Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy Part 15

The advantages of Defence are chiefly:--

(1) Proximity to base.

(2) Familiar ground.

(3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack.

NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo.

The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our s.h.i.+ps at Chatham, we were not acting on the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all.

The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke.

A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack.

A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive operations.

The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to a.s.sume the offensive, a.s.sume the defensive till you become so--

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies.

Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too weak to a.s.sume the offensive it is often necessary to a.s.sume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to acc.u.mulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pa.s.s to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation.

As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to intensify the attack; for by a.s.suming the defensive in one or more minor theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most important theatre.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION

(A) Counter attacks.

(B) Diversions.

(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this form of attack which const.i.tutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence."

(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they involve.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions.

EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Was.h.i.+ngton in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was negative--preventative--defensive.

2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815.

Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle (eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War.

Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold cla.s.sification of combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists.

Raids = Diversions.

Incursions = Eccentric attacks.

Invasions = True direct offence.

Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's cla.s.sification (Report of Royal Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):--

"Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.

"Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men.

"Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men.

NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important cla.s.sification of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.

(1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation of Cuba.

(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.

NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_.

EXAMPLE 1.--j.a.panese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive).

Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive.

SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war."

This depends upon:-- (1) The theatre of the war.

(2) The means at our disposal.

1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which the hostile parties may a.s.sail each other." This is insufficient. For an island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation."