Aftermath: following the bloodshed of America's wars in the muslim world Part 4

After Zarqawi's Death.

The death of Zarqawi in an American strike in June 2006 was hailed by the Bush administration as a turning point, but the civil war had its own cruel logic and did not need Zarqawi. Instead, a new Zarqawi emerged. Sunnis began speaking of the "s.h.i.+te Zarqawi." In the summer of 2006, rumors began spreading throughout Baghdad of a shadowy s.h.i.+te killer known as Abu Dira, a nickname meaning the Armor Bearer. In the s.h.i.+te uprisings of 2004, he was said to have held off the Americans in southern Sadr City. He earned his name either by destroying American armored vehicles or after killing an American soldier and stealing his body armor. Some rumors claimed he wore this armor at all times. Hailed by s.h.i.+tes as a hero who defended them, he was also known by Sunnis as the Rusafa Butcher, a reference to the eastern half of Baghdad, where he was said to live. Another story claimed that a Sunni prison guard under Saddam called Abu Dira was notorious among s.h.i.+tes for his brutality. The vengeful s.h.i.+te known as Abu Dira might have taken his nickname out of irony. All information about him was based on rumors, but he was said to be a man in his thirties called either Salim or Ismail, who lived in Sadr City but was born in the southern s.h.i.+te town of Amara. Some said he was a member of the Mahdi Army and commanded hundreds of fighters, but other sources claimed he was a renegade militiaman, out of Muqtada's control. Some said he was a bodyguard in the former regime who had deserted and fled to Iran; others thought he had been a guard who tortured prisoners in one of Saddam's prisons. One website claimed that he controlled the Interior Ministry's Falcon Brigade, which kidnapped Sunnis from Baghdad's Zafraniya district.

It was said that every time there was a terror attack against s.h.i.+tes he counted the dead and killed an equal number of Sunnis, although by other accounts he killed a higher ratio of Sunnis when he extracted vengeance. He was said to kill dozens of Sunnis every day in a remote part of Sadr City called Sadda, and he was also said to have threatened to fill the craters left from car bombs in Sadr City with the bodies of Sunnis. Some Sunni sources believed he was obeying the fatwa issued by Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri in Iran, who was Muqtada's erstwhile backer, urging s.h.i.+tes to kill Sunnis and former Baathists in particular. One Sunni website claimed he had taken an oath to slaughter a camel and feed the poor people of Sadr City after he had killed Sunni politician Adnan al-Dulaimi. A popular radical Sunni line is, "Our dead are in paradise and your dead are in the h.e.l.l." Abu Dira changed that, telling Sunnis, "Our dead are in paradise and your dead are in Sadda," Sadda being the dam in eastern Baghdad where s.h.i.+te gangs dumped Sunni corpses. Although some s.h.i.+tes in Baghdad cheered this legend as much as Sunnis feared him, Muqtada and the Mahdi Army denied that he even existed and claimed he had been invented by Sunnis to falsely accuse s.h.i.+tes of crimes. An American operation in Sadr City in July targeted a funeral for one of Abu Dira's relatives but failed to lead to his arrest.

Muqtada's control over his militia was tenuous. He issued statements such as "We are the enemies of the Saddamists," which were interpreted by his followers as a license to kill all Sunnis. The Mahdi Army was not strictly hierarchical, and Muqtada was unaware of most of its local commanders and activities. The Mahdi Army's cells were loosely organized; many of them were composed of friends who were on local soccer teams. Sayyid Ha.s.san Naji al-Musawi, an important Mahdi Army commander in Sadr City, had been a well-known local soccer star before the war. Different leaders of the Mahdi Army disliked one another. There were jealousies and rivalries. There was nothing stopping a group of s.h.i.+te youths from declaring that they were a Mahdi Army unit, collecting weapons, and interpreting Muqtada's statements as they saw fit. Mahdi Army leaders could be imams, sheikhs, or local toughs called shaqis. Before the war shaqis might have been neighborhood gang leaders, but with the formation of Sunni and s.h.i.+te militias and resistance groups, they took the lead. In Baghdad and majority-s.h.i.+te towns, most of the police were Mahdi Army as well. The reasons were simple. Most poor s.h.i.+te men supported Muqtada and claimed to belong to his militia, and most Iraqi police were poor s.h.i.+te men, so they were one and the same. Sunnis came to view the state as their enemy. As early as 2005, I realized that the once-confident and aggressive Sunnis were intimidated and uncertain about their fate. They worried about losing.

Rather than remaking the Middle East, the Iraq War was tearing it apart. Kurdish independence could provoke Turkish intervention. At a minimum it would push the Turks closer to the Iranians and Syrians, who would have the same concerns of Kurdish irredentism. Sunnis throughout the region, who already had so many reasons to hate the United States-Abu Ghraib, Haditha, Palestine, Guantanamo-would now have one more, for the Americans had handed Iraq to the s.h.i.+tes. As we shall see in the next chapter, Salafi jihadis could pour in to fight the hateful s.h.i.+tes. s.h.i.+tes might attempt to push Sunnis out of Iraq, for until they could control the key highways in the Anbar province leading to Syria and Jordan, their economy would be threatened. Arab Sunni countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia would support Sunni militias and perhaps intervene directly. Sunni retaliation against s.h.i.+tes or Alawites in Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and even Afghanistan could provoke sectarian clashes throughout the Muslim world. At some point Iran would intervene, and if it threatened the waters of the Persian Gulf, the entire world's economy could be threatened. It seemed as though we were seeing the death throes, and not the birth pangs, of a new Middle East.

Soon after the war, black and colorful flags appeared on rooftops throughout Iraq. Some s.h.i.+tes even covered their houses with big sheets of black cloth. Each referred to parts of the story of the martyr Imam Hussein. Under Saddam such public displays of s.h.i.+te ident.i.ty could have been met with punishment. Now more and more areas in Baghdad were full of s.h.i.+te symbolism. During the civil war, as more and more territory came safely into s.h.i.+te hands, the black flags and pictures of Hussein became ever more pervasive. s.h.i.+tes were no longer afraid; the city was theirs.

It was soon very clear that sectarian Islamist s.h.i.+te militias and parties had won the civil war, empowered as they were by their numerical superiority, their control of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the fact that the Americans were targeting the Sunni population of Iraq. Sunni leaders realized this too.

In late 2006 Sheikh Saad Mushhan Naif al-Hardan strode into a hotel lobby in Amman, Jordan, accompanied by two stern-faced companions. He wore a tailored suit and was more svelte than I remembered him from when I first met him more than two years earlier in his village of Albu Aitha, a collection of family compounds nearly hidden by the thick verdant fauna kept fertile by the wide still waters. One hundred miles west of Baghdad, past Ramadi and Falluja, a left turn off the highway led to dirt roads pa.s.sing through fecund fields fed by the nearby Euphrates. Sheep and cows drank from the river bank in the shade of towering date palm plantations.

Back then the sheikh had been draped in black and gray robes, his face partially concealed by a white head scarf, crowned with a black rope. His small keen eyes, thick arching brows, and mustache lay still, waiting for an emotion to animate them. He had been joined by his three cousins: a lawyer, a history professor, and a history teacher. Since 1995 the sheikh had led the Sunni Aithawi tribe, the largest subtribe (he claimed) of the Dulaimi tribe, one of Iraq's largest tribes (every sheikh in Iraq, it should be noted, claims his tribe is the largest). Sheikh Saad refused to enumerate his tribe's manpower; it was the tribal equivalent of cla.s.sified information. The enemy could not know the potential force his tribe could wield. In this case the enemy was the Americans. The Dulaimi tribe, whose lands reached from the Saudi border to the Syrian border and up to the outskirts of Baghdad in Abu Ghraib, was just as recalcitrant in the face of American occupation as it was nearly a century ago, during the 1920 uprising against the British occupation. Sheikh Saad's grandfather Hardan Hamid, head of the Aithawi branch of the Dulaimi tribe, had ridden south to Kut with his five brothers and all the fighting men his tribe could muster to face the invading British army. "The British had more advanced weapons and better tactics," Sheikh Saad said. His relatives were still buried near Kut. Sheikh Hardan had retreated to his tribal lands, fighting all the way. "When the British reached Anbar," he continued, "we told them that the only way Anbar would fall and they could occupy us was if they killed or arrested at least two of our sheikhs." The British took the advice of the Anbar leaders, killing Sheikh Sabar of the Albu Nimer tribe and arresting Sheikh Hardan, who was imprisoned in India for six years. "Then the British occupied the Anbar," Sheikh Saad concluded, adding with pride that it had been the last province to fall to the Americans (though the fact that it did not have a Jordanian or Saudi or Syrian front may have been a factor). "The British occupiers befriended the tribal leaders," he said. "This is the key to winning the people. They understood our traditions, unlike the Americans now. The British did not surround homes and break into them. They consulted sheikhs and respected them, and after they occupied all of Iraq, there was no more resistance." The Americans occupiers, Sheikh Saad maintained, "push people to the ground and step on their heads. They arrest the relatives and wives of wanted men and hold them hostage. They are holding one hundred thousand Iraqis in their prisons. Iraqis have lost their dignity, and for this reason the resistance grows."

Iraqis were incandescent over rumors that their women were being held prisoner by Americans. Sheikh Saad told of three women imprisoned as hostages by the Americans in Khaldiya because their husbands were wanted by the Americans. "I went to speak with the American commander in Falluja, who called the commander in Khaldiya. I told the commander, 'If you don't release these women, you should arrest all the men in Anbar, because there will be an uprising.'" Sheikh Saad said that three hours later the women were released, and added, "The British never arrested women." The sheikh himself was a resistance leader, and his men were fighting the Americans. "For us as the people of Anbar, revenge is an important tradition," he said, "if they kill one of our men we have to kill at least one of their soldiers."

At seven in the morning on July 20, 2003, Sheikh Saad was arrested with eighty-five of his men in an operation that took one hour and included, he claimed, more than 120 vehicles and helicopters. Sheikh Saad scoffed, "like it was a real battle, but they met no resistance from us. They accused me of belonging to an organized group called Nur Muhammad (Light of Muhammad) that is leading the resistance with the support and financing of Saddam and bringing in mujahideen from Syria, and they said 60 percent of the attacks in this area originate in Albu Aitha, so I must know about them, but none of it was true. Their method is to arrest many people and hope to at least find something. Until now they have no accurate information about the resistance" (though it seemed he did). Sheikh Saad was held for twelve days, but the rest of his men were held for a month, and five were still being held in the Abu Ghraib and Um Qasr prisons. "If Americans had not behaved the way they did there would be no resistance," he said. "Their behavior and broken promises increase the resistance."

The sheikh paused to contemplate, looking to the side. "Under the previous regime we all had equality," he said. "We could all study in the university and succeed depending on the degree we achieved. The one exception was the security forces, which went to certain tribes. But I don't want to talk about the previous regime. What's gone is gone. Saddam disliked the Dulaimi tribe, and we had n.o.body in high positions in his government, because Saddam feared we would overthrow him. The Americans told me that I am the only sheikh in Anbar who did not visit their bases and work with them. They want me to help them against my people? This won't happen. And this is why they make problems for me."

The lawyer leaned forward, his face long and gaunt, unlike his better-fed relatives, and a.s.serted, "Iraq is the cemetery of all its occupiers." He rejected the possibility of a civil war but warned that "they [the Americans] want a civil war. Before the war we didn't use words like "Sunni" or "s.h.i.+te." We are one nation and drink from the same two rivers. There won't be a civil war, but there might be problems." The sheikh and his cousins were convinced that "they will never allow elections," and so he smiled proudly, lifting his head. "We are an independent tribe. We don't have relations with other parties or the Iraqi Governing Council."

A lot had changed since those days. There was a civil war, and Sheikh Saad had actually joined the Iraqi government for a while, serving as a minister for provincial affairs. When I met him in late 2006, it was too dangerous for me to attempt such a trip to the Anbar province in a taxi, as I did in 2003. The sheikh and his companions still had thick mustaches, but now they wore the long black leather trench coats that had been popular with intelligence officers in the former regime. Sheikh Saad had brought his wife and children to Amman, where they lived in opulence. "All the leaders of the Anbar are outside of Iraq," he told me. "In the Anbar America is killing and Al Qaeda is killing."

I was stunned to learn that the recalcitrant sheikh had joined the government, and I asked him why. "Our country needs people like us who are well-known, especially in Anbar and its tribes. They wanted me." Although he had received various threats for joining the government, he explained that he did not care. "Any Iraqi who becomes part of the political process is threatened." I wondered if he still supported the resistance. "We all support the muqawama sharifa," he said, referring to the "honorable resistance" (a distinction from those groups that attacked civilians), and added, "and I am part of it." When he saw my eyebrows go up at the admission he added, "with words." I asked him if there was still an honorable resistance given the civil war that Sunni and s.h.i.+te militias were engaged in. "It still exists," he said. "You don't see how many Americans are killed in the Anbar?" He explained that "the ones who use the name of the resistance but kill innocent people, loot, kidnap, and have contacts outside the border who gave them an agenda and weapons" are not the real resistance.

Sheikh Saad admitted that there was a civil war in Iraq, "but it's not announced or declared yet." America was responsible for this, he told me. "If they want to calm the situation, they can tomorrow" by telling Syria and Iran to stop sending weapons into Iraq. "Why are the Americans fighting in the Anbar but not the militias?" he asked, referring to the s.h.i.+te militias. "Why don't they fight Badr and the Mahdi Army?" He answered his own question: "The Americans are part of them." Then he asked, "Why don't they make a balance in the political process between s.h.i.+tes and Sunnis? They are making Iraq like Iran."

The sheikh was no longer part of the government. "I'm resting now," he said. The minister who had replaced him, Saad al-Has.h.i.+mi, was loyal to Muqtada, and he had changed the ministry's staff, imposing, Sheikh Saad explained, "the agenda of his party and militia," which in practice meant firing all Sunnis and ideologically disloyal s.h.i.+tes.

I was shocked when Sheikh Saad admitted that the problems in Iraq were not the fault of the current s.h.i.+te-dominated Iraqi government. "The Sunnis left the political process," he said. "This is our fault. Sunni scholars led by Harith al-Dhari forbade political partic.i.p.ation." I had never heard an Iraqi Sunni admit such an error. Sheikh Saad added that even though he had realized his mistake, "Harith didn't change his mind."

The men who had accompanied Sheikh Saad were two former generals in Saddam's military intelligence, one of whom had also served as deputy chief of police for the Anbar province during the American occupation. He explained that for this he had survived numerous a.s.sa.s.sination attempts but had also faced difficulties working with the Americans. The head of his office had been arrested by the Americans and was still in jail, he said, accused of cooperating with the resistance. "The Americans only use force in the Anbar province," he said. "I had many problems with the Americans. We advised them that their behavior is wrong in the Anbar, raiding, putting feet on heads, this is worse than killing." He also blamed the Americans for the sectarianism. "They brought in the militias," he said. "The militias belong to Iran, not Iraq or America. Since the invasion until now they are fighting the Sunnis. There is a new dictators.h.i.+p now, a religious one." For his trouble, he said, Al Qaeda had blown up his house. "Al Qaeda is not cooperating with the Iraqi resistance," he said. "The real Iraqi resistance considers Al Qaeda an enemy."

IN THOSE DAYS it felt as if the Americans had withdrawn from Baghdad. They were devolving their authority willingly, abandoning their attempt at rebuilding the Iraqi state. It resembled Britain's "colonialism on the cheap." They no longer had the interest or money to micromanage Iraq. Iraq now felt as if it was occupied by Iraqi Security Forces and militias running amok, shooting into the air, shouting out of loudspeakers. Nowhere in Baghdad was safe from the militias. Even hospitals and universities were part of the battlefield. Whereas in the past Muqtada's followers had conducted joint prayers with radical Sunnis to demonstrate their solidarity, by 2006 mosques were no longer sacred. On Friday, December 22, 2006, Mahdi Army militiamen raided the Abdullah Bin Omar Mosque in the Binook area near Shaab. The raid occurred during the important noon prayer, when a large congregation gathers to hear a sermon. Sunnis claimed that fifty Mahdi Army militiamen raided the mosque while the sheikh was giving his sermon; all but four of the prayergoers managed to escape, but the sheikh and the muezzin were taken prisoner. The s.h.i.+te version of the story is that the Mahdi Army entered the mosque ten minutes before prayer time. They claim they ordered the Sunni prayergoers not to move and told them they had come only for the sheikh. One of the men praying had brought his pistol with him. He ran behind the pulpit and opened fire. There was an exchange of fire that lasted until the Mahdi Army men ran out of bullets. The Mahdi Army men then captured him, the sheikh, and the muezzin. Their corpses were later found with signs of torture, and it was revealed that the third man who opened fire during the raid was the sheikh's son.

In late 2006 Baghdad's walls and streets were covered with calls for students and professors to stay home. The radical Sunni movement Ansar al-Sunna had declared a "campaign for halting the a.s.sa.s.sinations of students and academics in Baghdad universities." According to one banner hung in a majority-Sunni part of Baghdad, "In order to protect the lives of our dearest academics and students from the a.s.sa.s.sinations of Maliki's government and the death squads of Maliki's government, we decided to stop the universities and all academic inst.i.tutes including the private ones for this academic year 2006-2007." The banner stressed that this applied only to Baghdad. "It is strictly forbidden to attend universities in order to cleanse them from death squads that use the universities as centers to launch their attacks from," the banner said. Such threats, warnings, and announcements are typically distributed to the Iraqi people through leaflets or by hanging banners on walls.

Ansar al-Sunna was the successor to the jihadist group Ansar al-Islam, the Al Qaeda-inspired group that had been based in northern Iraq's autonomous region before the war. The group was remaking itself as the defender of Iraq's Sunnis. While there were signs of clashes between the Sunni resistance and Al Qaeda, the move by Ansar al-Sunna was a sign of how the civil war was uniting the disparate Sunni militias and how Iraq's Sunnis would have to depend on them for protection, sometimes whether they wanted to or not, in the absence of reliable security forces loyal to the state. Some Sunni politicians defended the ban on university attendance. Asma al-Dulaimi, a female Iraqi Parliament member belonging to the Iraqi Accord Front, headed by the Islamic Party's Tariq al-Has.h.i.+mi, explained that she was sure the army of Ansar al-Sunna knew of threats to students and academics and that its call to halt university attendance was made out of a desire to protect the students. Meisoon al-Damalouji, a Sunni member of Ayad Allawi's Iraqiya Party, condemned Dulaimi's statements as unacceptable. A banner was hung up in Baghdad Mustansiriya University on Palestine Street announcing, "We will not surrender to terrorism, and that is our response." Prime Minister Maliki himself responded to the warnings by threatening to fire all professors who did not show up to work and to expel students who did not attend cla.s.ses. This move was seen by Sunnis as an attack by the s.h.i.+te-dominated government against them, since it was Sunni students and professors who had been warned not to attend.

On December 7 Muhamad Haidar Suleiman, a professor at a sports education college in Mosul, was a.s.sa.s.sinated, and Harith Abdul Hamid, director of Baghdad University's Psychology Center, was also murdered on his way to work. In early December a girl's high school in Jadida, or New Baghdad, the majority-Christian area of the city, was closed down by order of the school's headmaster after militants left posters on the walls threatening to kill the female students. In Zayuna, a majority-Sunni area, leaflets were scattered in two schools, one of which was called the Tariq bin Ziyad school, cursing s.h.i.+tes as b.a.s.t.a.r.ds and threatening them.

In fact, professors and administrators who had belonged to the Baath Party had been targeted ever since the fall of the regime. Student unions were dominated by sectarian and fundamentalist militias, and in Baghdad these militias often belonged to s.h.i.+te movements such as the Sadrists, Ayatollah Muhammad al-Yaqoubi's Fadhila, and the Supreme Council. Religious strictures began to be imposed as well. Hundreds of professors were a.s.sa.s.sinated and hundreds fled. Incredibly, in November the Ministry of Higher Education was attacked by Interior Ministry forces.

University attendance declined drastically because of the violence. Leaflets threatening students and professors at the University of Technology forced the school to shut down. In the Adhamiya and Yarmuk districts, both majority-Sunni areas of Baghdad, leaflets were distributed banning university students from attending their schools. In Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad, leaflets threatened students who attended the agriculture college. In the Zafraniya district students of the Technical Inst.i.tute were threatened by gunmen.

In majority-Sunni western Baghdad, banners signed by Ansar al-Sunna's Department for the Protection of Professors asked students and lecturers to abstain from attending government universities, academic inst.i.tutes, and private colleges because they were dominated by the government's s.h.i.+te militias. Ansar al-Sunna was planning on clearing the universities of the s.h.i.+te militias and killing them. As a result they announced that the school year was over.

"To our respected professors and our dear students in the universities and colleges of Baghdad," began one leaflet t.i.tled "Final Warning": "In an attempt to protect your lives from the wrongdoings of the Maliki government and its death squads, including the killings, kidnappings, and violations against the scientific talents, and especially the Sunni students, which led to Sunni talents in Baghdad universities becoming a market for the death squads, and to these colleges becoming safe houses for these squads to launch their killings and kidnappings against Sunni students and professors. . . . From these universities the learned and the mujahideen graduated . . . and in these same universities they are being killed today." The group warned it was abolis.h.i.+ng the 2006-07 school year for Baghdad university students. The letter was signed by Ansar al-Sunna's "campaign for the aid of the learned and the students in the universities of Baghdad."

As the civil war in Iraq intensified, Sunni militias appeared to be uniting to combat the more powerful s.h.i.+te militias as well as the police and army. In mid-October 2006 an alliance was announced between Sunni militias who called themselves Al Mutaibeen. The alliance included the Mujahideen Shura Council, Jeish al-Fatihin, Jund al-Sahaba, Ansar al-Tawhid wa al-Sunna, and some tribal leaders. Its name came from the word "tib" (perfume) and referred to the pre-Islamic custom of putting on perfume. (Before Islam was founded, some notable Meccan leaders agreed to help the needy and defend the weak; they sealed their agreement by putting their hands in perfume.) The members of the Mutaibeen Alliance announced that their goals were to fight the Americans and protect the poor Sunnis from the s.h.i.+tes.

The Sunni front was not restricted to Iraq. On December 7, thirty-eight Saudi clerics and university professors signed a global fatwa calling on all Sunnis in the world to unify their efforts and fight the s.h.i.+tes to protect the Sunnis of Iraq. This fatwa was likely to increase the support Iraq's Sunni militias received from abroad and the number of foreign volunteers attempting to enter Iraq. Sifr al-Hawali, an important Saudi cleric who often took a harder line than the Saudi regime, was one of the signatories. Other prominent Saudi Wahhabi thinkers who signed the letter were Abdul Rahman bin Na.s.ser al-Barrak, Sheikh Na.s.ser bin Suleiman al-Omar, and Sheikh Abdullah al-Tuweijiri. "What has been taken by force can only be got back by force," the letter said. Just two days before, Saudi papers announced that their government had intercepted a cell of fourteen people in the city of Hael who were promoting takfiri and jihadist ideology on the Internet and were involved in sending volunteers to fight in Iraq.

The Saudis also hosted Harith al-Dhari, head of the powerful Sunni a.s.sociation of Muslim Scholars, in an official visit. The a.s.sociation was closely linked to some Sunni Islamo-nationalist militias, and Dhari had recently defended Al Qaeda in Iraq against criticism. Some veterans of the Afghan jihad viewed the a.s.sociation as the ideal place to funnel money from wealthy Persian Gulf sponsors. Saudis and other Gulf Arabs were a significant source of funding for Sunni militias in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Jordan were apprehensive of a s.h.i.+te-dominated Iraq, which they viewed as an Iranian proxy. Nawaf Obaid, a close adviser to the Saudi government on security issues, wrote in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post that if the Americans withdrew from Iraq, the Saudis would increase their support for Iraq's Sunnis to undermine Iran's influence. This was viewed less as an a.n.a.lysis and more as a warning by some elements in the Saudi regime.

In November 2006 Jordan's King Abdullah warmly received Harith al-Dhari despite Dhari's public support for Al Qaeda and the fact that the Iraqi government wanted him for inciting sectarianism and supporting terrorists. In January 2007 Dhari was in Saudi Arabia speaking at private gatherings, praising Al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, and raising money for the resistance. He was accompanied by his movement's spokesman, Sheikh Abdul Salam al-Kubeisi, who warned that the fall of Baghdad to the Safavids would lead to the fall of Mecca and Medina. A cleric from Baquba also spoke in support of the resistance.

Meanwhile, by the end of 2006, there were signs that Muqtada al-Sadr, who had been reviled in a sensationalist Newsweek cover as the most dangerous man in Iraq, was barely in control of his organization. Muqtada seemed more and more like a mere figurehead for an army with no real leaders.h.i.+p or hierarchy. He had gone through many deputies, firing close allies. In a video of an internal debate among his men that was released without his approval, a different Muqtada was seen, one who jealously guarded his power but seemed to have little control over his men. Speaking in poor Arabic, all slang, Muqtada revealed his jealousy and insecurity as well, criticizing a deputy for praising Supreme Council leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.

Earlier, in the spring of 2006, Iraqis were as excited about the World Cup as other soccer-crazy countries. They hung flags for their favorite teams. Some who did received visits from Sadrists urging them to remove the flags and hang up Iraqi flags or pictures of clerics. Those who did not were threatened. Even though many of Iraq's top soccer players hailed from Sadr City, that spring Muqtada issued a fatwa about soccer, warning that he and his father viewed it as a distraction from wors.h.i.+p. It had been created by the West to prevent Muslims from perfecting themselves, he argued. The Israelis and the West kept Muslims distracted with soccer-as with singing and smoking-while they focused on science. The Mahdi Army tried to prevent women from going to the market in Karbala, causing businesses to suffer. Muqtada was desperately attempting to impose moral order on his followers at the same time as they were getting caught up in a maelstrom of violence.

Although politically motivated violence, the occupation, and the resistance all affected and destroyed the lives of civilians, simple, criminally motivated kidnapping also devastated countless Iraqi families. I heard many horror stories-many of them regaled to me by my friend Ali. He told me about his father-in-law, a Sunni, who was once a prominent Palestinian resistance fighter in the 1960s and '70s. "He has a small shop in an area that is controlled by the s.h.i.+te militias," Ali said. "About a month ago, there was a roadside bomb just in front of his shop. He survived the explosion, but many people were killed and injured. The police came and took him without asking how a sixty-year-old man could risk his life and put a bomb just in front of his source of living. His family, including myself, now live outside of Iraq, so he had no one in Baghdad with him. His sister-in-law used to call him every day, and at night someone else answered his phone. The man told my aunt that her brother-in-law was in the 'Ministry of Interior' and hung up. She called us, and I contacted everyone I know. I sent my friends to the police station nearest to his shop. They told me they found my father-in-law's car, but the police denied they had him. I am a s.h.i.+te, but I had never tried to establish any connections with the militias simply because I despise them. But seeing my family in that condition pushed me to contact some people who know some leaders in the militias. Someone called someone who called someone, and finally they found his trace. He had been taken to a house outside the police station for 'investigation. ' Anyway, my contacts were able to set him free the next day, but his head was covered with blood. They beat him on his head with the gun.

"About two months ago, three men remotely related to my wife were kidnapped from their shop in Al Shourja [the economic center of Baghdad]. They had been merchants in the area for more than thirty years. They were taken by the police special force [Maghawir al-Dakhiliya]. Two days after that, someone called their families and asked for ninety thousand dollars ransom. The families were forced to listen to the sounds of torture on the mobile. The families were 'convinced,' and they provided the money for the kidnappers. One of the kidnappers, a policeman, was related to the families by marriage, but it seems he had a grudge against them. The day after they paid the ransom, the kidnapped men's bodies were found in the morgue. They had been tortured to death, and there were marks of electric drills all over their bodies (one of them was eighty years old). When their families went to the morgue, the person in charge there told them he couldn't give them the bodies 'because the bodies belong to the Mahdi Army.' Anyway, they managed to contact some people who had contacts with the militias, and they got the bodies. Their relative, who was one of the kidnappers, confessed he partic.i.p.ated in the crime and threatened the families not to say anything. He also looted the shops of the victims two days after they had been killed.

"A Sunni friend of mine was kidnapped near his house in western Baghdad. The kidnappers took him to a place where he saw many people being tortured. They asked him where he was from, and he mentioned the name of his tribe. They said, 'So, you are one of our people, Saddam Hussein's people,' and my friend replied, 'I hope G.o.d saves our leader,' and they all replied, 'Amen!' Anyway, the kidnappers apologized to my friend and told him they needed to kidnap people to finance jihad. They called his family on a Friday and told them they would decide his fate after the Friday prayers. A couple of hours later they called the family (who don't even own a house) and asked for fifty thousand dollars.

"His poor family sold everything they had and gathered ten thousand dollars for his ransom. The kidnappers called them and told them the money was not enough and they might sell him to mujahideen in Latifiya for a bigger amount. The family was forced to ask their friends for loans, including me. They were able to provide another ten thousand dollars, and the kidnappers agreed to release him."

Like all Iraqis Ali's friend Rasha also had numerous stories of kidnappings and crime. Perhaps none were as chilling as her young s.h.i.+te cousin's tale.

"She was in love with her cla.s.smate Ahmed from their time together at the university. They could not get married, however, because Ahmed was young and from a poor family. He was his mother's only son, and his father had died before the war. He is Sunni and lived in Tarmiya, an area north of Baghdad dominated by Sunni militias. Ahmed himself belonged to the resistance. My cousin's family were not rich either, and they could no longer work in Iraq, so they left for Syria. Ahmed borrowed money to buy a car and worked as a taxi driver. In one year he had saved enough to afford to get married. He contacted my cousin in Syria, and she agreed to return to Baghdad to marry him. One night, a few days before their wedding, they were on the phone when he told her, 'I hear someone knocking on the door. I'll be back in a second.' She heard shooting and was so frightened that she hung up the phone and ran to her mother. Her mother redialed Ahmed's number and a man answered the phone. 'He is a traitor,' said the voice. 'He was going to marry a s.h.i.+te woman, so we killed him.'"

As more and more Iraqis were disappearing, their desperate relatives were not merely hanging up signs on walls but turning to the Internet. The home page of Iraqi Rabita, a pro-Baathist Sunni website, often posted photos of missing people with the request "Please help us find these people-lost." At first only Sunnis were posting on the site, hoping to locate family members kidnapped by s.h.i.+te militias. The site succeeded in finding some of the missing people, but it did not explain how it did so. So Christians and s.h.i.+tes whose sons had been kidnapped by Sunni militias began posting photos of their relatives on the site, calling for help in locating them. One day in late 2006, the home page had nineteen photos of missing people. Four were Christians, five were Sunnis, and ten were s.h.i.+tes.

IN LATE 2006 Adnan al-Dulaimi showed his true colors as Iraq's most sectarian politician. Dulaimi had taught at the University of Zarqa in Jordan while he was in exile before the overthrow of Saddam's regime. Zarqa's most famous son is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dulaimi returned to Iraq a week after the fall of Baghdad. He was appointed head of the Sunni Religious Endowment but was removed for what he claimed were political reasons because he was "defending the Sunnis," which could also refer to his staunch sectarianism. He formed the Conference of Iraqi Sunnis to unite Sunnis under what he described as "one umbrella" and to encourage their political partic.i.p.ation, and he was appointed religious adviser to President Jalal Talabani.

In late 2006 Dulaimi spoke at a major regional conference in Istanbul, hoping to raise funds for the resistance. He told the audience they should have named the gathering "The Conference for Supporting Sunnis in Iraq" and mocked the organizers' fear of being called sectarian. Iraq is worth nothing without Sunnis, he said, because Sunnis owned it and built it. "Yes, we are sectarian," he said. If they did not awaken, then Iraq would be lost and the Sunnis would be exterminated by the s.h.i.+tes. He demanded support from Muslims around the world for Iraq's Sunnis. He spoke of the Sunni mosques and neighborhoods that were being destroyed. "Iraq is going to be s.h.i.+te, and this will expand to the lands surrounding Iraq. Then you will all regret it, but your regret will be worth nothing because it will be too late. Where is Saudi Arabia? Where is Kuwait? Where is Jordan? Where is Pakistan? And where are the Muslims? Sleep and keep sleeping while Iraq is destroying. You sleep while Sunni mosques in Iraq are being destroyed. Sleep while Sunni mosques in Iraq are burning. Sleep and keep sleeping, but the fire of Iraq will expand to you. What is happening in Iraq has been planned for over fifty years in order to convert the region into s.h.i.+sm and create the Persian Empire under a s.h.i.+te cover."

In a December 22, 2006, interview with the American-sponsored Radio Sawa, the interviewer pressed Dulaimi on why he avoided criticizing Al Qaeda in Iraq but regularly criticized the Mahdi Army. "Is Al Qaeda a terrorist organization or not?" demanded the interviewer. "I will not and will never answer this question," said Dulaimi, "and if you ask me again I will hang up the phone." The interviewer persisted, and Dulaimi hung up.

The Death of Saddam.

The year 2006 culminated with one last insult to the Sunnis of Iraq and the region when Saddam Hussein became the first modern Arab dictator to die violently since Egypt's Anwar Sadat in 1981. Saddam's hanging at the hands of chubby Iraqi men wearing ski masks was likely to be perceived by many as an American execution and as part of a trend of American missteps contributing to sectarian tensions in Iraq and the region. Others viewed it as a lynching by reveling s.h.i.+te militiamen. The trial of Saddam was viewed by detractors as an event stage-managed by the Americans. According to Human Rights Watch, the Iraqi judges and lawyers involved in prosecuting Saddam were ill prepared and relied on their American advisers. American minders shut off the microphones and ordered the translators to halt whenever they disapproved of what was being said by the defendants. Saddam was being executed for the ma.s.sacre in Dujail. It was the least of his crimes, but it had targeted s.h.i.+tes and the Dawa Party, and they wanted revenge for his crimes against the Kurds-others could even be judged.

For Sunnis the important Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha began on Sat.u.r.day, December 30; for s.h.i.+tes it began on Sunday. According to tradition in Mecca, battles were suspended during the hajj period so that pilgrims could safely march to Mecca. This practice even predated Islam; Muslims had preserved it, calling this period Al Ashur al-Hurm, the months of truce. By hanging Saddam on the Sunni Eid, the Americans and the Iraqi government were in effect saying that only the s.h.i.+te Eid had legitimacy. Sunnis were irate that s.h.i.+te traditions were given primacy (as was increasingly the case in Iraq) and that s.h.i.+tes had disrespected the tradition and killed Saddam on this day. Because the Iraqi Const.i.tution prohibits executions from being carried out on Eid, the Iraqi government had to declare that Eid did not begin until Sunday. It was a striking decision, virtually declaring that Iraq was a s.h.i.+te state. Eid was the festival of the sacrifice of the sheep. But Saddam quickly became known as "the Martyr of the Sacrifice."

Saddam had been in American custody and was handed over to Iraqis just before his execution. It was therefore hard to dismiss the perception that the Americans could have waited, because in the end it was they who had the final say over such events. Iraqi officials consistently complained that they had no authority and that the Americans controlled the Iraqi police and the army. So it was unusual that Iraqis would suddenly regain sovereignty for this important event. For many Sunnis and Arabs in the region, this appeared to be one president ordering the death of another. It was possibly a message to Sunnis, a warning. The Americans often equated Saddam with the Sunni resistance. By killing Saddam they were killing what they believed was the symbol of the Sunni resistance, expecting its members to realize that their cause was hopeless. But Saddam's death also liberated the Sunni resistance from a.s.sociation with Saddam and the Baathists. They could more plausibly claim that they were fighting for national liberation and not out of support for the former regime, as their American and Iraqi government opponents often claimed. At the same time, the execution created a new symbol for those opposed to the occupation. Saddam was not given a hood, though prisoners normally do not have a choice about wearing one. The execution and the photo of the executed Saddam had the hallmark of the U.S. psy-ops tactics, similar to the deaths of Saddam's sons in 2003. Even the U.S. plane that flew him to his final resting spot indicated U.S. management.

The unofficial video of the execution, filmed on the mobile phone of one of the officials present, further inflamed sectarianism. It was clear from the film that sectarian s.h.i.+tes were executing Saddam. Men could be heard talking; one of them was called Ali. As the executioners argue over how to best position the rope on his neck, Saddam called out to G.o.d, saying, "Ya Allah." Referring to s.h.i.+tes, one official said, "Those who pray for Muhammad and the family of Muhammad have won!" Others triumphantly responded in the s.h.i.+te chant: "Our G.o.d prays for Muhammad and the family of Muhammad." Others then added the part chanted by supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr: "And speed his [the Mahdi's] return! And d.a.m.n his enemies! And make his son victorious! Muqtada! Muqtada! Muqtada!"

Saddam smiled and said something mocking about Muqtada. "Muqtada! It is this . . . " but the rest was blocked by the voices of officials saying, "Ila jahanam " (go to h.e.l.l). Saddam looked down disdainfully and said, "Is this your manhood?" As the rope was put around Saddam's neck, somebody shouted, "Long live Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr!" (Executed by Saddam in 1980, Sadr was still venerated by all three major s.h.i.+te movements in Iraq: the Dawa, the Sadrists, and the Supreme Council.) Others insulted Saddam. "Please all stop," one man pleaded. Saddam then said the Shahada, or testimony, that there is no G.o.d but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet. When he tried to say it again the trapdoor opened, and he fell through. One man then shouted, "The tyranny has ended!" Others called out triumphal s.h.i.+te chants. Somebody wanted to remove the rope from his neck but was told to wait eight minutes.

The Sunni Islamo-nationalist website Islam Memo claimed that the Safavids burned Saddam's Koran after they killed him, though there was no evidence of this. Similarly, the site made other unsubstantiated claims: that Saddam exchanged insults with the witnesses to his execution and cursed one of them, saying, "G.o.d d.a.m.n you, Persian midget"; that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani blessed Saddam's execution; that the Iraqi government refused to provide Saddam with a Sunni cleric to pray for him before the execution; that Saddam said, "Palestine is Arab" and then recited the Shahada before he was executed; that following his death his body was abused. Although the s.h.i.+te-dominated official Iraqi media claimed Saddam was terrified before his execution and that he fought with his hangmen, Saddam's onscreen visage was one of aplomb, for he was conscious of the image he was displaying and wanted to go down as the grand historic leader he believed himself to be.

Predictably, there were celebrations in s.h.i.+te areas, and the civil war continued. Following the execution three car bombs exploded in Baghdad's s.h.i.+te district of Hurriya, killing and injuring dozens. Another one went off in Baghdad's Seidiya district, near its amus.e.m.e.nt park, killing at least two civilians and two policemen. A roadside bomb exploded near a children's hospital in the majority-s.h.i.+te area of Iskan, killing two and injuring several others. In the southern town of Kufa, dominated by supporters of Muqtada, a car bomb exploded near a market, killing and injuring dozens. In the northern town of Tal Afar, a man wearing a suicide belt exploded himself in a market, killing at least five and injuring several others. It was also claimed that Sistani's representative was killed and his office was burned. In the town of Saqlawiya, in Anbar province, there was a big demonstration against Saddam's execution at which marchers carried large portraits of the former leader. Immediately after the execution five mortars were fired in Falluja, targeting the southern checkpoint to that city, known as the Numaniya checkpoint. In Tikrit, site of another large demonstration, Saddam's tribe officially requested that the Iraqi government allow his body to be buried near his parents in Owja, the town where he was born.

I asked a Kurdish Iraqi friend how he felt after seeing the video of Saddam's execution. "It is sad to see someone who knows he is going to die in a minute," he told me, "but I am happy that he died that way and not, as the so-called human rights groups want, to be in a jail where they want to make sure he has access to TV, newspaper, and good health." He agreed with me that the images of Saddam could potentially cause some people to sympathize with him but added, "If anyone who could live the life of an Iraqi for only one day-they would want worse than that to happen to Saddam. Last night, all of a sudden I remembered all the agonies my family went through in their life. We had to leave our home twenty times and walk to the borders and leave everything we had and buy new stuff every few years. He never had the feeling you and I have now for him when he was ordering Ali Ha.s.san Majid and the henchmen to bury people with their kids in the deserts, so why should I now feel sorry for him? But I hope I see one day when the current Saddamlets are hanged too, like Talabani, Ayad Allawi."

One thing was clear: the death of Saddam did not bring closure or peace to Iraq. Sunnis gathered at Saddam's grave, demonstrators showed his iconic image, and revenge was threatened. President George Bush declared his nemesis's death "a milestone." To many in Iraq and the Muslim world, it was a clear message that there would be no mercy for Sunnis in a s.h.i.+te-dominated Iraq.

Part Two.

THE IRAQIFICATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

CHAPTER FOUR.

Among the Jihadis.

REMARKABLY, THERE WERE NO ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK THE UNITED States in retaliation for its occupation of Iraq, not by American Muslims or by foreigners. But the jihad in Iraq did lead to a regional blowback, and its neighbor Jordan was the first to suffer.

On February 16, 2006, Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Wa.s.sim I. Mazloum were indicted by a U.S. district court in Ohio. The three were accused of conspiring to wage jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq, training in firearms and martial arts, collecting funds to support their mission, studying jihad training manuals on the Internet, meeting to plan how best to a.s.sist the Iraqi insurgency, studying how to build IEDs, and threatening the life of President Bush. Amawi flew to Jordan in August 2005 carrying laptops he wanted to donate to the mujahideen in Iraq. The indictment added that Amawi "unsuccessfully attempted to enter Iraq to wage violent Jihad, or 'holy war,' against the United States and coalition forces."

Amawi and El-Hindi were Jordanian-born naturalized citizens of the United States. Mazloum was from Lebanon. It was the first time such charges had been made against U.S. residents, but the charges were very similar to ones in numerous court cases in Jordan since the beginning of the Iraq War. These trials were held in the Marka military court, a squat white building across the road from a military airbase that is planted atop a hill in eastern Amman, the somnolent capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Apart from dealing with wayward soldiers, the court also handles security and terrorism cases. Relatives of prisoners stand on line on the curb outside, most dressed in traditional gowns, deep lines on their unshaven faces, waiting to be searched and allowed in. The winter winds blow hard on Amman's hilltops and m.u.f.fle the approaching sirens of a police sedan, which is followed by a dark blue van, windowless except for some bars on the back that show only blackness inside. The van is always followed by a pickup truck, with two masked counterterror agents manning a heavy mounted gun on the bed.

On Wednesday, December 28, 2005, the van entered Marka through the main gate and circled around the back of the courthouse. Ten shackled prisoners were taken out and led into a cage in the courtroom. Their lawyers chatted jovially in a smoke-filled waiting room; then made their way past the numerous police officers, security officers, and soldiers bustling back and forth in search of something to do; and headed into the small courtroom, lit with bright fluorescent lights, lined with old wooden benches, and full of blue uniformed Amn al-Am, or General Security, officers.

Muhamad Ibrahim al-Ghawi, twenty-five years old; Faris Sayid Ha.s.san Shoter, thirty-two; Muhamad Jamil al-t.i.ti, twenty-two; Rauf Aballah Abu Mayha, twenty-two; Muhamad Mahmud al-Sharman, twenty-nine; Basil Muhamad al-Ramah, twenty-nine; Monaem Ibrahim Hasan, thirty-one; Raed Ahmed Kaywan, thirty-three; Muhamad Qasim Sulaiman Ramah, thirty-five; and Majdi Khalid Ha.s.san al-Fawar, twenty-one: all stood in the cage, chatting in good spirits, smiling and waving at the few relatives who sat in the back. The cage had a chain-link fence around it, an innovation imposed after one prisoner called Azmi al-Jayusi, a friend of Jordanian terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, threw his shoe at the judge while on trial for attempting to bomb the Jordanian security headquarters. Other prisoners had been known to sing songs in honor of Zarqawi during trial.

All ten prisoners in the cage wore dark blue denim prison suits, wool caps, and slippers. Their beards were s.h.a.ggy, as was their hair, which curled out of their caps over their ears and the backs of their necks. They were hard to distinguish from one another. Some had a dark stain sunk in above their brows in the center of the forehead. It was a sima, a sign of intense piety, acquired by kneeling and bowing forward, placing the forehead on the floor in prayer. Their long beards and hair were a sign of their beliefs. These men were Salafis.

Salafi ideologues dominated Jordan's mosques, and young men filled their ranks. Salafism found a home in Jordan beginning in the 1970s, when a Syrian cleric called Muhamad Nasir al-Din Albani began teaching in Jordan at the invitation of the Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually he settled in the Jordanian city of Zarqa to avoid persecution by the secular Syrian Baathists and began preaching about the need to purify Islam. Hundreds came to hear him speak, and he influenced the ranks and hierarchy of Jordan's clergy. The regime was threatened by the crowds he drew, and he was prohibited from speaking in public. Unable to operate openly, Salafism became an informal underground movement. The late 1970s were a crucial period, as the leftist, secular, and nationalist projects in the Arab world appeared to be failing. Saudi radicals rose up against their regime, temporarily taking the mosque in Mecca; the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan; and the Iranian Revolution was both a model for political Islamists and a threat to Sunni regimes. By the early 1980s Arab regimes had decided to dispose of their excess radicals by dispatching them to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

Jordan was a ripe environment for political Islam. Since the British invented it in 1924, the kingdom had been ruled by the Hashemites, or Albu Hashem, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who gained their legitimacy by belonging to Ahl al-Beit, the family of the Prophet. In 1970, when King Hussein fought an uprising of nationalist Palestinians-some of whom promulgated the slogan "The liberation of Jerusalem begins in Amman"-the Muslim Brotherhood, previously disenfranchised, supported King Hussein. The King rewarded them by granting them control over the Ministry of Education, allowing them to inculcate generations of Jordanians. Founded by Egyptian Ha.s.san al-Banna in 1928, it sought to establish a Muslim state through nonviolent cultural revolution.

Radical Islam had received a needed fillip from the Afghan jihad, which began in 1979. But it was following the Gulf War of 1991 that jihadism became an international ideology. The Saudi government's dependence on the American infidels to protect it from Saddam, and the U.S. presence in the holiest Muslim land, coincided with Muslims' increasing resentment of their own governments. Arabs who had fought in the Afghan jihad began returning home and were disillusioned with what they encountered, so they sought to bring the jihad home too. The Israeli peace process was but one more betrayal for them. Also following the Gulf War, the Kuwaitis expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, most of whom settled in Jordan. Returning Jordanian jihadis were repelled by the ostentation that accompanied the arrival of wealthy Palestinians to their poor country. One such jihadi was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would lead the Tawhid and Jihad organization of Iraq, later known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Other Palestinians brought with them a radical jihadist Salafi ideology. Two of them were Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the most important ideologue for modern jihad and Zarqawi's former mentor, and Abu Anas al-Shami, who went on to become Zarqawi's key cleric and religious adviser in Iraq. Maqdisi's writings influenced the jihadis who carried out the 1995 bombings in Saudi Arabia that targeted Americans as well as the September 11 attackers. Zarqawi, Maqdisi, and Shami were heroes for young Jordanians such as those on trial in Marka.

Bordered by Palestine and Iraq, Jordan was caught between the two most important struggles in the Muslim world, at once both anticolonial wars and jihads. On November 9, 2005, Zarqawi brought the terror back home to Jordan when he dispatched four Iraqi suicide bombers to Amman, three of whom succeeded in detonating their deadly vests in three different hotels, killing sixty and injuring one hundred. It was Zarqawi's third successful attack in Jordan. Each time he had used non-Jordanians to avoid infiltration by Jordan's mukhabarat (intelligence service). In 2005 the mukhabarat had arrested thirteen terrorist cells, and in 2004 it had arrested eleven, one of which was in direct contact with Zarqawi. It was not a good time to go on trial for terrorism if you were a Salafi.

All of the prisoners held in Marka in 2005 were from Irbid, a northern city by the Syrian border. Six of the ten were originally Palestinians, their parents or grandparents having been expelled from their homes west of the border in 1948 or 1967. One of them paced back and forth in the cage, chanting lines from the Koran. Others joked with their relatives. One leaned forward in conversation with his lawyer, complaining that "the verdict was already decided before the trial. This is just a formality."

The charges against the ten stated that there were five other suspects who had escaped. According to the prosecution, they had met in the Qaqa'a Mosque in the Irbid's Hnina neighborhood, which they visited frequently. The charges mentioned that the men engaged in theological discussions about calling common people, rulers, and scholars infidels. They had agreed it was necessary to fight the Americans in Iraq and planned how they could recruit others, collect money to go to Iraq via Syria, and attack the Americans and the Iraqi Security Forces. In late July 2005 they pooled money to purchase a Kalashnikov and bullets. At different times they snuck into Syria, some of them ferried by a friend who owned a school bus. In Syria one of them met with a Tunisian who took him to an apartment where a Libyan and Saudi were staying. They discussed what operations he could execute and urged him to drive a car bomb, but the charges stated that he refused to become "suicidal." He tired of waiting in Syria and returned to Jordan, where his friends gave him a hard time for turning back. (Another one was invited to become a suicide bomber, but he too refused and returned to Jordan, where he was arrested.) Others later snuck into Syria and discussed joining the ranks of the mujahideen fighters in Iraq. Still others snuck into Syria with a Kalashnikov and four magazines full of bullets. In Syria they argued, and two of them decided to return to Jordan, where they too were arrested.

All the officials in the court had mustaches. Three military judges in olive uniforms sat behind a long wooden bench. Behind them were framed pictures of former King Hussein and current King Abdullah. Two young soldiers with red sashes from their waists to their shoulders stood against the wall. The chief judge sat in the center. As he prepared to read the charges, one of the prisoners shouted, "Say G.o.d is great!" The prisoners erupted in unison, yelling fiercely, "G.o.d is great! The way of G.o.d is jihad!" Perhaps they were imitating one of their role models, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, who made a similar show during his trial in Egypt for the a.s.sa.s.sination of President Anwar Sadat. The judge waited for them to finish shouting as if he was used to it and read the four charges, which were possession of an automatic weapon with intention to use it in illegal activity, initiation of illegal activities that could harm Jordan's relations with a foreign country, sneaking and helping to sneak from and to Jordan with an automatic weapon, and helping to sneak into Jordan illegally. When the judge got to the part about "a foreign country," he was interrupted by an angry prisoner, who shouted, "Infidel countries, not foreign countries!" The judge looked bored and tapped his pen on the table for silence, asking the prisoner to stop interrupting.

One by one the judge read the prisoners' names, asking if they pleaded guilty or not. He was interrupted by the same prisoner once more, who shouted, "This is a play. When is it going to end? We know that the verdicts have been decided and written in the files!" The judge tapped his pencil impatiently. "I am not guilty, you are guilty!" snapped some of the prisoners. "Jihad is not guilt!" shouted one prisoner. "Is jihad in the way of G.o.d guilt? Fighting the Americans and Jews and infidels is now guilt? We are protecting the honor of our sisters in Iraq. Is that guilt? G.o.d is our master and you have no master. Your regime is rotten and it stinks. You and your regime and your ranks, you are all guilty!" The judge tapped his pen and told the prisoners to answer without comments. "He who opens alcoholic bars is guilty!" said one prisoner.

The judge lost his temper and angrily told the guards to take the loudest prisoner out of the cage and back to the van, and the prisoner quieted down. Then, as punishment for the prisoners' recalcitrance, the judge ordered their families to leave the court. The military prosecutor, also in uniform and sporting a thick mustache, informed the judge that he had no witnesses, and the trial was postponed for one week. "G.o.d is our master and you have no master!" the prisoners shouted in unison. "He is the best master and the best supporter. America is your master and you have the worst master. G.o.d is great!"

Following the trial I met with Hussein al-Masri, lawyer for the accused ten. Masri, dressed in an ill-fitting brown jacket with green pants, a red s.h.i.+rt, and a brown tie, told me, "Now the law permits accusing people who only think or talk about terrorism. It is not required to commit the act of terrorism; only thinking or speaking is enough. The prosecution accused the defendants of already going to Syria and meeting and arranging terrorist activities, but they didn't do it."

The following Friday I drove up to Irbid's Hnina neighborhood to the Qaqa'a Mosque, hoping to learn more about what might have motivated the young prisoners in their failed and almost comical attempt to join the jihad in Iraq. As I drove up, my taxi driver recounted how his cousin had suddenly picked up and left for Iraq in March 2003. Many young men from his town, Zarqa, who were not even overtly religious, had poured over the border to fight the Americans. An hour and a half later we drove through Irbid's rolling hills, the elevation making the air cleaner than in Amman. We were a mere thirty kilometers from the Syrian border. Friday is a slow day in the Muslim world, and Irbid's streets were nearly empty. In the Hnina neighborhood, two boys sat on a curb sharing a bag of potato chips. A small group of men and women lined up in front of the Jowharat al-Zein bakery to purchase piles of large flat bread for lunch, which was always a more important occasion on Fridays. Children played in the street, and the few women walking by were not conservatively dressed.

I sat on a step in front of a closed store eating a sandwich with my friends and watching the trickle of men making their way to the Qaqa'a Mosque for the Friday noon prayer and the khutba (sermon). Men casually strolled by. "a.s.salamu aleik.u.m" (Peace be upon you), they said as they noticed us, and we responded, "Wa aleik.u.m salam wa rahmat ullah wa barakat" (And peace upon you and the mercy of G.o.d and his blessings).

The mosque was an inconspicuous white three-story building with a small dome and a loudspeaker. Down the hill from its narrow gated entrance, and around the back, was a small tiled bathroom for ablutions, the ritual was.h.i.+ng of the legs, arms, and face required before prayer. Inside was a long sink lined with many faucets and short benches. Upstairs the trickle of men had reached about six hundred; it seemed as if more men were present than the neighborhood could have produced on its own. Their shoes lined the entrance or were stuffed into pigeonholes. They kneeled, or bowed, or stood in silent prayer in rows along white lines painted on the green carpet, in a "fortified wall" the way tradition stipulated. Many small children played by the door; others prayed by their fathers or leaned against the columns. The mosque was unfinished, and unpainted cinder blocks and plaster were visible on the walls. The sun came in from a skylight around the dome. Men wore tracksuits, jeans, and dishdashas. I noticed one man wearing a salwar kameez, the traditional long s.h.i.+rt and baggy pants worn in Pakistan and Afghanistan but not in the Arab world. It was a statement of support for jihad.

By chance, the mosque's imam was called Sheikh Jihad Mahdi, though the name itself was of no significance (even Christian Arabs are known to call their sons Jihad). Sheikh Jihad wore a simple white dishdasha and white cap and sat in the front with a microphone. As he waited for the proper time to begin, he lectured the men in the mosque-and, through the loudspeakers, the entire neighborhood-on how to pray properly, using a strong colloquial accent and slang. As the majority of men completed their prayers in a low murmur, Sh