Kelly Miller's History of the World War for Human Rights Part 4

[Ill.u.s.tration: GUARDING THE FLAG.

The flag of the old 15th (decorated by the French) and Old Glory.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: AT THE Y.M.C.A. ON FRENCH FRONT.

This group of soldiers is being served at a "Y" tent.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: NEGRO SOLDIERS ON THE MARCH IN FRANCE.

Along this beautiful stream it was tramp, tramp, tramp the soldiers were marching on to do their duty and help bring the victory which meant "World Peace."]

[Ill.u.s.tration: HOME AGAIN. OH, HOW JOYFUL!

Back from France, and what a grand reception awaited them! Conquering heroes on the battlefield and the warmth and enthusiasm over their homecoming are beyond words to describe.]

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL PERs.h.i.+NG'S OWN STORY OF THE VICTORIOUS AMERICAN ARMY

ORGANIZATION OF HIS GENERAL STAFF--TRAINING IN FRANCE--IN THE AISNE OFFENSIVE--AT CHATEAU THIERRY--THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT--MEUSE-ARGONNE, FIRST PHASE--THE BATTLE IN THE FOREST--SUMMARY.

This is a brief summary of the organization and operations of the American Expeditionary Force from May 26, 1917, until the signing of the armistice, November 11, 1918. Immediately upon receiving my orders I selected a small staff and proceeded to Europe in order to become familiar with conditions at the earliest possible moment.

The warmth of our reception in England and France was only equaled by the readiness of the commanders in chief of the veteran armies of the Allies and their staffs to place their experience at our disposal. In consultation with them the most effective means of co-operation of effort was considered. With French and British armies at their maximum strength, and all efforts to dispossess the enemy from his firmly intrenched positions in Belgium and France failed, it was necessary to plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in favor of the Allies. Taking account of the strength of the Central Powers at that time, the immensity of the problem which confronted us could hardly be over-estimated. The first requisite being an organization that could give intelligent direction to effort, the formation of a General Staff occupied my early attention.

ORGANIZATION OF GENERAL STAFF.

A well organized General Staff through which the commander exercises his functions is essential to a successful modern army. However capable our division, our battalion, and our companies as such, success would be impossible without thoroughly co-ordinated endeavor. A General Staff broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto existed in our army. Under the Commander-in-Chief, this staff must carry out the policy and direct the details of administration, supply, preparation, and operations of the army as a whole, with all special branches and bureaus subject to its control. As models to aid us we had the veteran French General Staff and the experience of the British who had similarly formed an organization to meet the demands of a great army. By selecting from each the features best adapted to our basic organization, and fortified by our own early experience in the war, the development of our great General Staff system was completed.

The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its chief who is an a.s.sistant to the Chief of the General Staff. G.1 is in charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements, tonnage, priority of overseas s.h.i.+pment, the auxiliary welfare a.s.sociation and cognate subjects; G.2 has censors.h.i.+p, enemy intelligence, gathering and disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar subjects; G.3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, movement of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G.4 co-ordinates important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G.5 supervises the various schools and has general direction and co-ordination of education and training.

The first Chief of Staff was Colonel (now Major-General) James G.

Harbord, who was succeeded in May, 1918, by Major-General James W.

McAndrew. To these officers, to the deputy Chief of Staff, and to the a.s.sistant Chiefs of Staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great credit is due for the results obtained not only in perfecting the General Staff organization but in applying correct principles to the multiplicity of problems that have arisen.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCES.

After a thorough consideration of Allied organizations it was decided that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of 3,000 men, with three battalions to a regiment and four companies of 250 men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments, a machine gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery, a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions--four combat and one depot and one replacement division--and also two regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.

Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down, a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalions, and a third month after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a complete division in war of movement.

SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION.

Very early a system of schools was outlined and started, which should have the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the front. At the great school center at Langres, one of the first to be organized, was the staff school, where the principles of general staff work, as laid down in our own organization, were taught to carefully selected officers. Men in the ranks, who had shown qualities of leaders.h.i.+p, were sent to the school of candidates for commissions. A school of the line taught younger officers the principles of leaders.h.i.+p, tactics, and the use of the different weapons. In the artillery school, at Saumur, young officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery; while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in aviation. These and other schools, with their well-considered curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were co-ordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known even the rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and General Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their veteran experience.

AMERICAN ZONE.

The eventual place the American army should take on the western front was to a large extent influenced by the vital question of communication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British armies' s.h.i.+pping and supplies while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us as lines of supply and those leading from the southern ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots and regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years, enormous quant.i.ties of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.

VAST PREPARATIONS NECESSARY.

With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover, broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the nations a.s.sociated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of s.h.i.+pbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage depots.

All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war we must utilize the southern ports of France--Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire, and Brest--and the comparatively unused railway systems leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serving on the western front.

SKILLED HELP.

To build up such a system there were talented men in the Regular Army, but more experts were necessary than the army could furnish. Thanks to the patriotic spirit of our people at home, there came from civil life men trained for every sort of work involved in building and managing the organization necessary to handle and transport such an army and keep it supplied. With such a.s.sistance the construction and general development of our plans have kept pace with the growth of the forces, and the Service of Supply is now able to discharge from s.h.i.+ps and move 45,000 tons daily, besides transporting troops and material in the conduct of active operations.

WORK OF THE DEPARTMENTS.

As to organization, all the administrative and supply services, except the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, and Judge Advocates General's Departments which remain at general headquarters, have been transferred to the headquarters of the services of supplies at Tours under a commanding general responsible to the commander-in-chief for supply of the armies. The Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Air Service, Chief of Chemical Warfare, the general purchasing agent in all that pertains to questions of procurement and supply, the Provost Marshal General in the maintenance of order in general, the Director General of Transportation in all that affects such matters, and the Chief Engineer in all matters of administration and supply, are subordinate to the Commanding General of the Service of Supply, who, a.s.sisted by a staff especially organized for the purpose, is charged with the administrative co-ordination of all these services.

TRANSPORTATION AND ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT.

The transportation department under the Service of Supply directs the operation, maintenance, and construction of railways, the operation of terminals, the unloading of s.h.i.+ps, and transportation of material to warehouses or to the front. Its functions make necessary the most intimate relations.h.i.+p between our organization and that of the French, with the practical result that our transportation department has been able to improve materially the operations of railways generally.

Constantly laboring under a shortage of rolling stock, the transportation department has nevertheless been able by efficient management to meet every emergency.

The Engineer Corps is charged with all construction, including light railways and roads. It has planned and constructed the many projects required, the most important of which are the new wharves at Bordeaux and Nantes, and the immense storage depots at La Pallice, Montoir, and Gievres, besides innumerable hospitals and barracks in various ports of France. These projects have all been carried on by phases keeping pace with our needs. The Forestry Service under the Engineer Corps has cut the greater part of the timber and railway ties required.

PURCHASES IN EUROPE.

To meet the shortage of supplies from America, due to lack of s.h.i.+pping, the representatives of the different supply departments were constantly in search of available material and supplies in Europe. In order to co-ordinate these purchases and to prevent compet.i.tion between our departments, a general purchasing agency was created early in our experience to co-ordinate our purchases and, if possible, induce our Allies to apply the principle among the Allied armies. While there was no authority for the general use of appropriations, this was met by grouping the purchasing representatives of the different departments under one control, charged with the duty of consolidating requisitions and purchases. Our efforts to extend the principle have been signally successful, and all purchases for the Allied armies are now on an equitable and co-operative basis. Indeed, it may be said that the work of this bureau has been thoroughly efficient and business-like.

ARTILLERY, AIRPLANES AND TANKS.

Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and one-fifty-five GPF guns from their own factories for thirty divisions.

The wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon began the manufacture of these cla.s.ses of guns at home, there were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America on our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these types produced at home thus far received in France are 109 seventy-five millimeter guns.

In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French Government came to our aid until our own aviation program should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first airplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including airplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918. As to tanks, we were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we were less fortunate, for the reason that the French production could barely meet the requirements of their own armies.

OUR OBLIGATIONS TO FRANCE.

It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken a most liberal att.i.tude and has been most anxious to give us every possible a.s.sistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.