A History of Sea Power Part 24

On January 3, 1904, j.a.pan presented practically an ultimatum; on February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared war; and on the same night--just as the Czar was discussing with his council what should be done--she delivered her first blow. By extraordinary laxity, though the diplomatic rupture was known, the Port Arthur squadron remained in the outer anchorage, "with all lights burning, without torpedo nets out, and without any guard vessels."[1] Ten j.a.panese destroyers attacked at close quarters, fired 18 torpedoes, and put the battles.h.i.+p _Tsarevitch_ and two cruisers out of action for two months. It was only poor torpedo work, apparently, that saved the whole fleet from destruction. A Russian light cruiser left isolated at Chemulpa was destroyed the next day. The transportation of troops to Korea and Southern Manchuria was at once begun. Though not locked in by close blockade, and not seriously injured by the frequent j.a.panese raids, bombardments, and efforts to block the harbor entrance, the Port Arthur squadron made no move to interfere.

[Footnote 1: s.e.m.e.noff, RASPLATA, p. 45.]

Both fleets suffered from mines. Vice Admiral Makaroff, Russia's foremost naval leader, who took command at Port Arthur in March, went down with the _Petropavlosk_ on April 13, when his s.h.i.+p struck a mine laid by the j.a.panese. On May 14, on the other hand, the Russian mine-layer _Amur_ slipped out in a fog, spread her mines in the usual path of j.a.panese vessels off the port, and thus on the same day sank two of their best s.h.i.+ps, the _Hatsuse_ and _Yas.h.i.+ma_. Mining, mine-sweeping, an uneventful Russian sortie an June 23, progress of j.a.panese land forces down the peninsula and close investment of Port Arthur--this was the course of events down to the final effort of the Russian squadron on August 10.

[Ill.u.s.tration: HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR]

By this time j.a.panese siege guns were actually reaching s.h.i.+ps in the harbor. Action of any kind, especially if it involved some injury to the enemy navy, was better than staying to be shot to pieces from the sh.o.r.e. Yet Makaroff's successor, Witjeft, painfully and consciously unequal to his responsibilities, still opposed an exit, and left port only upon imperative orders from above.

Scarcely was the fleet an hour outside when Togo appeared on the scene. The forces in the Battle of August 10 consisted of 6 Russian battles.h.i.+ps and 4 cruisers, against 6 j.a.panese armored vessels and 9 cruisers; the combined large-caliber broadsides of the armored s.h.i.+ps being 73 to 52, and of the cruisers 55 to 21, in favor of Togo's squadron. In spite of this superiority in armament, and of fully a knot in speed, Togo hesitated to close to decisive range.

Five hours or more of complicated maneuvering ensued, during which both squadrons kept at "long bowls," now pa.s.sing each other, now defiling across van or rear, without marked advantage for either side.

At last, at 5.40 p.m., the j.a.panese got in a lucky blow. Two 12-inch sh.e.l.ls struck the flags.h.i.+p _Tsarevitch_, killing Admiral Witjeft, jamming the helm to starboard, and thus serving to throw the whole Russian line into confusion. Togo now closed to 3000 yards, but growing darkness enabled his quarry to escape. The battle in fact was less one-sided than the later engagement at Tsus.h.i.+ma. On both sides the percentage of hits was low, about 1% for the Russians and 6 or 7% for their opponents. Togo's flags.h.i.+p _Mikasa_ was. .h.i.t 30 times and lost 125 men; the total j.a.panese loss was about half that of the enemy--236 to 478.

Much might still have been gained, in view of the future coming of the Baltic fleet, had the Russians still persisted in pressing onward for Vladivostok; but owing to loss of their leader and ignorance of the general plan, they scattered. The cruiser _Novik_ was caught and sunk, another cruiser was interned at Shanghai, a third at Saigon, and the _Tsarevitch_ at Kiao-chau. The rest, including 5 of the 6 battles.h.i.+ps, fled back into the Port Arthur death-trap. Largely in order to complete their destruction, the j.a.panese sacrificed 60,000 men in desperate a.s.saults on the fortress, which surrendered January 2, 1905. As at Santiago, the necessity of saving battles.h.i.+ps, less easily replaced, led the j.a.panese to the cheaper expenditure of men.

On news of the Port Arthur sortie, the Vladivostok squadron, which hitherto had made only a few more or less futile raids on j.a.panese s.h.i.+pping, advanced toward Tsus.h.i.+ma Straits, and met there at dawn of August 14 a slightly superior force of 4 cruisers under Kamimura.

The better shooting of the j.a.panese soon drove the slowest Russian s.h.i.+p, the _Rurik_, out of line; the other two, after a plucky fight, managed to get away, with hulls and funnels riddled by enemy sh.e.l.ls.

The complete annulment of Russia's eastern fleet in this first stage of hostilities had enabled j.a.pan to profit fully by her easier communications to the scene of war. Its final destruction with the fall of Port Arthur gave a.s.surance of victory. The decisive battle of Mukden was fought in March, 1905. Close to their bases, trained to the last degree, inspired by success, the j.a.panese navy could now face with confidence the approach of Russia's last fleet.

_Rojdestvensky's Cruise_

After a series of accidents and delays, the Baltic fleet under Admiral Rojdestvensky--8 battles.h.i.+ps, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and numerous auxiliaries--left Libau Oct. 18, 1904, on its 18,000-mile cruise. Off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, the s.h.i.+ps fired into English trawlers under the impression that they were enemy torpedo craft, and thus nearly stirred England to war. Off Tangier some of the lighter vessels separated to pa.s.s by way of Suez, and a third division from Russia followed a little later by the same route.

Hamburg-American colliers helped Rojdestvensky solve his logistical problem on the long voyage round Africa, and German authorities stretched neutrality rules upon his arrival in Wahlfish Bay, for the engrossment of Russia in eastern adventures was cheerfully encouraged by the neighbor on her southern frontier. France also did her best to be of service to the fleet of her ally, though she had "paired off" with England to remain neutral in the war.

With the reunion of the Russian divisions at Nossi Be, Madagascar, January 9, 1905, came news of the fall of Port Arthur. The home government now concluded to despatch the f.a.g-ends of its navy, though Rojdestvensky would have preferred to push ahead without waiting for such "superfluous enc.u.mbrances" to join. s.h.i.+ps, as his staff officer s.e.m.e.noff afterward wrote, were needed, but not "old flatirons and galoshes"; guns, but not "holes surrounded by iron."[1] After a tedious 10 weeks' delay in tropical waters, the fleet moved on to French Indo-China, where, after another month of waiting, the last division under Nebogatoff finally joined--a slow old battles.h.i.+p, 3 coast defense ironclads, and a cruiser.

Upon these, Rojdestvensky's officers vented their vocabulary of invective, in which "war junk" and "auto-sinkers" were favorite terms.

[Footnote 1: RASPLATA, p. 426.]

Having already accomplished almost the impossible, the armada of 50 units on May 14 set forth on the last stage of its extraordinary cruise. Of three possible routes to Vladivostok--through the Tsugaru Strait between Nippon and Yezo, through the Strait of La Perouse north of Yezo, or through the Straits of Tsus.h.i.+ma--the first was ruled out as too difficult of navigation; the second, because it would involve coaling off the coast of j.a.pan. Tsus.h.i.+ma remained.

To avoid torpedo attack, the Russian admiral planned to pa.s.s the straits by day, and fully expected battle. But the hope lingered in his mind that fog or heavy weather might enable him to pa.s.s unscathed. He had been informed that owing to traffic conditions on the Siberian railway, he could get nothing at Vladivostok in the way of supplies. Hence, as a compromise measure which weakened fighting efficiency, he took along 3 auxiliary steamers, a repair s.h.i.+p, 2 tugs, and 2 hospital s.h.i.+ps, the rest of the train on May 25 entering Shanghai; and he so filled the bunkers and piled even the decks with fuel, according to Nebogatoff's later testimony, that they went into action burdened with coal for 3,000 miles.[2]

[Footnote 2: Mahan, NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 412.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905]

The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions of 4 s.h.i.+ps each: (1) the _Suvaroff_ (flags.h.i.+p), _Alexander III, Borodino_ and _Orel_, each a new battles.h.i.+p of about 13,600 tons; (2) the _Ossliabya_, a slightly smaller battles.h.i.+p, and three armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above, with the exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of 4 smaller cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers. The j.a.panese engaged in two main divisions of 6 s.h.i.+ps each (4 battles.h.i.+ps and 8 armored cruisers), backed by four light cruiser divisions of 4 s.h.i.+ps each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance, as will appear from the following table, but this was more than compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain of sh.e.l.ls. Of guns in broadside, the j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43.

-------------------------------------------------- | | MAIN BATTERIES | Q.F.

| |---------------------|------------ | s.h.i.+ps | 12" | 10" | 9" | 8" | 6" | 47"

-------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|-----|------ j.a.pan | 12 | 16 | 1 | | 30 | 160 | Russia | 12 | 26 | 15 | 4 | 3 | 90 | 20

On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the j.a.panese in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover, had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree of skill. The j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls were also superior, with fuses that detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the j.a.panese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was a heterogeneous a.s.semblage of new s.h.i.+ps hastily completed and old s.h.i.+ps indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a unit for only 13 days.

On the night of May 26-27, as the Russian s.h.i.+ps approached Tsus.h.i.+ma through mist and darkness, half the officers and men were at their posts, while the rest slept beside the guns. Fragments of wireless messages--"Last night" ... "nothing" ... "eleven lights" ... "but not in line"--revealed enemy patrols in the waters beyond. s.e.m.e.noff on the _Suvaroff_ describes vividly "the tall, somewhat bent figure of the Admiral on the side of the bridge, the wrinkled face of the man at the wheel stooping over the compa.s.s, the guns' crews chilled at their posts." In the brightly lighted engine-rooms, "life and movement was visible on all sides; men were nimbly running up and down ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and buzzing of voices; orders were being transmitted loudly; but, on looking more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same peculiar frame of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be observed."[1]

[Footnote 1: THE BATTLE OF TSUs.h.i.+MA, p. 28.]

_The Battle of Tsus.h.i.+ma_

At dawn (4.45) the j.a.panese scout _Sinano Maru_, which for an hour or more had been following in the darkness, made them out clearly and communicated the intelligence at once to Togo in his base at Masampho Bay, on the Korean side of the straits, and to the cruiser divisions off the Tsus.h.i.+ma Islands. This was apparently the first definite news that Togo had received for several days, and the fact suggests that his scouting arrangements were not above criticism, for it took fast steaming to get to the straits by noon. Cruiser divisions were soon circling towards the Russians through the mist and darting as swiftly away, first the 5th and 6th under Takeomi and Togo (son of the admiral), then the 3d under Dewa, all reporting the movements of the enemy fleet and shepherding it till the final action began. Troubled by their activity, Rojdestvensky made several s.h.i.+fts of formation, first placing his 1st and 2d divisions in one long column ahead of the 3d, then at 11.20 throwing the 1st division again to starboard, while the cruisers protected the auxiliaries which were steaming between the lines in the rear.

This was the disposition when, shortly after one o'clock, the j.a.panese main divisions appeared to northward about 7 miles distant, steaming on a westerly course across the enemy's bows. Since morning Togo had covered a distance of 90 miles. From his signal yards fluttered the stirring message: "The fate of the empire depends upon to-day's battle. Let every man do his utmost." Ordering all his cruisers to circle to the Russian rear, and striking himself for their left flank, which at the moment was the weaker, Togo first turned southward as if to pa.s.s on opposite courses, and then at about two o'clock led his two divisions around to east-northeast, so as to "cross the T" upon the head of the enemy line.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF TSUs.h.i.+MA, MAY 27, 1905

_j.a.panese_ I Division (Togo) II Division (Kamimura) Mikasa, B.S. Idzumo s.h.i.+kis.h.i.+ma, B.S. Iwate Asahi, B.S. Adzumo Fuji, B.S. Asama Niss.h.i.+n, A.C. Tokiwa Kasuga Yak.u.mo

_Russians_ I Division II Division Suvaroff Ossliabya (flag) Alexander III Borodino III Division Orel]

Just as Togo's flags.h.i.+p _Mikasa_ straightened on her new course, nearly north of the _Suvaroff_, and 6400 yards distant, the _Suvaroff_ opened fire. It has been suggested that at this critical moment the Russian admiral should have closed with the enemy, or, leading his s.h.i.+ps on a northwesterly course, laid his starboard broadsides on the knuckle formed by the j.a.panese turn. But the position of the enemy cruisers and destroyers, and worry over his transports, guided his movements. Moreover, he had not yet completed an awkwardly executed maneuver to get his s.h.i.+ps back into single column with the 1st division ahead. The _Ossliabya_ and other s.h.i.+ps of the 2d division were thrown into confusion, and forced to slow down and even stop engines. Under these difficulties, the _Suvaroff_ sheered more to eastward. As they completed their turn the j.a.panese secured a "capping" position and could concentrate on the leading s.h.i.+ps of both the 1st and the 2d Russian divisions, 4 s.h.i.+ps on the _Suvaroff_ and 7 on the _Ossliabya_. Under this terrible fire the _Ossliabya_ went down, the first modern battles.h.i.+p (in the narrow sense of the word) ever sunk by gunfire, and the _Suvaroff_ a few moments later fell out of line, torn by sh.e.l.ls, her forward funnel down, and steering gear jammed. "She was so battered," wrote a j.a.panese observer, "that scarcely any one would have taken her for a s.h.i.+p."

With an advantage in speed of 15 knots to 9, the j.a.panese drew ahead. The _Alexander_, followed by other Russian s.h.i.+ps in much confusion, about three o'clock made an effort to pa.s.s northward across the enemy rear, but they were countered by the j.a.panese first division turning west together and the 2d division in succession at 3.10. The first and decisive phase of the action thus ended. Both fleets eventually resumed easterly and then southerly courses, for considerable periods completely lost to each other in smoke and haze.

Plunging through heavy seas from the southwest, the j.a.panese cruisers had in the meantime punished the Russian rear less severely than might have been expected. Two transports went down in flames, two cruisers were badly damaged, and the high-sided ex-German liner _Ural_ was punctured with sh.e.l.ls. On the other hand, Dewa's flags.h.i.+p _Kasagi_ was driven to port with a bad hole under water, and Toga's old s.h.i.+p _Naniwa Kan_ had to cease action for repairs. Hits and losses in fact were considerable in both the main and the cruiser divisions of the j.a.panese, their total casualties numbering 465.

Late in the afternoon the Russian destroyer _Buiny_ came up to the wreck of the _Suvaroff_, and lurched alongside long enough for Rojdestvensky, wounded and almost unconscious, to be practically thrown on board. He was captured with the destroyer next day. In spite of her injuries, the _Suvaroff_ held off a swarm of cruisers and destroyers until at last torpedoed at 7.20 p. m.

The Russian battles.h.i.+ps had meanwhile described a large circle to southward, and at 5 p. m. were again steaming north, accompanied by some of their cruisers and train. Attacked once more between 6 and 7 o'clock, and almost incapable of defense, the _Alexander III_ and _Borodino_ went down, making 4 s.h.i.+ps lost out of the 5 new vessels that had formed the backbone of Rojdestvensky's forces. In the gathering darkness. Nebogatoff collected the survivors and staggered northward.

Of slight value in the day engagement, 21 j.a.panese destroyers, with about 40 torpedo boats which had sheltered under Tsus.h.i.+ma Island, now darted after the fleeing foe. In the fog and heavy weather they were almost as great a menace to each other as to the enemy. Russian s.h.i.+ps without searchlights escaped harm. Of three or perhaps four Russian vessels struck, all but the _Navarin_ stayed afloat until the next day. Admiral Custance estimates 8 hits, or 9% of the torpedoes fired. There were at least 6 collisions among the flotillas, and 4 boats destroyed.

On the morning of the 28th the remains of the Russian fleet were scattered over the sea. Nebagatoff with 4 battles.h.i.+ps and 2 cruisers surrendered at 10.30. Of the 37 s.h.i.+ps all told that entered Tsus.h.i.+ma Straits, only the following escaped: the cruisers _Oleg, Aurora_, and _Jemschug_ reached Manila on June 3; a tug and a supply s.h.i.+p entered Shanghai, and another transport with plenty of coal went clear to Madagascar; only the fast cruiser _Almaz_ and two destroyers made Vladivostok.

Among the lessons to be drawn from Tsus.h.i.+ma, one of the clearest is the weakening effect of divided purpose. With all honor to Admiral Rojdestvensky for his courage and persistence during his cruise, it is evident that at the end he allowed the supply problem to interfere with his preparations for battle, and that he fought "with one eye on Vladivostok." It is evident also that only by a long period of training and operating as a unit can a collection of s.h.i.+ps and men be welded into an effective fighting force. Torpedo results throughout the war, whether due to faulty materials or unskilled employment, were not such as to increase the reliance upon this weapon. The gun retained its supremacy; and the demonstrated advantage conferred by speed and heavy armament in long range fighting was reflected in the "all-big-gun" _Dreadnought_ of 1906 and the battle cruisers of 1908.

Immediately after the Russian navy had been swept out of existence, President Roosevelt offered to mediate, and received favorable replies from the warring nations. By the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New Hamps.h.i.+re, on September 5, 1905, Russia withdrew from Manchuria in favor of China, recognized j.a.pan's paramount position in Korea (annexed by j.a.pan in 1910), and surrendered to j.a.pan her privileges in Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. In lieu of indemnity, j.a.pan after a long deadlock was induced by pressure on the part of England and the United States to accept that portion of the island of Saghalien south of the parallel of 50. Thus the war thwarted Russia's policy of aggressive imperialism in the East, and established j.a.pan firmly on the mainland at China's front door.

At the same time, by the military debacle of Russia, it dangerously disturbed the balance of power in Europe, upon which the safety of that continent had long been made precariously to depend.

REFERENCES

_Spanish-American War_

NOTES ON THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (a series of publications issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department, 1900).

SAMPSON-SCHLEY OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE U. S. SENATE, Gov't Printing Office, 1899.

THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN, H. W. Wilson, 1900.

WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, W. A. M. Goode, 1899.

A HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, R. H. Tetherington, 1900.

_Russo-j.a.panese War_

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, 3 vols., H. B.

Morse, 1918.

THE BATTLE OF TSUs.h.i.+MA (1906), RASPLATA (1910), Captain Vladimir s.e.m.e.noff.

j.a.pANESE OFFICIAL HISTORY, translated in U. S. Naval Inst.i.tute Proceedings, July-August, September-October, 1914.

THE s.h.i.+P OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, Admiral Reginald Custance, 1912.

THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE RUSSO-j.a.pANESE WAR, Captain N. Klado, 1905.

OFFICIAL BRITISH HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-j.a.pANESE WAR, 3 vols., 1910.

THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE, Debaters' Handbook Series, N. Y., 1916 (with bibliography).