The Ayn Rand Lexicon - Objectivism From A To Z Part 25

[Ibid.]

See also BUSINESSMEN; CAREER.

Market Value. It is in regard to a free market that the distinction between an intrinsic, subjective, and objective view of values is particularly important to understand. The market value of a product is not an intrinsic value, not a "value in itself" hanging in a vacuum. A free market never loses sight of the question: Of value to whom? And, within the broad field of objectivity, the market value of a product does not reflect its philosophically objective value, but only its socially objective value.

By "philosophically objective," I mean a value estimated from the standpoint of the best possible to man, i.e., by the criterion of the most rational mind possessing the greatest knowledge, in a given category, in a given period, and in a defined context (nothing can be estimated in an undefined context). For instance, it can be rationally proved that the airplane is objectively of immeasurably greater value to man (to man at his best) than the bicycle-and that the works of Victor Hugo are objectively of immeasurably greater value than true-confession magazines. But if a given man's intellectual potential can barely manage to enjoy true confessions, there is no reason why his meager earnings, the product of his effort, should be spent on books he cannot read-or on subsidizing the airplane industry, if his own transportation needs do not extend beyond the range of a bicycle. (Nor is there any reason why the rest of mankind should be held down to the level of his literary taste, his engineering capacity, and his income. Values are not determined by fiat nor by majority vote.) Just as the number of its adherents is not a proof of an idea's truth or falsehood, of an art work's merit or demerit, of a product's efficacy or inefficacy-so the free-market value of goods or services does not necessarily represent their philosophically objective value, but only their socially objective value, i.e., the sum of the individual judgments of all the men involved in trade at a given time, the sum of what they valued, each in the context of his own life.

Thus, a manufacturer of lipstick may well make a greater fortune than a manufacturer of microscopes-even though it can be rationally demonstrated that microscopes are scientifically more valuable than lipstick. But-valuable to whom?

A microscope is of no value to a little stenographer struggling to make a living; a lipstick is; a lipstick, to her, may mean the difference between self-confidence and self-doubt, between glamour and drudgery.

This does not mean, however, that the values ruling a free market are subjective. If the stenographer spends all her money on cosmetics and has none left to pay for the use of a microscope (for a visit to the doctor) when she needs it, she learns a better method of budgeting her income; the free market serves as her teacher: she has no way to penalize others for her mistakes. If she budgets rationally, the microscope is always available to serve her own specific needs and no more, as far as she is concerned: she is not taxed to support an entire hospital, a research laboratory, or a s.p.a.ce s.h.i.+p's journey to the moon. Within her own productive power, she does pay a part of the cost of scientific achievements, when and as she needs them.

["What Is Capitalism?" CUI, 24.]

Within every category of goods and services offered on a free market, it is the purveyor of the best product at the cheapest price who wins the greatest financial rewards in that field-not automatically nor immediately nor by fiat, but by virtue of the free market, which teaches every partic.i.p.ant to look for the objective best within the category of his own competence, and penalizes those who act on irrational considerations.

[Ibid., 25.]

The "philosophically objective" value of a new product serves as the teacher for those who are willing to exercise their rational faculty, each to the extent of his ability. Those who are unwilling remain unrewarded -as well as those who aspire to more than their ability produces....

A given product may not be appreciated at once, particularly if it is too radical an innovation; but, barring irrelevant accidents, it wins in the long run. It is in this sense that the free market is not ruled bv the intellectual criteria of the majority, which prevail only at and for any given moment; the free market is ruled by those who are able to see and plan long-range-and the better the mind, the longer the range.

The economic value of a man's work is determined, on a free market, by a single principle: by the voluntary consent of those who are willing to trade him their work or products in return.

[Ibid., 26.]

[An] objection is usually expressed by a question such as: "Why should Elvis Presley make more money than Einstein?" The answer is: Because men work in order to support and enjoy their own lives-and if many men find value in Elvis Presley, they are ent.i.tled to spend their money on their own pleasure. Presley's fortune is not taken from those who do not care for his work (I am one of them) nor from Einstein-nor does he stand in Einstein's way-nor does Einstein lack proper recognition and support in a free society, on an appropriate intellectual level.

[Ibid., 27.]

See also CAPITALISM; COMPEt.i.tION; FREE MARKET; MONEY; PURCHASING POWER; TRADER PRINCIPLE.

Marriage. I consider marriage a very important inst.i.tution, but it is important when and if two people have found the person with whom they wish to spend the rest of their lives-a question of which no man or woman can be automatically certain. When one is certain that one's choice is final, then marriage is, of course, a desirable state. But this does not mean that any relations.h.i.+p based on less than total certainty is improper. I think the question of an affair or a marriage depends on the knowledge and the position of the two persons involved and should be left up to them. Either is moral, provided only that both parties take the relations.h.i.+p seriously and that it is based on values.

["Playboy's Interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, 8.]

See also LOVE; s.e.x.

Materials, Concepts of. Concepts of materials are formed by observing the differences in the const.i.tuent materials of ent.i.ties. (Materials exist only in the form of specific ent.i.ties, such as a nugget of gold, a plank of wood, a drop or an ocean of water.) The concept of "gold," for instance, is formed by isolating gold objects from all others, then abstracting and retaining the material, the gold, and omitting the measurements of the objects (or of the alloys) in which gold may exist. Thus, the material is the same in all the concrete instances subsumed under the concept, and differs only in quant.i.ty.

[ITOE. 19.].

See also CONCEPT-FORMATION; CONCEPT; MATTER.

Mathematics. Mathematics is a science of method (the science of measurement, i.e., of establis.h.i.+ng quant.i.tative relations.h.i.+ps), a cognitive method that enables man to perform an unlimited series of integrations. Mathematics indicates the pattern of the cognitive role of concepts and the psycho-epistemological need they fulfill.

[ITOE, 85.].

With the grasp of the (implicit) concept "unit," man reaches the conceptual level of cognition which consists of two interrelated fields: the conceptual and the mathematical. The process of concept-formation is, in large part, a mathematical process.

[Ibid., 8.]

A vast part of higher mathematics, from geometry on up, is devoted to the task of discovering methods by which various shapes can be measured-complex methods which consist of reducing the problem to the terms of a simple, primitive method, the only one available to man in this field: linear measurement. (Integral calculus, used to measure the area of circles, is just one example.) In this respect, concept-formation and applied mathematics have a similar task, just as philosophical epistemology and theoretical mathematics have a similar goal: the goal and task of bringing the universe within the range of man's knowledge-by identifying relations.h.i.+ps to perceptual data.

[lbid., 17.]

See also EPISTEMOLOGY; MEASUREMENT; METHOD, CONCEPTS of; NUMBERS; PSYCHO-EPISTEMOLOGY; SCIENCE; UNIT; UNIT-ECONOMY.

Matter. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist.

[GS, FNI, 147; pb 121.]

The day when [one] grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has-and this is his birth as a human being.

[Ibid., 194; pb 156.]

To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence. Whether its basic const.i.tuent elements are atoms, or subatomic particles, or some yet undiscovered forms of energy, it is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Ident.i.ty. All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe-from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life-are caused and determined by the ident.i.ties of the elements involved. Nature is the metaphysically given-i.e., the nature of nature is outside the power of any volition.

["The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made," PWNI, 30; pb 25.]

See also EXISTENCE; FREE WILL; LIFE; MATERIALS, CONCEPTS of; UNIVERSE.

"McCarthyism." In the late 1940's, another newly coined term was shot into our cultural arteries: "McCarthyism." Again, it was a derogatory term, suggesting some insidious evil, and without any clear definition. Its alleged meaning was: "Unjust accusations, persecutions, and character a.s.sa.s.sinations of innocent victims." Its real meaning was: "Anti-communism."

Senator McCarthy was never proved guilty of those allegations, but the effect of that term was to intimidate and silence public discussions. Any uncompromising denunciation of communism or communists was -and still is-smeared as "McCarthyism." As a consequence, opposition to and exposes of communist penetration have all but vanished from our intellectual scene. (I must mention that I am not an admirer of Senator McCarthy, but not for the reasons implied in that smear.) [" 'Extremism,' or The Art of Smearing," CUI, 176.]

See also "ANTI-CONCEPTS"; COMMUNISM; SOVIET RUSSIA.

Meaning (of Concepts). A word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its units.

[ITOE, 52.].

A widespread error, in this context, holds that the wider the concept, the less its cognitive content-on the ground that its distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic is more generalized than the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristics of its const.i.tuent concepts. The error lies in a.s.suming that a concept consists of nothing but its distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic. But the fact is that in the process of abstracting from abstractions, one cannot know what is a distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic unless one has observed other characteristics of the units involved and of the existents from which they are differentiated.

Just as the concept "man" does not consist merely of "rational faculty" (if it did, the two would be equivalent and interchangeable, which they are not), but includes all the characteristics of "man," with "rational faculty" serving as the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic-so, in the case of wider concepts, the concept "animal" does not consist merely of "consciousness and locomotion," but subsumes all the characteristics of all the animal species, with "consciousness and locomotion" serving as the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic.

[Ibid., 34.]

To know the exact meaning of the concepts one is using, one must know their correct definitions, one must be able to retrace the specific (logical, not chronological) steps by which they were formed, and one must be able to demonstrate their connection to their base in perceptual reality.

When in doubt about the meaning or the definition of a concept, the best method of clarification is to look for its referents-i.e., to ask oneself: What fact or facts of reality gave rise to this concept? What distinguishes it from all other concepts?

For instance: what fact of reality gave rise to the concept "justice"? The fact that man must draw conclusions about the things, people and events around him, i.e., must judge and evaluate them. Is his judgment automatically right? No. What causes his judgment to be wrong? The lack of sufficient evidence, or his evasion of the evidence, or his inclusion of considerations other than the facts of the case. How, then, is he to arrive at the right judgment? By basing it exclusively on the factual evidence and by considering all the relevant evidence available. But isn't this a description of "objectivity"? Yes, "objective judgment" is one of the wider categories to which the concept "justice" belongs. What distinguishes "justice" from other instances of objective judgment? When one evaluates the nature or actions of inanimate objects, the criterion of judgment is determined by the particular purpose for which one evaluates them. But how does one determine a criterion for evaluating the character and actions of men, in view of the fact that men possess the faculty of volition? What science can provide an objective criterion of evaluation in regard to volitional matters? Ethics. Now, do I need a concept to designate the act of judging a man's character and/or actions exclusively on the basis of all the factual evidence available, and of evaluating it by means of an objective moral criterion? Yes. That concept is "justice."

[Ibid., 67.]

Since a word is a symbol for a concept, it has no meaning apart from the content of the concept it symbolizes. And since a concept is an integration of units, it has no content or meaning apart from its units.

The meaning of a concept consists of the units-the existents-which it integrates, including all the characteristics of these units.

Observe that concepts mean existents, not arbitrarily selected portions of existents. There is no basis whatever-neither metaphysical nor epistemological, neither in the nature of reality nor of a conceptual consciousness-for a division of the characteristics of a concept's units into two groups, one of which is excluded from the concept's meaning.

[Leonard Peikoff, "The a.n.a.lytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," ITOE, 132.]

What, then, is the meaning of the concept "man"? "Man" means a certain type of ent.i.ty, a rational animal, including all the characteristics of this ent.i.ty (anatomical, physiological, psychological, etc., as well as the relations of these characteristics to those of other ent.i.ties)-all the characteristics already known, and all those ever to be discovered. Whatever is true of the ent.i.ty, is meant by the concept.

It follows that there are no grounds on which to distinguish "a.n.a.lytic" from "synthetic" propositions. Whether one states that "A man is a rational animal," or that "A man has only two eyes"-in both cases, the predicated characteristics are true of man and are, therefore, included in the concept "man." The meaning of the first statement is: "A certain type of ent.i.ty, including all its characteristics (among which are rationality and animality) is: a rational animal." The meaning of the second is: "A certain type of ent.i.ty, including all its characteristics (among which is the possession of only two eyes) has: only two eyes." Each of these statements is an instance of the Law of Ident.i.ty; each is a "tautology"; to deny either is to contradict the meaning of the concept "man," and thus to endorse a self-contradiction.

A similar type of a.n.a.lysis is applicable to every true statement. Every truth about a given existent(s) reduces, in basic pattern, to: "X is: one or more of the things which it is." The predicate in such a case states some characteristic(s) of the subject; but since it is a characteristic of the subject, the concept(s) designating the subject in fact includes the predicate from the outset.

[Ibid., 135.]

See also a.n.a.lYTIC-SYNTHETIC DICHOTOMY; CONCEPTS; UNIT; WORDS.

Measurement. Measurement is the identification of a relations.h.i.+p -a quant.i.tative relations.h.i.+p established by means of a standard that serves as a unit. Ent.i.ties (and their actions) are measured by their attributes (length, weight, velocity, etc.) and the standard of measurement is a concretely specified unit representing the appropriate attribute. Thus, one measures length in inches, feet and miles-weight in pounds -velocity by means of a given distance traversed in a given time, etc.

It is important to note that while the choice of a given standard is optional, the mathematical rules of using it are not. It makes no difference whether one measures length in terms of feet or meters; the standard provides only the form of notation, not the substance nor the result of the process of measuring. The facts established by measurement will be the same, regardless of the particular standard used; the standard can neither alter nor affect them. The requirements of a standard of measurement are: that it represent the appropriate attribute, that it be easily perceivable by man and that, once chosen, it remain immutable and absolute whenever used. (Please remember this; we will have reason to recall it.) Now what is the purpose of measurement? Observe that measurement consists of relating an easily perceivable unit to larger or smaller quant.i.ties, then to infinitely larger or infinitely smaller quant.i.ties, which are not directly perceivable to man. (The word "infinitely" is used here as a mathematical, not a metaphysical, term.) The purpose of measurement is to expand the range of man's consciousness, of his knowledge, beyond the perceptual level: beyond the direct power of his senses and the immediate concretes of any given moment. Man can perceive the length of one foot directly; he cannot perceive ten miles. By establis.h.i.+ng the relations.h.i.+p of feet to miles, he can grasp and know any distance on earth; by establis.h.i.+ng the relations.h.i.+p of miles to light-years, he can know the distances of galaxies.

The process of measurement is a process of integrating an unlimited scale of knowledge to man's limited perceptual experience-a process of making the universe knowable by bringing it within the range of man's consciousness, by establis.h.i.+ng its relations.h.i.+p to man. It is not an accident that man's earliest attempts at measurement (the evidence of which survives to this day) consisted of relating things to himself-as, for instance, taking the length of his foot as a standard of length, or adopting the decimal system, which is supposed to have its origin in man's ten fingers as units of counting.

It is here that Protagoras' old dictum may be given a new meaning, the opposite of the one he intended: "Man is the measure of all things." Man is the measure, epistemologically-not metaphysically. In regard to human knowledge, man has to be the measure, since he has to bring all things into the realm of the humanly knowable. But, far from leading to subjectivism, the methods which he has to employ require the most rigorous mathematical precision, the most rigorous compliance with objective rules and facts-if the end product is to be knowledge.

[ITOE, 8.].

Observe the multiple role of measurements in the process of concept-formation, in both of its two essential parts: differentiation and integration. Concepts cannot be formed at random. All concepts are formed by first differentiating two or more existents from other existents. All conceptual differentiations are made in terms of commensurable characteristics (i.e., characteristics possessing a common unit of measurement). No concept could be formed, for instance, by attempting to distinguish long objects from green objects. Incommensurable characteristics cannot be integrated into one unit.

Tables, for instance, are first differentiated from chairs, beds and other objects by means of the characteristic of shape, which is an attribute possessed by all the objects involved. Then, their particular kind of shape is set as the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic of tables-i.e., a certain category of geometrical measurements of shape is specified. Then, within that category, the particular measurements of individual table-shapes are omitted.

Please note the fact that a given shape represents a certain category or set of geometrical measurements. Shape is an attribute; differences of shape-whether cubes, spheres, cones or any complex combinations -are a matter of differing measurements; any shape can be reduced to or expressed by a set of figures in terms of linear measurement. When, in the process of concept-formation, man observes that shape is a commensurable characteristic of certain objects, he does not have to measure all the shapes involved nor even to know how to measure them; he merely has to observe the element of similarity.

Similarity is grasped perceptually; in observing it, man is not and does not have to be aware of the fact that it involves a matter of measurement. It is the task of philosophy and of science to identify that fact.

As to the actual process of measuring shapes, a vast part of higher mathematics, from geometry on up, is devoted to the task of discovering methods by which various shapes can be measured-complex methods which consist of reducing the problem to the terms of a simple, primitive method, the only one available to man in this field: linear measurement. (Integral calculus, used to measure the area of circles, is just one example.) [Ibid., 16.]

There is no exact method of measuring the intensity of all psychological processes, but-as in the case of forming concepts of colors-conceptualization does not require the knowledge of exact measurements. Degrees of intensity can be and are measured approximately, on a comparative scale. For instance, the intensity of the emotion of joy in response to certain facts varies according to the importance of these facts in one's hierarchy of values; it varies in such cases as buying a new suit, or getting a raise in pay, or marrying the person one loves. The intensity of a process of thought and of the intellectual effort required varies according to the scope of its content; it varies when one grasps the concept "table" or the concept "justice," when one grasps that 2 + 2 = 4 or that e = mc2.

[Ibid., 40.]

Observe that the attacks on the conceptual level of man's consciousness, i.e., on reason, come from the same ideological quarters as the attacks on measurement. When discussing man's consciousness, particularly his emotions, some persons use the word "measurement" as a pejorative term-as if an attempt to apply it to the phenomena of consciousness were a gross, insulting, "materialistic" impropriety. The question "Can you measure love?" is an example and a symptom of that att.i.tude.

As in many other issues, the two allegedly opposite camps are merely two variants growing out of the same basic premises. The old-fas.h.i.+oned mystics proclaim that you cannot measure love in pounds, inches or dollars. They are aided and abetted by the neo-mystics who-punch-drunk with undigested concepts of measurement, proclaiming measurement to be the sole tool of science-proceed to measure knee-jerks, statistical questionnaires, and the learning time of rats, as indices to the human psyche.

Both camps fail to observe that measurement requires an appropriate standard, and that in the physical sciences-which one camp pa.s.sionately hates, and the other pa.s.sionately envies-one does not measure length in pounds, or weight in inches.

Measurement is the identification of a relations.h.i.+p in numerical terms -and the complexity of the science of measurement indicates the complexity of the relations.h.i.+ps which exist in the universe and which man has barely begun to investigate. They exist, even if the appropriate standards and methods of measurement are not always as easily apparent nor the degree of achievable precision as great as in the case of measuring the basic, perceptually given attributes of matter. If anything were actually "immeasurable," it would bear no relations.h.i.+p of any kind to the rest of the universe, it would not affect nor be affected by anything else in any manner whatever, it would enact no causes and bear no consequences-in short, it would not exist.

The motive of the anti-measurement att.i.tude is obvious: it is the desire to preserve a sanctuary of the indeterminate for the benefit of the irrational-the desire, epistemologically, to escape from the responsibility of cognitive precision and wide-scale integration; and, metaphysically, the desire to escape from the absolutism of existence, of facts, of reality and, above all, of ident.i.ty.

[Ibid., 49.]

See also IDENt.i.tY; MATHEMATICS; TELEOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT; UNIT.

Mediocrity. "Mediocrity" does not mean an average intelligence; it means an average intelligence that resents and envies its betters.

["The Comprachicos," NL, 213.]

See also GUILD SOCIALISM; INTELLIGENCE; PYRAMID of ABILITY.

Mental Health. Psychology does not regard its subject morally, but medically-i.e., from the aspect of health or malfunction (with cognitive competence as the proper standard of health).

["The Psychology of 'Psychologizing,' " TO, March 1971, 5.]

See also BEHAVIORISM; EVASION; FREUD; IMAGINATION; NEUROSIS vs. PSYCHOSIS; PSYCHO-EPISTEMOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGY; SELF-ESTEEM; SUBCONSCIOUS.

Mercy. "Mercy" means an unearned forgiveness.

[Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), question period, Lecture 8.]

See also JUSTICE; MORAL JUDGMENT.

"Meritocracy." "Meritocracy" is an old anti-concept and one of the most contemptible package deals. By means of nothing more than its last five letters, that word obliterates the difference between mind and force: it equates the men of ability with political rulers, and the power of their creative achievements with political power. There is no difference, the word suggests, between freedom and tyranny: an "aristocracy" is tyranny by a politically established elite, a "democracy" is tyranny by the majority-and when a government protects individual rights, the result is tyranny by talent or "merit" (and since "to merit" means "to deserve," a free society is ruled by the tyranny of justice).

["An Unt.i.tled Letter," PWNI, 126; pb 105.]

See also "ANTI-CONCEPTS"; DEMOCRACY; ECONOMIC POWER vs. POLITICAL POWER; FREEDOM; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; JUSTICE; "PACKAGE-DEALING," FALLACY of; TYRANNY.

Metaphysical. I use the word "metaphysical" to mean: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence.

["The Objectivist Ethics," VOS, 2; pb 14.]

See also EXISTENCE; METAPHYSICAL VALUE-JUDGMENTS; METAPHYSICAL vs. MAN-MADE; METAPHYSICS.

Metaphysical Value Judgments. The key concept, in the formation of a sense of life, is the term "important." It is a concept that belongs to the realm of values, since it implies an answer to the question: Important-to whom? Yet its meaning is different from that of moral values. "Important" does not necessarily mean "good." It means "a quality, character or standing such as to ent.i.tle to attention or consideration" (The American College Dictionary). What, in a fundamental sense, is ent.i.tled to one's attention or consideration? Reality.

"Important"-in its essential meaning, as distinguished from its more limited and superficial uses-is a metaphysical term. It pertains to that aspect of metaphysics which serves as a bridge between metaphysics and ethics: to a fundamental view of man's nature. That view involves the answers to such questions as whether the universe is knowable or not, whether man has the power of choice or not, whether he can achieve his goals in life or not. The answers to such questions are "metaphysical value-judgments," since they form the base of ethics.

It is only those values which he regards or grows to regard as "important," those which represent his implicit view of reality, that remain in a man's subconscious and form his sense of life.

"It is important to understand things"-"It is important to obey my parents"-"It is important to act on my own"-"It is important to please other people"-"It is important to fight for what I want"-"It is important not to make enemies"-"My life is important"-"Who am I to stick my neck out?" Man is a being of self-made soul-and it is of such conclusions that the stuff of his soul is made. (By "soul" I mean "consciousness.") ["Philosophy and Sense of Life," RM, 34; pb 28.]

Is the universe intelligible to man, or unintelligible and unknowable? Can man find happiness on earth, or is he doomed to frustration and despair? Does man have the power of choice, the power to choose his goals and to achieve them, the power to direct the course of his life-or is he the helpless plaything of forces beyond his control, which determine his fate? Is man, by nature, to be valued as good, or to be despised as evil? These are metaphysical questions, but the answers to them determine the kind of ethics men will accept and practice; the answers are the link between metaphysics and ethics. And although metaphysics as such is not a normative science, the answers to this category of questions a.s.sume, in man's mind, the function of metaphysical value-judgments, since they form the foundation of all of his moral values.

Consciously or subconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, man knows that he needs a comprehensive view of existence to integrate his values, to choose his goals, to plan his future, to maintain the unity and coherence of his life-and that his metaphysical value-judgments are involved in every moment of his life, in his every choice, decision and action.

["The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," RM, 21; pb 19.]

See also ART; BENEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; MALEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; METAPHYSICS; MORALITY; PHILOSOPHY; SENSE of LIFE; SUBCONSCIOUS.