Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy Part 18

Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.

Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of pa.s.sage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened our communications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to control the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol.

II., p. 234).

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).

Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.

Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsus.h.i.+ma.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

FINAL NOTE

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind:--

(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.

(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.

WAR COURSE

Notes on Strategy

PART ONE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.

The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.

War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.

MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.

_Primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds--Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.

Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.

Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmans.h.i.+p which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versa_. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versa_. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to a.s.sist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with--

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.

(2) The direction of the force a.s.signed for the operation.

Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:--

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.

(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.

(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.

It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only.

Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

_Nature of Object_