The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence Part 14

358.]

CHAPTER XIV

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE BAILLI DE SUFFREN

The operations in India, both naval and military, stand by themselves, without direct influence upon transactions elsewhere, and unaffected also by these, except in so far as necessary succours were intercepted sometimes in European waters. The cause of this isolation was the distance of India from Europe; from four to six months being required by a fleet for the voyage.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France reached Calcutta July 7th, 1778. On the same day the Governor-General ordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the princ.i.p.al seaport of the French. The army arrived before the place on the 8th of August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward Vernon anch.o.r.ed in the roads to blockade by sea. A French squadron, under Captain Tronjoly, soon after appearing in the offing, Vernon gave chase, and on the 10th an action ensued. The forces engaged were about equal, the French, if anything, slightly superior; a 60-gun s.h.i.+p and four smaller vessels being on each side. As the French then went into Pondicherry, the immediate advantage may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returning on the 20th, Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned to the Ile de France.[136] From that day the British squadron blockaded closely, and on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated.

On the 7th of March, 1779, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes sailed for the East Indies with a small squadron. The French also sent out occasional s.h.i.+ps; but in 1779 and 1780 these went no further than the Ile de France, their naval station in the Indian Ocean. Hughes's force remained unopposed during those years. The period was critical, for the British were at war with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, and with the Mahrattas; and all depended upon command of the sea. In January, 1781, when Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comte d'Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder Ali's entreaties, it refused to cooperate with him. The different spirit of the two commanders may be ill.u.s.trated from contemporary doc.u.ments.

"We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron which appeared off that place on January 25, 26, and 27, consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties.

They proceeded south without making any attempt on five Indiamen then in the roads, with a number of vessels laden with grain and provisions; the destroying of which might have been easily accomplished, and would have been severely felt."

"On December 8th, off Mangalore,"[137] writes Hughes, "I saw two s.h.i.+ps, a large snow, three ketches, and many smaller vessels at anchor in the road with Hyder's flag flying; and, standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed for war. I anch.o.r.ed as close as possible, sent in all armed boats, under cover of three smaller s.h.i.+ps of war, which anch.o.r.ed in four fathoms water, close to the enemy's s.h.i.+ps. In two hours took and burned the two s.h.i.+ps, one of 28 and one of 26 guns, and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by throwing everything overboard, escaped over the bar into the port. Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men killed, 2 lieutenants and 51 wounded."

It is interesting to note these evidences of Hughes's conceptions of naval warfare and enterprise, common though they were to the British service; for their positive character brings into strong relief the qualities of his next antagonist, Suffren, and his great superiority in these respects over the average run of French officers of that day.

D'Orves returned to the Ile de France.

When war with Holland began, the British government decided to attempt the capture of the Cape of Good Hope. For that object a squadron of one 74, one 64, and three 50's, with numerous smaller vessels, under Commodore George Johnstone, convoying a considerable body of troops, sailed from England on the 13th of March, 1781, in company with the Channel fleet under Vice-Admiral George Darby, then on its way to relieve Gibraltar. The French government, having timely notice of the expedition, undertook to frustrate it; detailing for that purpose a division of two 74's, and three 64's, under the since celebrated Suffren.[139] These s.h.i.+ps left Brest on the 22d of March, with the fleet of de Gra.s.se. They also carried some battalions of troops.

On April 11th the British squadron reached Porto Praya, Cape de Verde Islands. This bay is open to the southward, extending from east to west about a mile and a half, and is within the limits of the north-east trade-winds. Although aware that a French division was on his track, and conscious, by the admissions of his report, that protection could not be expected from the neutrality of the place, Johnstone permitted his vessels to anchor without reference to attack.

His own flags.h.i.+p, the _Romney_, 50, was so surrounded by others that she could fire only with great caution through intervals. On the 16th of April, at 9.30 A.M., the _Isis_, 50, which was the outermost of the British squadron, signalled eleven sail in the north-east.

Fifteen hundred persons were then ash.o.r.e engaged in watering, fis.h.i.+ng, embarking cattle, and amusing themselves. The strangers were Suffren's division. The meeting was not expected by the French commander, whose object in entering was simply to complete the water of the s.h.i.+ps; but he determined at once to attack, and hauled round the east point of the bay in column, the two seventy-fours at the head, his own s.h.i.+p, the _Heros_, leading with the signal for battle (line ab). Pa.s.sing through, or along, the disordered enemy until he reached the only seventy-four among them, he there luffed to the wind, anchoring five hundred feet from the starboard beam of this vessel (f) which by an odd coincidence bore the same name--_Hero_. From this position he at once opened fire from both broadsides. His next astern, the _Annibal_ (b), brought up immediately ahead of him, but so close that the _Heros_ had to veer cable and drop astern (a), which brought her on the beam of the _Monmouth_, 64[140] (m). The captain of the _Annibal_ had thought the order for battle merely precautionary, and had not cleared for action. He was therefore taken unawares, and his s.h.i.+p did no service proportionate to her force. The third French vessel (c) reached her station, but her captain was struck dead just when about to anchor, and in the confusion the anchor was not let go. The s.h.i.+p drifted foul of a British East Indiaman, which she carried out to sea (c' c"). The two remaining French (d, e) simply cannonaded as they pa.s.sed across the bay's mouth, failing through mishap or awkwardness to reach an effective position.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

The attack thus became a mere rough and tumble, in which the two seventy-fours alone sustained the French side. After three quarters of an hour, Suffren, seeing that the attempt had failed, slipped his cable and put to sea. The _Annibal_ followed, but she had been so damaged that all her masts went overboard; fortunately, not until her head was pointed out of the harbour. Johnstone, thus luckily escaping the consequences of his neglect, now called his captains together to learn the condition of their s.h.i.+ps, and then ordered them to cut their cables and pursue. All obeyed except Captain Sutton of the _Isis_, who represented that the spars and rigging of his s.h.i.+p could not bear sail at once. Johnstone then ordered him to come out anyhow, which he did, and his fore topmast shortly went overboard. The disability of this s.h.i.+p so weighed upon the Commodore that his pursuit was exceedingly sluggish; and the French kept drawing him away to leeward, the _Annibal_ having got a bit of canvas on a jury foremast. Night, therefore, was falling as Johnstone came near them; the _Isis_ and _Monmouth_ were two or three miles astern; the sea was increasing; if he got much further to leeward, he could not get back; he had forgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the convoy might rejoin; a night action, he considered, was not to be thought of. Yet, if he let the enemy go, they might antic.i.p.ate him at the Cape. In short, Johnstone underwent the "anguish" of an undecided man in a "cruel situation,"[141] and of course decided to run no risks. He returned therefore to Porto Praya, put the captain of the _Isis_ under arrest, and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren hurried on to the Cape, got there first, landed his troops, and secured the colony against attack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood some time later, and, finding himself antic.i.p.ated, turned aside to Saldanha Bay, where he captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He then sent the _Hero_, _Monmouth_, and _Isis_ on to India, to reinforce Hughes, and himself went back to England.

No accusation of misbehavior lies against any of the British subordinates in this affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the _Isis_ was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of all the charges. The discredit of the surprise was not redeemed by any exhibition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on the part of the officer in charge. It has been said that he never had commanded a post-s.h.i.+p[142] before he was intrusted with this very important mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection for it was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conduct of Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance with the administration.[143] His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, was probably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British s.h.i.+ps of war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47 wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on board the convoy, bringing up the total to 36 killed and 130 wounded. The French admit 105 killed and 204 wounded, all but 19 being in the _Heros_ and _Annibal_. Although precipitated by Suffren, the affair clearly was as great a surprise to his squadron as to the British. Therefore, the latter, being already at anchor and more numerous as engaged, had a distinct advantage; to which also contributed musketry fire from the transports. Nevertheless, the result cannot be deemed creditable to the French captains or gunnery.

Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two months.

Then, having seen the colony secure, independent of his squadron, he departed for the Ile de France, arriving there October 25th. On the 17th of December the whole French force, under the command of d'Orves, sailed for the Coromandel coast. On the way the British 50-gun s.h.i.+p _Hannibal_, Captain Alexander Christie, was taken. On the 9th of February, 1782, Comte d'Orves died, and Suffren found himself at the head of twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line: three 74's, seven 64's and two 50's.[144] On the 15th Hughes's fleet was sighted, under the guns of Madras. It numbered nine of the line: two 74's, one 68, five 64's, and one 50. Suffren stood south towards Pondicherry, which had pa.s.sed into the power of Hyder Ali. After nightfall Hughes got under way, and also steered south. He feared for Trincomalee, in Ceylon, recently a Dutch port, which the British had captured on the 5th of January. It was a valuable naval position, as yet most imperfectly defended.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

At daylight the British saw the French squadron twelve miles east (A, A) and its transports nine miles south-west (c). Hughes chased the latter and took six. Suffren pursued, but could not overtake before sunset, and both fleets steered south-east during the night. Next morning there were light north-north-east airs, and the French were six miles north-east of the British (B, B). The latter formed line on the port tack (a), heading to seaward; Hughes hoping that thus the usual sea-breeze would find him to windward. The breeze, however, did not make as expected; and, as the north-east puffs were bringing the enemy down, he kept off before the wind (b) to gain time for his s.h.i.+ps to close their intervals, which were too great. At 4 P.M. the near approach of the French compelled him to form line again, (C), on the port tack, heading easterly. The rear s.h.i.+p, _Exeter_, 64 (e), was left separated, out of due support from those ahead. Suffren, leading one section of his fleet in person, pa.s.sed to windward of the British line, from the rear, as far as Hughes's flags.h.i.+p, which was fifth from the van. There he stopped, and kept at half cannon-shot, to prevent the four s.h.i.+ps in the British van from tacking to relieve their consorts. It was his intention that the second half of his fleet should attack the other side of the English rear. This plan of intended battle is shown by the figure D in the diagram. Actually, only two of the French rear did what Suffren expected, engaging to leeward of the extreme British rear; the others of the French rear remaining long out of action (C). The figure C shows the imperfect achievement of the design D. However, as the position of Suffren's flags.h.i.+p prevented the British van from tacking into action, the net result was, to use Hughes's own words, that "the enemy brought eight of their best s.h.i.+ps to the attack of five of ours." It will be noted with interest that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the first act of the battle of the Nile. The _Exeter_ (like the _Guerrier_ at the Nile) received the fresh broadsides of the first five of the enemy, and then remained in close action on both sides, a.s.sailed by two, and at last by three, opponents,--two 50's, and one 64. When the third approached, the master of the s.h.i.+p asked Commodore Richard King, whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, "What is to be done?" "There is nothing to be done," replied King, "but to fight her till she sinks." Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable under the circ.u.mstances to the French gunnery, which had been poor also at Porto Praya. At 6 P.M. the wind s.h.i.+fted to south-east, throwing all on the other tack, and enabling the British van at last to come into action. Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled off and anch.o.r.ed at Pondicherry. Hughes went on to Trincomalee to refit. The British loss had been 32 killed, among whom were Captain William Stevens of the flags.h.i.+p, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the _Exeter_, and 83 wounded.

The French had 30 killed; the number of their wounded is put by Professor Laughton at 100.

On the 12th of March Hughes returned to Madras, and towards the end of the month sailed again for Trincomalee carrying reinforcements and supplies. On the 30th he was joined at sea by the _Sultan_, 74, and the _Magnanime_, 64, just from England. Suffren had remained on the coast from reasons of policy, to encourage Hyder Ali in his leaning to the French; but, after landing a contingent of troops on the 22d of March, to a.s.sist at the siege of the British port of Cuddalore, he put to sea on the 23d, and went south, hoping to intercept the _Sultan_ and _Magnanime_ off the south end of Ceylon. On the 9th of April he sighted the British fleet to the south and west of him. Hughes, attaching the first importance to the strengthening of Trincomalee, had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action. He therefore continued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until the 11th, when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he bore away for it. Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy could overtake his rear s.h.i.+ps, he formed line on the starboard tack, at two cables' intervals, heading to the westward, towards the coast of Ceylon, wind north by east, and the French dead to windward (A, A). Suffren drew up his line (a) on the same tack, parallel to the British, and at 11 A.M. gave the signal to steer west-south-west all together; his vessels going down in a slanting direction (bb'), each to steer for one of the enemy. Having twelve s.h.i.+ps to eleven, the twelfth was ordered to place herself on the off side of the rear British, which would thus have two antagonists.

In such simultaneous approach it commonly occurred that the attacking line ceased to be parallel with the foe's, its van becoming nearer and rear more distant. So it was here. Further, the British opening fire as soon as the leading French were within range, the latter at once hauled up to reply. Suffren, in the centre, wis.h.i.+ng closest action, signalled them to keep away again, and himself bore down wrathfully upon Hughes to within pistol-shot; in which he was supported closely by his next ahead and the two next astern. The rear of the French, though engaged, remained too far distant. Their line, therefore, resembled a curve, the middle of which--four or five s.h.i.+ps--was tangent to the British centre (B). At this point the heat of the attack fell upon Hughes's flags.h.i.+p, the _Superb_, 74 (C, d), and her next ahead, the _Monmouth_, 64. Suffren's s.h.i.+p, the _Heros_, having much of her rigging cut, could not shorten sail, shot by the _Superb_, and brought up abreast the _Monmouth_. The latter, already hotly engaged by one of her own cla.s.s, and losing her main and mizzen masts in this unequal new contest, was forced at 3 P.M. to bear up out of the line (m). The place of the _Heros_ alongside the _Superb_ was taken by the _Orient_, 74, supported by the _Brillant_, 64; and when the _Monmouth_ kept off, the attack of these two s.h.i.+ps was reinforced by the half-dozen stern chasers of the _Heros_, which had drifted into the British line, and now fired into the _Superb's_ bows. The conflict between these five s.h.i.+ps, two British and three French, was one of the bloodiest in naval annals; the loss of the _Superb_, 59 killed and 96 wounded, and of the _Monmouth_, 45 killed and 102 wounded, equalling that of the much larger vessels which bore the flags of Nelson and Collingwood at Trafalgar. The loss of the three French was 52 killed and 142 wounded; but to this should be added properly that of the _Sphinx_, 64, the _Monmouth's_ first adversary: 22 killed and 74 wounded. At 3.40 P.M., fearing that if he continued steering west he would get entangled with the sh.o.r.e, Hughes wore his s.h.i.+ps, forming line on the port tack, heading off sh.o.r.e. The French also wore, and Suffren hoped to secure the _Monmouth_, which was left between the two lines; but the quickness of a British captain, Hawker, of the _Hero_, ran a tow-rope to her in time, and she was thus dragged out of danger.

At 5.40 Hughes anch.o.r.ed, and Suffren did the same at 8 P.M. The total British loss in men on this occasion was 137 killed and 430 wounded; that of the French 137 killed, and 357 wounded.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

The exhausted enemies remained at anchor in the open sea, two miles apart, for a week, repairing. On the 19th of April the French got under way and made a demonstration before the British, inviting battle, yet not attacking; but the condition of the _Monmouth_ forbade Hughes from moving. Suffren therefore departed to Batacalo, in Ceylon, south of Trincomalee, where he covered his own convoys from Europe, and flanked the approach of his adversary's. Hughes, on the 22d of April, got into Trincomalee, where he remained till June 23d. He then went to Negapatam, formerly a Dutch possession, but then held by the British. There he learned that Suffren, who meanwhile had captured several British transports, was a few miles north of him, at Cuddalore, which had surrendered to Hyder Ali on April 4th. On the 5th of July, at 1 P.M., the French squadron appeared. At 3 P.M. Hughes put to sea, and stood south during the night to gain the wind,--the south-west monsoon now blowing.

Next morning, at daylight, the French were seen at anchor, seven or eight miles to leeward. At 6 A.M. they began to get under way. One of their sixty-fours, the _Ajax_, had lost her main and mizzen topmasts in a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and was not in the line. There were therefore eleven s.h.i.+ps on each side. The action, known as that of Negapatam, began shortly before 11, when both fleets were on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east, wind south-west.

The British being to windward, Hughes ordered his fleet to bear up together to the attack, exactly as Suffren had done on the 12th of April. As commonly happened, the rear got less close than the van (Position I). The fourth s.h.i.+p in the French order, the _Brillant_, 64 (a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line, (a'), and astern of her place (a"). At half-past noon the wind flew suddenly to south-south-east,--the sea-breeze,--taking the s.h.i.+ps a little on the port bow. Most of them, on both sides, paid off from the enemy, the British to starboard, the French to port; but between the main lines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent upon such an incident, were left six s.h.i.+ps--four British and two French--that had turned the other way (Positions II and III).[145] These were the _Burford_, _Sultan_ (s), _Worcester_, and _Eagle_, fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth, in the British order; and the _Severe_ (b), third in the French, with the dismasted _Brillant_, which was now towards the rear of the fight (a). Under these conditions, the _Severe_, 64, underwent a short but close action with the _Sultan_, 74; and with two other British s.h.i.+ps, according to the report of the _Severe's_ captain. The remainder of the incident shall be given in the latter's own words.

"Seeing the French squadron drawing off,--for all the s.h.i.+ps except the _Brillant_ had fallen off on the other tack,--Captain de Cillart thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down. The s.h.i.+ps engaged with him immediately ceased their fire, and the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment the _Severe_ fell off to starboard, and her sails filled. Captain de Cillart then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones which remained manned, and he rejoined his squadron."

When the _Severe's_ flag came down, Suffren was approaching with his flags.h.i.+p. The _Sultan_ wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by the _Severe_ in so doing. The _Brillant_, whose mainmast had been shot away in conflict with either the _Sultan_ or the _Burford_, both much heavier s.h.i.+ps, had at this later phase of the fight fallen under the guns of the _Worcester_ and the _Eagle_. Her captain, de Saint-Felix, was one of the most resolute of Suffren's officers. She was rescued by the flags.h.i.+p, but she had lost 47 killed and 136 wounded,--an almost incredible slaughter, being over a third of the usual complement of a sixty-four; and Suffren's s.h.i.+ps were undermanned.

These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated s.h.i.+ps were approaching the enemy, and being approached by them, caused Hughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase; the flag for the line being hauled down. These signals would bring all the main body to the support of the separated s.h.i.+ps, without regard to their order in battle, and therefore with the utmost expedition that their remaining sail power would admit. Two of the fleet, however, made signals of disability; so Hughes annulled the orders, and at 1.30 formed on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadrons now stood in sh.o.r.e, and anch.o.r.ed at about 6 P.M.; the British near Negapatam, the French some ten miles north. The loss in the action had been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601 wounded.

On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he received word that two s.h.i.+ps of the line--the _Ill.u.s.tre_, 74, and _St. Michel_, 60, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops--were to be expected shortly at Pointe de Galle, then a Dutch port, on the south-west side of Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the 18th he was ready for sea; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder Ali delayed him until the 1st of August, when he started for Batacalo.

On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st the reinforcement joined him. Within forty-eight hours the supply-s.h.i.+ps were cleared, and the squadron sailed again with the object of taking Trincomalee.

On the 25th he was off the port, and, the operation being pushed energetically, the place capitulated on the 31st of August.

It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy on Hughes's part might have brought him up in time to prevent this mishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after the late action; and he did not sail thence until the 20th of August, notwithstanding that he apprehended an attempt upon Trincomalee.

Hence, when he arrived there on the 2d of September, not only had it pa.s.sed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had reembarked already the men and the guns that had been landed from his fleet.

When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea were hastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the French came out.

Hughes had been joined since the last action by the _Sceptre_, 64, so that the respective forces in the action fought off Trincomalee on September 3d were twelve of the line to fourteen, viz.: British, three 74's, one 70, one 68, six 64's, one 50; French, four 74's, seven 64's, one 60, two 50's. Suffren had also put into the line a 36-gun s.h.i.+p, the _Consolante_.[146]

While the French were getting underway from Trincomalee, the British fleet was standing south-south-east towards the entrance, close-hauled on the starboard tack, a fresh south-west monsoon blowing. When Hughes made out the hostile flags on the works, he kept away four points,[147] and steered east-south-east, still in column, under short canvas (A). Suffren pursued, being to windward yet astern, with his fleet on a line of bearing; that is, the line on which the s.h.i.+ps were ranged was not the same as the course which they were steering. This formation, (A), wherein the advance is oblique to the front, is very difficult to maintain. Wis.h.i.+ng to make the action, whatever the immediate event, decisive in results, by drawing the French well to leeward of the port, Hughes, who was a thorough seaman and had good captains, played with his eager enemy. "He kept avoiding me without taking flight," wrote Suffren; "or rather, he fled in good order, regulating his canvas by his worst sailers; and, keeping off by degrees, he steered from first to last ten or twelve different courses." Hughes, on his part, while perfectly clear as to his own object, was somewhat perplexed by the seeming indecision of an adversary whose fighting purpose he knew by experience. "Sometimes they edged down," he wrote; "sometimes they brought-to; in no regular order, as if undetermined what to do." These apparent vacillations were due to the difficulty of maintaining the line of bearing, which was to be the line of battle; and this difficulty was the greater, because Hughes was continually altering his course and Suffren's s.h.i.+ps were of unequal speed.

At length, at 2 P.M., being then twenty-five miles south-east of the port, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this movement might be carried out with precision, and all the vessels come into action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the wind, on the starboard tack, to rectify the order. This also being done poorly and slowly, he lost patience,--as Nelson afterwards said, "A day is soon lost in manoeuvring,"--and at 2.30, to spur on the laggard s.h.i.+ps, the French admiral gave the signal to attack, (a), specifying pistol-range. Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents promptly into line with the flags.h.i.+p, the latter fired a gun to enforce obedience. Her own side being still turned towards the British, as she waited, the report was taken by the flags.h.i.+p's men below decks to be the signal for opening fire, and her whole broadside was discharged. This example was followed by the other s.h.i.+ps, so that the engagement, instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his fleet now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The French, starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolution, under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven s.h.i.+ps, prematurely rounding-to to bring their broadsides to the enemy, and fore-reaching, formed a confused group (v), much to windward and somewhat ahead of the British van. Imperfectly deployed, they interfered with one another and their fire consequently could not be adequately developed.

In the rear a somewhat similar condition existed. Suffren, expecting the bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directed the _Vengeur_, 64, and the _Consolante_, 36, to double to leeward on the extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of the enemy were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be cut off. They attacked the rear British s.h.i.+p, the _Worcester_, 64 (w), to windward; but the _Monmouth_, 64 (m), dropping down to her support, and the _Vengeur_ catching fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled to haul off. Only Suffren's own s.h.i.+p, the _Heros_, 74 (a), and her next astern, the _Ill.u.s.tre_, 74, (i), came at once to close action with the British centre; but subsequently the _Ajax_, 64, succeeding in clearing herself from the snarl in the rear, took station ahead (j) of the _Heros_. Upon these three fell the brunt of the fight. They not only received the broadsides of the s.h.i.+ps immediately opposed to them, but, the wind having now become light yet free, the British vessels ahead and astern, (h, s,) by luffing or keeping off, played also upon them. "The enemy formed a semicircle around us," wrote Suffren's chief of staff, "and raked us ahead and astern, as the s.h.i.+p came up and fell off with the helm to leeward." The two seventy-fours were crushed under this fire. Both lost their main and mizzen masts in the course of the day, and the foretopmast of the flags.h.i.+p also fell. The _Ajax_, arriving later, and probably drawing less attention, had only a topmast shot away.

The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly distributed throughout the fleet. Only the rear s.h.i.+p lost an important spar,--the main topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned, and upon the two leading s.h.i.+ps, the _Exeter_ and _Isis_, that fell the heaviest fire, proportionately, of the French. From the position of the seven van s.h.i.+ps of the latter, such fire as they could make must needs be upon the extreme British van, and the _Exeter_ was forced to leave the line. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and 255 wounded; of which 64 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the _Heros_, _Ill.u.s.tre_, and _Ajax_. The British had 51 killed and 283 wounded; the greatest number of casualties in one s.h.i.+p being 56. Singularly enough, in such a small list of deaths, three were commanding officers: Captains Watt of the _Sultan_, Wood of the _Worcester_, and Lumley of the _Isis_.

At 5.30 P.M. the wind s.h.i.+fted suddenly from south-west to east-south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the other tack, and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at 6 P.M., that the mainmast of the French flags.h.i.+p came down. The van s.h.i.+ps of the French had towed their heads round with boats before 4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to a signal from Suffren; but the light airs and calms had r.e.t.a.r.ded them.

With the s.h.i.+ft they approached, and pa.s.sed in column (c) between their crippled vessels and the enemy. This manoeuvre, and the failure of daylight, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's report, several of his fleet "were making much water from shot-holes so very low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped; and the whole had suffered severely in their masts and rigging."

Trincomalee being in the enemy's possession, and the east coast of Ceylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the monsoon, he felt compelled to return to Madras, where he anch.o.r.ed on the 9th of September. Suffren regained Trincomalee on the 7th of the month, but the _Orient_, 74, running ash.o.r.e at the entrance and being lost, he remained outside until the 17th, saving material from the wreck.

The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to be accompanied by violent hurricanes, and is succeeded by the north-east monsoon, during which the east coasts of the peninsula and of Ceylon give a lee sh.o.r.e, with heavy surf. Naval operations, therefore, were suspended for the winter. During that season Trincomalee is the only secure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to go to Bombay, and for that purpose left Madras on the 17th of October. Four days later a reinforcement of five s.h.i.+ps of the line arrived from England, under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, who at once followed the Commander-in-Chief to the west coast. In the course of December the entire British force was united at Bombay.

In Trincomalee Suffren had a good anchorage; but the insufficiency of its resources, with other military considerations, decided him to winter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived there on the 2d of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore, where the _Bizarre_, 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20th of December he left Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened his stay to the eastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th of January, 1783, he was off Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence reached Trincomalee again on the 23d of February. There he was joined on the 10th of March by three s.h.i.+ps of the line from Europe: two 74's and one 64. Under their convoy came General de Bussy, with twenty-five hundred troops, which were at once despatched to Cuddalore.

On the 10th of April Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from Bombay, pa.s.sed Trincomalee on the way to Madras, The various maritime occurrences, wrecks and reinforcements, since the battle of September 3d had reversed the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen s.h.i.+ps of the line, one of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen under Suffren. Another important event in the affairs of India was the death of Hyder Ali, on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy was continued by his son, Tippoo Saib, the blow to the French was serious.

Under all the conditions, the British authorities were emboldened to attempt the reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to this enterprise marched from Madras, pa.s.sed round Cuddalore, and encamped south of it by the sh.o.r.e. The supply-s.h.i.+ps and lighter cruisers anch.o.r.ed near, while the fleet cruised to the southward. Being there to windward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it covered the operations against disturbance from the sea.

Towards the beginning of June the investment of the place was complete by land and by water. Intelligence of this state of things was brought on the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussey's direction was keeping his inferior fleet in Trincomalee until its services should be absolutely indispensable. Immediately upon receiving the news he left port, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then at anchor off Porto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his approach Hughes moved off, and anch.o.r.ed again five miles from the besieged place. For the next two days the French were baffled by the winds; but on the 17th the south-west monsoon resumed, and Suffren again drew near.

The British Vice-Admiral, not caring to accept action at anchor, got under way, and from that time till the 20th remained outside, trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which he was frustrated by the variableness of the winds. Meanwhile Suffren had anch.o.r.ed near the town, communicated with the general, and, being very short of men at the guns, had embarked twelve hundred troops for his expected battle; for it was evident that the issue of the siege would turn upon the control of the sea. On the 18th he weighed again, and the two fleets manoeuvred for the advantage, with light baffling airs, the British furthest from sh.o.r.e.

On the 20th of June, the wind holding at west with unexpected constancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack which Suffren evidently intended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force,--fifteen to eighteen,--probably contemplated an action that should be decisive only as regarded the fate of Cuddalore; that is, one which, while not resulting in the capture or destruction of s.h.i.+ps, should compel his opponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages. The British formed line on the port tack, heading to the northward. Suffren ranged his fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy, and was careful to see the order exact before bearing down. When the signal to attack was given, the French kept away together, and brought-to again on the weather beam of the British, just within point-blank range. The action lasted from shortly after 4 P.M. to nearly 7, and was general throughout both lines; but, as always experienced, the rears were less engaged than the centres and vans. No s.h.i.+p was taken; no very important spars seem to have been shot away. The loss of the British was 99 killed, 434 wounded; of the French, 102 killed, 386 wounded.