Moral Theology Part 97

2051. Meaning of the Expression "Infamous in a Certain Place."--(a) The place referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a college, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a neighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to is either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general (i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient (i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole community will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to one or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not notorious.

2052. Number of Persons Who Are Required for Sufficient Notoriety.--(a) Some authors a.s.sign certain definite figures for this purpose--for example, in a closed community of thirty or a hundred members a fact is notorious if known to seven or fifteen; in a neighborhood of forty persons, if it is known to eight individuals from different families; in a village whose population is one thousand, if it is known to twenty here and there; in a town of five thousand people, if it is known to forty here and there.

(b) Other authors hold that no invariable rule can be given, but that in each case the matter has to be determined by a prudent judgment based on the character of the crime, the quality of the guilty person and of the persons present at the time, the publicity of the place, etc. Thus, if the crime was committed in some central spot from which news was quickly disseminated, a smaller number of spectators would make a deed notorious in the surrounding territory.

2053. Publicity of Commission or Report.-Actual infamy or disrepute is produced either by the publicity of the crime or by the publicity of the report.

(a) Thus, a crime has publicity in its commission when it was done in a public place (e.g., on the street, in a public room) or in a private place but before a considerable number of persons, or when its indications were publicly given (e.g., by a confession, by maintenance of a suspected woman in one's home), or when it was submitted to public notice or judgment (e.g., the acts of one in public office, the words of one who delivers a public address, the deeds of one who boasts about them).

(b) A crime has publicity in its report, when it is widely known, whether due to the talk of the people, or to presumptions or suspicions.

2054. Revelation about a Person Who Is Juridically in Disrepute Elsewhere.--(a) This exposure is not contrary to commutative justice, according to the common opinion, for the condemnation deprives the criminal of his right to fame (as regards the matter in which he is found guilty) in all places, and it is often to the interest of the public to know who has been convicted of crime elsewhere. Exception should be made for the case in which a trial is conducted secretly in order to spare the reputation of the condemned, as when a corporation expels one of its members after a hearing and an unfavorable vote (see 2057).

(b) This revelation is contrary to charity when it deprives a person without reason of the good fame which he possesses and which he would not otherwise have lost; for we should love our neighbor as ourselves.

Example: Balbus served a term in jail in the town of A, on account of drunkenness. He then moved to the distant town of B and by his good conduct built up an excellent reputation. Claudius from A arrives and maliciously spreads around the news that Balbus had been once in jail for drunkenness. Claudius sins gravely against charity.

2055. Revelation about a Person Who Is Actually in Disrepute Elsewhere.--If the person in question will in all likelihood soon lose the reputation he has here, the following cases must be considered:

(a) if the disrepute is based on the publicity of a misdeed, the revelation is not opposed to commutative justice; for he who sins publicly thereby resigns his right to reputation as regards all those persons and places to which knowledge of his delinquency is likely to arrive. The revelation is against charity, however, if there is no sufficient reason for it; but since the news would be soon brought hither from other sources, no great harm is done and no serious sin committed by the revelation;

(b) if the disrepute is based on public rumor and the rumor is unjust, revelation, according to some, is opposed to commutative justice, since it is nothing but a continuation and extension of the original injury.

Others hold that, unless one knows the rumor to be false, revelation is not unjust in this case, since, as is supposed, the revealer was not the author of the rumor, and those to whom he spoke would have learned it shortly even without him. Of course, if the person about whom the revelation is made suffers some considerable damage by reason of the early loss of his good name, the person who makes the revelation unnecessarily is guilty of serious sin. And rumor should never be represented as an established fact.

2056. If the revelation is made about one who is actually in disrepute elsewhere, but who is in little danger on that account of losing the good name which he has here, opinions differ regarding the extent of the guilt.

(a) Some hold that revelation in this case is a grave sin against charity, since in a serious matter it saddens a neighbor, and thus violates the rule of love to do unto others as we would have them do unto us; and others add that it is also a grave sin against justice, if the party spoken against is solicitous about his fame, since it deprives him without reason of a great good to which he is ent.i.tled on account of undisturbed possession.

(b) Others hold that this revelation is not a grave sin, either against justice (since the right of the community to know about crimes that were committed elsewhere prevails over the right of the individual) or against charity (since charity does not oblige under grave inconvenience).

(c) Others again distinguish between different cases, Thus, some say that, if the crime in question is one that is very detrimental to the public (e.g., murder, treason, white slave traffic, scandalous impurity), the opinion under (b) is true; whereas, if it is one that is not of that character (e.g., drunkenness in a private person), the opinions under (a) are true. Some also distinguish in the case of non-pernicious delinquencies between those that are notorious elsewhere by reason of the public way in which sin was committed and those that are notorious only on account of rumor; in the former case, they say, the manifestation is not unjust, for, although public good does not call for it, the guilty person himself has forfeited his right by the public manner in which he sinned; but in the latter case it may easily be unjust (see previous paragraph). The mere fact, however, that a fault which contains no threat to the public welfare was committed in a public manner does not seem to be a sufficient reason for manifestation (e.g., when it will injure a man in earning a living or in supporting his family), and we believe that one who speaks of such a fault without necessity sins against charity, if not against justice, and that the sin is often mortal.

2057. Notoriety in a Closed Community.--Notoriety in a closed community is not absolute publicity, and hence the conclusions just given on absolute publicity do not apply to closed communities.

(a) Thus, if a fault is actually notorious in a closed community, the members may speak about it to one another, if there is any sufficient reason for this. Hence, if the majority of the members of a religious house know about a fault that has been committed there, it may be divulged to one who is in ignorance about it for his instruction or warning. Similarly, servants in a house may tell other domestics about faults which are commonly known in the house.

(b) If a fault is notorious in a closed community but not outside, the members as a rule may not speak or write about it to outsiders without injustice, for generally speaking there is no reason arising from necessity or utility for such a revelation. Moreover, the community itself suffers in repute from such disclosures, since outsiders will be impressed with the thought that the community has wicked members or is lax, and that there is a lack of unity among them. To carry stories from one monastery or house to another (even of the same Order) is a form of detraction to outsiders, according to St. Alphonsus.

2058. Revelation about a Person Formerly in Disrepute.--When the revelation concerns one who was in disrepute formerly, but who has a good name now, either because his crime has been forgotten or because he has lived it down, a distinction must be made between juridical and actual notoriety.

(a) If the former disrepute was juridical notoriety, the revelation of it is not unjust, since condemnation p.r.o.nounced in a court of law gives the right to others to make the sentence known in any place or at any time; but more probably it is mortally uncharitable, if made without necessity, since it harms the other person or his family in the reputation which he has honestly recovered, thus depriving him of a good most useful to him and hurtful to no one else.

(b) If the former disrepute was actual notoriety only, the revelation is uncharitable, according to all, since it does not observe the golden rule of doing to others as we would be done by. Many hold that it is also unjust, since an obliterated crime is the same as an occult crime, which cannot be divulged without injustice (see 2067). Moreover, the person who has built up for himself a new reputation has a right to it, and by the revelation of the old reputation this right is infringed, inasmuch as his present good name is also lost or made useless. It should be noted that the common good sometimes makes exceptions, and thus it is not forbidden to historians to make revelations about happenings that throw a new and unfavorable light on the youth or earlier years of persons no longer living (see 2072 Sqq.).

2059. Case in Which the Name of the Person Defamed Is Not Given.--(a) If there is nothing to indicate the individual and no reflection is cast on a body to which he belongs, _per se_ no sin is committed.

Hence, if one says, "A certain person whom we shall call Balbus stole a sheep," there is no defamation in the narrative, even though a real happening is described. Similarly, if one says that in the city where he is speaking there are many criminals, or that even among his numerous auditors there are doubtless some who are living in mortal sin, there is no defamation.

(b) If there is something to indicate the individual meant, or if reflection is cast on a body to which the individual belongs, sin is committed by the remarks. Hence, if the narrative about Balbus and the stolen sheep went on to describe incidents so that the hearers could easily perceive that Balbus was a person known to them, this person would be injured in his fame. Again, if one states that in a certain city which one names 90% of the married people are addicted to drunkenness, or that the party who was guilty of some scandalous act was a member of a Religious Inst.i.tute, harm is brought directly upon individuals or damage is done to societies. It is true that an organization is not really discredited by the misdeeds of one of its members, but in popular opinion very often the disgrace of one is the disgrace of all.

2060. Defamation of Deceased and Legal Persons.--(a) Defamation of the dead, whether they be long or only recently dead, is sinful _per se_, since the departed are capable of a glorious or inglorious memory, and it is reasonable that one should wish one's good name to be respected after one's death, both for one's own sake and for the sake of others.

Hence the saying, "_De mortuis nil nisi bonum_." But _per accidens_ it is not sinful to make revelations about the dead when this is necessary for historical truth (see 2072 sqq.). Defamation of the dead in itself is less sinful than defamation of the living, since the dead have less need of a good reputation; but circ.u.mstances may be such that one who defames a dead person does serious harm and commits a mortal sin.

(b) Defamation of legal persons is also sinful _per se_, since these bodies possess along with other rights of natural persons the right to a good name. Public esteem is very necessary for them, and they are protected in their enjoyment of it by the laws. Thus, it is injurious to state that a certain Religious Order or monastery or diocese is relaxed, or that a certain business corporation is not well managed.

But _per accidens_ it is not sinful to make revelations about organizations, when there is a sufficient reason for the revelation (see 2067). For example, if a political party is preying on the citizens, or if a mercantile house is practising frauds, the common good would require one to make these facts known. Neither is it sinful to mention faults or defects that are notorious, for example, that a certain government is warlike, that a certain people is backward, that a certain group is devoted to erroneous principles or practices (t.i.t., i. 12).

2061. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person of the Defamer.--(a) The person of the defamer increases the harm when his authority is greater.

A person who is supposed to be better informed (e.g., one who reports that he was an eyewitness of the event he narrates), or who enjoys a better reputation for truth (e.g., one who is in an official position, or who is thought to be honest and disinterested), does more harm by defamation than another whose authority is weak.

(b) The person of the defamer decreases the harm when his authority is less. Hence, those who give out unfavorable reports about others with reservations (such as "perhaps," "it is not impossible," "it seems so, but I would not swear to it," etc.), and also those whose weight as authorities is light (such as talkative, lightminded, envious, gossipy, or untruthful persons), do less harm than persons who are held in higher repute. The confessor should not let these defamers off easily, however, since many of them act on the principle that if enough mud is thrown, no matter how foolish the charges, some of the mud will stick.

2062. One of the commonest forms of defamation is the narration of some crime or defect at second hand, as when the defamer introduces his remarks as follows: "They say," or, "It is reported," or, "I hear," etc.

(a) The mode of defamation here lessens the sin when it weakens the effect of the story upon the hearers. Hence, if one says that the talk of the town is that Claudius is a heavy drinker, and the listeners gather from this only that there is a vague rumor which cannot be traced to any source or be confirmed by any fact and which is therefore unreliable, the harm is less.

(b) The mode of defamation here does not lessen the sin when it does not weaken the impression of the story; on the contrary, it increases the sin when it adds strength to the story. Hence, if one says that Claudius is said to be an excessive drinker, and if from the phrasing the listeners will understand that the report originated with very good authorities, or that it is based on general knowledge of the public, the harm is greater. Justice is violated if the narrative itself inclines the hearers to sinister thoughts or suspicions, for then the narrator causes the harm; charity alone may be violated if it is only the character of the listeners (e.g., their suspicious or frivolous minds or their own guilt) that engenders in them evil opinion, for then the narrator only occasions the harm (cfr. 1447, 1464).

2063. The Harm Done by Reason of the Listeners.--(a) The quality of the listeners makes a difference, since it may cause the person defamed to suffer more or less readily in their eyes (e.g., if they are suspicious, or prejudiced, or credulous, or guilty themselves, they will more easily believe evil about others) or in the eyes of others (e.g., if the listeners are newsmongers or enemies of the person defamed, the spread of the defamatory story is more certain). The loss itself may be greater or less on account of the character or position of the listener (e.g., loss of reputation with a friend or a virtuous person is felt more, loss of reputation with customers or employers is more damaging, etc.).

(b) The quant.i.ty of the listeners also makes a difference, since it is more harmful, other things being equal, to be defamed before several than before one. Hence, the fact that many persons are present when the defamation is uttered is an aggravating circ.u.mstance of the sin.

Whether it multiplies the sin numerically, so that one commits as many sins of defamation as there are persons who hear and are impressed, is a disputed point. Those who hold for multiplication argue that the defamed person has a distinct right to his reputation with each person present; those who deny multiplication contend that the right to reputation is a single object, since reputation is the opinion of others, whether they be many or few. This latter view seems to be more common, and its practical bearing is that a penitent need not mention the number of persons before whom he defamed his neighbor (see 217).

2064. Is the malice of defamation aggravated by the fact that the listeners are peculiar and think the defect mentioned is far more serious than it really is?

(a) If only the harm to reputation is considered, it does not seem that the over-strict notions of the listeners increase the sinfulness of defamation; for the harm to reputation is to be measured by the common opinion, not by the singular ideas of certain persons. Example: Semp.r.o.nius tells that Balbus wastes a little time in telling humorous incidents and reading detective stories. The small group of auditors think that this is one of the blackest of crimes.

(b) If other harms are taken into account, the peculiar ideas of the listener may add to the sinfulness of defamation. Thus, if a young person of delicate conscience will be scandalized at hearing that Caius plays cards, or if older listeners will be led by this remark to take their trade away from Caius, the sins of scandal and of unjust damage are added to defamation. Defamation often destroys in the listener all faith in humanity, or all belief in religion.

2065. Detraction to One Discreet Person.--Is detraction a mortal sin, if the revelation of a serious sin is made without sufficient reason but to only one prudent and discreet person, who will neither divulge the information, nor be influenced by it to the harm of the party spoken against?

(a) If the purpose of the speaker is to inflict serious injury on his neighbor, mortal sin is committed, since the gravity of the sin is measured by the malevolence of the will.

(b) If the purpose of the speaker is not to inflict serious injury, but only to indulge his love of talk, levity of mind, etc., the gravity of the sin depends on the actual harm that is done; for one wills indirectly the harm connected with one's acts, even when one does not desire it directly (see 102). Hence, if the harm is in fact serious, mortal sin is incurred by the detractor, unless he is excused from it by the imperfection of his deliberation or consent. How much harm, then, is done in this case? Most moralists, it seems, think grave harm is done, since the loss of good name with one prudent man is generally more distasteful than its loss with many light-minded persons. Some moralists, however, dissent from this view, and hold that the harm done is small. They argue that the loss of good name with one prudent person (exception being made for the cases when he is the one person whose esteem is prized above that of all others, or when the crime revealed is an enormous or very degrading one) is not a great blow to reputation, since reputation consists in the opinion of many persons, and since a prudent man will be inclined to help rather than harm one who has been defamed in his presence. The advocates of the first opinion appeal also to the a.n.a.logy of contumely and rash judgment, for these two sins are grave, even when the loss of honor or good opinion is in respect to one person only. But their adversaries deny the a.s.sumed parity: for, while contumely includes the purpose to injure and rash judgment includes the imputation to another of a defect of which he is not guilty or not known to be guilty, the detraction now considered is innocent both of design to injure and of calumny. Both opinions are probable, but the former seems to be more common and more likely.

2066. Belittling a Person to Himself.--It is not impossible to belittle a person to himself, for example, to make him believe that lie is illegitimate, that he is regarded with contempt by others, that his ability is mediocre or his character defective, etc. Is this defamation, or is it sinful?

(a) To lower a person in his own estimation is not defamation in the strict sense of the word, since defamation is properly an injury to the reputation that one has with one's neighbors or with the public, not to the opinion one has of oneself. This sin belongs rather to derision (see 2106).

(b) To lower a person in his own eyes is sinful or not sinful according to the purpose intended or the means employed. Thus, if a parent, wis.h.i.+ng to correct the pride or presumption of his son, gives the latter a true picture of his failings or limitations, the act is one of virtuous correction. But if an envious person, wis.h.i.+ng to produce a sense of inferiority in another, deprives the latter of rightful peace of mind and of reasonable confidence in self, charity and justice are violated and there is a duty of rest.i.tution.

2067. Disclosing Matters Detrimental to Third Party.--In what cases is it lawful to disclose to others matters that will be detrimental to the reputation of a third party?

(a) If the communication is false, it is never lawful, no matter how important the reason; for the end does not justify the means. It is sinful, therefore, to resort to calumny as a defense of one's own reputation or dignity (see 2035, 2036).

(b) If the communication is truthful and the matter is already well known to the persons addressed, there is no defamation, unless the communication makes these persons strongly convinced, whereas they had been rather uncertain before, or reveals to them some important detail about which they had been in ignorance.

(c) If the communication is truthful, but the defects are secret and unknown to the parties addressed, there is defamation, unless the person whose defects are revealed has lost his right to good name on account of the right of another person which has precedence and cannot otherwise be upheld (cfr. 2035). In this latter case there is no obligation to maintain silence, neither from justice (since the lesser right must yield to the greater right) nor from charity (since this virtue does not oblige at the cost of great inconvenience). Thus, Our Lord made known to the Apostles that the Pharisees were hypocrites (Luke, xii, 1; Matt., xvi. 6), and St. Paul told Timothy that Alexander and Hymeneus had neither faith nor a good conscience (I Tim., i. 20).

2068. Rights that Have Precedence over a False Reputation.--(a) The public good is to be preferred to a false reputation, for the public welfare is the ground for the right to such reputation, the subject himself being unworthy of the good name he bears (see 2037). It is right, therefore, to denounce criminals or conspirators to the proper authorities, or to testify against them. Employers have the duty to discuss together the failings or imperfections of their employees that interfere with the business; subjects should manifest abuses about which they are asked in a canonical visitation; students in a college should give information about companions who are depraving the morals of the student body or exercising an evil influence on the other residents, etc.