Auction of To-day Part 8

One of the most remarkable features of Auction is the extraordinary desire, exhibited by a large percentage of players, to play the combined hands. This comment is not applicable to a strong player, who, for the good of the partners.h.i.+p, is anxious to get the declaration himself, in order that during the play two or three tricks may not be presented to the adversaries, but is intended for the general run of cases where the partners are of equal, or nearly equal, ability.

A player, before determining to overbid his partner's call, should remember that one of the greatest pleasures of the game is facing the Dummy, especially when the declaration is apt to be successful, and he should a.s.sure himself beyond peradventure that, in bidding his own suit in preference to advancing his partner's, he is not in any way influenced by his own selfish desires. He should be sure that, with the positions reversed, he would thoroughly approve of just such action by his partner; and, if his partner be the better player, he should also convince himself that his suit is at least two tricks stronger, as his partner's superior play probably makes a difference of at least one in favor of his declaration.

It should be put down as axiomatic that, when a partner takes out a Heart or Royal with a bid of another suit, he denies strength in the suit originally declared and announces great length with probably four honors in the suit he names; also, that when a Heart or Royal is taken out by a No-trump declaration (except with a four-Ace holding), not only is weakness in the declared suit announced, but also the fact that every other suit is safely stopped.

This must not be understood as a suggestion that a partner should seldom be overbid. Quite the reverse. The informatory school of modern bidding, which attempts, as nearly as possible, to declare the two hands as one, has as an essential feature the overbidding of the partner in an infinite number of cases. It is against the foolish and selfish instances which occur with great frequency that this protest is directed.

WHEN "TWO SPADES" HAS BEEN DECLARED

When the Dealer bids two Spades, he gives explicit information regarding the contents of his hand.[9] The Third Hand is, therefore, practically in the position of having twenty-six cards spread before him, and the question of what he should declare is not apt to be at all confusing.

[9] See page 47.

If his hand be trickless, or practically so, he must bid one Royal, as that reduces the commitment from two tricks to one, and increases the possible gain per trick from 2 points to 9.

It is a noncommittal bid, as it may be made with great weakness or moderate strength. With considerable Spade strength, however, two Royals should be declared.

When the Third Hand has other than Spade strength, he will, of course, bid in accordance with his holding, but it goes without saying that he should make the best possible use of the accurate information he has received. With four strong Spades, even with sufficient additional strength to justify a weak No-trump, a Royal is generally preferable, and with more than four Spades, two Royals is unquestionably the bid, regardless of the strength of the remainder of the hand, unless, of course, it contain the much looked for, but seldom found, four Aces.

WHEN "THREE SPADES" HAS BEEN DECLARED

When the Dealer has called three Spades, the Third Hand has quite accurate data with which to work.[10] In this case, even if his hand be trickless, he must bid one Royal, as his partner's three Spades might otherwise be left in by the Fourth Hand. With some strength in other suits, one Royal is his bid, unless his cards justify him in telling the Dealer that, in spite of the announced long, weak Spades, the combined hands are apt to sail more smoothly and on more peaceful seas to the port called "Game" by the No-trump than by the suggested Royal route.

[10] See page 49.

Should the Third Hand overbid three Spades with either Hearts, Diamonds, or Clubs, he shows great strength in the suit named and absolute weakness in Spades; the bid of two Royals shows a.s.sistance in Spades, and probably other strength.

WHEN "ONE CLUB" OR "ONE DIAMOND" HAS BEEN DECLARED

When the Dealer has called one Club or one Diamond, the Third Hand (the score being love) must realize that going game with the declaration made is most unlikely. He should, therefore, overbid it whenever he has sufficient strength to justify such action. With strong Hearts or Spades, he should bid Hearts or Royals; without such Heart or Spade strength, but with three tricks and two suits stopped, he should bid No-trump. In the rare case in which game seems probable with the Club or Diamond declaration, he should advance his partner's call to two or three.

WHEN "TWO DIAMONDS" OR "TWO CLUBS" HAS BEEN DECLARED

When the Dealer has called two Clubs or two Diamonds with the score at love, the Third Hand should allow the declaration to stand, unless his Heart or Spade holding be such that he believes, with the a.s.sistance of his partner's Club or Diamond suit, he may win the game; or unless able to bid two No-trumps. With the information that his partner has an established suit, it does not require much strength to justify the two No-trumps call. With all the other suits stopped, no matter how weakly, the bid is imperative. With two securely stopped, it is advisable, but with only one stopped, it is entirely out of the question.

With a score in the trick column, the Third Hand will treat either a one or two Club or Diamond declaration just as, with the score at love, he treats a similar call in Hearts or Royals.

WHEN "ONE HEART" OR "ONE ROYAL" HAS BEEN DECLARED

When the Dealer bids one Heart or one Royal, the Third Hand should not overbid unless without strength in the declaration. By this is meant not only the absence of high cards, but also the absence of length.

With four small Hearts or Spades, and that suit bid by the Dealer, it is almost invariably the part of wisdom to allow it to remain.

The Third Hand should bid one Royal over one Heart, or two Hearts over one Royal with strength sufficient to justify an original call in that suit, and distinct weakness in the partner's declaration. The theory is that the Third Hand knows he cannot help his partner's declaration, while it is possible his partner may help him.

When the Third Hand has such strength in Hearts or Royals that he would advance his partner's declaration of either, in the event of an adverse bid, it is wise for him to bid two on the first round, in order, if possible, to shut out such adverse declaration and the information thereby given to the leader.

The Third Hand should call two Diamonds or Clubs over one Heart or Royal when he holds a long and practically solid suit. The original bidder can then use his judgment whether to let this declaration stand, continue his own, or try two No-trumps.

With a score, two Clubs or Diamonds may be bid more freely over the partner's Heart or Royal.

The Third Hand should not bid a No-trump over the Dealer's Heart or Royal, unless he have the three remaining suits safely stopped, or his hand contain solid Diamonds or Clubs, and one other suit stopped.

WHEN "TWO HEARTS" OR "TWO ROYALS" HAS BEEN DECLARED

The declaration of two Hearts or two Royals is practically a command to the partner not to alter the call. It indicates at least six sure tricks, probably more, and a valuable honor count, in the Declarer's hand, provided the suit named be the Trump. The Third Hand should only change such a declaration when convinced beyond reasonable doubt that his holding is so unusual that he is warranted in a.s.suming the responsibility of countermanding the order that has issued.

Weakness in the Trump and strength in some other suit is far from being a sufficient justification, as the chances are that the Dealer is weak in the suit of the Third Hand, and called "two" mainly for the purpose of keeping it from being named. To overbid two Royals or Hearts with three Diamonds or Clubs is obviously absurd, unless holding _five honors_ and such other strength that game is a.s.sured.

To overbid two Hearts with two Royals, or two Royals with three Hearts, is almost tantamount to saying, "Partner, I know you are trying to shut out this declaration, but I am strong enough to insist upon it." Such action is only justified by 64 or 72 honors, and a sure game.

To overbid two Hearts or two Royals with two No-trumps, as a rule, means 100 Aces. High-card strength a.s.sures the game in the partner's call with probably a big honor score; only the premium of 100 makes the change advisable.

With strength, in the case under consideration, the Third Hand should advance his partner's call with much greater confidence than if it were an ordinary bid of one. He should not worry even if absolutely void of Trumps; in that suit his partner has announced great length as well as commanding cards; Aces and Kings of the other suits are what the Declarer wishes to find in his hand, and with them he should bid fearlessly.

The same line of comment applies with even greater force to the action of the Third Hand when the Dealer has bid three Royals or three Hearts.

WHEN TO OVERBID A PARTNER'S NO-TRUMP

When the Dealer bids one No-trump and the Third Hand holds five or more of any suit, one of the most disputed questions of Auction presents itself.

The conservative player believes that with five Hearts or Spades, inasmuch as but one more trick is required to secure game, it is safer to bid two Hearts or Royals, except, of course, when the Third Hand, in addition to a five-card suit, has the three remaining suits stopped.

The theory is that if the combined hands are very strong, the winning of the game is absolutely a.s.sured with the suit in question the Trump, but may possibly be lost in the No-trump by the adversaries running a long suit. The chance of a hostile suit being established is unquestionably worthy of the consideration of the Third Hand whenever, with great strength in Hearts or Spades, he allows his partner's No-trump to stand. Five adverse tricks prevent a game. In the majority of cases, the leader opens a five-card suit. When it is not stopped, the game is saved by the adversaries before the powerful No-trump hand can get in; if it be stopped but once, the game is still in grave danger unless the Declarer take nine tricks before losing the lead.

With a Heart or Royal declaration the adversaries are not apt to take more than two tricks in their long suit, which, at No-trumps, may produce four or five (in rare cases six), and yet the Trump bid requires only one more trick for game.

It is unquestionably true that, with great strength, the game will be won nine times out of ten with the No-trump declaration, but in every such case it is absolutely "cinched" by the Heart or Royal call.

It is further argued that, when the combined hands are not quite so strong, a game is more frequently won with the Trump declaration, as the small Trumps are sure to take tricks, but the long suit may not be established in the No-trumper.

The believers in taking a chance, however, view the situation from the opposite standpoint. Their argument is that the game requires one more trick, when a Trump is declared, but does not count as much, that the original declarer may be weak in the suit named, yet strong in all the others, and therefore, with a good hand, it is wiser to leave the No-trump alone.

It is possible that the question is one rather of the temperament of the player than of card judgment. It is susceptible of almost mathematical deduction that five or more cards of a long suit are of greater trick-taking value when that suit is the Trump than when No-trump is being played, and it does not require any argument to substantiate the proposition that the slight difference in the score, between the total in the trick and honor columns netted from a game made without a Trump and a game made with Royals or Hearts, is so infinitesimal as not to be worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, players possessed of a certain temperament will, for example, refuse to overbid a partner's No-trump with Ace, King, Ten, and two small Spades, King of Hearts, and Ace of Diamonds, on the ground that the hand is too strong, although the No-trump bid may have been thoroughly justified by such a holding as Ace, Queen, Knave, of Hearts; King, Queen, Knave, of Diamonds; and Queen, Knave, of Spades. In that event it is practically sure the adversaries will open the Club suit and save the game before the Declarer has a chance to win a trick. This and similar situations occur with sufficient frequency to make them well worthy of consideration, and when such a hand fails to make game, it certainly seems to be a perfect example of what might be termed "useless sacrifice."

In spite of all this, however, probably as long as the game lasts, in the large proportion of hands in which the taking-out does not make any difference, the Declarer will say, "With such strength you should have let my No-trump alone"; or the Dummy will learnedly explain, "I was too strong to take you out."

It would be in the interest of scientific play, if, except when all suits are stopped, the theory, "Too strong to take the partner out of the No-trump," had never been conceived, and would never again be advanced.

The same comment applies with equal force to the remark so often heard, "Partner, I was too weak to take you out."

This generally emanates from a Third Hand who has a five- or six-card suit in a trickless hand. He does not stop to realize that his hand will not aid his partner's No-trump to the extent of a single trick, but that in a Trump declaration, it will almost certainly take two tricks. The Trump bid only increases the commitment by one, so it is obviously a saving and advantageous play. Furthermore, it prevents the adversaries from running a long suit. It, also, in Clubs and Diamonds, is a real danger signal, and, in the probable event of a bid by the Fourth Hand, warns the partner away from two No-trumps.

The advocates of the weakness take-out realize that in exceptional instances the play may result most unfortunately. When the Dealer has called a border-line No-trump, without any strength in the suit named by the Third Hand, and one of the adversaries has great length and strength in that suit, a heavy loss is bound to ensue, which may be increased 100 by the advance of the bid from one to two. This case is, indeed, rare, and when it does turn up the chances are that the Declarer will escape a double, as the holder of the big Trumps will fear the Dealer may be able to come to the rescue if he point out the danger by doubling the suit call.