Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church Part 20

Strigel's entire position is based on the error that a remnant of spiritual ability still remains in natural man. True, he taught that in consequence of original sin the powers of man and the proper use and exercise of these powers are greatly impeded, weakened, checked, and insulated, as it were, and that this impediment can be removed solely by the operation of the Holy Spirit. "Through the Word the Holy Spirit restores to the will the power and faculty of believing," Strigel declared. (Luthardt, 250.) But this restoration, he said, was brought about by liberating, arousing, inciting, and strengthening the powers inherent in man rather than by divine impartation of new spiritual powers or by the creation of a new good volition.

Strigel plainly denied that natural man is truly spiritually dead. He declared: "The will is so created that it can expel the Holy Spirit and the Word, or, when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit, can in some manner will and obey--to receive is the act of the will; in this I cannot concede that man is simply _dead--accipere est hominis; in hoc non possum concedere simpliciter mortuum esse hominem._" (Frank 1, 199.) Natural man, Strigel explained, is indeed not able to grasp the helping hand of G.o.d with his own hand; yet the latter is not dead, but still retains a minimum of power. (678.) Again: Man is like a new-born child, whose powers must first be strengthened with nourishment given it by its mother, and which, _though able to draw this nourishment out of its mother's breast,_ is yet unable to lift itself up to it, or to take hold of the breast, unless it be given it. (Preger 2, 209.)

With special reference to the last ill.u.s.tration, Flacius declared: "Strigel, accordingly, holds that we have the faculty to desire and receive the food, _i.e._, the benefits of G.o.d. Forsooth, you thereby attribute to corrupt man a very great power with respect to spiritual things. Now, then, deny that this opinion is Pelagian." (209.) "Your statements agree with those of Pelagius, yet I do not simply say that you are a Pelagian; for a good man may fall into an error which he does not see." Pelagius held that man, by his natural powers, is able to begin and complete his own conversion; Ca.s.sia.n.u.s, the Semi-Pelagian taught that man is able merely to begin this work; Strigel maintained that man can admit the liberating operation of the Holy Spirit, and that after such operation of the Spirit he is able to cooperate with his natural powers. Evidently, then, the verdict of Flacius was not much beside the mark. Planck though unwilling to relegate Strigel to the Pelagians, does not hesitate to put him down as a thoroughgoing Synergist. (Planck 4, 683f.) Synergism, however, always includes at least an element of Pelagianism.

Strigel ill.u.s.trated his idea by the following a.n.a.logy. When garlic-juice is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672; Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: "The example of the temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of the _Tridentinum_ to this effect: The free will of natural man may be compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters." (1, 136.) Also the _Formula of Concord,_ evidently with a squint at Strigel, rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching "that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice, whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment from the wall." (865, 22.)

163. Strigel's "Cooperation."

When the impediment caused by original sin has been removed, and the will liberated and aroused to activity, man, according to Strigel, is able also to cooperate in his conversion. At Weimar he formulated the point at issue as follows: "The question is whether [in conversion] the will is present idle, as an inactive, indolent subject, or, as the common saying is, in a purely pa.s.sive way; or whether, when grace precedes, the will follows the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and in some manner a.s.sents--_an vero praeeunte gratia voluntas comitetur efficaciam Spiritus Sancti et aliquo modo annuat_." (Luthardt, 222.) Following are some of his answers to this question: When incited by the Spirit, the will is able to a.s.sent somewhat and to pray for a.s.sistance.

_Inter trepidationem utc.u.mque a.s.sent.i.tur, simul petens auxilium._ Contrition and faith, as well as other virtues, are gifts of G.o.d, "but they are given to those only who hear and contemplate G.o.d's Word, embrace it by a.s.senting to it, strive against their doubts and in this conflict pray for the help of G.o.d." (230.) The Holy Ghost converts those "who hear the Word of G.o.d and do not resist stubbornly, but consent," and G.o.d a.s.sists such only "as follow His call and pray for a.s.sistance." (229.) "The will and heart do not resist altogether, but desire divine consolation, when, indeed, they are a.s.sisted by the Holy Ghost." "The will is neither idle nor contumacious; but, in a manner, desires to obey." (Planck 4, 682.) "Man is dead [spiritually] in as far as he is not able to heal his wounds with his own powers; but when the remedy is offered him by the Holy Spirit and the Word, then he, at least in receiving the benefit, is not altogether dead; for otherwise a conversion could not occur. For I cannot conceive a conversion where the process is that of the flame consuming straw (_denn ich kann mir keine Bekehrung vorstellen, bei der es zugeht, wie wenn die Flamme das Stroh ergreift_). The nature of the will is such that it can reject the Holy Spirit and the Word; or, being supported by the Holy Spirit, can in a manner will and obey. The remedy is heavenly and divine, but the will--not the will alone, but the will supported by the Holy Spirit--is able to accept it. One must ascribe at least a feeble consent and an 'Aye' to the will, which is already supported by the Holy Spirit."

(Preger 2, 208.) "In a betrothal, consent is necessary; conversion is a betrothal of Christ to the Church and its individual members; hence consent is required," which the will is able to give when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit. (Luthardt, 224.)

It is, however, only a languid, wavering, and weak consent which man is able to render (_qualisc.u.mque a.s.sensio languida, trepida et imbecilla_).

"Compared with the divine operation," Flacius reports Strigel as having said, "the cooperation of our powers in conversion is something extremely small (_quiddam pertenue prorsus_). If, after drinking with a rich man, he paying a _taler_ and I a _h.e.l.ler,_ I would afterwards boast that I had been drinking and paying with him--such is cooperation, _talis est synergia._" (Planck 4, 677; Luthardt, 220. 222.) According to Strigel, therefore, man is not purely pa.s.sive, but plays an active part in his conversion. With Melanchthon and Pfeffinger he maintained: "These three concur in conversion: the Holy Spirit, who moves the hearts; the voice of G.o.d; the will of man, which a.s.sents to the divine voice.

_Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae a.s.sent.i.tur._" (Tschackert, 524.)

Flacius declared with respect to the issue formulated by Strigel: "I explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely pa.s.sive (_h.o.m.o se habet pure pa.s.sive_). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its willing and its powers, then he is purely pa.s.sive when he receives (_in accipiendo_). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this spark is not purely pa.s.sive. But the Adamic will does not only not operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart, even operates contrarily (_verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui contra operatur_)." (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished between cooperation _before_ conversion (which he rejected absolutely) and cooperation _after_ conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this point, he said to Strigel: "I ask whether you say that the will cooperates _before_ the gift of faith or _after_ faith has been received whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy Spirit. _Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle._" (Seeberg 4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will declare it as your opinion "that only the regenerated, sanctified, renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will."

"Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by G.o.d, not from the will he brings with him from his natural Adam--_quod h.o.m.o cooperetur ex fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo naturali Adamo.'_" "We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you [Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end." Strigel, however, who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but repeated that it was only a weak a.s.sent (_qualisc.u.mque a.s.sensio languida trepida et imbecilla_) which man was able to render when his will was incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit.

(Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)

164. Objections Answered.

At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely pa.s.sive in the reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?"

(216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of willing and thinking of G.o.d alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that G.o.d alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the natural will in conversion (_non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in conversione_)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)

In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared: "Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of G.o.d and of ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will.

_Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit velle aut perficere nisi n.o.bis volentibus._" Charging Strigel with ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to see the difference, answered: "For G.o.d's sake, have a little forbearance with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it be to my discredit.--_Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's eine Schand'_." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that man, too, has a share in _producing_ the good volition, while Flacius understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the latter, _e.g._, writing in _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:_ "It is certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of whom it is written: It is G.o.d who worketh in us to will. _Certum est nos velle c.u.m volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus est, qui operatur in n.o.bis velle._" (Frank 1, 238.)

In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely pa.s.sive in his conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a block or stone when he is converted. "That is true," said Flacius, "for a block can neither love nor hate G.o.d, while man by nature hates G.o.d, and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus G.o.d is dealing with one whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial that man is purely pa.s.sive in conversion] is buried a popish _meritum de congruo_ and a particle of free will." (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a stone or block (_miserior trunco_), because by his natural powers he resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4, 696f.)

Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an impossibility, a contradiction. He said: "If the will, even when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to a.s.sent, it must of necessity resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently rejecting, should be in the same will. _Si voluntas etiam adiuta a Spiritu Sancto non potest a.s.sentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verb.u.m et Spiritum Sanctum.

Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem perstare in reiectione._" Flacius replied: You need but distinguish between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always resists, and the new consenting will implanted by G.o.d in conversion.

"Man consents with the faith given by G.o.d, but he resists with the inborn wickedness of his Old Adam." Your error is that you acknowledge only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of one's own to do and to perform (_talis incitatio includit proprias vires ad perficiendum_). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (_hominem ...

penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum_)." "The will is free with respect to things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and created in, man by the grace of G.o.d. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff., Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)

Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of G.o.d, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied: "Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at least to observe external decency (_Zucht_), which G.o.d earnestly demands of us, for example, to hear G.o.d's Word, to go to church more frequently than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he has not done." "G.o.d may justly hold us responsible also with respect to things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)

Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of G.o.d. But the latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (_voluntas repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter_), but not by coercion or compulsion. Necessity to resist (_necessitas repugnandi_), Flacius explained, does not involve coercion to resist (_coactio repugnandi_), since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (_necessitas immutabilitatis_), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion, although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to remain in union with G.o.d is elevated to immutability of so willing.

Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced to resist prove that he is able also to a.s.sent to grace. The fact, said Flacius, that the wicked _willingly_ will, think, and do only what pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills.

In brief: The categories "coercion" and "compulsion" cannot be applied to the will. This, however, does not imply that G.o.d is not able to create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was no coercion or compulsion involved when G.o.d, creating Adam, Eve, and the angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as coercion or compulsion when G.o.d, in conversion, bestows faith and a good will upon man.

In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated what Luther had written before him, in _De Servo Arbitrio:_ "For if it is not we, but G.o.d alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, _i.e._, man, dest.i.tute of the Spirit of G.o.d, does not sin perforce, as though seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it.

For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else, within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of immutability, _i.e._, the will cannot change itself and turn to something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being resisted, as is proved by its indignation. _Si enim non nos, sed solus Deus operatur salutem in n.o.bis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare, velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dic.u.n.t, necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est h.o.m.o c.u.m vacat Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur magis ad volendum, dum ei resist.i.tur, quod probat eius indignatio._" (E.

v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)

Flacius was also charged with teaching that "man is converted resisting (_hominem converti repugnantem_)." In their _Confession and Opinion Concerning Free Will,_ of 1561, the Wittenberg theologians repeated the a.s.sertion that Flacius taught "_converti hominem ... repugnantem et hostiliter Deo convertenti adversantem._" (Planck 4, 688.) But Flacius protested: "I do not simply say that man is converted resisting (_hominem repugnantem converti_). But I say that he resists with respect to his natural and carnal free will." "It is not denied that G.o.d converts us as willing and understanding (_quin Deus nos convertat volentes et intelligentes_), but willing and understanding not from the Old Adam but from the light given by G.o.d and from the good volition bestowed through the Word and the Holy Spirit." (692.) "Man is converted or drawn by the Father to the Son not as a thief is cast into prison, but in such a manner that his evil will is changed into a good will by the power of the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 218.) It is the very essence of conversion that by the grace of G.o.d unwilling men are made willing.

In support of his error that natural man is able to cooperate in his conversion Strigel appealed to Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities," etc.; and appealing to the _Augustana_ for the correctness of his interpretation, he declared that this pa.s.sage proves that one may speak of a languid and weak a.s.sent in man even before he is endowed with faith. Flacius replied that this Bible-pa.s.sage referred to such only as are already converted, and that Strigel's interpretation was found not in the original _Augustana,_ but in the _Variata._--From the admonition 2 Cor. 5, 20: "Be ye reconciled to G.o.d," Strigel inferred that free will must to a certain extent be capable of accepting the grace offered by G.o.d. Flacius answered that it was a logical fallacy, conflicting also with the clear Word of G.o.d, to conclude that man by his own powers is able to perform something because G.o.d demands it and admonishes and urges us to do it.--From Acts 5, 32: "...the Holy Ghost, whom G.o.d hath given to them that obey Him," Strigel argued that the will is able to consent to the Holy Spirit. But Flacius rejoined that this pa.s.sage refers to special gifts bestowed upon such as are already converted.--In support of his synergism, Strigel also appealed to the Parable of the Prodigal Son, who himself repented and returned to his father. But Flacius answered: If every detail of this parable taken from every-day life were to be interpreted in such a manner, Strigel would have to abandon his own teaching concerning prevenient grace, since according to the parable the repentance and return of the son precedes the grace bestowed by the father. (Preger 2, 210f.)

165. Teaching of the Anti-Synergists.

While the Philippists, also in the Synergistic Controversy, endeavored to supplant the authority and doctrine of Luther by that of Melanchthon, their opponents, Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others (though not always fortunate in the choice of their phraseology), stood four-square on Luther's teaching of the _sola gratia,_ which, they were fully convinced, was nothing but the pure truth of the Gospel itself.

They maintained that, as a result of the Fall, man has lost his original holiness and righteousness or the image of G.o.d; that both as to his intellect and will he is totally corrupt spiritually; that of his own powers he is utterly unable to think or will anything that is truly good; that not a spark of spiritual life is found in natural man by virtue of which he might a.s.sent to the Gospel or cooperate with the Holy Spirit in his conversion; that his carnal mind is enmity toward G.o.d; that of his own powers he is active only in resisting the work of the Holy Spirit, nor is he able to do otherwise; that such resistance continues until he is converted and a new will and heart have been created in him; that conversion consists in this, that men who by nature are unwilling and resist G.o.d's grace become such as willingly consent and obey the Gospel and the Holy Spirit; that this is done solely by G.o.d's grace, through Word and Sacrament; that man is purely pa.s.sive in his conversion, inasmuch as he contributes nothing towards it, and merely suffers and experiences the work of the Holy Spirit; that only after his conversion man is able to cooperate with the Holy Spirit; that such cooperation, however, flows not from innate powers of the natural will, but from the new powers imparted in conversion; that also in the converted the natural sinful will continues to oppose whatever is truly good, thus causing a conflict between the flesh and the spirit which lasts till death; in brief, that man's conversion and salvation are due to grace alone and in no respect whatever to man and his natural powers.

The _Book of Confutation,_ of 1559, drafted, as stated above, by the theologians of Jena, designates the synergistic dogma as a "rejection of grace." Here we also meet with statements such as the following: Human nature "is altogether turned aside from G.o.d, and is hostile toward Him and subject to the tyranny of sin and Satan (_naturam humanam prorsus a Deo aversam eique inimicam et tyrannidi peccati ac Satanae subiectam esse_)." It is impossible for the unregenerate man "to understand or to apprehend the will of G.o.d revealed in the Word, or by his own power to convert himself to G.o.d and to will or perform anything good (_homini non renato impossibile esse intelligere aut apprehendere voluntatem Dei in Verbo patefactam aut sua ipsius voluntate ad Deum se convertere, boni aliquid velle aut perficere_)." "Our will to obey G.o.d or to choose the good is utterly extinguished and corrupted. _Voluntas nostra ad Dei obedientiam aut ad bonum eligendum prorsus extincta et depravata est_."

(Tschackert, 523; Gieseler 3, 2, 229.)

The second of the Propositions prepared by Simon Musaeus and Flacius for the Disputation at Weimar, 1560, reads: "Corrupt man cannot operate or cooperate toward anything good by true motions, and such as proceed from the heart; for his heart is altogether dead spiritually, and has utterly lost the image of G.o.d, or all powers and inclinations toward that which is good. _h.o.m.o corruptus nihil boni potest veris ac ex corde proficiscentibus motibus operari aut cooperari, nom plane est spiritualiter mortuus et Dei imaginem seu omnes bonas vires et inclinationes prorsus amisit._" The third: Not only "has he lost entirely all good powers, but, in addition, he has also acquired contrary and most evil powers, ... so that, of necessity or inevitably, he constantly and vehemently opposes G.o.d and true piety (_ita [tr. note: sic on punctuation] ut necessario seu inevitabiliter Deo ac verae pietati semper et vehementer adversetur._" The fourth thesis states that G.o.d alone, through His Word and the Holy Spirit, converts, draws, and illumines man, kindles faith, justifies, renews, and creates him unto good works, while natural or Adamic free will is of itself not only inactive, but resists (_non solum non cooperante ex se naturali aut Adamico libero arbitrio, sed etiam contra furente ac fremente_). (Planck 4, 692; Gieseler 3, 2, 245.)

The same position was occupied by the Mansfeld ministers in a statement of August 20, 1562, and by Hesshusius in his _Confutation of the Arguments by which the Synergists Endeavor to Defend Their Error Concerning the Powers of the Dead Free Will_. They held that in his conversion man is purely pa.s.sive and has no mode of action whatever; that he is but the pa.s.sive subject who is to be converted (_subiectam patiens, subiectum convertendum_); that he contributes no more to his conversion than an infant to its own formation in the womb of its mother; that he is pa.s.sive, like a block, inasmuch as he does not in any way cooperate, but at the same time differs from, and is worse than, a block, because he is active in resisting the Holy Spirit until he has been converted. The _Confession_ presented by the theologians of Ducal Saxony (Wigand, Coelestinus, Irenaeus, Rosinus, Kirchner, etc.) at the Altenburg Colloquy March, 1569, occupies the same doctrinal position. As stated before, these theologians made it a special point also to declare their agreement with Luther's book _De Servo Arbitrio_. (Schluesselburg 5, 316. 133.)

166. Att.i.tude of Formula of Concord.

The second article of the _Formula of Concord_, which decided the questions involved in the Synergistic Controversy, takes a clear, determined, and consistent stand against all forms and formulas of synergism. At the same time it avoids all extravagant, improper, offensive, and inadequate terms and phrases, as well as the numerous pitfalls lurking everywhere in the questions concerning free will, against which also some of the opponents of the Synergists had not always sufficiently been on their guard. Article II teaches "that original sin is an unspeakable evil and such an entire corruption of human nature that in it and all its internal and external powers nothing pure or good remains, but everything is entirely corrupt, so that on account of original sin man is in G.o.d's sight truly spiritually dead, with all his powers dead to that which is good (_da.s.s der Mensch durch die Erbsuende wahrhaftig vor Gott geistlich tot und zum Guten mit allen seinen Kraeften ers...o...b..n sei_)" (CONC. TRIGL. 879, 60); "that in spiritual and divine things the intellect, heart, and will of the unregenerate man are utterly unable, by their own natural powers, to understand, believe, accept, think, will, begin, effect, work, or concur in working, anything, but they are entirely dead to what is good, and corrupt, so that in man's nature since the Fall, before regeneration, there is not the least spark of spiritual power remaining, nor present, by which, of himself, he can prepare himself for G.o.d's grace, or accept the offered grace, nor be capable of it for and of himself, or apply or accommodate himself thereto, or by his own powers be able of himself, as of himself, to aid, do, work, or concur in working anything towards his conversion either wholly, or half, or in any, even the least or most inconsiderable part; but that he is the servant [and slave] of sin, John 8, 34, and a captive of the devil, by whom he is moved, Eph. 2, 2; 2 Tim. 2, 26. Hence natural free will according to its perverted disposition and nature is strong and active only with respect to what is displeasing and contrary to G.o.d" (883, 7; 887, 17); that "before man is enlightened, converted, regenerated, renewed and drawn by the Holy Spirit he can of himself and of his own natural powers begin work, or concur in working in spiritual things and in his own conversion or regeneration just as little as a stone or a block or clay." (891, 24); that, moreover, "in this respect" [inasmuch as man resists the Holy Spirit] "it may well be said that man is not a stone or block, for a stone or block does not resist the person who moves it, nor does it understand and is sensible of what is being done with it, as man with his will so long resists G.o.d the Lord until he is converted (_donec ad Deum conversus fuerit_)" (905, 59); that "the Holy Scriptures ascribe conversion, faith in Christ, regeneration, renewal, and all that belongs to their efficacious beginning and completion, not to the human powers of the natural free will, neither entirely, nor half nor in any, even the least or most inconsiderable part, but _in solidum_, that is, entirely and solely, to the divine working and the Holy Spirit" (891, 25); that "the preaching and hearing of G.o.d's Word are instruments of the Holy Ghost, by, with, and through which He desires to work efficaciously, and to convert men to G.o.d, and to work in them both to will and to do" (901, 52); that "as soon as the Holy Ghost ... has begun in us this His work of regeneration and renewal, it is certain that through the power of the Holy Ghost we can and should cooperate (_mitwirken_), although still in great weakness" (907, 65); that this cooperation, however, "does not occur from our carnal natural powers, but from the new powers and gifts which the Holy Ghost has begun in us in conversion," and "is to be understood in no other way than that the converted man does good to such an extent and so long as G.o.d by His Holy Spirit rules, guides, and leads him, and that as soon as G.o.d would withdraw His gracious hand from him, he could not for a moment persevere in obedience to G.o.d," and that hence it is not a power independent from, and coordinated with, the Holy Spirit, as though "the converted man cooperated with the Holy Ghost in the manner as when two horses together draw a wagon" (907, 66); and finally, that as to the three-concurring-causes doctrine it is "manifest, from the explanations presented that conversion to G.o.d is a work of G.o.d the Holy Ghost alone, who is the true Master that alone works this in us, for which He uses the preaching and hearing of His holy Word as His ordinary means and instrument. But the intellect and will of the unregenerate man are nothing else than _subiectum convertendum_, that is, that which is to be converted, it being the intellect and will of a spiritually dead man, in whom the Holy Ghost works conversion and renewal, towards which work man's will that is to be converted does nothing, but suffers G.o.d alone to work in him until he is regenerated and then he [cooperates] works also with the Holy Ghost that which is pleasing to G.o.d in other good works that follow in the way and to the extent fully set forth above"

(915, 90).

It has been said that originally also the _Formula of Concord_ in its Torgau draft (_Das Torgausche Buch, i.e._, the draft preceding the Bergic Book=_Formula of Concord_) contained the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon and the Synergists. As a matter of fact, however, the Torgau Book does not speak of three causes of conversion, but of three causes in those who are already converted,--a doctrine entirely in agreement with the _Formula of Concord_, which, as shown, plainly teaches that after conversion the will of man also cooperates with the Holy Spirit. In the Torgau Book the pa.s.sage in question reads: "Thus also three causes concur to effect this internal new obedience in the converted. The first and chief cause is G.o.d Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.... The second is G.o.d's Word.... The third is man's intellect, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, which ponders and understands G.o.d's command [threat and promise], and our new and regenerate will, which is governed by the Holy Spirit, and now desires with a glad and willing heart (_herzlich gern und willig_), though in great weakness, to submit to, and obey, the Word and will of G.o.d." In the same sense, at the colloquy in AItenburg, 1568 to 1569, the Jena theologians also mentioned as a "third cause" "the mind of man, which is regenerated and renewed, and yields to, and obeys, the Holy Spirit and the Word of G.o.d (_des Menschen Gemuet, so wiedergeboren und erneuert ist und dem Heiligen Geiste und Gottes Wort Folge tut und gehorsam ist_)." (Frank 1, 214f.)

XV. The Flacian Controversy.

167. Flacius Entrapped by Strigel.

Matthias Flacius Illyricus, one of the most learned and capable theologians of his day and the most faithful, devoted, staunch, zealous, and able exponent and defender of genuine Lutheranism, was the author of the malignant controversy which bears his name. Flacius was born March 3, 1520, in Illyria hence called Illyricus. He studied in Basel, Tuebingen, and Wittenberg. At Wittenberg he was convinced that the doctrine of the Lutheran Church is in complete agreement with the Word of G.o.d. Here, too, he was appointed Professor of Hebrew in 1544. In April, 1549, he left the city on account of the Interim. He removed to Magdeburg where he became the energetic and successful leader of the opponents of the Interimists and Adiaphorists. He was appointed professor at the University of Jena, founded 1547, partly in opposition to Philippism. In December 1561, he and his adherents were banished from Jena. When the latter returned in 1567, he was not recalled. Persecuted by his enemies (especially Elector August of Saxony) and forsaken by his friends, he now moved from one place to another: from Jena to Regensburg, thence to Antwerp, to Frankfort-on-the-Main, to Stra.s.sburg (from where he was expelled in the spring of 1573), and again to Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he found a last asylum for himself and his family (wife and eight children), and where he also died in a hospital, March 11, 1575.

In the Adiaphoristic Controversy Flacius had time and again urged the Lutherans to die rather than deny and surrender the truth. And when in the controversy about original sin all shunned him and turned against him he gave ample proof of the fact that he himself was imbued with the spirit he had endeavored to kindle in others, being willing to suffer and to be banished and persecuted rather than sacrifice what he believed to be the truth.--The most important of his numerous books are: _Catalogus Testium Veritatis_, qui ante nostram aetatem reclamarunt Papae, 1556; _Ecclesiastica Historia_, or the so-called Magdeburg Centuries (_Centuriones_), comprising the history of the first thirteen centuries, and published 1559-1574; _Clavis Scripturae_, of 1567; and _Glossa Novi Testamenti_. Walther remarks: "It was a great pity that Flacius, who had hitherto been such a faithful champion of the pure doctrine, exposed himself to the enemies in such a manner. Henceforth the errorists were accustomed to brand all those as Flacianists who were zealous in defending the pure doctrine of Luther." (_Kern und Stern_, 34.)

The Flacian Controversy sprang from, and must be regarded as an episode of, the Synergistic Controversy, in which also some champions of Luther's theology (Amsdorf, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others) had occasionally employed unguarded, extreme, and inadequate expressions.

Following are some of the immoderate and extravagant statements made by Flacius: G.o.d alone converts man, the Adamic free will not only not cooperating, "but also raging and roaring against it (_sed etiam contra furente ac fremente_)." (Preger 2, 212.) The malice of our free will is a "diabolical malice (_nostra diabolica malitia carnis aut liberi arbitrii_)." By original sin man is "transformed into the image of Satan (_ad imaginem Satanae transformatus, eiusque charactere [foeda Satanae imagine] signatus_)." (Gieseler 3, 2, 245.) By original sin "the substance of man is destroyed (_substantiam hominis ablatam esse_);"

after the Fall original sin is the substance of man; man's nature is identical with sin; in conversion a new substance is created by G.o.d. In particular, the a.s.sertions concerning the substantiality of original sin gave rise to the so-called Flacian Controversy. After Strigel, at the second session of the disputation in Weimar, had dilated on the philosophical definitions of the terms "substance" and "accident"

("_accidens, quod adest vel abest praeter subiecti corruptionem_"), and had declared that original sin was an accident which merely impeded free will in its activity, Flacius, in the heat of the controversy, exclaimed: "_Originale peccatum non est accidens_. Original sin is not an accident, for the Scriptures call it flesh, the evil heart," etc.

Thus he fell into the pitfall which the wily Strigel had adroitly laid for him. Though Flacius seemed to be loath to enter upon the matter any further, and protested against the use of philosophical definitions in theology, Strigel now was eager to entangle him still further, plying him with the question: "_An negas peccatum originis esse accidens?_ Do you deny that original sin is an accident?" Flacius answered: "_Lutherus diserte negat esse accidens_. Luther expressly denies that it is an accident." Strigel: "_Visne negare peccatum esse accidens?_ Do you mean to deny that sin is an accident?" Flacius: "_Quod sit substantia, dixi Scripturam et Lutherum affirmare._ I have said that Scripture and Luther affirm that it is a substance." (Luthardt, 213. 216.)

After the session in which the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, Wigand and Musaeus expostulated with Flacius, designating (according to later reports of theirs) his statement as "this new, perilous, and blasphemous proposition of the ancient Manicheans (_haec nova, periculosa et blasphema veterum Manichaeorum propositio_)." (Planck 4, 611.) Flacius declared that, "in the sudden and pressing exigency, in the interest of truth, and against Pelagian enthusiasm, he had taken this expression [concerning the substantiality of original sin] from Luther's doctrine and books." (Preger 2, 324.) In the following (third) session, however, he repeated his error, declaring: I must stand by my statement that original sin is not an accident, but a substance, "because the testimonies of the Holy Scriptures which employ terms denoting substance (_quae verbis substantialibus utuntur_) are so numerous." (Planck 4, 610; Luthardt, 216.) Also later on Flacius always maintained that his doctrine was nothing but the teaching of the Bible and of Luther. As to Scripture-proofs, he referred to pa.s.sages in which the Scriptures designate sin as "flesh," "stony heart," etc. Regarding the teaching of Luther, he quoted statements in which he describes original sin as "man's nature," "essence," "substantial sin," "all that is born of father and mother," etc. (Preger 2, 318.)

However, the palpable mistake of Flacius was that he took the substantial terms on which he based his theory in their original and proper sense, while the Bible and Luther employ them in a figurative meaning, as the _Formula of Concord_ carefully explains in its first article, which decided and settled this controversy. (874, 50.) Here we read: "Also to avoid strife about words, _aequivocationes vocabulorum_, that is, words and expressions which are applied and used in various meanings, should be carefully and distinctly explained, as when it is said: G.o.d creates the nature of men, there by the term _nature_ the essence, body, and soul of men are understood. But often the disposition or vicious quality of a thing is called its nature, as when it is said: It is the nature of the serpent to bite and poison. Thus Luther says that sin and sinning are the disposition and nature of corrupt man.

Therefore original sin properly signifies the deep corruption of our nature as it is described in the _Smalcald Articles_. But sometimes the concrete person or the subject that is, man himself with body and soul in which sin is and inheres, is also comprised under this term, for the reason that man is corrupted by sin, poisoned and sinful, as when Luther says: 'Thy birth, thy nature, and thy entire essence is sin,' that is, sinful and unclean. Luther himself explains that by nature-sin, person-sin, essential sin he means that not only the words, thoughts, and works are sin, but that the entire nature, person and essence of man are altogether corrupted from the root by original sin." (875, 51f.)

168. Context in which Statement was Made.

In making his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin, the purpose of Flacius was to wipe out the last vestige of spiritual powers ascribed to natural man by Strigel, and to emphasize the doctrine of total corruption, which Strigel denied. His fatal blunder was that he did so in terms which were universally regarded as savoring of Manicheism. As was fully explained in the chapter of the Synergistic Controversy Strigel taught that free will, which belongs to the substance and essence of man, and hence cannot be lost without the annihilation of man himself, always includes the capacity to choose in both directions, that also with respect to divine grace and the operations of the Holy Spirit man is and always remains a _liberum agens_ in the sense that he is able to decide _in utramque partem;_ that this ability, const.i.tuting the very essence of free will, may be weakened and impeded in its activity, but never lost entirely. If it were lost, Strigel argued, the very substance of man and free will as such would have to be regarded as annihilated. But now man, also after the Fall, is still a real man, possessed of intellect and will. Hence original sin cannot have despoiled him of this liberty of choosing _pro_ or _con_ also in matters spiritual. The loss of original righteousness does not, according to Strigel, involve the total spiritual disability of the will and its sole tendency and activity toward what is spiritually evil. Moreover, despite original corruption, it is and remains an indestructible property of man to be able, at least in a measure, to a.s.sent to and to admit, the operations of the Holy Spirit, and therefore and in this sense to be converted "_aliquo modo volens._"

(Planck 4, 667. 675. 681.)

It was in opposition to this Semi-Pelagian teaching that Flacius declared original sin to be not a mere accident, but the substance of man. Entering upon the train of thought and the phraseology suggested by his opponent, he called substance what in reality was an accident, though not an accident such as Strigel contended. From his own standpoint it was therefore a shrewd move to hide his own synergism and to entrap his opponent, when Strigel plied Flacius with the question whether he denied that original sin was an accident. For in the context and the sense in which it was proposed the question involved a vicious dilemma. Answering with yes or no, Flacius was compelled either to affirm Strigel's synergism or to expose himself to the charge of Manicheism. Instead of replying as he did, Flacius should have cleared the sophistical atmosphere by explaining: "If I say, 'Original sin is an accident,' you [Strigel] will infer what I reject, _viz._, that the corrupt will of man retains the power to decide also in favor of the operations of the Holy Spirit. And if I answer that original sin is not an accident (such as you have in mind), you will again infer what I disavow, _viz._, that man, who by the Fall has lost the ability to will in the spiritual direction, has _eo ipso_ lost the will and its freedom entirely and as such." As it was, however, Flacius instead of adhering strictly to the real issue--the question concerning man's cooperation in conversion--and exposing the sophistry implied in the question put by Strigel, most unfortunately suffered himself to be caught on the horns of the dilemma. He blindly walked into the trap set for him by Strigel, from which also later on he never succeeded in fully extricating himself.

With all his soul Flacius rejected the synergism involved in Strigel's question. His blunder was, as stated, that he did so in terms universally regarded as Manichean. He was right when he maintained that original sin is the inherited tendency and motion of the human mind, will, and heart, not toward, but against G.o.d,--a direction, too, which man is utterly unable to change. But he erred fatally by identifying this inborn evil tendency with the substance of fallen man and the essence of his will as such. It will always be regarded as a redeeming feature that it was in antagonizing synergism and championing the Lutheran _sola gratia_ that Flacius coined his unhappy proposition. And in properly estimating his error, it must not be overlooked that he, as will be shown in the following, employed the terms "substance" and "accident" not in their generally accepted meaning but in a sense, and according to a philosophical terminology, of his own.