crew, I was blown to the after end of the tubes, I must have been knocked out for a while, because when I came to, my arm hurt me; the s.h.i.+p had stopped with a list to port. Here is something, believe it or believe it not, I climbed back into the control seat, I see those two s.h.i.+ps, I fired the remaining torpedoes, no one told me to, I guess I was raving mad. G.o.d alone knows why I fired them, but I did. The Acasta's Acasta's guns were firing the whole time, even firing with a list on the s.h.i.+p. The enemy then hit us several times, but one big explosion took place right aft, I have often wondered whether the enemy hit us with a torpedo, in any case it seemed to lift the s.h.i.+p out of the water. At last the Captain gave orders to abandon s.h.i.+p. I will always remember the Surgeon Lieutenant, guns were firing the whole time, even firing with a list on the s.h.i.+p. The enemy then hit us several times, but one big explosion took place right aft, I have often wondered whether the enemy hit us with a torpedo, in any case it seemed to lift the s.h.i.+p out of the water. At last the Captain gave orders to abandon s.h.i.+p. I will always remember the Surgeon Lieutenant,1 his first s.h.i.+p, his first action. Before I jumped over the side, I saw him still attending to the wounded, a hopeless task, and when I was in the water I saw the Captain leaning over the bridge, take a cigarette from a case and light it. We shouted to him to come on our raft, he waved "Good-bye and good luck" the end of a gallant man. his first s.h.i.+p, his first action. Before I jumped over the side, I saw him still attending to the wounded, a hopeless task, and when I was in the water I saw the Captain leaning over the bridge, take a cigarette from a case and light it. We shouted to him to come on our raft, he waved "Good-bye and good luck" the end of a gallant man.

Thus perished 1,474 officers and men of the Royal Navy and forty-one of the Royal Air Force. Despite prolonged search, only thirty-nine were rescued and brought in later by a Norwegian s.h.i.+p. In addition, six men were picked up by the enemy and taken to Germany. The Scharnhorst, Scharnhorst, heavily damaged by the heavily damaged by the Acasta's Acasta's torpedo, made her way to Trondheim. torpedo, made her way to Trondheim.

While this action was going on, the cruiser Devons.h.i.+re, Devons.h.i.+re, with the King of Norway and his Ministers, was about a hundred miles to the westward. The with the King of Norway and his Ministers, was about a hundred miles to the westward. The Valiant Valiant coming north to meet the convoy was still a long way off. The only message received from the coming north to meet the convoy was still a long way off. The only message received from the Glorious Glorious was corrupt and barely intelligible, which suggests that her main wireless equipment was broken from an early stage. The was corrupt and barely intelligible, which suggests that her main wireless equipment was broken from an early stage. The Devons.h.i.+re Devons.h.i.+re alone received this message, but as its importance was not apparent she did not break wireless silence to pa.s.s it on, as to do so would have involved serious risk of revealing her position, which in the circ.u.mstances was highly undesirable. Not until the following morning were suspicions aroused. Then the alone received this message, but as its importance was not apparent she did not break wireless silence to pa.s.s it on, as to do so would have involved serious risk of revealing her position, which in the circ.u.mstances was highly undesirable. Not until the following morning were suspicions aroused. Then the Valiant Valiant met the met the Atlantis, Atlantis, who informed her of the loss of the who informed her of the loss of the Orama Orama and that enemy capital s.h.i.+ps were at sea. The and that enemy capital s.h.i.+ps were at sea. The Valiant Valiant signalled the information and pressed on to join Lord Cork's convoy. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Forbes, at once proceeded to sea with the only s.h.i.+ps he had, the signalled the information and pressed on to join Lord Cork's convoy. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Forbes, at once proceeded to sea with the only s.h.i.+ps he had, the Rodney, Rodney, the the Renown, Renown, and six destroyers. and six destroyers.

The damage inflicted on the Scharnhorst Scharnhorst by the heroic by the heroic Acasta Acasta had important results. The two enemy battle cruisers abandoned further operations and returned at once to Trondheim. The German High Command were dissatisfied with the action of their admiral in departing from the objective which had been given him. They sent the had important results. The two enemy battle cruisers abandoned further operations and returned at once to Trondheim. The German High Command were dissatisfied with the action of their admiral in departing from the objective which had been given him. They sent the Hipper Hipper out again; but it was then too late. out again; but it was then too late.

On the tenth, Admiral Forbes ordered the Ark Royal Ark Royal to join him. Reports showed that enemy s.h.i.+ps were in Trondheim and he hoped to make an air attack. This was delivered by R.A.F. bombers on the eleventh without effect. On the following morning, fifteen Skuas from the to join him. Reports showed that enemy s.h.i.+ps were in Trondheim and he hoped to make an air attack. This was delivered by R.A.F. bombers on the eleventh without effect. On the following morning, fifteen Skuas from the Ark Royal Ark Royal made a dive-bombing attack. Enemy reconnaissance gave warning of their approach, and no fewer than eight were lost. To add one last misfortune to our tale, it is now known that one bomb from a Skua struck the made a dive-bombing attack. Enemy reconnaissance gave warning of their approach, and no fewer than eight were lost. To add one last misfortune to our tale, it is now known that one bomb from a Skua struck the Scharnhorst, Scharnhorst, but failed to explode. but failed to explode.

Whilst these tragedies were in progress, the Narvik convoys pa.s.sed on safely to their destinations, and the British campaign in Norway came to an end.

From all this wreckage and confusion there emerged one fact of major importance potentially affecting the whole future of the war. In their desperate grapple with the British Navy, the Germans ruined their own, such as it was, for the impending climax. The Allied losses in all this sea-fighting off Norway amounted to one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, one sloop, and nine destroyers. Six cruisers, two sloops, and eight destroyers were disabled, but could be repaired within our margin of sea power. On the other hand, at the end of June, 1940, a momentous date, the effective German Fleet consisted of no more than one eight-inch cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers. one eight-inch cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers. Although many of their damaged s.h.i.+ps, like ours, could be repaired, the German Navy was no factor in the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain. Although many of their damaged s.h.i.+ps, like ours, could be repaired, the German Navy was no factor in the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain.

17.

The Fall of the Government

Debate of May 7 - 7 - A Vote of Censure Supervenes - Lloyd George's Last Parliamentary Stroke - I Do My Best with the House - My Advice to the Prime Minister - Conferences of May A Vote of Censure Supervenes - Lloyd George's Last Parliamentary Stroke - I Do My Best with the House - My Advice to the Prime Minister - Conferences of May 9 - 9 - The German Onslaught - A Conversation with the Prime Minister, May The German Onslaught - A Conversation with the Prime Minister, May 10 - 10 - The Dutch Agony - Mr. Chamberlain Resigns The Dutch Agony - Mr. Chamberlain Resigns - - The King Asks Me to Form a Government - Accession of the Labour and Liberal Parties - Facts and Dreams. The King Asks Me to Form a Government - Accession of the Labour and Liberal Parties - Facts and Dreams.

THE MANY DISAPPOINTMENTS and disasters of the brief campaign in Norway caused profound perturbation at home, and the currents of pa.s.sion mounted even in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of some of those who had been most slothful and purblind in the years before the war. The Opposition asked for a debate on the war situation, and this was arranged for May 7. The House was filled with Members in a high state of irritation and distress. Mr. Chamberlain's opening statement did not stem the hostile tide. He was mockingly interrupted and reminded of his speech of April 5, when in quite another connection he had incautiously said, "Hitler missed the bus." He defined my new position and my relations.h.i.+p with the Chiefs of Staff, and in reply to Mr. Herbert Morrison made it clear that I had not held those powers during the Norwegian operations. One speaker after another from both sides of the House attacked the Government and especially its chief with unusual bitterness and vehemence, and found themselves sustained by growing applause from all quarters. Sir Roger Keyes, burning for distinction in the new war, sharply criticised the Naval Staff for their failure to attempt the capture of Trondheim. "When I saw," he said, "how badly things were going, I never ceased importuning the Admiralty and War Cabinet to let me take all responsibility and lead the attack." Wearing his uniform as Admiral of the Fleet, he supported the complaints of the Opposition with technical details and his own professional authority in a manner very agreeable to the mood of the House. From the benches behind the Government, Mr. Amery quoted amid ringing cheers Cromwell's imperious words to the Long Parliament: "You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of G.o.d, go!" These were terrible words coming from a friend and colleague of many years, a fellow Birmingham Member, and a Privy Councillor of distinction and experience. and disasters of the brief campaign in Norway caused profound perturbation at home, and the currents of pa.s.sion mounted even in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of some of those who had been most slothful and purblind in the years before the war. The Opposition asked for a debate on the war situation, and this was arranged for May 7. The House was filled with Members in a high state of irritation and distress. Mr. Chamberlain's opening statement did not stem the hostile tide. He was mockingly interrupted and reminded of his speech of April 5, when in quite another connection he had incautiously said, "Hitler missed the bus." He defined my new position and my relations.h.i.+p with the Chiefs of Staff, and in reply to Mr. Herbert Morrison made it clear that I had not held those powers during the Norwegian operations. One speaker after another from both sides of the House attacked the Government and especially its chief with unusual bitterness and vehemence, and found themselves sustained by growing applause from all quarters. Sir Roger Keyes, burning for distinction in the new war, sharply criticised the Naval Staff for their failure to attempt the capture of Trondheim. "When I saw," he said, "how badly things were going, I never ceased importuning the Admiralty and War Cabinet to let me take all responsibility and lead the attack." Wearing his uniform as Admiral of the Fleet, he supported the complaints of the Opposition with technical details and his own professional authority in a manner very agreeable to the mood of the House. From the benches behind the Government, Mr. Amery quoted amid ringing cheers Cromwell's imperious words to the Long Parliament: "You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of G.o.d, go!" These were terrible words coming from a friend and colleague of many years, a fellow Birmingham Member, and a Privy Councillor of distinction and experience.

On the second day, May 8, the debate, although continuing upon an adjournment motion, a.s.sumed the character of a vote of censure, and Mr. Herbert Morrison, in the name of the Opposition, declared their intention to have a vote. The Prime Minister rose again, accepted the challenge, and in an unfortunate pa.s.sage appealed to his friends to stand by him. He had a right to do this, as these friends had sustained his action, or inaction, and thus shared his responsibility in "the years which the locusts had eaten" before the war. But today they sat abashed and silenced, and some of them had joined the hostile demonstrations. This day saw the last decisive intervention of Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons. In a speech of not more than twenty minutes he struck a deeply wounding blow at the head of the Government. He endeavoured to exculpate me: "I do not think that the First Lord was entirely responsible for all the things which happened in Norway." I immediately interposed: "I take complete responsibility for everything that has been done by the Admiralty, and I take my full share of the burden." After warning me not to allow myself to be converted into an air-raid shelter to keep the splinters from hitting my colleagues, Mr. Lloyd George turned upon Mr. Chamberlain: "It is not a question of who are the Prime Minister's friends. It is a far bigger issue. He has appealed for sacrifice. The nation is prepared for every sacrifice so long as it has leaders.h.i.+p, so long as the Government show clearly what they are aiming at, and so long as the nation is confident that those who are leading it are doing their best." He ended: "I say solemnly that the Prime Minister should give an example of sacrifice, because there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice the seals of office."

As Ministers we all stood together. The Secretaries of State for War and Air had already spoken. I had volunteered to wind up the debate, which was no more than my duty, not only in loyalty to the chief under whom I served, but also because of the exceptionally prominent part I had played in the use of our inadequate forces during our forlorn attempt to succour Norway. I did my very best to regain control of the House for the Government in the teeth of continuous interruption, coming chiefly from the Labour Opposition benches. I did this with good heart when I thought of their mistaken and dangerous pacifism in former years, and how, only four months before the outbreak of the war, they had voted solidly against conscription. I felt that I, and a few friends who had acted with me, had the right to inflict these censures, but they had not. When they broke in upon me, I retorted upon them and defied them, and several times the clamour was such that I could not make myself heard. Yet all the time it was clear that their anger was not directed against me, but at the Prime Minister, whom I was defending to the utmost of my ability and without regard for any other considerations. When I sat down at eleven o'clock, the House divided. The Government had a majority of eighty-one, but over fifty Conservatives voted with the Labour and Liberal Oppositions, and there was no doubt that in effect, though not in form, both the debate and the division were a violent manifestation of want of confidence in Mr. Chamberlain and his Administration.

After the debate was over, he asked me to go to his room, and I saw at once that he took the most serious view of the sentiment of the House towards himself. He felt he could not go on. There ought to be a National Government. One party alone could not carry the burden. Someone must form a Government in which all parties would serve, or we could not get through. Aroused by the antagonisms of the debate, and being sure of my own past record on the issues at stake, I was strongly disposed to fight on. "This has been a damaging debate, but you have a good majority. Do not take the matter grievously to heart. We have a better case about Norway than it has been possible to convey to the House. Strengthen your Government from every quarter, and let us go on until our majority deserts us." To this effect I spoke. But Chamberlain was neither convinced nor comforted, and I left him about midnight with the feeling that he would persist in his resolve to sacrifice himself, if there was no other way, rather than attempt to carry the war further with a one-party Government.

I do not remember exactly how things happened during the morning of May 9, but the following occurred. Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, was very close to the Prime Minister as a colleague and a friend. They had long worked together in complete confidence. From him I learned that Mr. Chamberlain was resolved upon the formation of a National Government and, if he could not be the head, he would give way to anyone commanding his confidence who could. Thus, by the afternoon, I became aware that I might well be called upon to take the lead. The prospect neither excited nor alarmed me. I thought it would be by far the best plan. I was content to let events unfold. In the afternoon, the Prime Minister summoned me to Downing Street, where I found Lord Halifax, and after a talk about the situation in general, we were told that Mr. Attlee and Mr. Greenwood would visit us in a few minutes for a consultation.

When they arrived, we three Ministers sat on one side of the table and the Opposition leaders on the other. Mr. Chamberlain declared the paramount need of a National Government, and sought to ascertain whether the Labour Party would serve under him. The conference of their party was in session at Bournemouth. The conversation was most polite, but it was clear that the Labour leaders would not commit themselves without consulting their people, and they hinted, not obscurely, that they thought the response would be unfavourable. They then withdrew. It was a bright, sunny afternoon, and Lord Halifax and I sat for a while on a seat in the garden of Number 10 and talked about nothing in particular. I then returned to the Admiralty and was occupied during the evening and a large part of the night in heavy business.

The morning of the tenth of May dawned, and with it came tremendous news. Boxes with telegrams poured in from the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Foreign Office. The Germans had struck their long-awaited blow. Holland and Belgium were both invaded. Their frontiers had been crossed at numerous points. The whole movement of the German Army upon the invasion of the Low Countries and of France had begun.

At about ten o'clock, Sir Kingsley Wood came to see me, having just been with the Prime Minister. He told me that Mr. Chamberlain was inclined to feel that the great battle which had broken upon us made it necessary for him to remain at his post. Kingsley Wood had told him that, on the contrary, the new crisis made it all the more necessary to have a National Government, which alone could confront it, and he added that Mr. Chamberlain had accepted this view. At eleven o'clock, I was again summoned to Downing Street by the Prime Minister. There once more I found Lord Halifax. We took our seats at the table opposite Mr. Chamberlain. He told us that he was satisfied that it was beyond his power to form a National Government. The response he had received from the Labour leaders left him in no doubt of this. The question, therefore, was whom he should advise the King to send for after his own resignation had been accepted. His demeanour was cool, unruffled, and seemingly quite detached from the personal aspect of the affair. He looked at us both across the table.

I have had many important interviews in my public life, and this was certainly the most important. Usually I talk a great deal, but on this occasion I was silent. Mr. Chamberlain evidently had in his mind the stormy scene in the House of Commons two nights before, when I had seemed to be in such heated controversy with the Labour Party. Although this had been in his support and defence, he nevertheless felt that it might be an obstacle to my obtaining their adherence at this juncture. I do not recall the actual words he used, but this was the implication. His biographer, Mr. Feiling, states definitely that he preferred Lord Halifax. As I remained silent, a very long pause ensued. It certainly seemed longer than the two minutes which one observes in the commemorations of Armistice Day. Then at length Halifax spoke. He said that he felt that his position as a peer, out of the House of Commons, would make it very difficult for him to discharge the duties of Prime Minister in a war like this. He would be held responsible for everything, but would not have the power to guide the a.s.sembly upon whose confidence the life of every Government depended. He spoke for some minutes in this sense, and by the time he had finished, it was clear that the duty would fall upon me had in fact fallen upon me. Then, for the first time, I spoke. I said I would have no communication with either of the Opposition Parties until I had the King's commission to form a Government. On this the momentous conversation came to an end, and we reverted to our ordinary easy and familiar manners of men who had worked for years together and whose lives in and out of office had been spent in all the friendliness of British politics. I then went back to the Admiralty, where, as may well be imagined, much awaited me.

The Dutch Ministers were in my room. Haggard and worn, with horror in their eyes, they had just flown over from Amsterdam. Their country had been attacked without the slightest pretext or warning. The avalanche of fire and steel had rolled across the frontiers, and when resistance broke out and the Dutch frontier guards fired, an overwhelming onslaught was made from the air. The whole country was in a state of wild confusion; the long-prepared defence scheme had been put into operation; the d.y.k.es were opened; the waters spread far and wide. But the Germans had already crossed the outer lines, and were now streaming across the causeway which enclosed the Zuyder Zee. Could we do anything to prevent this? Luckily, we had a flotilla not far away, and this was immediately ordered to sweep the causeway with fire, and take the heaviest toll possible of the swarming invaders. The Queen was still in Holland, but it did not seem she could remain there long.

As a consequence of these discussions, a large number of orders were dispatched by the Admiralty to all our s.h.i.+ps in the neighborhood, and close relations were established with the Royal Dutch Navy. Even with the recent overrunning of Norway and Denmark in their minds, the Dutch Ministers seemed unable to understand how the great German nation, which, up to the night before, had professed nothing but friends.h.i.+p, and was bound by treaty to respect the neutrality of Holland, so strictly maintained, should suddenly have made this frightful and brutal onslaught. Upon these proceedings and other affairs, an hour or two pa.s.sed. A spate of telegrams pressed in from all the frontiers affected by the forward heave of the German armies. It seemed that the old Schlieffen Plan, brought up to date with its Dutch extension, was already in full operation. In 1914, the swinging right arm of the German invasion had swept through Belgium, but had stopped short of Holland. It was well known then that had that war been delayed for three or four years, the extra army group would have been ready, and the railway terminals and communications adapted, for a movement through Holland. Now the famous movement had been launched with all these facilities and with every circ.u.mstance of surprise and treachery. But other developments lay ahead. The decisive stroke of the enemy was not to be a turning movement on the flank, but a break through the main front. This none of us or the French, who were in responsible command, foresaw. Earlier in the year I had, in a published interview, warned these neutral countries of the fate which was impending upon them and which was evident from the troop dispositions and road and rail development, as well as from the captured German pla