A History of Indian Philosophy Part 55

The perception of the cla.s.s (_jati_) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were

[Footnote 1: Compare this with the [email protected] view as interpreted by S'ridhara.]

[Footnote 2: See [email protected]_ and _S'astradipika_.]

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the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of _avayava_ (part) and _avayavi_ (whole). He argues as an exponent of [email protected]@nyavada that the proof of the true existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness must be admitted to have its existence established. Following this canon Prabhakara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material cause and their connection ([email protected]_) is the immaterial cause ([email protected]_), and it is the latter which renders the whole altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the whole is perceived. k.u.marila holds that it is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see _S'lokavarttika, Vanavada_) [Footnote ref 1].

Jati, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its entirety in each individual const.i.tuting that jati ([email protected]_),

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[Footnote 1: According to [email protected] a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (_samanyavis'esasamudayo dravyam, Vyasabhasya_, III. 44), for there is no other separate ent.i.ty which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds.

Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close together (_mrantara hi tadavayavah_), and it is this latter combination (_ayutasiddhavayava_) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible s.p.a.ce between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Panditas'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (_avayavi_), it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying s.p.a.ce (_paramanava eva hi pararupades'apariharenotpannah parasparasahita avabhasamana desavitanavanto bhavanti_). The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see _Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless _(niravayava}_ and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it:

"_adustakaranodbhutamanavirbhutabadhakam asandigdanca vijnanam katham mithyeti kathyate._"

_Nyayamanjari_, pp. 550 ff.]

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but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the argument that jati should be denied, because it involves the conception of a whole (cla.s.s) consisting of many parts (individuals). The cla.s.s character or jati exists because it is distinctly perceived by us in the individuals included in any particular cla.s.s. It is eternal in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual of that cla.s.s (e g. cow cla.s.s) comes into being, a new relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is brought into relation with the cla.s.s-character existing in other individuals, for inherence (_samavaya_) according to Prabhakara is not an eternal ent.i.ty but an ent.i.ty which is both produced and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyaya holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the cla.s.s-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual, nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of cla.s.s-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the cla.s.s-character or jati has no separate existence apart from the individuals as Nyaya supposes. Apprehension of jati is essentially the apprehension of the cla.s.s-character of a thing in relation to other similar things of that cla.s.s by the perception of the common characteristics. But Prabhakara would not admit the existence of a highest genus satta (being) as acknowledged by Nyaya. He argues that the existence of cla.s.s-character is apprehended because we find that the individuals of a cla.s.s possess some common characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate jati as satta, as demanded by the naiyayikas. That all things are said to be _sat_ (existing) is more or less a word or a name without the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When we speak of a thing as _sat_, we do not mean that it is possessed of any such cla.s.s-characters as satta (being); what we mean is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarupasatta.

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Thus the Nyaya view of perception as taking only the thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc, ([email protected] [email protected]@m_) is made untenable by Prabhakara, as according to him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According to k.u.marila however jati is not something different from the individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived.

k.u.marila's view of jati is thus similar to that held by [email protected], namely that when we look at an individual from one point of view (jati as identical with the individual), it is the individual that lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jati becomes latent, but when we look at it from another point of view (the individual as identical with jati) it is the jati which presents itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent.

The apprehension as jati or as individual is thus only a matter of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jati, k.u.marila holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves (_S'lokavarttika, [email protected]_, 149, 150, _abhedat samavayo'stu svarupam [email protected]@h_), k.u.marila agrees with Prabhakara that jati is perceived by the senses (_tatraikabuddhinirgrahya jatirindriyagocara_).

It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of Prabhakara we find that the category of [email protected] admitted by the [email protected] school is not accepted as a separate category by the [email protected] on the ground that the differentiation of eternal things from one another, for which the category of [email protected] is admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary qualities of these things. The quality of [email protected] or specific differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they const.i.tute, can very well serve the purposes of [email protected]

The nature of knowledge.

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. The division

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of the [email protected] as [email protected] (perception), anumana (inference), etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge ([email protected]_) that reveals by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects.

It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather say that they have the same identical reality too. The [email protected] answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the cognized were not different from one another, they could not have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The cognition ([email protected]_) of a person simply means that such a special kind of quality (_dharma_) has been manifested in the self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition is that with reference to which the active operation of the self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless, for they have the cognitional character by which things are illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency ([email protected]@[email protected]_). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the operation of [email protected]@[email protected], as the person deserves to have in accordance with his previous merit or demerit.

The Prabhakara [email protected], in refuting the arguments of those who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we do not experience any such double cognition and also because it would lead us to a _regressus ad infinitum,_ for if a second cognition

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is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition, then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this self-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be apprehended by perception ([email protected]_). Prabhakara draws a subtle distinction between perceptuality ([email protected]_) and being object of knowledge (_prameyatva_). A thing can only be apprehended ([email protected]_) by perception, whereas inference can only indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1].

k.u.marila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding that perception is never the object of another perception and that it ends in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he says that every perception involves a relations.h.i.+p between the perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition.

This is indeed different from the Prabhakara view, that in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of [email protected]@sa_) [Footnote ref 2].

The Psychology of Illusion.

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called _satkhyati_ which we have described before, and of the Vedantists, which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three different theories of illusion, viz. (1) _atmakhyati_, (2) _viparitakhyati_ or _anyathakhyati_, and (3) _akhyati_ of the [email protected] school. The

[Footnote 1: See [email protected],_ by Dr [email protected] Jha.]

[Footnote 2: _loc. cit._ pp. 26-28.]

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viparitakhyati or anyathakhyati theory of illusion is accepted by the Nyaya, [email protected] and the Yoga, the akhyati theory by [email protected] and [email protected] and the atmakhyati by the Buddhists.

The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-sh.e.l.l as a piece of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny the existence of the external world and think that there are only the forms of knowledge, generated by the acc.u.mulated karma of past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception.

Nyaya objects to the above view, and says that, if knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver."

Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming from outside and that the external as such does not exist.

The viparitakhyati or the anyathakhyati theory supposes that the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-sh.e.l.l as distinguished from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the conch-sh.e.l.l unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In illusion the object before us with which our eye is a.s.sociated is not conch-sh.e.l.l, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-sh.e.l.l as silver. This school agrees with the akhyati school that the fact

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that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite positive aspect a.s.sociated with it, viz. the false identification of silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-sh.e.l.l before us.

The akhyati theory of [email protected] holds that since the special peculiarities of the conch-sh.e.l.l are not noticed, it is erroneous to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-sh.e.l.l as the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-sh.e.l.l is not cognized at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the features common to conch-sh.e.l.l and silver being noticed, the perceiver fails to apprehend the difference between these two things, and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the common features of the conch-sh.e.l.l and silver is not apprehended, and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the present conch-sh.e.l.l that the illusion takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case of a real perception. k.u.marila agrees with this view as expounded by Prabhakara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that does not matter, for it is admitted in [email protected] that when later experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its production [Footnote Ref. 1]. It is easy to see that the [email protected] had to adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition at the moment of its production is valid. The akhyati theory

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[Footnote 1: See [email protected], S'astradipika_, and _S'lokavarttika_, sutra 2.]

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tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition, is made up of two elements, the present perception and memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also, as in the case "Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded as self-valid as any other cognition.

Inference.

S'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. k.u.marila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire), though including all the cases of the existence of the other (smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter (smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of the constellation of [email protected] with [email protected], where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of ident.i.ty (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming

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one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called _gamya_ or _vyapaka_ and the other (e.g. smoke) _vyapya_ or _gamaka_ and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill, the [email protected]) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a third thing (e g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place where they are found a.s.sociated. It is by virtue of such a memory that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also.

Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception and not from any universal general proposition. k.u.marila holds that the inference gives us the minor as a.s.sociated with the major and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not antic.i.p.ated and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new knowledge ([email protected] anumanasya, Nyayaratnakara_, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that in forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things, a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances in which the absence of the gamya or vyapaka was marked by an