Polity Athenians and Lacedaemonians Part 2

(16) See Thuc. i. 143. Pericles says: "Reflect, if we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are."

(17) Or, "are the more ready to cringe." See, for the word {uperkhontai}, "Pol. Lac." viii. 2; Plat. "Crit." 53 E; Rutherford, "New Phrynichus," p. 110.

(18) Or, "by the minority"; or, "by a handful of people."

(19) As they did during the Peloponnesian war; and earlier still, before the battle of Salamis, in the case of that one island.

(20) Or, "but mean the forfeiture of others."

Further, states oligarchically governed are forced to ratify their alliances and solemn oaths, and if they fail to abide by their contracts, the offence, by whomsoever committed, (21) lies nominally at the door of the oligarchs who entered upon the contract. But in the case of engagements entered into by a democracy it is open to the People to throw the blame on the single individual who spoke in favour of some measure, or put it to the vote, and to maintain to the rest of the world, "I was not present, nor do I approve of the terms of the agreement." Inquiries are made in a full meeting of the People, and should any of these things be disapproved of, it can at once discover ten thousand excuses to avoid doing whatever they do not wish. And if any mischief should spring out of any resolutions which the People has pa.s.sed in council, the People can readily s.h.i.+ft the blame from its own shoulders. "A handful of oligarchs (22) acting against the interests of the People have ruined us." But if any good result ensue, they, the People, at once take the credit of that to themselves.

(21) Reading {uph otououn adikeitai onomati upo ton oligon}, which I suggest as a less violent emendation of this corrupt pa.s.sage than any I have seen; or, reading with Sauppe, {uph otou adikei anomeitai apo ton oligon}, "the illegality lies at the door of."

(22) Or, "a few insignificant fellows."

In the same spirit it is not allowed to caricature on the comic stage (23) or otherwise libel the People, because (24) they do not care to hear themselves ill spoken of. But if any one has a desire to satirise his neighbour he has full leave to do so. And this because they are well aware that, as a general rule, this person caricatured (25) does not belong to the People, or the ma.s.ses. He is more likely to be some wealthy or well-born person, or man of means and influence. In fact, but few poor people and of the popular stamp incur the comic lash, or if they do they have brought it on themselves by excessive love of meddling or some covetous self-seeking at the expense of the People, so that no particular annoyance is felt at seeing such folk satirised.

(23) See Grote, "H. G." viii. 446, especially p. 449, "growth and development of comedy at Athens"; Curtius, "H. G." iii. pp. 242, 243; Thirlwall, "H. G." ch. xviii. vol. iii. p. 42.

(24) Or, more lit. "it would not do for the People to hear," etc.

(25) Or, "the b.u.t.t of comedy."

What, then, I venture to a.s.sert is, that the People of Athens has no difficulty in recognising which of its citizens are of the better sort and which the opposite. (26) And so recognising those who are serviceable and advantageous (27) to itself, even though they be base, the People loves them; but the good folk they are disposed rather to hate. This virtue of theirs, the People holds, is not engrained in their nature for any good to itself, but rather for its injury. In direct opposition to this, there are some persons who, being (28) born of the People, are yet by natural instinct not commoners. For my part I pardon the People its own democracy, as, indeed, it is pardonable in any one to do good to himself. (29) But the man who, not being himself one of the People, prefers to live in a state democratically governed rather than in an oligarchical state may be said to smooth his own path towards iniquity. He knows that a bad man has a better chance of slipping through the fingers of justice in a democratic than in an oligarchical state.

(26) Or, "and which are good for nothing."

(27) Or,"its own friends and supporters."

(28) Reading {ontes} or (if {gnontes}), "who, recognising the nature of the People, have no popular leaning." Gutschmidt conj. {enioi egguoi ontes}, i.e. Pericles.

(29) On the principle that "the knee is nearer than the s.h.i.+n-bone,"

{gonu knemes}, or, as we say, "charity begins at home."

III

I repeat that my position concerning the polity of the Athenians is this: the type (1) of polity is not to my taste, but given that a democratic form of government has been agreed upon, they do seem to me to go the right way to preserve the democracy by the adoption of the particular type (2) which I have set forth.

(1) Or, "manner."

(2) Or, "manner."

But there are other objections brought, as I am aware, against the Athenians, by certain people, and to this effect. It not seldom happens, they tell us, that a man is unable to transact a piece of business with the senate or the People, even if he sit waiting a whole year. Now this does happen at Athens, and for no other reason save that, owing to the immense ma.s.s of affairs they are unable to work off all the business on hand, and dismiss the applicants. And how in the world should they be able, considering in the first place, that they, the Athenians, have more festivals (3) to celebrate than any other state throughout the length and breadth of h.e.l.las? (During these festivals, of course, the transaction of any sort of affairs of state is still more out of the question.) (4) In the next place, only consider the number of cases they have to decide--what with private suits and public causes and scrutinies of accounts, etc., more than the whole of the rest of mankind put together; while the senate has multifarious points to advise upon concerning peace and war, (5) concerning ways and means, concerning the framing and pa.s.sing of laws, (6) and concerning the thousand and one matters affecting the state perpetually occurring, and endless questions touching the allies; besides the receipt of the tribute, the superintendence of dockyards and temples, etc. Can, I ask again, any one find it at all surprising that, with all these affairs on their hands, they are unequal to doing business with all the world?

(3) See Arist. "Wasps," 661.

(4) This sentence is perhaps a gloss.

(5) Or, "about the war," {peri tou polemou}.

(6) See Thirlwall, ch. x.x.xii. vol. iv. p. 221, note 3.

But some people tell us that if the applicant will only address himself to the senate or the People with a fee in his hand he will do a good stroke of business. And for my part I am free to confess to these gainsayers that a good many things may be done at Athens by dint of money; and I will add, that a good many more still might be done, if the money flowed still more freely and from more pockets. One thing, however, I know full well, that as to transacting with every one of these applicants all he wants, the state could not do it, not even if all the gold and silver in the world were the inducement offered.

Here are some of the cases which have to be decided on. Some one fails to fit out a s.h.i.+p: judgement must be given. Another puts up a building on a piece of public land: again judgement must be given. Or, to take another cla.s.s of cases: adjudication has to be made between the choragi for the Dionysia, the Thargelia, the Panathenaea, year after year. ( (7) And again in behalf of the gymnasiarchs a similar adjudication for the Panathenaea, the Prometheia, and the Hephaestia, also year after year.) Also as between the trierarchs, four hundred of whom are appointed each year, of these, too, any who choose must have their cases adjudicated on, year after year. But that is not all. There are various magistrates to examine and approve (8) and decide between; there are orphans (9) whose status must be examined; and guardians of prisoners to appoint.

These, be it borne in mind, are all matters of yearly occurrence; while at intervals there are exemptions and abstentions from military service (10) which call for adjudication, or in connection with some other extraordinary misdemeanour, some case of outrage and violence of an exceptional character, or some charge of impiety. A whole string of others I simply omit; I am content to have named the most important part with the exception of the a.s.sessments of tribute which occur, as a rule, at intervals of five years. (11)

(7) Adopting the emendation of Kirchhoff, who inserts the sentence in brackets. For the festivals in question, see "Dict. of Antiq."

"Lampadephoria"; C. R. Kenney, "Demosth. against Leptines," etc., App. vi.

(8) For the inst.i.tution called the {dokimasia}, see Aristot.

"Const.i.tution of Athens," ch. lv.

(9) See Dem. "against Midias," 565, 17; "against Apholus" (1), 814, 20.

(10) See Lys. "Or." xiv. and xv.

(11) See Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 48; Thuc. vii. 78; i. 96; Arist.

"Wasps," 707; Aristot. "Pol." v. 8.

I put it to you, then: can any one suppose that all, or any, of these may dispense with adjudication? (12) If so, will any one say which ought, and which ought not, to be adjudicated on, there and then? If, on the other hand, we are forced to admit that these are all fair cases for adjudication, it follows of necessity that they should be decided during the twelve-month; since even now the boards of judges sitting right through the year are powerless to stay the tide of evildoing by reason of the mult.i.tude of the people.

(12) Reading with Kirchhoff. Cf. for {oiesthai khre}, "h.e.l.l." VI. iv.

23; "Cyr." IV. ii. 28.

So far so good. (13) "But," some one will say, "try the cases you certainly must, but lessen the number of the judges." But if so, it follows of necessity that unless the number of courts themselves are diminished in number there will only be a few judges sitting in each court, (14) with the further consequence that in dealing with so small a body of judges it will be easier for a litigant to present an invulnerable front (15) to the court, and to bribe (16) the whole body, to the great detriment of justice. (17)

(13) See Grote, "H. G." v. 514, 520; Machiavelli, "Disc. s. Livio," i.

7.

(14) Reading with Sauppe, {anagke toinun, ean me} (for the vulgate {ean men oliga k.t.l.}) {oliga poiontai dikasteria, oligoi en ekasto esontai to dikasterio}. Or, adopting Weiske's emendation, {ean men polla poiontai dikasteria k.t.l.} Translate, "Then, if by so doing they manage to multiply the law courts, there will be only a few judges sitting," etc.

(15) Or, as Liddell and Scott, "to prepare all his tricks."

(16) {sundekasoi}, "to bribe in the lump." This is Schneider's happy emendation of the MS. {sundikasai}; see Demosthenes, 1137, 1.

(17) Reading {oste}, lit. "so as to get a far less just judgment."

But besides this we cannot escape the conclusion that the Athenians have their festivals to keep, during which the courts cannot sit. (18) As a matter of fact these festivals are twice as numerous as those of any other people. But I will reckon them as merely equal to those of the state which has the fewest.

(18) Lit. "it is not possible to give judgment"; or, "for juries to sit."

This being so, I maintain that it is not possible for business affairs at Athens to stand on any very different footing from the present, except to some slight extent, by adding here and deducting there.

Any large modification is out of the question, short of damaging the democracy itself. No doubt many expedients might be discovered for improving the const.i.tution, but if the problem be to discover some adequate means of improving the const.i.tution, while at the same time the democracy is to remain intact, I say it is not easy to do this, except, as I have just stated, to the extent of some trifling addition here or deduction there.

There is another point in which it is sometimes felt that the Athenians are ill advised, in their adoption, namely, of the less respectable party, in a state divided by faction. But if so, they do it advisedly.

If they chose the more respectable, they would be adopting those whose views and interests differ from their own, for there is no state in which the best element is friendly to the people. It is the worst element which in every state favours the democracy--on the principle that like favours like. (19) It is simple enough then. The Athenians choose what is most akin to themselves. Also on every occasion on which they have attempted to side with the better cla.s.ses, it has not fared well with them, but within a short interval the democratic party has been enslaved, as for instance in Boeotia; (20) or, as when they chose the aristocrats of the Milesians, and within a short time these revolted and cut the people to pieces; or, as when they chose the Lacedaemonians as against the Messenians, and within a short time the Lacedaemonians subjugated the Messenians and went to war against Athens.