Our National Defense: The Patriotism of Peace Part 17

A citizen soldiery is what we must undoubtedly have in this country, but it must be a citizen soldiery trained and inured at all times in advance to the real hards.h.i.+ps of war. They must have the physical stamina necessary to endure such hards.h.i.+ps. They must be kept at all times physically fit by the labor of their daily life and the occupations whereby they earn their bread. They must be trained thoroughly and well in time of peace, as it is contemplated they shall be trained under the military system of Switzerland and Australia. That system would to a large extent be the model which would be the guide for the creation of the Homecroft Reserve, except that under the latter system the regular annual training period would be longer and the training more thorough and complete. It would be sufficiently so to make a reservist in every way the equal, so far as training goes, of a soldier in the regular army.

The creation of a great Military Reserve under the plan proposed for a Homecroft Reserve in the Colorado River Valley for the national defense would require, for its complete and satisfactory fruition, the acquisition by the United States of the territory through which the Colorado River now flows from the present boundary line to the Gulf of California and extending around the head of the Gulf of California.

The Gulf of California should be made neutral waters forever, by treaty between the United States and Mexico, and this treaty should be agreed to by all the nations of the world. The neutral waters thus created should extend far enough into the open sea so that all commerce from the sh.o.r.es of the Gulf of California or reaching the markets of the world through that waterway from any of the vast interior territory embraced in the drainage basin of the Colorado River, could at any time reach the ocean highways of commerce without danger of being waylaid by the hostile s.h.i.+ps of war of any nation.

The territory which the United States should thus acquire from Mexico by peaceful agreement and purchase should include the section of land lying north of the most southerly line of New Mexico and Arizona, which runs through or very close to Douglas, Naco, and Nogales, extended due west to and across the Gulf of California and thence to the Pacific Ocean. The land lying north and east of this line and the Gulf of California and Colorado River should become a part of Arizona. The land lying north of the same line and extending from the Colorado River and the Gulf of California on the east to the Pacific Ocean on the west, should become a part of the State of California.

A neutral zone should be created, south of and parallel to the boundary line between the United States and Mexico, extending all the way from the Pacific Coast to the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the Rio Grande River.

This neutral zone should be controlled by an International Commission.

That commission should also have jurisdiction to determine any controversies that might arise with reference to the Gulf of California.

They should have the same jurisdiction over that neutral sea zone as over the neutral land zone. The jurisdiction of such an International Commission might well be extended to cover all controversies that might arise between the United States and Mexico, as to which it might be given full powers as an International Commission of Conciliation or Arbitration, whenever such disputed question was referred to it by the Executive or Legislative authority of either government, and in all cases before an actual declaration of war should be made by either country against the other.

Such an agreement would be of inestimable advantage to both countries, and would more than compensate Mexico for the transfer to the United States of the little corner of land which should be a part of Arizona and California.

It is of no possible benefit to Mexico to hang on to it. Its acquisition by the United States is vital to its safe development. Its owners.h.i.+p by Mexico puts the great population that will eventually live in the valley of the Colorado River in the same position with reference to their national outlet to the sea that the people of the Mississippi Valley would be in, if some other nation owned the mouth of the Mississippi River, or that New York would occupy if, for instance, Germany or France owned Long Island and Staten Island and the territory immediately adjacent to the Narrows and Long Island Sound on the mainland.

If the peace advocates in the United States, who limit their energies to the establishment of the machinery for arbitration or conciliation, would go one step farther and work out such a plan as that suggested above for getting rid of a national controversy before it becomes acute, they would render invaluable service to their country. The owners.h.i.+p of the delta of the Colorado River and the head of the Gulf of California is one of those certain points of danger that should be removed. The people of Mexico must realize that, and the creation of a neutral zone and the neutralization of the Gulf of California would be of infinitely greater value to Mexico than the small tract she would transfer to the United States could ever be under any circ.u.mstances. For Mexico to continue to hold it, creates a constant danger of friction or conflict which would be entirely removed if it were taken over by the United States.

The situation now is exactly as though one man owned the doorway to another man's house. He could make no real beneficial use of it except to embarra.s.s the owner of the house. Such a situation can only result in controversy. Is it not possible that the advocates of national arbitration and conciliation or of an International Court can be induced to see this and use their efforts to accomplish a great national benefit that is entirely practicable? The plan above proposed would have all the merits claimed for International Arbitration and Conciliation and for an International Peace Tribunal. That is what the proposed International Peace Commission between this country and Mexico would be, in fact, and its value and success being demonstrated in one place where it could be practically put in operation, it would be much easier to get the same plan adopted in wider fields by other nations, and perhaps gradually evolve a world-wide system for an International Peace Tribunal that way.

Another change that should be made in existing boundary lines to facilitate the development of the resources of that country and its settlement by a dense population, is shown by the map on the following page. State lines in the arid region should have been located, so far as possible, where they would have followed the natural boundaries of hydrographic basins. When early errors can be now corrected with advantage to the people it should be done. The development of Northern California would be facilitated by separating it from Southern California at the Tehachapi Mountains. Then the great problem of the reclamation and settlement of the 12,500,000 acres in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys could be solved much easier than as the state is now const.i.tuted. It would also be to the advantage of Southern California to be able to deal with its vast problems of irrigation development without being complicated with those of Northern California.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

The accompanying map ill.u.s.trates the lines which should be the boundary lines of the States of California, South California and Nevada. The North and South line between California and Nevada, running from Oregon to Lake Tahoe, should be continued south until it strikes the crest of the Pacific Watershed; thence it should follow the crest of that watershed southeast, south and southwest, until it joins the Pacific Ocean between Santa Barbara and Ventura. The southern boundary line of Utah should be extended until it intersects the line last described at the crest of the Pacific Watershed.

The land north of the line so extended to the west and draining into Nevada, formerly in California, and comprising Mono and part of Inyo Counties should go to Nevada and all south of this east and west line should go to South California. Nevada would gain by the exchange and so would South California. A glance at the map will satisfy anyone of the advantages to all the sections affected which would accrue from this correction of present boundaries, and the creation of the new State of South California.

CHAPTER X

_California is a remote Insular Province of the United States--just as much an island as Hawaii, to all practical intents and purposes. It would be more easily accessible from j.a.pan by sea, in case of war, than from the United States by land. It is bounded on the west by the Pacific Ocean, now nothing more than a large lake in these days of modern steams.h.i.+ps. It is bounded on the east and south by mountain ranges from which a thousand miles of desert and the Rocky Mountains intervene before the populous sections of the United States are reached. On the north inaccessible mountains separate California from the plains and valleys of Oregon. There are hundreds of places on its coast where an army could be landed. To reach it from the north, mountains must be crossed. From the east, mountains must be crossed. From the south, mountains must be crossed. From the west, the gentle waves of the Pacific, in all ordinary weather, lap the sloping sands which for nearly a thousand miles tempt a landing on so fair a sh.o.r.e._

All this is true of Southern California, so far as its inaccessibility from the east is concerned, but it is more essentially true of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley. There you have a great bowl, fas.h.i.+oned by Nature in such a way as to open invitingly to the warm and equable winds that come from the Pacific and the j.a.pan current, while on the north, west, and south are high mountain ranges that protect from the blizzards that come out of the north or the hot desert blasts from the south.

This peculiar conformation of the great central valley of California makes its defense in case of war with any maritime nation a most difficult problem.

The idea that the Pacific Coast of the United States or the coast of California can be protected by a navy seems so utterly without foundation that it is difficult to treat it seriously. Do those who delude themselves with that mistaken dream recall that Cervera steamed in from the sea and slipped into Santiago Harbor when practically the whole American Navy was searching and watching for him?

If England cannot protect two hundred miles of seacoast from the raids of German battles.h.i.+ps, can we protect two thousand miles? Does anyone doubt that if Germany had been so disposed, and her battles.h.i.+ps had been convoying fast transports laden with soldiers, she easily could have landed them at Scarborough or anywhere along that part of the English Coast? Does anyone doubt that j.a.pan could do the same thing anywhere along the Pacific Coast, particularly when the fact is borne in mind that in the summer, often for weeks at a time, the Pacific Coast is enveloped in dense fogs that are almost continuous?

Does anyone question that the instant war was declared j.a.pan would seize Alaska and the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands, and cut off all possibility of our navy operating anywhere except close to our few coaling stations on the mainland? If so, they should surely read "The Valor of Ignorance" by Homer Lea, not for the author's opinions, but just to get the cold hard facts which our national heedlessness makes it so difficult to get the people of this country to realize.

In "The Valor of Ignorance" the fact is pointed out with the most specific detail that the number of transports j.a.pan had, when that book was published--1909--was a transport fleet of 95 steamers with a troop capacity of 199,526 as against ten American transports. The author makes this further comment:

"Should j.a.pan embark on these two fleets an average of two j.a.panese to the s.p.a.ce and tonnage ordinarily deemed necessary for one American, then the troop capacity on a single voyage of these fleets would exceed three hundred thousand officers and men together with their equipment and supplies. That this would be easily possible and would work no hards.h.i.+p on the men was demonstrated by the j.a.panese winter quarters in Manchuria during the Russian War."

Is there anyone so blind as to believe that if such an army of invasion was started from j.a.pan, convoyed by the j.a.panese navy, that we could find and destroy that entire navy and then find and destroy ninety-five transports before they could land their soldiers on the beaches along the peaceful sh.o.r.es of California, Oregon, and Was.h.i.+ngton? The greater part of every year they _are_ peaceful sh.o.r.es. That is why the name Pacific was chosen for that great ocean.

The unique feature about this whole subject is that while the American people are utterly indifferent, j.a.pan, in an incredibly short s.p.a.ce of time, has equipped herself with everything needful for such an invasion,--Navy, Transports, and Soldiers, probably the most perfectly organized army in the world.

That is the situation of California from the side of the Pacific Ocean.

What is it from the land side?

If j.a.pan contemplated an invasion of our territory, how many are there who realize that just five dynamite bombs exploded in the right places would block a tunnel on every one of the railroads leading into the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley?

The California and Oregon from the north.

The Southern Pacific from the south.

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, the Central Pacific and the Western Pacific from the east.

Blow up one tunnel on each line and do the job thoroughly and well as the j.a.panese would do it,--that's the j.a.panese way,--and it would be weeks and perhaps months before one single train could be got in or out of California.

We may rest a.s.sured also that the j.a.panese, when they undertook that job, would not stop with blowing up one tunnel. They would blow up a dozen on every one of the railroads mentioned, and bridges and culverts and trestles. With a little dynamite, mixed with the reckless daring of the j.a.panese, California could be made inaccessible to an army from the east, except by sea, for a longer time than it would take to transport an army from Asia to America.

No doubt the idea will occur to some that soldiers could be transported from the Atlantic Coast to California through the Panama Ca.n.a.l in time to meet such an emergency. But what would we transport them in? We have no s.h.i.+ps. And it is no sure thing that the j.a.panese would not get the Panama Ca.n.a.l blown up and stop that channel of transportation, if war was begun between them and the United States. It would require nothing more desperate to accomplish it than we know the j.a.panese are ready for at any time the opportunity offered--nothing more desperate than Hobson's feat at Santiago.

The j.a.panese are a farsighted people and war with them is an exact science.

They master every detail in advance. They proved that in their war with Russia. There can be no doubt--not because they have any hostile intentions towards the United States, but merely because it is a part of the duty of their professional military scientists--that the plans are now made in the war office at Tokio, for every detail of the whole project outlined above for dynamiting every railroad into California and blowing up the Panama Ca.n.a.l, in the event of war between the United States and j.a.pan. And it is quite probable that the men are detailed for the job and the dynamite carefully stored away with which to do the job, if the necessity arose for it.

_The j.a.panese do not want a war with the United States._

Neither did they want a war with Russia. But it is a part of their religion to be prepared for war. It is the thorough j.a.panese way. Their way is not our way. They take no chances. We do nothing else but take chances. Because what we are doing or have done for national defense is as nothing.

All we spend on our navy is wasted, so far as any possible trouble with j.a.pan is concerned. If war came, it would come like the eruption of Mont Pelee, so unexpectedly and quickly that escape was impossible. The people of the United States, if we have a war with j.a.pan, will awaken some morning and read in all their morning papers that the Panama Ca.n.a.l has been blown up, and that tunnels on all the railroads into California and the Colorado River Bridges at Yuma and Needles have been blown up; that the 50,000 or more j.a.panese soldiers in California have mobilized and intrenched themselves in impregnable positions in the mountains of the coast range near the ocean; that j.a.panese steamers have landed 10,000 more j.a.panese soldiers to reenforce the 50,000 already in California; that those same steamers have brought arms, ammunition, field artillery, aeroplanes, and a complete equipment for a field campaign by this j.a.panese army of 60,000 men; that those j.a.panese steamers have landed at some entirely unfortified roadstead in California: Bodega Bay or Tomales Bay or Purissima or Pescadero or Santa Cruz or Monterey or Port Harford or any one of a dozen other places where they could land between San Diego and Point Arena.

The j.a.panese making this landing would within two days make a junction with the j.a.panese already in California. Then an army of occupation of 60,000 veteran soldiers is in military control of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley.

How surprised the good people would be who have been so anxious to get enough of the "inferior people" who are willing to do "squat labor" for the American _owners of the country_, which had just been taken away from them by the j.a.panese. Does it make any American proud to contemplate that the whole situation above outlined is not only possible but that it is the exact thing that would happen if we had a war with j.a.pan?

Soldiers for defense? We could not get them there in time, and we cannot maintain a soldier in idleness in a barracks in California for every j.a.panese who is industriously earning his living in a potato field, doing "squat labor" and thinking the while that he wishes his country would make it possible, as she could so easily do, for him to own a potato patch himself. Let no one imagine he is not thinking about it. The j.a.panese are a farsighted and subtle people, with brains four thousand years old.

And with this army of occupation of 60,000 j.a.panese veterans in possession of the great central valley of California, what would the j.a.panese do with our coast fortifications and the big guns that cost so much money and were designed to riddle j.a.panese battles.h.i.+ps miles at sea?

Why, the j.a.panese would just laugh at them. They would not be worth taking.

If they thought they were they would take them, just as they took Port Arthur and Tsing Tau. But they would not try to do that until they had landed a couple of hundred thousand more veteran j.a.panese troops on the Pacific Coast. Then they would take our coast fortifications from the land side not so much by storm as by _swarm_.

What would the California Militia be doing all this time?

_It is better not to dwell on unpleasant subjects._

Most probably they would be defending San Francisco or Sacramento from invasion while the j.a.ps were intrenching themselves in the appropriate places to control every pa.s.s across the Siskiyous or the Sierras or the Tehachapi Mountains, making it impossible to get across those mountains with an army, even though the army could first be got across the deserts to the mountains.

In winter the Siskiyous and the Sierras would be made impa.s.sible by Nature's snow and ice and avalanches, without any other defenses being built by the j.a.panese.

But one of the first things the j.a.panese would do would be to organize a force of aeroplane scouts with bombs to swoop out and down from their mountain aeries and dynamite culverts and bridges on every railroad approaching the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley. They could make it impossible to keep open railroad communication in any way other than by an adequate force to repel an aeroplane attack stationed at every bridge and culvert across a thousand miles of desert. Once the bridges across the Colorado River at the Needles and Yuma were blown up, the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe would be out of commission for months.