History of the Philippine Islands Part 8

[The king of Bantam is too young to negotiate with, and too much money would be spent uselessly. For the natives throughout the Indies would not hesitate to violate any treaty in any peril or to their own profit.]

Besides we are at peace with the English, and it would be unjust to try to find means to exclude them from a commerce which they have already commenced. But measures can easily be taken to prevent them from entering into the commerce of other spices. In regard to pepper, we would have to make it serve as a ballast. By this means we could give it so cheaply that the other nations, finding scarcely any profit in it longer, would be obliged to cease trading in it themselves, without counting on our part our profits from the other merchandise.

For, according to my opinion, we could easily attract all the commerce of nutmegs and mace. For this purpose, instead of seizing Banda, and building a fort there, which would cost considerable, and give us a bad reputation among the Indian princes, the following is what I think that we should do.

As the king of Maca.s.sar is a powerful prince, whose country is densely populated, and well supplied with rice and all manner of food; and as he furnishes them to Malacca and Banda: it would be necessary to make a treaty with him, and to send him three vessels with two hundred men for his country. This number, together with the Maca.s.sar men, would be sufficient to attack Banda, and we would promise the king to deliver it into his hands, without claiming any recompense for this aid, except that no other nation but our own could load merchandise there, and that the nutmegs and mace would be taken annually at a fixed price, namely, at the selling price at the time of the expedition.

[Matelief is certain that the king of Maca.s.sar will acquiesce, and would also probably be willing to build a trading-house for the Dutch. Other conditions for the security of Banda might also be imposed in the treaty.]

Of the clove-trade, it is very difficult for us to render ourselves masters. We have the product of Amboina, Luho, and Cambelo; but not that yielded by the Moluccas. The only means of obtaining it is to drive the Spaniards from Ternate, and it can easily be imagined that the task is not easy. However I shall not hesitate to write here my thought concerning the matter.

The thing does not appear impossible to me, if one wishes to build on a firm foundation. This would require a return to the Malacca affair. For had the Portuguese lost Malacca, they could not easily go from Goa to reenforce the Moluccas; and I do not think there would be much trouble in preventing the sending of supplies to Ternate from the Manilles.

First, we should have to send three or four vessels to the king of Mindanao, whose country is densely inhabited, and who, as report runs, can launch fifty caracoas. All this fleet would go to Panama or Panati [i.e., Panay] which is near the Manilles, and where there is a place named Otting [i.e., Oton], guarded by but eighteen Spanish soldiers with about the same number of other inhabitants, so that in all there are but forty whites. This place would be destroyed, or if the blacks of Mindanao wished to keep it, it would be given them, for it is a country abounding in rice and several other foods, which are transported to Ternate.

Thence I would suggest going directly to the Manilles to destroy all the vessels in their ports, so that they could not aid Ternate. Immediately a vessel of one hundred and sixty or two hundred tons would be sent back to Mindanao, which would cross with the king's caracoas to the strait of Tagima, to capture the vessels that should try still to go to Ternate, because there is no other route. After capturing one or two of them, no other vessels would dare to try it, so that Ternate would perish from famine. For did we try at present to overpower the island by force, I believe that the Spaniards could fortify it so strongly, and have so many men there, that large armies would be required to drive them out.

It would be difficult for them to provide Ternate with cloth, for the little taken there now is brought by the Chinese to the Manilles. This want of cloth would not fail to trouble the inhabitants, and it would have to be sent from Malacca, and that could not be done easily. If a galley could also be taken to Ternate, it would greatly annoy the Spaniards....

The commerce of China depends moreover upon Malacca. If the Portuguese were driven from that place, the Chinese would have to give up that traffic....

The commerce of cotton stuffs at Coromandel is of great importance, for all the inhabitants of the Indias dress in those stuffs, and must have them at any price. There are different styles for each nation, according to their taste, and they make them so in different places ... If Malacca were taken from the Portuguese, they would have no further favorable opportunity for the trade in cloth....

If no means are found to besiege Malacca again, the Portuguese might make use of their fustas to hinder our trade with Coromandel. For, since this entire coast is low, and the fustas draw but little water, they could always station themselves between the sh.o.r.e and our vessels. Besides it is very dangerous for vessels to anchor there. If the enemy is spry, he could carry the news to Goa in one week, whence they could easily despatch their fleets against us.

It is certain that, if the Portuguese could be driven from Malacca, they would have to renounce trade on the Coromandel coast; for they would have no safe course, should they wish to get cloth, and they could gain nothing, for the expense would overbalance the profit. Consequently, I believe that all the commerce of the Portuguese in the East Indies depends on Malacca, and that, in order to cut it, one must take that place.

After that, there is no doubt that the inhabitants of Bantam would not be reasonable, when they would see us in fixed establishments, and would understand that since the English had no other commerce in the Indias than that of pepper, they would not care to make frequent voyages, or great expenses. The pepper of Jambeo, Andragyri, and other points, that is taken to Bantam, would be taken to Malacca, where, also, cloth for the return cargo would be found.

I have not learned whether the Portuguese have any strength at Bengale. All whom I have heard speak of that country say that a good commerce can be obtained there....

It would be advisable to send two vessels to Arracan to try to trade. Besides the king is very anxious for us to go there. A Portuguese, one Philippe de Britto, has a fort there, with a garrison of eighty men. This fort is fifty leagues inland, and Britto holds the entire country in check. Although the king of Arracan is powerful, he has been unable as yet to find means for driving out this Portuguese. This alarms all the kingdom of Pegu, especially since it is annoyed by civil wars. That country has immense wealth, especially in precious gems.

I do not believe that anything can be done with Cambaie while the Portuguese have forts on the Malabar coast, and while the king is not better disposed toward us. We must wait until he knows us better, and until his mind is disabused concerning the Spaniards. For, until he gives us permission to trade in his ports, we would always encounter great danger, since large vessels can not enter. Besides that country is so near Goa, that the Portuguese would be notified as soon as we arrived there, and would pounce upon us with their forces, so that we could hope for neither help nor protection.

All the above points to Malacca's importance, for the establishment that we wish to make in the Indias. Therefore, for that reason, we should reflect on it well. For, in short, it is time now for us to a.s.sure ourselves of a fixed place and of a retreat. And this place or that place that one might select, would cost immense sums before it could reach the present condition of Malacca. Besides it will be very difficult to find a place so advantageous.

The second expedition of Paul van Caerden (1606-1609) consisted of eight vessels, equipped at a cost of 1,825,135 livres. Its chief result was the capture of the Spanish fort at Machian and the two captures of the commander, who finally died in prison at Manila. The expedition sailed April 20, 1606, and shortly afterward began to have trouble with the Portuguese. After rounding the cape they besieged and took a Portuguese trading-post, after which they cruised past Goa, Calcutta, and other places, finally sighting Sumatra, January 5, 1607, and anchoring at Bantam, January 6. There they met the Matelief expedition. With a half-hearted following of Matelief's advice, van Caerden anch.o.r.ed at Amboina in March, whence on May 10, he started for Ternate. His capture by the Spanish of Ternate, the taking of the Spanish fort at Machian--the place "most abounding in cloves of all the Moluccas"--and other operations on land and sea followed. The expedition finally left Ternate on August 3, 1608, and by way of Bantam, reached Holland August 6, 1609, with a portion of its vessels.

The few years succeeding, events came thick and fast. Dutch interests in the Indias multiplied. The taking of Malacca was again considered. Resistance to Portuguese and Spanish interests became even more p.r.o.nounced, while the English and the Dutch came to definite agreements, between their respective trading companies as to trade in the Indias. The Dutch opened trade communication with j.a.pan. They became thoroughly established in the Moluccas, in Amboina, and in the islands of Banda. The Spanish under Governor Juan de Silva of Manila, took the offensive, and opposed the Dutch vigorously, maintaining certain forts in Ternate, from which the efforts of the Dutch failed to dislodge them. A Dutch fleet of thirteen vessels, with Pierre Verhoeven as Admiral, and Francois Wittert as vice-admiral, left Holland in 1607. Their course carried them along the sh.o.r.es of India, before Malacca, and among the islands of Sumatra, Java, and others. They had communication with vessels of other Dutch commanders, among them those of the ill-fated van Caerden, who was exchanged by the Spaniards March 23, 1610, proclaimed general of all the Moluccas July 1, 1610, and shortly after captured again by the Spaniards. They had certain negotiations also with the English. At Borneo, Amboina, Banda, Ternate, and their neighboring islands many important negotiations were carried on, looking ever to the strengthening and prepetuation of Dutch power. The war with the Banda islanders was at length settled satisfactorily, although it required a number of years. In this period came the twelve years' truce between Spain and Holland, or the States-general, but notwithstanding active hostilities between the two nations occurred afterward, the defeat and capture of Wittert's vessels near Manila Bay occurring after news of the truce had reached the Indias. In September of 1610 two vessels returning to Holland met seven vessels under Admiral Both, in which were the first Dutch women sent to the Indias. About 1613 the Spanish force in the Moluccas is stated as follows:

"... The Spaniards have control of the city of Gammalamma, in the island of Ternate, which they took from the inhabitants. They call it Nuestra Signora di Rosario. It has a wall and bastions built of stone. It is abundantly provided with cannon and war-supplies, which are sent from the Manilles.

"It is at present garrisoned by 200 Spaniards and 90 Papaugos [i.e., Pampangos (?)] who are inhabitants of the Philippines, who are well disciplined in arms, and serve as Spanish soldiers. There are also 30 Portuguese families, 60 or 80 Chinese families, who engage in different trades, and 50 or 60 Christian Molucca families.

"They have another fort between Gammalamma and Malaia, called Sts. Peter and Paul, located on an elevation, and mounted with six pieces of cannon. There are thirty-three cast-iron cannon in the first fort. The garrison of the latter consists generally of 27 Spaniards, 20 Papaugos, and some other people from the Manilles.

"They possess all the island of Tidore, where they have three forts, namely, that of Taroula, located in the large city where the king lives. It is stronger than the other two by its situation, which is on an elevation. Its garrison is usually 50 Spaniards, and 8 or 10 Papaugos. It has ten large cast-iron cannon.

"The second fort is the old Portuguese castle taken by Corneille Bastiaansz, which the Spaniards have retaken. It has 13 Spaniards, with several islanders, and 2 pieces of cannon.

"The third is named Marieco, and is in sight of Gammalamma....Its garrison consists of 14 Castilians and a few Papaugos, and it has two pieces of cannon....The wars have somewhat depopulated the country...."

[The Spaniards also possessed several forts in Gilolo: Sabougo, taken from the Dutch by Juan de Silva in 1611; Gilolo, also taken from the Dutch by the same governor; and Aquilamo. All these forts contained light garrisons. On the island of Moro, the Spaniards had the forts Jolo, Isiau, and Joffougho. They usually maintained in the sea a number of vessels. Juan de Silva is described as a brave, energetic, and diplomatic man. The second capture of van Caerden proved a decided blow to the Dutch, because of the loss of certain important papers.]

The Dutch power in the Moluccas was as follows:

"We have three forts at Ternate: that of Malaia, or Orange, commenced by Admiral Matelief, where the king of Ternate lives; that of Toluco, or Hollande, lying at the east end of the island, on an elevation, one-half legua north of that of Malaia, built of stone; for fear lest the Spaniards occupy this post, and for the same reason to send there to live a portion of the superfluous men at Malaia.

"Our third fort is that of Tacomma or Willemstad, lying at the northwest. It was constructed by Admiral Simon Jansz Hoen...."

[In the island of Machian, they possessed the fort of Taffalo and Tabillola. In Bachian they had a fort called Gammedource. All these forts were adequately garrisoned.]

By 1627 affairs were still more flouris.h.i.+ng and Batavia in Bantam, on the island of Java, had already been made a base of supplies. Spain still maintained forts at Ternate in that year. Signs of a desire to attack the Spaniards in the Philippines began to be manifest.

In regard to Wittert's expedition, defeat, and death, the following has been translated and condensed from Journal de l'amiral Wittert, 1607-10 (Liege, 1875), a small pamphlet in the library of Columbia University, New York.

"In the year 1607, the Company of the East Indies despatched thirteen vessels to find the Portuguese fleet, and probably to attack it, off Mosambique or in neighboring waters. Pierre Willemsz, of Amsterdam, was appointed admiral of this fleet; and Francois de Wittert, of the ancient baronial family of that name--seignior of Hoogeland, Emeeclaar, etc.--was made vice-admiral and president of the council-in-ordinary, with full power to take the place of the admiral, who was very old and infirm." The flags.h.i.+ps of these officers were of eight hundred and one thousand tons, respectively. The entire fleet carried two thousand eight hundred to two thousand nine hundred men, forty-two pieces of bra.s.s artillery and two hundred and eighty-three of iron, one hundred stone-mortars, with the necessary munitions, and provisions for more than three years. This armament cost ten million eight hundred livres. The fleet set sail from the Texel on December 22, 1607, and reached "the fort of Mosambique" on the twenty-eighth of July following. The Dutch besieged the fort, but were obliged to retreat (August 13). "In this siege 30 of our men were killed, and 85 wounded. We fired 2,250 cannon-shots at this fortress, which is the most important one possessed by the Portuguese in the East Indies; it has four bastions and three ramparts. But after this siege, it was almost entirely ruined, and the Portuguese power is destroyed, especially as regards the puissant empire of the Abissinians, whose emperor is named Preter-Jan [i.e., Prester John]." On November 5, 1608, the Dutch fleet reached Sumatra, where a naval battle with some Portuguese vessels ensued. In January, 1609, Wittert went, with some of the s.h.i.+ps, to Johor, and aided the king of that state to resist the Portuguese. On February 15, the fleet anch.o.r.ed at Bantam, and on April 8, at Nera, one of the isles of Banda, where they built a fort. Here, on May 22, the admiral and many of his officers were treacherously a.s.sa.s.sinated by the natives. Here the journal ends. Another and later entry reads: "Letters from Moluque [Maluco] bring the news that on June 12, 1610, the admiral Francois Wittert, while having some junks unloaded at Manila, was surprised by the Spanish and slain in the combat. He was attacked by more than 12 vessels at once, but defended himself for a long time. The 'Amsterdam'

was finally captured by four s.h.i.+ps which attacked it at once--one of which, however, the Dutch blew up--and was taken to Manila with 51 dead on board, including the admiral; the yacht 'Faucon' had 34 dead, and all its officers were slain except two--Pierre Gervits, master of the yacht, and Pierre Hertsing--who were wounded. The 'Faucon'

also was carried away, with 22 dead. [170] The Spaniards made 120 prisoners on the two s.h.i.+ps. As for the other vessels in their company the yacht 'Aigle' was blown up; the 'Paon' and the shallop 'Delft'

escaped. It is not exactly known whither these vessels have gone; but it is believed that they went to Patan."

With the increase of Dutch power in the Indias, complications naturally multiplied. The year spent by Pierre van den Broeck in the eastern seas, saw conflicts on the Indian coast, in Java, against the English and Javanese, and also with the Portuguese. Van den Broeck was in the service of the Dutch Trading Company for over seventeen years. He went first to the Indias in the expedition under Gerard Reyust, which left Holland May 3, 1613. On June 1, 1615, he embarked with Admiral Verhagen for the Moluccas. He played an important part in the establishment of Batavia in 1619, and in the troubles with the English and Javanese. The truth of the inadequacy of the natives against the more progressive races was proved again, as it had previously been proved by the experiences of Portuguese and Spanish. A siege of Batavia in 1629, by the Javanese failed in its purpose. Van den Broeck returned to Holland June 6, 1630.

The second Dutch voyage to the East Indies under command of Georges Spilberg sailed from Holland August 8, 1614, with six vessels. Its object was chastis.e.m.e.nt of the Spanish. Reaching the Strait of Magellan, March 28, 1615, after many adventures with the Portuguese along the Brazilian coast, the fleet made the pa.s.sage, and debouched into the South Sea on May 6. Thence they coasted the western sh.o.r.es of South America, and as far as Acapulco in New Spain. Near Lima a sea fight with the Spanish occurred, in which the latter were worsted, and three s.h.i.+ps destroyed. When some of the Spanish who were in the water called piteously for help, after saving the first and second pilot, and a few sailors, "we left the remainder to the mercy of the waves." The chronicle adds "Nevertheless some of the sailors killed several who were swimming, and struggling against death--which they did in disobedience to their orders." At Acapulco, the Spanish received the Dutch well and some change of prisoners was effected. On November 18, 1615, the fleet turned westward, and sighted the Ladrones by January 1, 1616. On February 9, the cape of Espiritu Santo was sighted, and on the 19th, under the guidance of native pilots, they sailed toward Manila Bay, and anch.o.r.ed that same day near Luzon. "Our intention was to make some Spaniard prisoner, in order to gain more detailed information of what had been told us at Capul, namely, that a fleet had been awaiting us for many days at the Manilles, and we wished eagerly to learn more particular news of it." It was learned that the Spanish fleet under Juan de Silva had gone to the Moluccas to aid the Spanish there. Consequently, the Dutch fleet, after an ineffectual attempt to exchange prisoners at Manila, went (March 10) to the Moluccas. On the way they received a.s.surance of the hatred in and about Mindanao for the Spaniards, and their willingness to join the Dutch.

Reaching the Moluccas they cruised about for some time, and finally two of the vessels were sent back to Holland, reaching that country, July 1, 1617. With them they took the celebrated Jacques le Maire who had attempted to find a new pa.s.sage to the South Sea, below the Strait of Magellan. As his voyage was not for the trading company which enjoyed the monopoly of trade in the Indias, his s.h.i.+p was confiscated. He died on the pa.s.sage home. [171]

Although the Dutch were later in their explorations and conquests throughout the Indias and neighboring regions than other nations, their activity carried them to all the places visited or conquered by the latter. As years went on the contests of the Dutch with the Spanish tended to lessen, while those with the natives increased. Women went to the new colonies in greater number, and life gradually a.s.sumed a more settled aspect. The strenuous efforts of the Dutch sent them into Formosa, China, j.a.pan, and other countries. Expeditions of more or less s.h.i.+ps multiplied. The names of the Dutch famous in the annals of the eastern seas are numerous. Their efforts, first and foremost, were the establishment of a sound commerce. The above, with the exception of the extract concerning Francois de Wittert, is translated and condensed from Recueil des voyages ... de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales (Amsterdam, 1725). See also, Histoire des voyages (Paris, 1750); Isabelo de los Reyes y Florentino: Articulos varios, (Manila, 1887), pp. 71-86, "Triunfos del Rosario o Los Holandeses en Filipinas;" and Ferdinand Blumentritt: Hollaendische Angriffe auf die Philippinen (Leitmeritz, 1880).

Morga's Philippine Islands

Volume II