Japan Part 15

Art. III. s.h.i.+pwrecked persons of either nation to be cared for, and expenses to be refunded.

Art. IV. s.h.i.+pwrecked and other persons not to be imprisoned but to be amenable to just laws.

Art. V. Americans at s.h.i.+moda and Hakodate not to be subject to confinement; free to go about within defined limits.

Art. VI. Further deliberation to be held between the parties to settle concerning trade and matters requiring to be arranged.

Art. VII. Trade in open ports to be subject to such regulations as the j.a.panese government shall establish.

Art. VIII. Wood, water, provisions, coal, etc., to be procured only through appointed j.a.panese officers.

Art. IX. If at any future day privileges in addition to those here enumerated are granted to any other nation, the same to be allowed to Americans.

Art. X. s.h.i.+ps of the United States not to resort to other ports than s.h.i.+moda and Hakodate except in stress of weather.

Art. XI. Consuls or agents of the United States to reside at s.h.i.+moda.

Art. XII. The ratification of this treaty to be exchanged within eighteen months.

As might have been expected, as soon as this treaty with the United States had been signed there was a rush of other nations to obtain similar terms.

Admiral Sir John Sterling, acting in behalf of the government of Great Britain, negotiated a treaty which was signed at Nagasaki on the 15th of October, 1854. Admiral Pontiatine negotiated a similar treaty for Russia, which was signed at s.h.i.+moda on the 7th of February, 1855. A treaty with the Netherlands was signed on the 30th of January, 1856.

None of these were in any general sense commercial treaties, providing for trade and making regulations by which it might be conducted. They were rather preliminary conventions, making arrangements for vessels to obtain necessary provisions, and stipulating for the protection of those suffering s.h.i.+pwreck, and for vessels driven under stress of weather to take shelter in the harbors of j.a.pan. They each provided for admission to two ports: The American treaty to s.h.i.+moda and Hakodate; the English treaty to Nagasaki and Hakodate; the Russian treaty to s.h.i.+moda and Hakodate.

All these treaties contained what is called "the most favored nation clause," so that where the privileges granted to any one nation were in excess of those granted previously to others, these privileges were also without further negotiation extended to the nations that had already made treaties.

These dealings with foreign nations produced the most intense excitement throughout the empire. The old sentiment of hostility to foreign intercourse showed itself in unmistakable intensity. The song of the Black s.h.i.+p, by which term the vessels of foreign nations were designated, was heard everywhere. Two distinct parties came into existence called the _Jo-i_ party, who wished to expel the barbarians; and the _Kai-koku_ party, who were in favor of opening the country.(272) The members of the latter party were princ.i.p.ally connected with the shogun's government, and had become impressed with the folly of trying to resist the pressure of the outside world. The _Jo-i_ party was made up of the conservative elements in the country, who clung to the old traditions of j.a.pan that had matured during the two centuries of the Tokugawa rule. Besides these conservatives there was also a party who nourished a traditional dislike to the Tokugawa family, and was glad to see it involved in difficulties which were sure to bring down upon it the vengeance of the nation. These were chiefly found among the southwestern daimiates such as Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa. The daimyo of Mito(273) although connected with the shogun's family was bitterly hostile to the policy of holding any friendly relations with foreigners. He was therefore regarded as the head of the _Jo-i_ party, and many of the disaffected _samurai_ rallied about him as their champion and leader.

It was charged against the shogun that in making treaties with foreign nations he had transcended the powers(274) that rightly belonged to him.

He was not the sovereign of j.a.pan and never had been. He was only the chief executive under the emperor, and was not even next in rank to the emperor. It was impossible, therefore, that treaties made by the shogun and not ratified by his sovereign should be regarded by the j.a.panese as legitimate and binding.

The question of the legality of the treaties which the shogun had made was an important one, and interested not only the j.a.panese themselves but the foreigners whose privileges under these treaties were at stake. There is no doubt that Commodore Perry as well as all the subsequent negotiators, believed that in making treaties with the shogun they were dealing with a competent authority. The precedents occurring in the history of j.a.pan seemed all to bear in this direction. The Portuguese and the Spanish had dealt with the shogun and never with the emperor. The Dutch had received from Ieyasu the privileges of trade and had ever since continued under the shogun's protection. Captain Saris in his negotiations in 1614 received written a.s.surances of protection and privileges of trade from the shogun.

It was because the shogun's power had become weakened, and there had grown up an active sentiment against him, that the question in reference to his legitimate authority arose. "Had the treaty" (with Perry) "been concluded when the power of Yedo was at its former height, it is probable that no questions would have been asked."(275)

According to the terms of the treaty made with the United States it was provided that a consul should be appointed "to reside at s.h.i.+moda at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the signing the treaty."

In execution of this provision the United States government sent out Townsend Harris, who arrived in August, 1856. After some hesitation he was allowed to take up his residence at s.h.i.+moda. He was a man of great patience and tact, and gradually urged his way into the confidence of the government. He became the counsellor and educator of the officials in everything pertaining to foreign affairs. He was received December 7, 1857, by the shogun with the ceremony due to his new rank of plenipotentiary which he had then received.(276) In a despatch, dated July 8, 1858, he tells of a severe illness which he had suffered; how the shogun sent two physicians to attend him, and when a bulletin was sent to Yedo that his case was hopeless, the physicians "received peremptory orders to cure me, and if I died they would themselves be in peril."

The princ.i.p.al effort of Mr. Harris was the negotiation of a commercial treaty which should make provision for the maintenance of trade in specified ports of j.a.pan. The treaties already made by j.a.pan with foreign nations only provided for furnis.h.i.+ng vessels with needed supplies, and for the protection of vessels driven by stress of weather and of persons s.h.i.+pwrecked on the j.a.panese islands. It remained to agree upon terms, which should be mutually advantageous, for the regular opening of the ports for trade and for the residence at these ports of the merchants engaged in trade.

The excitement occasioned by the steps already taken rendered the shogun's government exceedingly reluctant to proceed further in this direction. It was only after much persuasion, and with a desire to avoid appearing to yield to the appearance of force(277) with which the English were about to urge the negotiation of a commercial treaty, that at last, on the 17th of June, 1857, a treaty "for the purpose of further regulating the intercourse of American citizens within the empire of j.a.pan" was duly concluded. The port of Nagasaki was to be opened in addition to those already stipulated. American citizens were to be permitted to reside at s.h.i.+moda and Hakodate for the purpose of supplying the wants of the vessels which visited there.

This does not seem to have been adequate, for only about a year later a further treaty, revoking that of June, 1857, was arranged. It was signed at Yedo on the 29th of July, 1858. Equivalent treaties were negotiated by other nations, and it is under the terms of these that the intercourse between j.a.pan and the nations of Europe and America is still conducted.

They provided for the opening of the ports of Ni-igata and Hyogo, and for the closing of s.h.i.+moda, which had been found unsuitable, and the opening in its place of Kanagawa.(278) They fixed dates for the opening of the cities of Yedo and Osaka, and provided for the setting apart of suitable concessions in each of them for residence and trade. They provided that all cases of litigation in which foreigners were defendants should be tried in the consular court of the nation to which the defendant belonged, and all cases in which j.a.panese citizens were defendants should be tried in j.a.panese courts. They fixed the limits within which foreigners at any of the treaty ports could travel, but permitted the diplomatic agent of any nation to travel without limitation. They prohibited the importation of opium. Commercial regulations were attached to the treaties and made a part of them, which directed that a duty of five _per centum_ should be paid on all goods imported into j.a.pan for sale, except that on intoxicating liquors a duty of thirty-five _per centum_ should be exacted.

All articles of j.a.panese production exported were to pay a duty of five _per centum_, except gold and silver coin and copper in bars. These trade regulations stipulated that five years after the opening of Kanagawa the export and import duties should be subject to revision at the desire of either party. The treaties themselves provide that on and after 1872 either of the contracting parties may demand a revision of the same upon giving one year's notice of its desire.

These stipulations in reference to a revision of the treaties, and especially of the tariff of duties to be paid on imported goods, have been a source of great anxiety and concern to the j.a.panese government. The small duty of five _per centum_, which it has been permitted to collect on the goods imported, is scarcely more than enough to maintain the machinery of collection. And while the initiative is given to it to ask for a revision of the treaties, it has never yet been able to obtain the consent of the princ.i.p.al nations concerned to any change in the original hard terms.

Another provision in the treaties which has been the occasion of endless debate is that which requires all foreigners to remain under the jurisdiction of the consuls of their respective countries. It is claimed on the part of the j.a.panese that this provision, which was reasonable when the treaties were first made, is no longer just or necessary. The laws have been so far perfected, their judges and officers have been so educated, and the machinery of their courts have been so far conformed to European practice that it is no longer reasonable that foreigners residing in j.a.pan should be under other than j.a.panese jurisdiction. It is earnestly to be hoped that these sources of irritation between j.a.pan and the treaty powers may speedily be removed, and that the efforts of this progressive race to fall into line in the march of civilization may be appreciated and encouraged.

Any one who reads the diplomatic correspondence covering this period will see how serious were the troubles with which the country was called upon to deal. He will realize also how almost impossible it was for the diplomatic representatives of the western powers to comprehend the difficulties of the situation or know how to conduct the affairs of their legations with justice and consideration.

A succession of murders and outrages occurred, which awakened the fears of the foreign residents. It is plain enough now that this state of things was not so much due to the want of effort on the part of the government to carry out its agreements with foreign nations, as to the bitter and irreconcilable party hatred which had sprung up in consequence of these efforts. The feudal organization of the government, by which the first allegiance was due to the daimyo, rendered the condition of things more demoralized. It was an old feudal custom, whenever the retainers of a daimyo wished to avenge any act without committing their lord, they withdrew from his service and became _ronins_. Most of the outrages which occurred during the years intervening between the formation of the treaties and the restoration were committed by these masterless men.

Responsibility for them was disclaimed by the daimyos, and the government of Yedo was unable to extend its control over these wandering swash-bucklers. There was no course for the foreign ministers to pursue but to hold the shogun's government responsible for the protection of foreigners and foreign trade. This government, which was called the _bakufu_,(279) had made the treaties with the foreign powers, as many claimed, without having adequate authority, and had thus a.s.sumed to be supreme in matters of foreign intercourse. It was natural therefore that the representatives of the treaty powers should look to the _bakufu_ for the security of those who had come hither under the sanction of these treaties.

It was in consequence a b.l.o.o.d.y time through which the country was called to pa.s.s. The prime minister and the head of the _bakufu_ party was Ii Kamon-no-kami,(280) the daimyo of Hikone in the province of Mino. On account of the youth of the shogun he was created regent. He was a man of great resolution and unscrupulous in the measures by which he attempted to carry out the policy to which he was committed. By his enemies he was called the "swaggering prime minister (_bakko genro_)." a.s.sured that the foreign treaties could not be abrogated without dangerous collisions with foreign nations, he sought to crush the opposition which a.s.sailed them.

The daimyo of Mito, who had been the head of the anti-foreign party at Yedo, he compelled to resign and confined him to his private palace in his province. Numerous other persons who had busied themselves with interfering with his schemes and in promoting opposition in Kyoto, he also imprisoned.

Suddenly on the 23d of March, 1860, Ii Kamon-no-kami was a.s.sa.s.sinated as he was being carried in his _norimono_ from his _yas.h.i.+ki_ outside the Sakurada gate to the palace of the shogun.

The a.s.sa.s.sins were eighteen _ronins_ of the province of Mito, who wished to avenge the imprisonment of their prince. They carried the head of the murdered regent to the Mito castle, and after exhibiting it to the gloating eyes of the prince, exposed it upon a pike at the princ.i.p.al gate.

The death of the regent was an irreparable blow to the government. There was no one who could take his place and a.s.sume his _role_. His loss must be reckoned as one of the princ.i.p.al events which marked the decadence of the shogun's power.

CHAPTER XIV. REVOLUTIONARY PRELUDES.

The outrages which now succeeded each other with terrible frequency were not confined to the native members of the opposing parties. Foreigners, who were so essentially the cause of the political disturbances in j.a.pan, were particularly exposed to attacks. On the 14th of January, 1861, Mr.

Heusken, the secretary and interpreter of the American legation, when riding home at night from the Prussian legation in Yedo, was attacked by armed a.s.sa.s.sins and mortally wounded. The object of this murder is supposed to have been the desire of one of the ministers of foreign affairs to take revenge on Mr. Heusken,(281) for his activity in promoting foreign intercourse.

The weakness and the fears of the government were shown by the warning, which they sent to the foreign ministers to avoid attending the funeral of Mr. Heusken, lest further outrages might be committed. They did attend, however, and no disturbances occurred. It only remains to mention that Mr.

Harris subsequently made an arrangement with the government for the payment of an indemnity(282) of $10,000 to the mother of Mr. Heusken, who was then living at Amsterdam in Holland.

The next circ.u.mstance which awakened universal attention was an attack made on the British legation, on the night of the 5th of July, 1861. At this time the British minister occupied as a legation the buildings of the temple Tozenji, situated at Takanawa in the city of Yedo. It was guarded by a company of j.a.panese troops, to whom the government had entrusted its protection. Mr. Alc.o.c.k had just returned by an overland journey from Nagasaki, and with a number of other Englishmen was domiciled in the legation. The attacking party consisted of fourteen _ronins_ belonging to the Mito clan, who had banded themselves together to take vengeance on the "accursed foreigners." Several of the guards were killed, and Mr.

Oliphant,(283) the secretary of legation, and Mr. Morrison, H. B. M's consul at Nagasaki, were severely wounded. On one of the party who was captured was found a paper,(284) which set forth the object of the attack and the names of the fourteen _ronins_ who had conspired for its accomplishment.

That the government regarded such outrages with alarm is certain. They took the earliest opportunity to express their distress that the legation under their protection had thus been invaded. They a.s.sured Mr. Alc.o.c.k with the most pitiable sincerity that "they had no power of preventing such attacks upon the legation, nor of providing against a renewal of the same with a greater certainty of success." "They could not," they said, "guarantee any of the representatives against these attempts at a.s.sa.s.sination, to which all foreigners in j.a.pan were liable, whether in their houses or in the public thoroughfares."(285) They pretended to punish, and yet were afraid openly to punish the persons engaged in this attack.(286) They promised to do what they could for the protection of the foreign representatives; but their measures necessarily consisted in making the legations a kind of prison where the occupants were confined and protected.

And yet, with all these a.s.surances of danger, the foreign representatives seem to have been singularly ignorant of the real difficulties with which the government had to deal. This was due, no doubt, to the want of candor on the part of the j.a.panese officials in not explaining frankly and fully to them the political complications which existed between the governments of Yedo and Kyoto. They represented a widespread discontent to have grown up since the negotiation of the treaties, owing to the increased price of provisions, the derangement of the currency, and the danger of famine. In view of these pressing difficulties they asked for the postponement of the time fixed by the treaties for opening a port on the western coast and Hyogo on the Inland sea, and for the establishment of definite concessions in the cities of Yedo and Osaka. These modifications of the treaties were finally accepted, and it was arranged that the opening of the ports named above should be postponed for a period of five years from the first of January, 1863.

This postponement of the opening of the ports was the chief reason for sending to foreign countries their first emba.s.sy. This set out from Yokohama in January, 1862, and visited the United States, then England, and the other treaty powers. They were everywhere received with the utmost kindness and distinction. The immediate object of their mission was, as we have seen, accomplished. The opening of additional ports was deferred on condition that in those already opened the obstacles which had been put in the way of trade should be removed.

But, besides the attainment of this end, the visit of the emba.s.sy to foreign capitals and countries produced a salutary influence both on the foreigners whom they met and on the influential personages of which it consisted. The former learned to their surprise that they had a cultivated, intelligent, and clever race to deal with, whose diplomatists,(287) although inexperienced in European politics, were not unqualified to enter the courts of western capitals. But the revelation to the j.a.panese envoys was still greater and more surprising. For the first time they saw the terrible armaments of western powers, and realized the futility of attempting to make armed resistance to their measures. But they encountered on every hand not hatred and aversion, but the warmest interest and kindness,(288) and a desire to render them every courtesy.

Instead of barbarians, as they had been taught to regard all foreigners, they found everywhere warm-hearted and intelligent friends who were anxious to see their country treated with justice and consideration.

On the 26th of June, 1862, a year after the first, a second attack was made upon the British legation. Lieutenant-Colonel Neale was at this time _charge d'affaires_, and had just removed from Yokohama and resumed the occupancy of the temple of Tozenji. The government took the precaution to establish guards, who daily and nightly made their rounds to protect the buildings. Besides this there was a guard detailed from the British fleet to render the legation more secure. The officials persisted in claiming that only one person, Ito Gumpei, was engaged in the attack, and that it was a matter of private revenge for an insult which one of the English guards had put upon him. Two of these guards were killed in the attack, and Ito Gumpei the a.s.sa.s.sin escaped to his own house, where he was permitted to commit _hara-kiri_. There was probably no plot on the part of those whose duty it was to protect the legation. But the uncertainty which hung over the affair, and the repet.i.tion of the violence of the preceding year led Colonel Neale to abandon his residence at Yedo and return to Yokohama. An indemnity of 10,000 was demanded and finally paid for the families of the two members of the guard who had been murdered.

In the meantime the relations between the courts at Kyoto and Yedo had become more and more strained. The efforts at reconciliation, such as the marriage between the young shogun and the sister of the emperor in 1861, produced no permanent effect. The disease was too deep-seated and serious to be affected by such palliations. s.h.i.+mazu Saburo, the uncle(289) and guardian of the young daimyo of Satsuma, came in 1862 to Kyoto with the avowed purpose of advising the emperor in this emergency. He was accompanied by a formidable body of Satsuma troops, and on these he relied to have his advice followed.

On his way thither he had been joined by a body of _ronins_ who were contemplating the accomplishment of some enterprise which should be notable in the expulsion of foreigners. They imagined that the powerful head of the Satsuma clan would be a suitable leader for such an enterprise. They approached him therefore and humbly pet.i.tioned to be received under his standard. Not quite satisfied to have such a band of reckless ruffians under his command, he, however, scarcely dared to refuse their pet.i.tion. He therefore permitted them to join his escort and march with him to Kyoto.

The emperor's court, although bitterly hostile to the liberal policy which prevailed at Yedo, were alarmed by the desperate allies which s.h.i.+mazu was bringing with him. He presented their memorial to the emperor, and favored their wishes to use all the force of the country to dislodge the hated foreigner from its soil. Other powerful daimyos were collected at the same time at the imperial capital, and its peaceful suburbs resounded with the clank of warlike preparations. The most notable of these was the daimyo of Choshu, who at this time was joined with the Satsuma chief in the measures against the shogun's government.