Where Men Win Glory Part 12

Marie decided "the best way to honor our relations.h.i.+p and the life Pat and I had together is to not get swallowed in the grief and anger and other negative emotions, which are definitely there, and can take over if you let them." Toward that end, shortly after Pat was killed, Marie, Alex Garwood, Reka Cseresnyes, Benjamin Hill, Kevin Tillman, and Jared Schrieber established the Pat Tillman Foundation,* the aim of which was to carry Pat's legacy forward by motivating young people to better themselves and their communities. Marie agreed to be chairman of the board of directors, a position that has evolved over the ensuing years into a demanding full-time job thanks to the organization's rapid growth. the aim of which was to carry Pat's legacy forward by motivating young people to better themselves and their communities. Marie agreed to be chairman of the board of directors, a position that has evolved over the ensuing years into a demanding full-time job thanks to the organization's rapid growth.

To achieve its goals, the foundation endowed a two-semester curriculum at Arizona State University's W. P. Cary School of Business. Called the Leaders.h.i.+p Through Action program, it is distinguished from leaders.h.i.+p programs at other universities, says Marie, "by its focus on action-which of course was what Pat was all about. He didn't just talk; he acted on his beliefs and tried to have a real impact on the things he considered to be important." Between fifteen and twenty "Tillman Scholars" are accepted into the program each year, and currently Marie is spearheading an effort to expand it to other academic inst.i.tutions around the nation.

To raise funds, the Pat Tillman Foundation holds a pair of 4.2-mile running events each April in Tempe and San Jose; the distance is based on the number Pat wore on his jersey when he played football for ASU: 42. In 2008, some 15,500 runners and walkers partic.i.p.ated in Pat's Run Tempe, and 6,000 in Pat's Run San Jose. "The number of people who come out has been growing every year," Marie says. "It's amazing."

The foundation has received hundreds of letters and e-mails recounting how ordinary folks were inspired by Pat's example to undertake extraordinary challenges. Although such tangible evidence of Pat's impact on the world has been a solace to Marie, she concedes that his death in April 2004 has left a void of such immensity that it's probably impossible for other people to even imagine the pall it still casts. "It left a hole in my life that's huge," she says.

At some point, Marie predicts, "The sadness will run its course." A moment later, with stoic certainty, she adds, "But it's never going to go away."

* www.pattillmanfoundation.org.

PART FIVE

"... But you, Achilles, there's not a man in the world more blest than you- there never has been, never will be one.

Time was, when you were alive, we Argives honored you as a G.o.d, and now down here, I see, you lord it over the dead in all your power.

So grieve no more at dying, great Achilles."I rea.s.sured the ghost, but he broke out, protesting, "No winning words about death to me me, s.h.i.+ning Odysseus!

By G.o.d, I'd rather slave on earth for another man- some dirt-poor tenant farmer who sc.r.a.pes to keep alive- than rule down here over all the breathless dead...."-HOMER, The Odyssey The Odyssey

POSTSCRIPT.

January 5, 2007. Twelve miles south of the hillside where Pat Tillman lost his life, a dozen sandbag bunkers squat atop an outcrop of naked bedrock wreathed in smoke from smoldering garbage. Patches of dirty, crusted snow scab the ground. The stench of an overflowing latrine hangs in the air. In the distance, badlands corrugate the landscape without apparent end, their slopes dotted with pines and junipers and th.o.r.n.y, stunted oaks.

This bleak outpost, surrounded by tangles of razor wire, is occupied by a platoon of American infantrymen augmented by approximately forty Afghan National Army troops. Designated Observation Post Four-OP4, for short-it's the northernmost of four hilltop encampments established around the perimeter of Forward Operating Base Tillman to prevent the latter from being overrun by enemy forces. Situated half a mile from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the so-called Zero Line, OP4 provides a bird's-eye view of a route used by al-Qaeda and the Taliban to infiltrate Afghanistan from havens in North Waziristan-one of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Although nominally governed by Pakistan, in reality the Tribal Areas function as autonomous states beyond the control of Islamabad. Launching their a.s.saults from North Waziristan, fighters under the command of Jalaluddin Haqqani attack FOB Tillman or its observation posts every three or four days, on average.

The majority of these attacks originate from the vicinity of a Pakistan Army firebase dubbed the Gray Castle by the American troops because of its crenellated concrete walls. Perched atop a b.u.t.te directly across the border from OP4, the Gray Castle is so close to the American encampment that Pakistani soldiers are visible with the naked eye as they stand guard on the parapets. Last night, OP4 was. .h.i.t by a barrage of Taliban rockets fired from the vicinity of the Gray Castle, prompting the commanding officer of FOB Tillman to request a meeting with his Pakistani counterpart in order to avert such attacks in the future.

The two officers, each accompanied by a large contingent of subordinates and security forces, grimly face each other across the border on the morning following the incident, buffeted by a frigid breeze. Major Umar, commander of Pakistan's Thirty-ninth Frontier Corps, is a trim, dapper man wearing an immaculately pressed uniform and kid-leather driving gloves. He begins the dialogue by adamantly denying that the rocket attack originated in Pakistan. When the U.S. Army captain Scott Horrigan-dressed in battle-worn camouflage and scuffed combat boots-replies that azimuth a.n.a.lysis of the fresh blast craters at OP4 leaves no doubt that the rockets had been launched from high ground just north of the Gray Castle, Umar grows indignant. "You may claim that the attacks come from Pakistan," he declares in perfect King's English, "but I had ten patrols in the area last night, and they didn't hear anything, didn't see anything. We will look at your claims, but no, I don't think any of these attacks are coming from Pakistan territory. And if I can be so bold to say it, I don't think the enemy, the miscreants, have the courage to use my area to fire upon American or Afghan positions. I will not allow that.... If any miscreants dare to come into this area, I will personally deal with them myself."

Despite Umar's a.s.surances, a preponderance of evidence gathered by American intelligence operatives indicates that the Pakistani Frontier Corps has been extensively infiltrated by the Taliban throughout the Tribal Areas, and that Pakistani forces have cooperated both pa.s.sively and actively in numerous attacks on American and NATO troops-notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan is a putative ally of the United States and that Islamabad has received more than $17 billion from Was.h.i.+ngton since September 2001 to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Two nights after the powwow between Umar and Horrigan, OP4 is. .h.i.t with nine more enemy rockets; during the first three weeks of January, the FOB is attacked a total of six times by enemy forces based in Pakistan.

On January 27, the frustrated Americans hold another meeting with Pakistani military officers, on this occasion taking the highly unusual step of inviting them to tour a radar installation at FOB Tillman, during which the Pakistanis are shown cla.s.sified data gathered from Q-36 antibattery radar that pinpoints the precise locations within Pakistan from which recent rocket barrages were launched. Afterward, Captain Dennis Knowles expresses doubt that this new evidence will persuade the Pakistanis to do anything to curtail the attacks. "I'll bet you five bucks," he predicts, not bothering to mask his irritation, "that OP4 is. .h.i.t again tonight."

At 6:15 that evening, an hour after dark, an Afghan soldier sees a light flicker on a hillside across from OP4 and pops off a few AK-47 rounds at the incandescent pinp.r.i.c.k, whereupon an estimated fifty to sixty Haqqani fighters immediately return fire from positions to the west, north, and east. For the next fifteen minutes, a squall of bullets, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107-millimeter rockets, and 105-millimeter Howitzer sh.e.l.ls shreds the air over OP4 without pause, and the shooting continues at a lesser rate for another hour before the multi-p.r.o.nged attack is repelled and the insurgents retreat back to their hideouts in Pakistan. A young private named Harker is shot in the left thigh, requiring a Black Hawk helicopter to swoop down under fire and medevac him to Bagram. By the time the battle sputters to an end, more than thirteen thousand rounds have been fired at the enemy, killing three Taliban and reportedly wounding ten more.

In April 2004, Pat Tillman was deployed to Afghanistan as part of a campaign to subdue the forces of Jalaluddin Haqqani and bring Khost Province under control of President Hamid Karzai's government. During the half a decade since Tillman perished in that effort, neither of those aims has been achieved-the Taliban/al-Qaeda presence in Khost and adjacent Paktika Province is stronger now than it has been at any time since the first months of the U.S. invasion in 20012002. Villagers throughout the area defiantly fly the white flag of the Taliban from their homes. Less than a mile from the eastern end of Tillman Pa.s.s (the name U.S. soldiers spontaneously bestowed upon the canyon where Pat was killed), a loudspeaker at a bustling madra.s.sa blares anti-American messages into the surrounding community while young boys are instructed in the principles of jihad within the school's walls.

As these words are being written in early 2010, Spera is cla.s.sified as "denied territory" by the U.S. Army-meaning it's denied to American and NATO forces, not the enemy's. The district is firmly in the grip of the Haqqani Network, which has maintained close ties to al-Qaeda ever since bin Laden and Haqqani developed a strong personal bond during the Soviet-Afghan War. Haqqani's fighters have adopted increasingly vicious means of achieving their ends, including ma.s.sive suicide bombings, a.s.sa.s.sinations of local officials and teachers, and the indiscriminate beheading of villagers. Although Jalaluddin is still the nominal head of the Haqqani organization, leaders.h.i.+p of day-to-day operations has been pa.s.sed to his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, known as Siraj. According to the Army lieutenant colonel Dave Anders, "Siraj is the one dictating the new parameters of brutality a.s.sociated with Taliban senior leaders.h.i.+p." The Army is offering a five-million-dollar reward for information leading to Siraj's capture or elimination.

The revival of the Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgency isn't limited to Khost and Paktika provinces; the entire nation has spiraled deeper into violence and chaos. Afghanistan presently supplies 95 percent of the opium used in the global heroin trade, and narcotics production accounts for half of the country's gross domestic product. The Taliban takes a significant percentage of this drug money, which is one of the insurgents' primary sources of revenue, and much of the rest flows to high-ranking members of the Karzai administration, further debasing a government that was permeated with corruption even before the Taliban renaissance. Having squandered most of the credibility he once had with the Afghan people, Karzai is presently teetering on the brink, along with his government. On April 27, 2008, a cadre of Haqqani insurgents carried out an audacious, elaborately planned attempt to a.s.sa.s.sinate Karzai during the Afghan National Day military parade in the heart of Kabul. Although the president escaped injury, four others were killed, including a member of parliament who was sitting near Karzai in the reviewing stands.

Taliban and al-Qaeda forces now move freely throughout the Pashtun regions on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, and Osama bin Laden-still on the loose-is believed by most of the U.S. intelligence community to be securely ensconced on Pakistan's side of the Zero Line. Attacks on U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan have increased precipitously in each of the past four years. Insurgents have established hundreds of new bases and training camps in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. Seth G. Jones, the author of a highly regarded study for the RAND National Defense Research Inst.i.tute t.i.tled Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, warned in June 2008, "The United States faces a threat from Al Qaeda today that is comparable to what it faced on September 11, 2001."

There is broad agreement across the political spectrum that the alarming expansion of the Afghan insurgency occurred because the Bush administration's preoccupation with Iraq led to a strategy dubbed "economy of force" (a euphemism for "war on the cheap") when it came to Afghanistan. But the mounting troubles on the latter front are attributable to much more than ill-conceived policies. The greatest threats to peace and stability in Afghanistan are now firmly rooted outside its borders, in Pakistan, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have found safe haven since early 2002. Owing to the convoluted, fractious, and exceedingly volatile nature of Pakistani politics, subduing the insurgent forces running amok within Pakistan presents a quandary of such apparently intractable complexity that it's unclear how American diplomats and military leaders might even begin to grapple with the problem, let alone engineer a remedy.

Chaos, in the meantime, sweeps across both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the blood-dimmed tide is loosed. On July 7, 2008, during morning rush hour in Kabul, the Afghan capital, a jihadi jihadi detonated a powerful car bomb outside the Indian emba.s.sy, killing more than fifty people, including the Indian defense attache, although most of the victims were ordinary Afghan citizens who'd been standing in line to apply for visas for travel to India. American intelligence agencies determined that the suicide bomber who carried out the attack was a Haqqani operative. detonated a powerful car bomb outside the Indian emba.s.sy, killing more than fifty people, including the Indian defense attache, although most of the victims were ordinary Afghan citizens who'd been standing in line to apply for visas for travel to India. American intelligence agencies determined that the suicide bomber who carried out the attack was a Haqqani operative.

Additionally, the New York Times New York Times reported that the ISI-Pakistan's powerful national spy service-had played an active role in planning the emba.s.sy bombing, and that "the highest levels of Pakistan's security apparatus"-including the leader of Pakistan's army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani-knew about such plans before the attack was carried out but did nothing to intercede. This alarming revelation confirmed complaints about the ISI's cozy relations.h.i.+p with the Taliban that U.S. soldiers on the front lines in Afghanistan had been expressing privately for years. According to the reported that the ISI-Pakistan's powerful national spy service-had played an active role in planning the emba.s.sy bombing, and that "the highest levels of Pakistan's security apparatus"-including the leader of Pakistan's army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani-knew about such plans before the attack was carried out but did nothing to intercede. This alarming revelation confirmed complaints about the ISI's cozy relations.h.i.+p with the Taliban that U.S. soldiers on the front lines in Afghanistan had been expressing privately for years. According to the Times Times, proof of ISI involvement was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region. The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Within the ranks of the Pakistani military and intelligence services, support for the Taliban is not universal. Some units of the Frontier Corps have battled Haqqani's forces with courage and resolve. Indeed, more than three thousand Pakistani soldiers and police officers have been killed fighting insurgents in the Tribal Areas, four times the number of Americans who have died in Afghanistan. But even as some Pakistani soldiers are losing their lives in a campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, other Pakistani military units, as well as powerful factions within the ISI, are providing insurgents with money, weapons, and secret intelligence given to Pakistan by the CIA and the American military. In dozens of doc.u.mented instances, units of the Pakistani Frontier Corps have shot at American forces across the international border.

Among the insurgent groups supported by the ISI, none has enjoyed the fruits of such backing more than the Haqqani Network, which isn't surprising given that Jalaluddin Haqqani and the ISI have maintained an intimate, mutually beneficial relations.h.i.+p that goes back three decades. Presently that relations.h.i.+p is defined by a tacit agreement between the Haqqanis and the ISI: if the Haqqanis restrict their attacks to American, Afghan, and NATO targets, and refrain from attacking Pakistani troops, Pakistan will refrain from interfering with the Haqqani Network.

The emba.s.sy bombing in Kabul was just one of many recent a.s.saults occasioned by the pact between the Haqqanis and the ISI. On December 30, 2009, a Jordanian doctor working as a double agent for al-Qaeda detonated an uncommonly sophisticated explosive vest at a covert CIA base in Khost known as Camp Chapman. It was the deadliest strike against the CIA in more than a quarter century, killing seven American officers, including the chief of the base, a forty-five-year-old woman who was one of the CIA's leading al-Qaeda experts. The suicide bomber had been invited inside the ultrasecure compound, which is less than two miles from FOB Salerno, after convincing the CIA that he had "urgent information" that would lead them directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's most influential collaborator. "There is no way this operation would have occurred in Khost without the knowledge and active support of Jalaluddin [Haqqani] and/or his son," Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, told the a.s.sociated Press. "They and their organization own the area...and nothing occurs that would impact their tribe or its allies without their knowledge and OK. Both men, moreover, would be delighted to help bin Laden in any way they can."

The Pakistani ISI continues to a.s.sist Haqqani and other Islamist insurgents for the same reason the American CIA once did: because the jihadis jihadis function as a proxy army willing to bear arms against a mortal enemy in possession of a nuclear a.r.s.enal with whom the government in Islamabad dares not wage war openly. In Pakistan's case, that enemy is India (a.s.sisted by its close ally Afghanistan), which Islamabad considers at least as great a threat to its security as the United States viewed the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As long as Pakistan feels imperiled by India, it is unlikely to mount an effective campaign to eradicate the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban from its Tribal Areas-an undertaking that would pose staggering challenges and tremendous risks for the current government in Islamabad, which is widely acknowledged to be corrupt and incompetent, and has only a tenuous hold on the reins of power. function as a proxy army willing to bear arms against a mortal enemy in possession of a nuclear a.r.s.enal with whom the government in Islamabad dares not wage war openly. In Pakistan's case, that enemy is India (a.s.sisted by its close ally Afghanistan), which Islamabad considers at least as great a threat to its security as the United States viewed the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As long as Pakistan feels imperiled by India, it is unlikely to mount an effective campaign to eradicate the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban from its Tribal Areas-an undertaking that would pose staggering challenges and tremendous risks for the current government in Islamabad, which is widely acknowledged to be corrupt and incompetent, and has only a tenuous hold on the reins of power.

By staging hit-and-run attacks on targets in Afghanistan from camps across the Zero Line in Pakistan, the Haqqani clan and its ilk are using precisely the same strategy against the United States that they employed twenty years ago to defeat the Soviets at the behest of the United States. And in the long run, the insurgents may emerge just as victorious as they did in 1989, because until Pakistan ceases to give them sanctuary, it will be impossible for the United States and its allies to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban by military force, regardless of how many soldiers the United States deploys to Afghanistan-just as it was impossible for the Soviets to defeat the mujahideen despite the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Army.

If staying in Afghanistan is looking more and more like a no-win prospect for the United States, so, too, does pulling out. Both options are fraught with uncertainty, although the strife in South Asia is so incendiary, and so thoroughly entangled with American security interests, that American soldiers are apt to be engaged in Afghanistan for years to come, if not decades. And if recent events are any indication, Americans are likely to be fighting and dying in Pakistan as well.

In July 2008, President Bush issued secret orders for U.S. Special Operations Forces to begin carrying out unilateral ground attacks in Pakistani territory without prior approval from Islamabad, marking a drastic s.h.i.+ft in American policy and unleas.h.i.+ng an outpouring of ferocious anti-American sentiment throughout Pakistan. The rationale for the new strategy was self-evident (the Pakistanis seemed unwilling to and/or incapable of eradicating enemy sanctuaries from their territory), but it was a very perilous gamble. Covert American action thirty years ago in this same corner of the world (which seemed then like such a good idea) is still yielding cataclysmic repercussions that were impossible to imagine at the time. Whatever near-term tactical advantage is gained by sending American soldiers over the Zero Line to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it would be naive to presume such actions won't have unforeseen consequences thirty years hence, some of which may prove to be no less cataclysmic. Blowback, the CIA calls it.

As Bruce Riedel warned in an article t.i.tled "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,"

Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. All of the nightmares of the twenty-first century come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, military dictators.h.i.+p, and above all, international terrorism. Pakistan almost uniquely is both a major victim of terrorism and a major sponsor of terrorism. It has been the scene of horrific acts of terrorist violence, including the murder of Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto in late 2007, and it has been one of the most prolific state sponsors of terror aimed at advancing its national security interests. For the next American president, there is no issue or country more critical to get right....

In his 1992 best seller, The End of History and the Last Man The End of History and the Last Man, Francis f.u.kuyama predicted that the inexorable spread of capitalist democracy "would mean the end of wars and b.l.o.o.d.y revolutions. Agreeing on ends, men would have no large causes for which to fight. They would satisfy their needs through economic activity, but they would no longer have to risk their lives in battle." f.u.kuyama acknowledged that this rosy future would come with a slight downside, however: the emasculation of humankind. World peace would sp.a.w.n "the creature who reportedly emerges at the end of history, the last man." last man."

"The last man" was a derisive term coined by Friedrich Nietzsche in his overstuffed masterwork, Thus Spoke Zarathustra Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In Nietzsche's estimation, according to f.u.kuyama, modern liberal democracies produced men composed entirely of desire and reason, clever at finding new ways to satisfy a host of petty wants through the calculation of long-term self-interest.... It is not an accident that people in democratic societies are preoccupied with material gain and live in an economic world devoted to the satisfaction of the myriad small needs of the body.... The last man at the end of history knows knows better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless battles in which men fought over whether they should be Christian or Muslim, Protestant or Catholic, German or French. The loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of courage and sacrifice were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices. Men with modern educations were content to sit at home, congratulating themselves on their broadmindedness and lack of fanaticism. better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless battles in which men fought over whether they should be Christian or Muslim, Protestant or Catholic, German or French. The loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of courage and sacrifice were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices. Men with modern educations were content to sit at home, congratulating themselves on their broadmindedness and lack of fanaticism.

Mocking these contemptible "last men," Nietzsche's Zarathustra famously declares, "Thus you stick out your chests-but alas, they are hollow!" Which prompted f.u.kuyama to label such milquetoasts "men without chests."

Given the current state of turmoil in South Asia, Africa, and the Caucasus, the onset of international peace prophesied by f.u.kuyama does not seem imminent. But his forecast about the ascendancy of the American wimp remains disturbingly accurate, according to the historian Lee Harris. In a polemic t.i.tled The Suicide of Reason The Suicide of Reason, Harris argues, The problem is not that f.u.kuyama is dead wrong; the problem is that he is half right. Unfortunately for us, the wrong half.In the West, we are perilously getting down to our our last man. Liberal democracy, among us, is achieving the goal that f.u.kuyama predicted for it: It is eliminating the alpha males from our midst, and at a dizzyingly accelerating rate. But in Muslim societies, the alpha male is still alive and well. While we in America are drugging our alpha boys with Ritalin, the Muslims are doing everything in their power to encourage their alpha boys to be tough, aggressive, and ruthless.... We are proud if our sons get into a good college; they are proud if their sons die as martyrs. last man. Liberal democracy, among us, is achieving the goal that f.u.kuyama predicted for it: It is eliminating the alpha males from our midst, and at a dizzyingly accelerating rate. But in Muslim societies, the alpha male is still alive and well. While we in America are drugging our alpha boys with Ritalin, the Muslims are doing everything in their power to encourage their alpha boys to be tough, aggressive, and ruthless.... We are proud if our sons get into a good college; they are proud if their sons die as martyrs.To rid your society of high-testosterone alpha males may bring peace and quiet; but if you have an enemy that is building up an army of alpha boys to hate you fanatically and who have vowed to destroy you, you will be committing suicide....The end of testosterone in the West alone will not culminate in the end of history, but it may well culminate in the end of the West.

Harris's dire conjecture certainly grabs one's attention, but it seems at least as far off the mark as f.u.kuyama's. Anyone who has spent time with American troops in Afghanistan or Iraq is bound to take issue with Harris's contention that the current generation of young men raised in the West suffers from a deficit of testosterone.

In truth, our society produces all manner of males, in proportions roughly comparable to those in Muslim (and other) societies: compa.s.sionate and cruel; leaders and followers; brainiacs and f.u.c.kwits; heroes and cowards; selfless exemplars and narcissistic pretenders. Patriotic zeal runs strong in the United States, and young Americans are no less susceptible to the allure of martial adventure than young males from other cultures, including fanatical tribal cultures. Decades from now, when the president of the United States declares yet another war on some national adversary, a great many men (and more than a few women) will doubtless stream forth to enlist, just as eager to join the fight as the Americans who flocked to recruiting offices during previous armed conflicts-regardless of whether the war in question is a reckless blunder or vital to the survival of the Republic.

If the United States' involvement in future wars is inevitable, so, too, is it inevitable that American soldiers will fall victim to friendly fire in those conflicts, for the simple reason that fratricide is part and parcel of every war. While acknowledging that the "statistical dimensions of the friendly fire problem have yet to be defined; reliable data are simply not available in most cases," The Oxford Companion to American Military History The Oxford Companion to American Military History estimates that between 2 percent and 25 percent of the casualties in America's wars are attributable to friendly fire. estimates that between 2 percent and 25 percent of the casualties in America's wars are attributable to friendly fire.

Whatever the statistical likelihood of being killed or wounded by friendly fire, it seems to deter few men and women from enlisting in the Armed Forces. When one talks to soldiers on the front lines, most of them accept that fratricide occasionally comes with the territory; they view it as just one of many occupational hazards in their line of work. As an infantryman, Pat Tillman understood that outside the wire, bad things happen. But he was an optimist. Archetypically American, he was confident that right would usually prevail over wrong. When he swore the oath of enlistment in the summer of 2002, he trusted that those responsible for sending him into battle would do so in good faith. At the time, he didn't envisage that any of them would trifle with his life, or misrepresent the facts of his death, in order to further careers or advance a political agenda.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche introduced the concept of the ubermensch: ubermensch: an exemplary, transcendent figure who is the polar opposite of "the last man" or "men without chests." The an exemplary, transcendent figure who is the polar opposite of "the last man" or "men without chests." The ubermensch ubermensch is virtuous, loyal, ambitious and outspoken, disdainful of religious dogma and suspicious of received wisdom, intensely engaged in the hurly-burly of the real world. Above all he is pa.s.sionate-a connoisseur of both "the highest joys" and "the deepest sorrows." He believes in the moral imperative to defend (with his life, if necessary) ideals such as truth, beauty, honor, and justice. He is self-a.s.sured. He is a risk taker. He regards suffering as salutary, and scorns the path of least resistance. is virtuous, loyal, ambitious and outspoken, disdainful of religious dogma and suspicious of received wisdom, intensely engaged in the hurly-burly of the real world. Above all he is pa.s.sionate-a connoisseur of both "the highest joys" and "the deepest sorrows." He believes in the moral imperative to defend (with his life, if necessary) ideals such as truth, beauty, honor, and justice. He is self-a.s.sured. He is a risk taker. He regards suffering as salutary, and scorns the path of least resistance.

Nietzsche, it is not difficult to imagine, would have recognized in Pat Tillman more than a few of the attributes he ascribed to his ubermensch ubermensch. Prominent among such qualities were Tillman's robust masculinity and its corollary, his willingness to stand up and fight. Because Tillman's story conforms in some regards to the cla.s.sic narrative of the tragic hero, and the protagonist of such a tale always possesses a tragic flaw, it might be tempting to regard Tillman's resounding alpha maleness as his Achilles' heel, the trait that ultimately led to his death.

A compelling argument can be made, however, that the sad end he met in Afghanistan was more accurately a function of his stubborn idealism-his insistence on trying to do the right thing. In which case it wasn't a tragic flaw that brought Tillman down, but a tragic virtue.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

I am deeply indebted to Marie Ugenti Tillman, whose contributions to Where Men Win Glory Where Men Win Glory were beyond measure. Although other members of the Tillman family declined to be interviewed on the record for this book, I nevertheless owe profound thanks to Pat Tillman's parents, Mary and Patrick Tillman; his brothers, Kevin and Richard Tillman; and his uncle, Stephen Michael Spalding, for their relentless efforts to uncover the truth about Pat's death. Without their determination to hold the Army accountable, most of what is known about the fratricide and subsequent cover-up would never have been revealed. I am especially grateful to Mary and Kevin, who deserve most of the credit for bringing the truth to light. I encourage anyone who wants to learn more about Pat's life to read Mary Tillman's beautiful, searing book, were beyond measure. Although other members of the Tillman family declined to be interviewed on the record for this book, I nevertheless owe profound thanks to Pat Tillman's parents, Mary and Patrick Tillman; his brothers, Kevin and Richard Tillman; and his uncle, Stephen Michael Spalding, for their relentless efforts to uncover the truth about Pat's death. Without their determination to hold the Army accountable, most of what is known about the fratricide and subsequent cover-up would never have been revealed. I am especially grateful to Mary and Kevin, who deserve most of the credit for bringing the truth to light. I encourage anyone who wants to learn more about Pat's life to read Mary Tillman's beautiful, searing book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: My Tribute to Pat Tillman Boots on the Ground by Dusk: My Tribute to Pat Tillman.

Thanks are owed as well to the numerous individuals at Doubleday, Broadway, Vintage/Anchor, and Knopf who have a.s.sisted me with this project over the past three years, most prominently Charlie Conrad, Bill Thomas, Steve Rubin, David Drake, Alison Rich, Kathy Trager, Sonny Mehta, John Fontana, Caroline Cunningham, Bette Alexander, John Pitts, Sonia Nash, Carol Janeway, Deb Foley, Rebecca Gardner, Jenna Ciongoli, Laura Swerdloff, LuAnn Walther, Marty Asher, Amy Metsch, Anne Messitte, Dana Maxson, Russell Perreault, John Siciliano, Thomas Dobrowski, and Sloane Crosley. Thanks also to my agent John Ware, to Matthew Ericson for creating the maps, to Amy Fitzgibbons for a.s.sistance with Freedom of Information Act requests, and to Ingrid Sterner for copyediting the ma.n.u.script.

Linda Moore, Bill Briggs, Becky Hall, David Roberts, Sharon Roberts, Pat Joseph, Bill Costello, and MaryAnn Briggs read early drafts of the ma.n.u.script and offered vital criticism.

The book benefited in crucial ways from conversations I had with Jade Lane, Russell Baer, Mel Ward, Brad Jacobson, Bradley Shepherd, Jason Parsons, Josey Boatright, Will Aker, the late Jared Monti, the late Abdul Ghani, Seymour Hersh, Paul Brookes, Ghulam Khalil, Michael Svensson, Abdul Khaliq, Mohammed Akram, Naim, Michael McGovern, Yar Mohammed, Zach Warren, Dennis Knowles, Ron Locklear, Eric Hayes, Scott Horrigan, Frank Adkinson, Allen Moore, John Hawes, Paul Fitzpatrick, Aaron Swain, Ehsan Farzan, Dominic Cariello, Mike Slusher, Alex Garwood, Christine Ugenti Garwood, Benjamin Hill, Jamie Hill, Brandon Hill, Tulio Tourinho, Reka Cseresnyes, Darin Rosas, Carol Rosas, Erin Clarke Bradford, Mike Bradford, Kemp Hare, Scott Strong, Dan Jensen, and Carson Sprott.

While conducting research in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007, I received invaluable help from Ansar Rahel, Randy Kohlman, Franz Zenz, Eric Zenk, the late Joseph Fenty, John Breitsprecker, Tony Bennett, Paul Miovas, Mike Vieira, Ross Berkoff, Christopher Cunningham, Dan Dillow, Hunter Marksberry, John Garner, Matt Gibson, Franklin Woods, Derek James, Jorge Villaverde, Delbert Byers, Mike Howard, Paul Deis, Kevin Boyd, Thomas Marbury Jr., Jason Quash, Brian Serota, Dan Huvane, Matthew Cannon, Doc Devlin, Craig Westberg, Kevin Grant, Lawrence Willams, Brandon Peac.o.c.k, Keith Macklin, Zach Schultz, Josh Renken, David Beebe, Daniel Linnihan, John Tierney, Mike Hanson, Tracy Less, Stephanie Van Geete, Matt Brown, Bradley Hubble, Todd Lowell, Elissa Hurley, Dan Bean, Ann Lockwood, Charlotte Hildebrand, Tom Baker, Bill Metheny, Cathrin Fraker, Ryan Woolf, Jason Sartori, Peter Parison, Roshan Karokhel, Ahmad Shah Sayeed, Baz Mohammed, Mohamed Azim, Abadkhan Akelzareen, Abdul Gafar, Shah Mahmad, Mohammed Sameh, Tayeb Haidari, Mohammed Zakirulah, Noor Aqa, Mohammed Amin, Hedayat Hedayatullah, Javid Nuristani, s.h.i.+r Mohammed, Kobus Human, and Martin Venter.

For providing counsel and support over the long haul, special thanks to Mark Bryant, Tom Hornbein, Harry Kent, Owen Kent, Martin Shapiro, Nancy McElwain, Eric Zacharias, Sam Brower, Tom Sam Steed, Carine McCandless, Sean Penn, Eddie Vedder, Chip Lee, Brian Nuttall, Marilyn Voorhis, Drew Simon, David Wolf, Ashley Humphries, Eric Love, Josie Heath, Margaret Katz, Carly Hare, Leah Sullivan, Carol Krakauer, Karin Krakauer, Wendy Krakauer, Sarah Krakauer, Andrew Krakauer, Tim Stewart, Mel Kohn, Robin Krakauer, Rosie Stewart, Ali Stewart, Shannon Costello, Mo Costello, Ari Kohn, Miriam Kohn, Kelsi Krakauer, A. J. Krakauer, the late Ralph Moore, and Mary Moore.

NOTES.

The following notes doc.u.ment the main sources for each chapter; they do not list the source of every quotation, anecdote, and fact. Pa.s.sages throughout the book that refer to the ongoing American military campaign in Afghanistan (including the battle that claimed Pat Tillman's life), and to the politics, history, ethnography, geography, geology, and botany of South Asia, were informed in large part by research I undertook on the ground in Afghanistan in May and June 2006, and from December 2006 through February 2007. I spent most of that time in remote parts of Konar, Khost, Paktika, and Paktia provinces, where I accompanied troops from the U.S. Army's Tenth Mountain Division, Eighty-second Airborne Division, and Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha 773; U.S. Army National Guard Embedded Training Teams; the Afghan National Army; the Afghan Special Forces; and the Afghan Security Guard on numerous combat missions along the Pakistan border.

PROLOGUE.

Details about the events of April 22, 2004, in the Spera District of Khost Province came from interviews and correspondence with Jade Lane, Mel Ward, Will Aker, Bradley Shepherd, Russell Baer, Josey Boatright, Brad Jacobson, and Jason Parsons, augmented by sworn testimony published in "Army Regulation (AR) 156 Investigation- Corporal Pat Tillman," by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, January 10, 2005; "Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Pat Tillman, U.S. Army, Report Number IPO2007E001, March 26, 2007," by the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense; "Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield," preliminary transcript, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, April 24, 2007; and "Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes," by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 17, 2008. References to a July 2007 a.s.sociated Press article were based on "New Details on Tillman's Death," by Martha Mendoza, published on July 27, 2007. The reference to comments made by Ann Coulter was based on a column she wrote t.i.tled "2004: Highlights and Lowlifes," published in Human Events Human Events on December 30, 2004. The reference to Ted Rall was based on a comic strip he published on April 29, 2004. on December 30, 2004. The reference to Ted Rall was based on a comic strip he published on April 29, 2004.

CHAPTER ONE.

My sources for the material about Pat Tillman's youth were Boots on the Ground by Dusk: My Tribute to Pat Tillman Boots on the Ground by Dusk: My Tribute to Pat Tillman, by Mary Tillman; interviews and correspondence with Marie Tillman, Benjamin Hill, Jamie Hill, and Carson Sprott; the diaries of Pat Tillman; and Fearless, a Fearless, a forty-five-minute film about Tillman produced by Asylum Entertainment for the Outdoor Life Network. My main sources for the material about the Soviet-Afghan conflict were "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan," a 1998 interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski published in forty-five-minute film about Tillman produced by Asylum Entertainment for the Outdoor Life Network. My main sources for the material about the Soviet-Afghan conflict were "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan," a 1998 interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski published in Le Nouvel Observateur; Le Nouvel Observateur; "Transcript of Bin Laden's October Interview," the transcript of an interview with bin Laden by Al Jazeera Television correspondent Tayseer Alouni in October 2001; "Transcript of Bin Laden's October Interview," the transcript of an interview with bin Laden by Al Jazeera Television correspondent Tayseer Alouni in October 2001; Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, by Steve Coll; Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Time Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Time, by George Crile; The Bear Went over the Mountain: The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, edited by Lester W. Grau; Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, by Stephen Tanner; and "Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan," by Denny R. Nelson. The Francis f.u.kuyama quotation was taken from his essay "The End of History?"

CHAPTER TWO.

My sources for the material about Pat Tillman's youth were Boots on the Ground by Dusk; Boots on the Ground by Dusk; interviews and correspondence with Marie Tillman, Benjamin Hill, Jamie Hill, and Carson Sprott; and interviews and correspondence with Marie Tillman, Benjamin Hill, Jamie Hill, and Carson Sprott; and New Almaden New Almaden, by Michael Boulland and Arthur Boudreault. Details about Forward Operating Base Tillman, the Afghan Security Guard, and Pashtunwali Pashtunwali came from research I conducted in Konar, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces in 2006 and 2007, which included interviews with Jared Monti, Aaron Swain, Dennis Knowles, Ron Locklear, Eric Hayes, Ghulam Khalil, and Abdul Ghani. came from research I conducted in Konar, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces in 2006 and 2007, which included interviews with Jared Monti, Aaron Swain, Dennis Knowles, Ron Locklear, Eric Hayes, Ghulam Khalil, and Abdul Ghani.

CHAPTER THREE.

My main sources were Ghost Wars; The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 Ghost Wars; The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, by Lawrence Wright; The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States; and Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban.

CHAPTER FOUR.

My sources were interviews and correspondence with Marie Tillman, Benjamin Hill, Jamie Hill, and Carson Sprott; articles published in the San Jose Mercury News; Boots on the Ground by Dusk; San Jose Mercury News; Boots on the Ground by Dusk; and and I've Got Things to Do with My Life: Fat Tillman: The Making of an American Hero I've Got Things to Do with My Life: Fat Tillman: The Making of an American Hero, by Mike Towle.

CHAPTER FIVE.

My sources were interviews and correspondence with Marie Tillman, Darin Rosas, Mike Bradford, Erin Clarke Bradford, Kemp Hare, Scott Strong, and Carol Rosas; and Boots on the Ground by Dusk Boots on the Ground by Dusk.

CHAPTER SIX.

My sources were interviews and correspondence with Marie Tillman, Darin Rosas, Mike Bradford, Erin Clarke Bradford, Kemp Hare, Scott Strong, Carol Rosas, and Dan Jensen; and Boots on the Ground by Dusk Boots on the Ground by Dusk.