Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 Part 87

_Source_: Office, Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights).

Chance of promotion for officers and men was one factor in judging equal treatment and opportunity in the services. A statistical comparison of the ranks of enlisted black servicemen between 1964 and 1966 reveals a steady advance (_Table 28_). With the exception of the Air Force, the percentage of Negroes in the higher enlisted ranks compared favorably with the total black percentage in each service.

The advance was less marked for officers, but here too the black share of the O-4 grade (major or lieutenant commander) was comparable with the black percentage of the service's total strength. The services could declare with considerable justification that reform in this area was necessarily a drawn-out affair; promotion to the senior ranks must be won against strong compet.i.tion.

Table 28--Percentage of Negroes in Certain Military Ranks, 1964-1966

E-6 (Staff Sergeant or Petty Officer, First Cla.s.s)

_1964_ _1965_ _1966_ Army 13.9 15.5 18.1 Navy 4.7 5.0 5.6 Marine Corps 5.0 5.3 10.4 Air Force 5.3 5.6 6.6

O-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander)

Army 3.6 4.5 5.2 Navy 0.3 0.3 0.3 Marine Corps 0.3 0.3 0.2 Air Force 0.8 0.9 1.6

_Source_: Office, Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights).

The department's civil rights office forwarded to the services complaints from black servicemen who, despite the highest efficiency ratings and special commendations from commanders, failed to win promotions. "Almost uniformly," the office reported in 1965, "the reply comes back from the service that there had been no bias, no partiality, no prejudice operating in detriment on the complainant's consideration for promotion. They reply the best qualified was promoted, but this was not to say that the complainant did not have a very good record."[22-47] While black officers might well have (p. 572) been subtly discriminated against in matters of promotion, they also, it should be pointed out, shared in the general inflation in efficiency ratings, common in all the services, that resulted in average officers being given "highest efficiency ratings."

[Footnote 22-47: Paul Memo.]

In addition to complaining of direct denial of promotion opportunity, so-called "vertical mobility," some black officers alleged that their chances of promotion had been systematically reduced by the services when they failed to provide Negroes with "horizontal mobility," that is, with a wide variety of a.s.signments and all-important command experience which would justify their future advancement. Supporting these claims, the civil rights office reported that only 5 Negroes were enrolled at the senior service schools in 1965, 4 black naval officers with command experience were on active duty, and 26 black Air Force officers had been given tactical command experience since 1950.

The severely limited a.s.signment of black Army officers at the major command headquarters, moreover, ill.u.s.trated the "narrow gauge"

a.s.signment of Negroes.[22-48] This picture seemed somewhat at variance with Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary Shulman's a.s.surances to the Kansas Conference on Civil Rights in May 1965 that "we have paid particular attention to the a.s.signment of Negro officers to the senior Service schools, and to those positions of command that are so vital to officer advancement to the highest rank."[22-49]

[Footnote 22-48: Ibid.]

[Footnote 22-49: Shulman, "The Civil Rights Policies of the Department of Defense," 4 May 65.]

Since promotion in the military ranks depended to a great extent on a man's skills, training in and a.s.signment to vital job categories were important to enlisted men. Here, too, the statistics revealed that the percentage of Negroes in the technical occupations, which had begun to rise in the years after Korea, had continued to increase but that a large proportion still held unskilled or semiskilled military occupational specialties (_Table 29_). Eligibility for the various military occupations depended to a great extent on the servicemen's mental apt.i.tude, with men scoring in the higher categories usually winning a.s.signment to technical occupations. When the Army began drafting large numbers of men in the mid-1960's, the number of men in category IV, which included many Negroes, began to go up. Given the fact that many Negroes with the qualifications for technical training were ignoring the services for other vocations while the less qualified were once again swelling the ranks, the Department of Defense could do little to insure a fair representation of Negroes in technical occupations or increase the number of black soldiers in higher grades. The problem tended to feed upon itself. Not only were the statistics the bane of civil rights organizations, but they also influenced talented young blacks to decide against a service career, in effect creating a variation of Gresham's law in the Army wherein men of low mentality were keeping out men of high intelligence. There seemed little to be done, although the department's civil rights office pressed the services to establish remedial training for category IV men so that they might become eligible for more technical a.s.signments.

Table 29--Distribution of Servicemen in Occupational Groups by Race, 1967

| White | Black |Unknown|Total | | | | | Percent| | | | | | |of Total| | | |Percent| |Percent| in Each| | Group/Activity | Number| Dist. | Number| Dist. | Group/ | Number|Number | | | | |Activity| | Combat troops 324,560 12.1 55,518 18.7 14.5 2,646 382,724 Electronics repairmen 239,595 9.0 13,843 4.7 5.5 204 253,642 Communications specialists 191,372 7.2 12,856 4.4 6.3 392 204,620 Medical personnel 101,793 3.8 11,074 3.8 9.8 76 112,943 Other technicians 52,132 1.9 3,812 1.3 6.8 86 56,030 Administrative personnel 430,186 16.1 55,543 18.8 11.4 986 486,715 Mechanical repairmen 498,899 18.6 39,820 13.5 7.4 794 539,513 Draftsmen 144,070 5.4 15,728 5.3 9.8 248 160,046 Service & supply personnel 283,976 10.6 53,136 18.0 15.7 998 338,110 Miscellaneous/ unknown 245,055 9.1 14,964 5.1 13.5 1,337 261,356 Trainees[a] 166,478 6.2 18,753 6.4 10.1 1,194 186,425 Total 2,678,116 100.0 295,047 100.0 9.9 8,961 2,982,124

[Tablenote a: Represents an Army category only.]

_Source_: Bahr, "The Expanding Role of the Department of Defense As an Instrument of Social Change." Bahr's table is based on unpublished data from the DASD (CR).

If a man's a.s.signment and promotion depended ultimately on his (p. 573) apt.i.tude category, that category depended upon his performance in the Armed Forces Qualifying Test and other screening tests usually administered at induction. These tests have since been widely criticized as being culturally biased, more a test of an individual's understanding of the majority race's cultural norms than his mental apt.i.tude. Even the fact that the tests were written also left them open to charges of bias. Some educational psychologists have claimed that an individual's performance in written tests measured his cultural and educational background, not his mental apt.i.tude. It is true that the accuracy of test measurements was never rea.s.sessed in light of the subsequent performance of those tested. The services paid little attention to these serious questions in the 1960's, yet as a Defense Department task force studying the administration of military justice was to observe later:

the most important determination about a serviceman's future career (both in and out of the service) is made almost solely on the basis of the results of these tests: where he will be placed, how and whether he will be promoted during his. .h.i.tch, and whether what he will learn in the service will be saleable for his post-service career.[22-50]

[Footnote 22-50: Department of Defense, "Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces," 30 Nov 72, vol. I, p.

47.]

The Department of Defense depended on the "limited predictive capability of these tests," the task force charged, in deciding whether a serviceman was a.s.signed to a "soft core" field, that is, given a job in such categories as transportation or supply, or whether he could enter one of the more profitable and prestigious "hard core"

fields that would bring more rapid advancement.

Accurate and comprehensive testing and the measurement of acquired (p. 574) skills was obviously an important and complex matter, but in 1963 it was ignored by both the Civil Rights Commission and the Gesell Committee. President Kennedy, however, seemed aware of the problem.

Before leaving for Europe in the summer of 1963 he called on the Secretary of Defense to consider establis.h.i.+ng training programs keyed primarily to the special problems of black servicemen found ineligible for technical training. According to Lee White, the President wanted to use new training techniques "and other methods of stimulating interest and industry" that might help thousands of men bridge "the gap that presently exists between their own educational and cultural backgrounds and those of the average white serviceman."[22-51]

[Footnote 22-51: Memo, a.s.st Spec Counsel to President for SecDef, 27 Jun 63, copy in CMH.]

Because of the complexity of the problem, White agreed with Fitt that the program should be postponed pending further study, but the President's request happened to coincide with a special survey of the deficiencies and changes in recruit training then being made by Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes.[22-52] Ailes offered to develop a special off-duty training program in line with the President's request. The program, to begin on a trial basis in October 1963, would also include evaluation counseling to determine if and when trainees should be a.s.signed to technical schools.[22-53] Such a program represented a departure for the services, which since World War II had consistently rejected the idea frequently advanced by sociologists that the culturally, environmentally, and educationally deprived were denied equal opportunity when they were required to compete with the middle-cla.s.s average.[22-54] Although no specific, measurable results were recorded from this educational experiment, the project was eventually blended into the Army's Special Training and Enlistment Program and finally into McNamara's Project 100,000.[22-55]

[Footnote 22-52: ACSFOR, "Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Years 1963-64," copy in CMH; Memo, DASD (CR) for Paul, 25 Sep 63, sub: Training Program Keyed Primarily to the Special Problems of Negro Servicemen, ASD (M) files.]

[Footnote 22-53: Memo, Under SA for ASD (M), 14 Sep 63, sub: Training Program Keyed Primarily to the Special Problems of Negro Servicemen; Memo, ASD (M) for a.s.st Spec Counsel to President, 25 Sep 63; both in ASD (M) files.]

[Footnote 22-54: For a discussion of this argument, see [BuPers] Memo for Rcd, Capt K. J. B. Sanger, USN, 9 Oct 63, Pers 1, BuPersRecs.]

[Footnote 22-55: Interv, author with Davenport, ASA, Manpower (Ret.), 2 Aug 73, CMH files.]

Beyond considering the competence of black servicemen, the Department of Defense had to face the possibility that discrimination was operating at least in some cases of a.s.signment and promotion.

Abolis.h.i.+ng the use of racial designations on personnel records was one obvious way of limiting such discrimination, and throughout the mid-1960's the department sought to balance the conflicting demands for and against race labeling. Along with the integration of military units in the 1950's, the services had narrowed their multiple and c.u.mbersome definition of races to a list of five groups. Even this list, a compromise drawn up by the Defense Department's Personnel Policy Board, was criticized. Reflecting the opinion of the civil rights forces, Evans declared that the definition of five races and twelve subcategories was scientifically inaccurate, statistically (p. 575) complicated, and racially offensive. He wanted a simple "white, nonwhite" listing of servicemen.[22-56] The subject continued to be discussed throughout the 1960's, the case finally going to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the ultimate authority on government forms. In August 1969 the director announced a uniform method for defining the races in federal statistics. The collectives "Negro and Other Races," "All Other Rates," or "All Other" would be acceptable to designate minorities; the terms "White," "Negro," and "Other Races" would be acceptable in distinguis.h.i.+ng between the majority, princ.i.p.al minority, and other races.[22-57]

[Footnote 22-56: See, for example, the following Memos: Evans for Judge Jackson, 1 Apr 63, and Mr.

Jordan, 3 Sep 64, sub: Racial Designations; Douglas Dahlin for E. E. Moyers, 3 Sep 58, sub: Case History of an OSD Action; James Evans for Philip M.

Timpane, 10 Aug 65, sub: Race and Color-Coding. See also Memo for Rcd, Evans, 15 Aug 62, sub: Racial Designations. All in DASD (CR) files.]

[Footnote 22-57: Bureau of the Budget, Circular No.

A-46, Transmittal Memorandum No. 8, 8 Aug 69.]

It was the use to which these definitions were put more than their number that had concerned civil rights leaders since the 1950's. Under pressure from civil rights organizations, some congressmen, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services began to abandon some of the least justifiable uses of racial designations, princ.i.p.ally those used on certain inductees' travel orders, rea.s.signment orders, and reserve rosters.[22-58] But change was not widespread, and as late as 1963 the services still distinguished by race in their basic personnel records, casualty reports, statistical and command strength reports, personnel control files, and over twenty-five other departmental forms.[22-59] They continued to defend the use of racial designations on the grounds that measurement of equal opportunity programs and detection of discrimination patterns depended on accurate racial data.[22-60] Few could argue with these motives, although critics continued to question the need for race designations on records that were used in a.s.signment and promotion processes. When public opposition developed to the use of racial entries on federal forms in general, the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity appointed a subcommittee in 1963 under Civil Service Chairman John W.

Macy, Jr., to investigate. After much deliberation this group conducted a statistical experiment within the Department of Agriculture to discover whether employees could be identified by racial groups in a confidential manner separate from other personnel data.[22-61]

[Footnote 22-58: See Ltr, Clarence Mitch.e.l.l, NAACP, to ASD (M), 8 Jul 53; Ltr, Congressman Henry S. Reuss of Wisconsin to SecDef, 27 Sep 56; Memo, Yarmolinsky for Fitt, 29 Nov 61; Memo, Dep Under SA for ASD (M), 1 Dec 61, sub: Racial Designation in Special Orders; Ltr, Chmn, Cmte on Gov Operations, House of Representatives, to SA, 9 Jul 62; Memo, ASD (M) for SA, 29 Mar 51, sub: Racial Designations on Travel Orders; Memo, Chief, Mil Personnel Management Div, G-1, for Dir, Personnel Policies, 5 Aug 52, sub: Racial Designations, G-1 291.2; Memo, SecNav for ASD (M), 7 May 54, sub: Deletion of Question Regarding "Race" ... Copies of all in CMH.]

[Footnote 22-59: See Memo, TAG for Distribution, 21 Sep 62, sub: Racial Identification in Army Doc.u.ments, AGAM (M) 291.2; Memo for Rcd, Evans, 20 Dec 62, sub: Racial Designations--Navy, ASD (M) 291.2; Memo, DASD (CR) for DASD (H&M) et al., 19 Feb 64, sub: Racial Designations on Department of Defense Forms, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 22-60: See, for example, Ltr, Dir of Personnel Policy (OSD) to J. Francis Pohlhous, Counsel, NAACP, 6 Jul 55, ASD (M) 291.2.]

[Footnote 22-61: Ltr, Director, Civil Service Commission, to Rear Adm Robert L. Moore, Chief of Industrial Relations, USN, 9 Jul 63, copy in CMH.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: SUPPLYING THE SEVENTH FLEET. _USS Procyon crewmen rig netload of supplies for a wars.h.i.+p._]

The civil rights staff of the Defense Department was also (p. 576) interested in further limiting the use of race in departmental forms.

In April 1963 a.s.sistant Secretary Paul ordered a review of military personnel records and reporting forms to determine where racial entries were included unnecessarily.[22-62] His review uncovered twenty-five forms used in common by the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense that contained racial designations. On 3 March 1964 Paul discreetly ordered the removal of race designations on all but nine of these forms, those concerning biostatistical, criminal, and casualty figures.[22-63] His order did not, however, extend to another group of forms used by individual services for their own purposes, and later in the year Fitt drafted an order that would have eliminated all racial designations in the services except an entry for data processing systems and one for biostatistical information. The directive also would have allowed racial designations on forms that did not identify individuals, arranged for the disposition of remains and casualty reporting, described fugitives and other "wanted" types, and permitted other exceptions granted at the level of the a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense or that of the service secretary. Finally it would have set up a system for purging existing records and removing photographs from promotion board selection folders.[22-64] The services strongly objected to a purge of existing records on the grounds of costliness, and they were particularly opposed to the removal of photographs. Photographs were traditional and remained desirable, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army Roy K. Davenport explained, because they were useful in portraying individual physical characteristics unrelated to race.[22-65] Davenport added, however, that photographs could be eliminated from promotion board materials.

[Footnote 22-62: Memo, Spec a.s.st to ASD (M) for Under SA, 15 Apr 63, sub: Racial Identification on Military Records (similar memorandums were sent to the Secretaries of Navy and Air Force on the same day); Memo, ASD (M) for OASD (Comptroller) (ca. 1 Jun 63); both in ASD (M) 291.2. For service reviews, answers, and exchanges on the subject, see ASD (M) 68A-1006. See also Memo, SSJ [Stephen S.

Jackson, Spec a.s.st to ASD (M)] for Valdes, OASD (M), and James C. Evans, 11 Jun 63, ASD (M) 291.2.]

[Footnote 22-63: Memo, DASD (CR) for DASD (Management), 3 Mar 64, sub: Elimination of Racial Designations on DD Forms (the Army adopted this DOD policy in the form of Change 1 to AR 66-21 in October 1965). See also Memo, DASD (CR) for DASD (H&M) et al., 19 Feb 64, sub: Racial Designations on Department of Defense Forms; idem for Lee C.

White, 9 Jul 64. All in ASD (M) files. See also Was.h.i.+ngton _Evening Star_, June 22, 1964, p. A2.]

[Footnote 22-64: Memo, Philip M. Timpane for DASD (CR), 10 Aug 64, sub: Race on Records, ASD (M) 291.2.]

[Footnote 22-65: Memo, Dep Under SA for DASD (CR), 3 Jun 64, sub: Proposed DOD Instruction Re: Use of Racial Designations in Forms and Records and Annual Racial Distribution Report, copy in CMH.]