A History of the Japanese People Part 83

CHAPTER XLV

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE DECLINE OF THE TOKUGAWA: (Continued)

THE TWELFTH SHOGUN, IEYOs.h.i.+ (1838-1853)

FROM the period of this shogun the strength of the Bakufu began to wane steadily, and the restoration of the administrative power to the sovereign came to be discussed, with bated breath at first, but gradually with increased freedom. It is undeniable, however, that the decline of the Tokugawa was due as much to an empty treasury as to the complications of foreign intercourse. The financial situation in the first half of the nineteenth century may be briefly described as one of expenditures constantly exceeding income, and of repeated recourse by the Bakufu to the fatal expedient of debasing the currency. Public respect was steadily undermined by these displays of impecuniosity, and the feudatories in the west of the empire--that is to say, the tozama daimyo, whose loyalty to the Bakufu was weak at the best--found an opportunity to a.s.sert themselves against the Yedo administration, while the appreciation of commodities rendered the burden of living constantly more severe and thus helped to alienate the people.

SUMPTUARY LAWS

While with one hand scattering abroad debased tokens of exchange, the Bakufu legislators laboured strenuously with the other to check luxury and extravagance. Conspicuous among the statesmen who sought to restore the economical habit of former days was Mizuno Echizen no Kami, who, in 1826 and the immediately subsequent years, promulgated decree after decree vetoing everything in the nature of needless expenditures. It fared with his attempt as it always does with such legislation. People admired the vetoes in theory but paid little attention to them in practice.

FAMINE IN THE TEMPO ERA (1830-1844)

From 1836 onward, through successive years, one bad harvest followed another until the prices of rice and other cereals rose to unprecedented figures. The Bakufu were not remiss in their measures to relieve distress. Free grants of grain were made in the most afflicted regions; houses of refuge were constructed where the indigent might be fed and lodged during a maximum period of 210 days, each inmate receiving in addition a daily allowance of money which was handed to him on leaving the refuge, and this example of charity was obeyed widely by the feudatories. It is on record that twenty thousand persons availed themselves of these charitable inst.i.tutions in Yedo alone. One particularly sad episode marks the story. Driven to desperation by the sight of the people's pain and by his own failure to obtain from wealthy folks a sufficient measure of aid, although he sold everything he himself possessed by way of example, a police official, Os.h.i.+o Heihachiro, raised the flag of revolt and became the instrument of starting a tumult in which eighteen thousand buildings were destroyed in Osaka. In a manifesto issued before committing suicide in company with his son, Heihachiro charged the whole body of officials with corrupt motives, and declared that the sovereign was treated as a recluse without any practical authority; that the people did not know where to make complaint; that the displeasure of heaven was evinced by a succession of natural calamities, and that the men in power paid no attention to these warnings.

The eleventh shogun, Ienari, after fifty-one years of office, resigned in favour of his son, Ieyos.h.i.+, who ruled from 1838 to 1853.

Ienari survived his resignation by four years, during which he resided in the western castle, and, under the t.i.tle of o-gosho, continued to take part in the administration. As for Ieyos.h.i.+, his tenure of power is chiefly notable for the strenuous efforts made by his prime minister, Mizuno Echizen no Kami, to subst.i.tute economy for the costly luxury that prevailed. Reference has already been made to this eminent official's policy, and it will suffice here to add that his aim was to restore the austere fas.h.i.+ons of former times. The schedule of reforms was practically endless. Expensive costumes were seized and burned; theatres were relegated to a remote suburb of the city; actors were ostracized; a censors.h.i.+p of publications checked under severe penalties the compilation of all anti-foreign or immoral literature, and even children's toys were legislated for.

At first these laws alarmed people, but it was soon found that competence to enforce was not commensurate with ability to compile, and the only result achieved was that splendour and extravagance were more or less concealed. Yet the Bakufu officials did not hesitate to resort to force. It is recorded that storehouses and residences were sealed and their inmates banished; that no less than 570 restaurants were removed from the most populous part of the city, and that the maidservants employed in them were all degraded to the cla.s.s of "licensed prost.i.tutes." This drastic effort went down in the pages of history as the "Tempo Reformation." It ended in the resignation of its author and the complete defeat of its purpose.

TOKUGAWA NARIAKI

Contemporaneous with the wholesale reformer, Mizuno, was Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860), daimyo of Mito, who opposed the conciliatory foreign policy, soon to be described, of Ii Naosuke (Kamon no Kami).

Nariaki inherited the literary tastes of his ancestor, Mitsukuni, and at his court a number of earnest students and loyal soldiers a.s.sembled. Among them were Fujita Toko (1806-1855) and Toda Tadanori, who are not less remarkable as scholars and historians than as administrators.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

j.a.pan now began to make the acquaintance of American citizens, who, pursuing the whaling industry in the seas off Alaska and China, pa.s.sed frequently in their s.h.i.+ps within easy sight of the island of Yezo. Occasionally, one of these schooners was cast away on j.a.pan's sh.o.r.es, and as a rule, her people were treated with consideration and sent to Des.h.i.+ma for s.h.i.+pment to Batavia. j.a.panese sailors, also, were occasionally swept by hurricanes and currents to the Aleutian Islands, to Oregon, or to California, and in several cases these mariners were sent back to j.a.pan by American vessels. It was on such an errand of mercy that the sailing s.h.i.+p Morrison entered Yedo Bay, in 1837, and being required to repair to Kagos.h.i.+ma, was driven from the latter place by cannon shot. It was on such an errand, also, that the Manhattan reached Uraga and lay there four days before she was compelled to take her departure. It would seem that the experiences collected by Cooper, master of the latter vessel, and published after his return to the United States, induced the Was.h.i.+ngton Government to essay the opening of j.a.pan. A ninety-gun s.h.i.+p of the line and a sloop, sent on this errand, anch.o.r.ed off Uraga in 1846, and their commander, Commodore Biddle, applied for the sanction of trade. He received a positive refusal, and in pursuance of his instructions to abstain from any act calculated to excite hostility or distrust, he weighed anchor and sailed away.

GREAT BRITAIN AND OTHER POWERS

In this same year, 1846, a French s.h.i.+p touched at the Ryukyu archipelago, and attempted to persuade the islanders that if they wished for security against British aggression, they must place themselves under the protection of France. England, indeed, was now much in evidence in the seas of southern China, and the Dutch at Des.h.i.+ma, obeying the instincts of commercial rivalry, warned j.a.pan that she must be prepared for a visit from an English squadron at any moment. The King of Holland now (1847) intervened. He sent to Yedo a number of books together with a map of the world and a despatch urging j.a.pan to open her ports. This was not done for j.a.pan's sake.

The apparent explanation is that the trade at Des.h.i.+ma having ceased to be worth pursuing, the Dutch East India Company had surrendered its monopoly to the Netherlands Government, so that the latter's advice to j.a.pan is explained. But his Majesty's efforts had no immediate result, though they doubtless augmented j.a.pan's feeling of anxiety.

Twelve months later, the Preble, an American brig under Commander Glynn, anch.o.r.ed off Nagasaki and threatened to bombard the town unless immediate delivery was made of fifteen foreign seamen held by the j.a.panese for s.h.i.+pment to Batavia. The castaways were surrendered, and Commander Glynn found evidence to prove that j.a.pan was by no means ignorant of American doings in Mexico, and that she was beginning to comprehend how close the world was approaching her sh.o.r.es. Once again in the following year (1849), the King of Holland wrote, telling the j.a.panese to expect an American fleet in their waters twelve months later, and to look for war unless they agreed to international commerce. This was no empty threat. The Was.h.i.+ngton Government had actually addressed to European nations a memorandum justifying an expedition to j.a.pan on the ground that it would inure to the advantage of all, and the King of Holland appended to his letter a draft of the treaty which would be presented in Yedo. "All these things render it obvious that in the matter of renewing their relations with the outer world, the j.a.panese were not required to make any sudden decision under stress of unexpected menace; they had ample notice of the course events were taking."

THE 121ST SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR KOMEI (A.D. 1846-1867)

The Emperor Ninko died in 1846 and was succeeded by his son, Komei, the 121st sovereign. The country's foreign relations soon became a source of profound concern to the new ruler. Among the Court n.o.bles there had developed in Ninko's reign a strong desire to make their influence felt in the administration of the empire, and thus to emerge from the insignificant position to which the Bakufu system condemned them. In obedience to their suggestions, the Emperor Ninko established a special college for the education of Court n.o.bles, from the age of fifteen to that of forty. This step does not seem to have caused any concern to the Bakufu officials. The college was duly organized under the name of Gakushu-jo (afterwards changed to Gakushu-iri). The Yedo treasury went so far as to contribute a substantial sum to the support of the inst.i.tution, and early in the reign of Komei the n.o.bles began to look at life with eyes changed by the teaching thus afforded. Instructors at the college were chosen among the descendants of the immortal scholars, Abe no Seimei, Sugawara no Michizane, and others scarcely less renowned. The Emperor Ninko had left instructions that four precepts should be inscribed conspicuously in the halls of the college, namely:

Walk in the paths trodden by the feet of the great sages.

Revere the righteous canons of the empire.

He that has not learned the sacred doctrines, how can he govern himself?

He that is ignorant of the cla.s.sics, how can he regulate his own conduct?

A manifest sign of the times, the portals of this college were soon thronged by Court n.o.bles, and the Imperial capital began to awake from its sleep of centuries. The Emperor himself evinced his solicitude about foreign relations by fasting and by praying at the shrines of the national deities, his Majesty's constant formula of wors.h.i.+p being a supplication that his life might be accepted as a subst.i.tute for the safety of his country. The fact was that the overthrow of the Yedo Bakufu had begun to const.i.tute an absorbing object with many of the high officials in Kyoto. It had hitherto been an invariable rule that any policy contemplated in Yedo became an accomplished fact before a report was presented in the Imperial capital. But very soon after his coronation, the Emperor Komei departed from this time-honoured sequence of procedure and formally instructed the Bakufu that the traditional policy of the empire in foreign affairs must be strictly maintained. The early Tokugawa shoguns would have strongly resented such interference, but times had changed, and Ieyos.h.i.+ bowed his head quietly to the new order.

Thenceforth the Bakufu submitted all questions of foreign policy to the Imperial Court before final decision.

COMMODORE PERRY

In the year 1853, Commodore Perry of the United States Navy appeared in Uraga Bay with a squadron of four wars.h.i.+ps and 560 men. The advent of such a force created much perturbation in Yedo. Instead of dealing with the affair on their own absolute authority, the Bakufu summoned a council of the feudatories to discuss the necessary steps.

Meanwhile, the shogun, who had been ill for some time, died, and his decease was pleaded as a pretext for postponing discussion with the Americans. Perry being without authority to resort to force, did not press his point. He transmitted the President's letter to the sovereign of j.a.pan, and steamed away on the 17th of July, declaring his intention to return in the following year. This letter was circulated among the feudatories, who were invited to express their opinions on the doc.u.ment. Their replies are worthy of perusal as presenting a clear idea of j.a.panese views at that time with regard to foreign intercourse. The gist of the replies may be summarized as follows:

-The ultimate purpose of foreigners in visiting j.a.pan is to reconnoitre the country. This is proved by the action of the Russians in the north. What has been done by Western States in India and China would doubtless be done in j.a.pan also if opportunity offered. Even the Dutch are not free from suspicion of acting the part of spies.

-Foreign trade, so far from benefitting the nation, cannot fail to impoverish it, inasmuch as oversea commerce simply means that, whereas j.a.pan receives a number of unnecessary luxuries, she has to give in exchange quant.i.ties of precious metals.

-To permit foreign intercourse would be to revoke the law of exclusion which has been enforced for centuries, and which was the outcome of practical experience.

These opinions were subscribed by a great majority of the feudatories. A few, however, had sufficient foresight and courage to advocate foreign intercourse. The leaders of this small minority were, Ii Naosuke, baron of Hikone, historically remembered as Ii Kamon no Kami; Toda Izu no Kami, bugyo of Uraga; Takas.h.i.+ma Kihei (called also s.h.i.+rodayu, or Shuhan); Egawa Tarozaemon, bugyo of Nirayama; and Otsuki Heiji, a va.s.sal of the baron of Sendai. The views of these statesmen may be briefly summarized as follows:

-It is not to be denied that many ill.u.s.trious and patriotic men, antic.i.p.ating injury to the country's fortunes and perversion of the nation's moral canons, are implacably opposed to foreign intercourse.

But the circ.u.mstances of the time render it impossible to maintain the integrity of the empire side by side with the policy of seclusion. The coasts are virtually unprotected. The country is practically without a navy. Throughout a period of nearly two and a half centuries the building of any s.h.i.+p having a capacity of over one hundred koku has been forbidden, and in the absence of war-vessels there is no means of defence except coast batteries, which are practically non-existent.

-When inaugurating the policy of seclusion, the Bakufu Government took care to leave China and Holland as a bridge between j.a.pan and the rest of the world. It will be wise to utilize that bridge for dealing with foreign States, so as to gain time for preparations of defence, instead of rus.h.i.+ng blindly into battle without any supply of effective weapons. If the Americans have need of coal, there is an abundant supply in Kyushu. If they require provisions and water, their needs can easily be satisfied. As for returning distressed foreign seamen, that has. .h.i.therto been done voluntarily, and an arrangement on this subject can be made through the medium of the Dutch. As for foreign trade, the times have changed radically since a veto was imposed on all commercial transactions, and it by no means follows that what was wise then is expedient now. j.a.pan must have ocean-going vessels, and these cannot be procured in a moment. Her best way is to avail herself of the services of the Dutch as middlemen in trade, and to lose no time in furnis.h.i.+ng herself with powerful men-of-war and with sailors and gunners capable of navigating and fighting these vessels.

-In short, the wisest plan is to make a show of commerce and intercourse, and thus gain time to equip the country with a knowledge of naval architecture and warfare. The two things most essential are that Christianity should not be admitted in the train of foreign trade, and that the strictest economy should be exercised by all cla.s.ses of the people so as to provide funds for the building of a navy and the fortification of the coasts.

The question alluded to at the close of the above, namely, the question of finance, was a paramount difficulty for the Bakufu. In the very year of Perry's coming, a member of the Cabinet in Yedo wrote as follows to Fujita Toko, chief adviser of the Mito feudatory: "Unless I tell you frankly about the condition of the treasury you cannot appreciate the situation. If you saw the accounts you would be startled, and would learn at a glance the hopelessness of going to war. The country could not hold out even for a twelvemonth, and there is nothing for it except that everyone should join in saving money for purposes of equipment. If we keep the peace now and toil unremittingly for ten years, we may hope to restore the situation."

In truth, the Bakufu had practically no choice. "On one hand, thousands of publicists, who believed themselves patriotic, clamoured for the policy of seclusion, even at the cost of war; on the other, the Yedo Government knew that to fight must be to incur crus.h.i.+ng defeat." The Bakufu then issued the following temporizing decree:

"With regard to the despatch from the United States Government, the views of competent men have been taken and have been carefully considered by the shogun. The views expressed are variously worded but they advocate either peace or war. Everyone has pointed out that we are without a navy and that our coasts are undefended. Meanwhile, the Americans will be here again next year. Our policy shall be to evade any definite answer to their request, while at the same time maintaining a peaceful demeanour. It may be, however, that they will have recourse to violence. For that contingency we must be prepared lest the country suffer disgrace. Therefore every possible effort will be made to prepare means of defence. Above all it is imperative that everyone should practise patience, refrain from anger, and carefully observe the conduct of the foreigners. Should they open hostilities, all must at once take up arms and fight strenuously for the country."

A less vertebrate policy could scarcely have been formulated, but the conduct of the Bakufu statesmen was more stalwart than their language. Under the guidance of Abe Masahiro, one of the ablest statesmen that Yedo ever possessed, batteries were built at s.h.i.+nagawa to guard the approaches to Yedo; defensive preparations were made along the coasts of Musas.h.i.+, Sagami, Awa, and Kazusa; the veto against the construction of ocean-going s.h.i.+ps was rescinded, and the feudatories were invited to build and arm large vessels; a commission was given to the Dutch at Des.h.i.+ma to procure from Europe a library of useful books; cannon were cast; troops were drilled, and everyone who had acquired expert knowledge through the medium of the Dutch was taken into official favour.

But all these efforts tended only to expose their own feebleness, and on the 2nd of November, 1853, instructions were issued that if the Americans returned, they were to be dealt with peacefully. "In short, the sight of Perry's steam-propelled s.h.i.+ps, their powerful armament, and the specimens they carried of Western wonders had practically broken down the barriers of j.a.pan's isolation without any need of treaties or conventions." Thus, when the American commodore returned in the following February with ten s.h.i.+ps and crews numbering two thousand, he easily obtained a treaty by which j.a.pan promised kind treatment to s.h.i.+pwrecked sailors; permission to foreign vessels to obtain stores and provisions within her territory, and an engagement that American vessels might anchor in the ports of s.h.i.+moda and Hakata. Much has been written about Perry's judicious display of force and about his sagacious tact in dealing with the j.a.panese, but it may be doubted whether the consequences of his exploit did not invest its methods with extravagant l.u.s.tre.

TREATIES OF COMMERCE

Russia, Holland, and England speedily obtained treaties similar to that concluded by Commodore Perry in 1854. These, however, were not commercial conventions. It was reserved for Mr. Townsend Harris, American consul-general in j.a.pan, to open the country to trade.

Arriving in August, 1856, he concluded in March, 1857, a treaty securing to United States citizens the right of permanent residence at s.h.i.+moda and Hakodate, as well as that of carrying on trade at Nagasaki and establis.h.i.+ng consular jurisdiction. Nevertheless, nothing worthy to be called commercial intercourse was allowed by the Bakufu, and it was not until Mr. Harris, with infinite patience and tact, had gone to Yedo alter ten months' delay that he secured the opening of ports other than Nagasaki to international commerce. In this achievement he was a.s.sisted by Hotta Masamutsu, successor to the great Masahiro, and, like most of his colleagues, a sincere advocate of opening the country.

j.a.pan has been much blamed for her reluctance in this matter, but when we recall the danger to which the Yedo administration was exposed by its own weakness, and when we observe that a strong sentiment was growing up in favour of abolis.h.i.+ng the dual form of government, we can easily appreciate that to sanction commercial relations might well have shaken the Bakufu to their foundations. It was possible to construe the Perry convention and the first Harris convention as mere acts of benevolence towards strangers, but a commercial treaty would not have lent itself to any such construction. We cannot wonder that the shogun's ministers hesitated to take an apparently suicidal step. They again consulted the feudatories and again received an almost unanimously unfavourable answer.

In fact, history has preserved only one unequivocal expression of consent. It was formulated by Matsudaira Yos.h.i.+naga, baron of Echizen.

He had been among the most ardent exclusionists in the first council of feudatories; but his views had subsequently undergone a radical change, owing to the arguments of one of his va.s.sals, Has.h.i.+moto Sanae--elder brother of Viscount Has.h.i.+moto Tsunatsune, president of the Red Cross Hospital, who died in 1909. "Not only did this remarkable man frankly advocate foreign trade for its own sake and as a means of enriching the nation, thus developing its capacity for independence, but he also recommended the fostering of industries, the purchase of s.h.i.+ps and firearms, the study of foreign arts and sciences, and the despatch of students and publicists to Western countries for purposes of instruction. Finally, he laid down the principle that probity is essential to commercial success." Such doctrines were then much in advance of the time. Nevertheless, Harris achieved his purpose. He had audience of the shogun in November, 1857, and, on the 29th of the following July, a treaty was concluded opening Yokohama, from the 1st of July, 1858, to commerce between the United States and j.a.pan.

This treaty was concluded in spite of the failure of two attempts to obtain the sanction of the Throne. Plainly the Bakufu shrank from openly adopting a policy which, while recognizing its necessity, they distrusted their own ability to force upon the nation. They had, however, promised Mr. Harris that the treaty should be signed, and they kept their word at a risk, of whose magnitude the American consul-general had no conception. Mr. Harris had brought to this conference exceptional diplomatic skill and winning tact, but it cannot be denied that he derived a.s.sistance from contemporaneous events in China, where the Peiho forts had just been captured and the Chinese forced to sign a treaty. He was thus able to warn the j.a.panese that the British and the French fleets might be expected at any moment to enter Yedo Bay, and that the best way to avert irksome demands at the hands of the British was to establish a comparatively moderate precedent by yielding to the American proposals.

THE THIRTEENTH SHOGUN, IESADA (1853-1858)

Between the conclusion of the Harris commercial treaty and its signature, the Bakufu prime minister visited Kyoto, for the purpose of persuading the Imperial Court to abandon its anti-foreign att.i.tude. His mission was quite unsuccessful, the utmost concession obtained by him being that the problem of the treaty should be submitted to the feudatories. Another question raised on this occasion in Kyoto was the succession to the shogunate. The twelfth shogun, Ieyos.h.i.+, had died in 1853, and was succeeded by Iesada, a physically incompetent ruler. Iesada had been married to the daughter of the Satsuma feudatory, as planned by the former Bakufu premier, Abe, who hoped thus to cement friendly relations with the great southern baron, a hereditary enemy of the Tokugawa. There was no issue of the marriage, and it being certain that there could be no issue, two candidates for the shogunate were proposed. They were Keiki, son of Nariaki of Mito a man of matured intellect and high capacities, and Iemochi, son of Nariyuki of Kii, a boy of thirteen.