Retreat, Hell! Part 1

RETREAT, h.e.l.l!

by W.E.B. Griffin.

Prologue.

Until August 1945, when General Order Number One, the protocol for the surrender-and occupation-of j.a.pan was being somewhat hastily drafted in Was.h.i.+ngton, the 38th Parallel, which runs across the Korean Peninsula, had been just one line on a map of the globe.

At the time, World War II was just about over. Nagasaki and Hiros.h.i.+ma had been obliterated by atomic bombs, and j.a.pan was willing to surrender. The Soviet Union had just- somewhat belatedly-declared war on the j.a.panese Empire, and had already started to move troops into the j.a.panese "Protectorates" of Manchuria and Korea.

President Truman, who had already learned not to trust the Soviet Union, realized that to keep the Red Army from occupying all of Korea, a border-"a demarcation line"-between the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and the southern, where the United States planned to station troops, was needed.

If Korea was divided-about equally-at the 38th Parallel, the United States would control Seoul, the capital, and the major ports of Inchon-near Seoul-and Pusan- at the southern tip of the peninsula.

The division at the 38th Parallel was proposed to the Soviets as the demarcation line, and they raised no objections. The seeds for what became the People's Democratic Republic of North Korea and the Republic of South Korea were sown.

Four years and eleven months later, the Inmun Gun- the Soviet-trained North Korean Army-invaded South Korea across the 38th Parallel with the announced intention of "unifying" Korea. the Inmun Gun- the Soviet-trained North Korean Army-invaded South Korea across the 38th Parallel with the announced intention of "unifying" Korea.

The attack officially-and in fact-came as a "complete surprise" to the United States. United States intelligence agencies at all levels had failed to perform their basic duty to warn of an impending attack on the United States or its allies.

It was hard then-and still is, more than half a century later-to understand why we didn't see the attack coming.

Immediately after World War II, Stalin had managed to establish surrogate governments in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia-and North Korea. On 5 March 1946, in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, British Wartime Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill said, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."

President Harry S Truman had become very suspicious of Soviet intentions even before he ordered the use of atomic weapons against j.a.pan, and he had acted to foil them.

For example, Truman had courageously dispatched American advisers-actually the first special forces/operations soldiers, long before anyone even thought of wearing a green beret-to Greece, where they successfully thwarted Soviet intentions to take over the birthplace of democracy.

And when the Soviets tried to force the Americans, French, and English from Berlin, Truman had ordered the Air Lift, which saw U.S. Air Force transports landing round the clock at sixty-second intervals to keep Berlin fed, and the Western Allies in the former German capital. the clock at sixty-second intervals to keep Berlin fed, and the Western Allies in the former German capital.

Many historians now believe that the reason Stalin authorized his surrogate North Korean Army to invade South Korea is that the United States had actually led him to believe we would raise no objections.

On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined President Truman's Asian policy in a speech at the National Press Club in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. Acheson "drew a line" of countries the United States considered "essential to its national interests," a euphemism everyone understood to mean the United States would go to war to defend.

Acheson placed j.a.pan, Okinawa, and the Philippines within the "American defense perimeter." Taiwan and Korea were not mentioned.

The United States was then "completely surprised" five months later when, in the early morning of 25 June 1950, the North Koreans invaded across the 38th Parallel.

Not that twenty-four hours'-or ten days' or six months'-advance warning of the attack would have been of much real use: The Inmun Gun was well trained, well disciplined, and well armed. The South Korean armed forces were not.

The South Koreans had been denied, for example, heavy artillery because some of Truman's advisers believed they might use it to invade North Korea. South Korea had also been denied modern aircraft, tanks, and other military hardware by the same reasoning. And, of course, for reasons of economy.

There were only several hundred American troops in South Korea on that Sunday morning, a.s.signed to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), and they were armed only with their individual weapons.

The Eighth United States Army was scattered among the islands of j.a.pan, but it was not prepared to fight a war.

Blame can fairly be laid for this: The President of the United States, under the Const.i.tution, is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The authors of the Const.i.tution wanted to make absolutely sure that the armed forces were firmly under civilian control, and gave that control to the President.

With that authority, of course, came responsibility. It is the responsibility-the duty-of the President to ensure that the armed forces are prepared to wage war when called upon to do so. In practical terms, this means the President ensures that the uniformed officers in command of the armed forces meet their responsibilities to keep their forces in readiness. In turn, that means that the armed forces are trained and equipped to go to war.

There is little question now that the senior American officer in the Pacific, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, failed in his duty to make sure that the Eighth Army under his command was both trained and equipped to go to war. On 25 June 1950, it was neither.

That it was not adequately trained trained is entirely MacArthur's fault, but to place blame for the literally disgraceful lack of equipment in the Eighth United States Army, it is necessary to go all the way to the top of the chain of command. is entirely MacArthur's fault, but to place blame for the literally disgraceful lack of equipment in the Eighth United States Army, it is necessary to go all the way to the top of the chain of command.

United States Forces, Far East, were under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur repeatedly advised them of the sorry state of his equipment, and requested to be supplied with what he believed he needed.

The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs-there were several during this period-repeatedly requested of their superior, the Secretary of Defense, that the U.S. Armed Forces worldwide (not only MacArthur's forces in j.a.pan) be adequately supplied with the necessary equipment.

Truman's Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, openly boasted at the time that he had first cut military spending to the bone, and then cut some more.

He had. At Johnson's orders, there were two battalions (instead of the three considered necessary) in most of the U.S. Army's regiments. And there were two regiments (instead of three) in all but one of the divisions.

The Secretary of Defense is, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed by the President. Once Louis Johnson had been confirmed, President Truman was responsible for his actions, good or bad.

The blame for the inadequate equipment in the Eighth U.S. Army-and just about everywhere else-has to be laid on the desk of President Harry S Truman, right beside the small sign reading "The Buck Stops Here" that he kept there.

There were, of course, extenuating circ.u.mstances.

Congress, for one, was not in the mood to appropriate the billions of dollars it would have cost to bring the armed forces back to the state of preparedness they had been in five years before, when, on 2 September 1945, MacArthur had accepted the unconditional surrender of the j.a.panese Empire on the battles.h.i.+p USS Missouri Missouri in Tokyo Harbor. in Tokyo Harbor.

And Korea was almost at the bottom of the list of problems with which President Truman had to deal on a daily basis. Most of these problems had to do with thwarting Soviet mischief in Europe, the Near East, and even Africa.

The Soviets hadn't done nearly so well in the Far East, and the credit for that unquestionably belongs to Douglas MacArthur, who had flatly refused to permit the Soviets to partic.i.p.ate in the occupation of j.a.pan.

MacArthur had also successfully sown the seed of democratic government in the mind of the j.a.panese people, and taken wide and generally successful steps to get the war-ravaged j.a.panese economy moving.

As far as the disgraceful condition of the Eighth United States Army in j.a.pan was concerned, one has to remember that all armies are rank conscious.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was not only the senior officer on active duty, but he had been Army Chief of Staff when the general officers in the 1950 Pentagon had been captains and majors. In World War II, MacArthur had been a theater commander, commanding more men of all services than there were now in 1950 in all the armed forces of the United States.

There are annual inspections of every organization in the Army, ending with a conference during which the inspectors point out to the commander where he is doing what he should not be doing, or not doing what he should be doing.

It is very difficult to imagine any officer, even one with a galaxy of stars on his epaulets, pointing out to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, and Commanding General, United States Far East Command (FECOM), where he was doing something wrong, or where he had failed to do something he should have been doing.

And none did.

Because of the International Date Line, when it is Sunday in Korea it is Sat.u.r.day in New York City and Was.h.i.+ngton. The first word of the attack reached the Pentagon about eight o'clock Sat.u.r.day night, and at about the same time, the United Nations Commission in Korea managed to get UN Secretary General Trygve Lie on the telephone at his estate on Long Island.

Lie blurted, "This is war against the United Nations."

President Truman learned of the attack at his home in Independence, Missouri, early Sunday morning and immediately boarded his airplane, the Independence, Independence, to fly back to Was.h.i.+ngton. to fly back to Was.h.i.+ngton.

Lie convened an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council at two o'clock Sunday afternoon. The Soviet Union, trying to force the UN into seating Red China-and expelling Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalists-was refusing to attend Security Council meetings and did not partic.i.p.ate.

This was a blunder on their part. Had they attended, the Soviet Union could have vetoed the resolution the UN pa.s.sed. The resolution stated that the attack const.i.tuted a breach of the peace, ordered an immediate cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea, and called upon all UN members to "render every a.s.sistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution." to "render every a.s.sistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution."

At about six o'clock that evening, in Was.h.i.+ngton, in Blair House-across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House, which was being repaired-President Truman met with the more important members of his staff.

They quickly and unanimously agreed with Truman that the interests of the United States demanded that immediate action be taken to stop Communist aggression in Korea.

A little after ten-thirty Sunday evening, two teletype orders from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were sent to the Far East.

The first, to the Commanding General, FECOM- MacArthur-authorized him to send ammunition and military equipment to Korea, to prevent the loss of Seoul; authorized him to provide s.h.i.+ps and aircraft to evacuate American citizens from Korea; and directed him to send a "survey party" to Korea to see what was going on.

It is germane to note that until MacArthur got that teletype order he had no official role in Korea. The former j.a.panese Protectorate of Korea, now the Republic of South Korea, was an independent nation.

The second order went to the United States Seventh Fleet. It was to immediately sail from its several major home ports-the largest were in the Philippines and Okinawa-for the U.S. Navy Base at Sasebo, j.a.pan. On arrival, the wars.h.i.+ps would come under the operational control of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East.

Since Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, was under FECOM, that meant they would be under MacArthur's command.

MacArthur immediately ordered the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force-already under his command-to Korea to protect the evacuation of American civilians and dependents from Inchon and Pusan.

Over Inchon, the American jets were fired upon by three Russian-made YAK fighters, which the Americans promptly shot down.

It was the first American victory in the Korean War, and much time would pa.s.s before there was another.

Outnumbered, outgunned, and in many cases poorly led, most of the South Korean Army simply began to disintegrate in the face of the North Korean attack.

The Survey Party-thirteen officers and two enlisted men under Brigadier General John H. Church-took off from Tokyo as soon as it could be formed. While in the air, they received two messages, the first saying it would probably be wiser not to try to land at Seoul's Kimpo Airfield, and suggesting the field at Suwon, thirty miles or so south of Seoul, as an alternate. The second said that the Pentagon had given MacArthur command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, and the Survey Party had been rather grandly redesignated as "GHQ Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea."

ADCOM landed at Suwon about 1900 27 June. Colonel William H. S. Wright, the KMAG Chief of Staff, who met them, suggested that it probably would be better to wait for morning to drive into Seoul than to try to do so in the hours of darkness.

At 0400 the next day, two KMAG officers drove into Suwon and reported to General Church that the bridges across the Han River had been blown and that Seoul was in the hands of the enemy.

Church radioed MacArthur that U.S. ground troops were going to be necessary if the United States intended to push the North Koreans back across the 38th Parallel. The reply was a query: "Is Suwon safe for a high-ranking officer to land there tomorrow?"

Church replied that it was.

The "high-ranking officer" turned out to be General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who took a quick look around, then radioed the Pentagon that U.S. troops were going to be necessary.

While this was going on, the United Nations, realizing that the North Koreans had no intention of obeying the UN resolution to cease, desist, and get out of South Korea, issued-on 27 June-another one: ". . . recommends that the members of the UN furnish such a.s.sistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack. . . ."

Resisting the Communist attack would be an action of the United Nations, rather than a unilateral action by the United States.

Just before 0500 30 June, President Truman got MacArthur's a.s.sessment of the Korean situation and his request for authorization to use American ground troops. Truman immediately authorized the deployment of one regimental combat team, and after thinking it over for two hours, authorized the deployment of two infantry divisions.

At 0800 1 July "Task Force Smith"-400 officers and men from the 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith-boarded USAF C-54 transports at Itazuke Air Force Base in j.a.pan and were flown to Korea.

It was not the regimental combat team Truman had authorized. It was all the men the 24th Division could muster on short notice.

On the morning of 5 July, Task Force Smith was in place on the Suwon-Osan Highway, south of Suwon. The "crew-served" weapons with which it was supposed to halt the North Korean Army consisted of two 75-mm recoilless rifles; two 4.2-inch mortars; six 2.36-inch rocket launchers; and four 60-mm mortars. The 52nd Field Artillery-six light 105-mm howitzers-had been a.s.signed to them.

When the North Koreans' Russian-built T-34 tanks attacked, they were engaged by Task Force Smith's 75-mm recoilless rifles. The projectiles bounced off the Russian armor. So did the 2.36-inch rockets. So did the sh.e.l.ls from the 105-mm howitzers.

On the morning of 6 July, Colonel Smith was was able to muster only 248 officers and men of the original 400. The artillery had lost five officers and twenty-six men and most of its cannon. able to muster only 248 officers and men of the original 400. The artillery had lost five officers and twenty-six men and most of its cannon.

And they had managed to delay-not stop-the North Koreans for less than seven hours.

More troops were going to be needed, and quickly. The problem was, there were no more troops.

The Marine Corps was ordered to furnish a division. There were two Marine divisions: The First, in California, was at less than half wartime strength, and the Second, on the East Coast, was in even worse shape. At Headquarters, USMC, Major Drew J. Barrett, Jr.,1 a junior G-1 staff officer, marched into the office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to report that there was no way the Corps could meet the requirements laid on it by the Commander-in-Chief except by mobilizing the entire reserve. This was done. a junior G-1 staff officer, marched into the office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to report that there was no way the Corps could meet the requirements laid on it by the Commander-in-Chief except by mobilizing the entire reserve. This was done.

The Eighth Army, under General Walton H. "Johnny" Walker, who had served with distinction under Patton in Europe, began a series of delaying actions-in other words, retreated-down the Korean Peninsula.

On 4 August, the Pusan Perimeter was established. This was a small enclave at the tip of the peninsula. The alternative to the perimeter was being pushed into the sea.

Reinforcements began to arrive from j.a.pan, Hawaii, and the continental United States. By gutting the 2nd Marine Division on the East Coast, the Marine Corps was able to form from the 1st Marine Division the First Marine Brigade (Provisional) and send it to Korea.

General Walker immediately made the Marines his "Fire Brigade," moving it around within the perimeter to reinforce whatever Army units seemed most vulnerable to the continuing North Korean attack.

MacArthur, meanwhile-while there was still genuine doubt that Walker could hold the Pusan Perimeter-was planning a counterattack. He was later to claim he'd first thought of it when he'd made his first quick visit to Korea.

It is a matter of record that MacArthur, in early July, had ordered his chief of staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to plan for a landing on the west coast of the peninsula.

When he finally revealed his plan-to make an amphibious landing at Inchon, the port near Seoul-it was greeted with reactions ranging from "grave doubts" to mutters of "absolute insanity" from just about every senior officer made privy to it.

It was the worst possible place to stage an amphibious landing. There was a long list of things wrong with the plan, primarily the "landing beach" itself.

To get to the "landing beach" the invasion fleet would have to navigate the narrow Flying Fish Channel, which was not navigable except at high tide, and then only for two hours. When the thirty-plus-foot tides receded, the landing area was a sea of mud.

There was no beach. Men would have to climb a seawall when they left their landing barges.

Army Chief of Staff Collins sent General Matthew B. Ridgway, recognized as one of the brightest officers in the Army, to Tokyo to "confer" with MacArthur about the Inchon plan. Everyone understood that Ridgway's mission was to talk MacArthur out of his plan.

He failed to do so.

President Truman was faced with the choice of listening to the senior officers in the Pentagon, who wanted him to forbid the operation, or letting MacArthur have his way.

Political considerations certainly influenced Truman to some degree. It was a given that if Truman supported the Pentagon and forbade the invasion, MacArthur would logically conclude that the President had no faith in him, and retire.

If he did so quietly, fine. But that was unlikely. It was more likely that the "firing" of the legendary national hero would see MacArthur as the Republican candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

Whatever the reasons, Truman decided not to interfere with MacArthur's plan to invade at Inchon on 15 September.

MacArthur gave command of the invasion force-X Corps-to Major General Ned Almond. He did not, however, relieve Almond of his a.s.signment as his chief of staff. While this was perfectly legal, and certainly MacArthur's prerogative, the Pentagon establishment was outraged.

Some of their rage, MacArthur's supporters claimed, was because they could not now give MacArthur a chief of staff who could be counted on to provide them a window into MacArthur's thinking.

Eighth Army Commander Walker bitterly protested the loss of the Marines to X Corps. He said he could not guarantee holding the Pusan Perimeter without them. MacArthur was unmoved. The First Marine Brigade (Provisional) came off the lines in Pusan, boarded the s.h.i.+ps of the invasion fleet, and en route to Inchon, reinforced at sea by a third regiment, became the 1st Marine Division.

The invasion was a spectacular success.

At 1200 29 September-two weeks after the landing- MacArthur stood in Seoul's National a.s.sembly Hall and told South Korean President Syngman Rhee, ". . . On behalf of the United Nations Command, I am happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the seat of your government. . . ."