Moral Theology Part 127

(d) It is easy only in so far as the claims of justice will allow; that is, it acts from a sense of responsibility to the rights and claims of the common good and of all the interests involved, and decides according to an impartial and enlightened judgment that circ.u.mstances of person, deed, cause, etc., call for a departure from the strict requirements of law or custom. Clemency is not the same thing, then, as arbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.

(e) It is moved in the first place by kindness to the offender, and thus it differs both from the virtue of equity (which acts from the sense of higher justice) and from the vices of favoritism, extortion, and cowardice (which extend forbearance only to friends or to those who offer bribes or who bring pressure to bear).

(f) It is moved secondly by a spirit of moderation. Many persons are spoiled by authority: feeling their own importance, they desire to exercise their powers to the limit and to keep others down as much as possible. The clement man, on the contrary, keeps his poise and uses his authority with moderation. Meekness should be practised by all, but clemency is the proper virtue of superiors.

2552. The Vices Opposed to Clemency.--(a) The extreme of defect is cruelty, which is a hardness of heart, not moved by the sufferings of others, that disposes one to inflict excessive punishments. The worst form of cruelty is savagery, which takes inhuman delight in the sufferings of others and inflicts pain without regard for guilt or innocence.

(b) The extreme of excess is undue leniency, which spares the rod when it should be used. There are times when severity is necessary, as when a crime was malicious and cold-blooded, when an offender is stubborn and irreformable, and when mildness will harm the public welfare or invite the sinner to repeat his offense. In such cases it would be unwise and harmful to mitigate the sentence which wise statutes or customs provide for the offense.

2553. Humility.--Humility is the virtue that makes one modest in the desire of greatness.

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a moral excellence and a voluntary disposition. Hence, it is not the same as physical humility (e.g., the humble or lowly circ.u.mstances in which a person was born) or as involuntary humility (e.g., the humiliation which comes upon those who exalt themselves).

(b) It is concerned with greatness, that is, with the higher things that pertain to greatness of soul (see 2448 sqq.). There is no opposition between these two virtues, for greatness of soul makes one set such a value upon the gifts one has received from G.o.d as to aspire to the betterment for which they prepare one, while humility makes one realize one's own shortcomings so sincerely that it keeps one from the desire of those excellences for which one is unsuited.

(c) It is modest; that is, it regulates according to the standard of reason the pa.s.sion for greatness, so that one may avoid the extremes of pride and of abjectness or littleness of soul (see 2465 c).

2554. The Three Acts of Humility.--(a) Its regulatory act is in the intellect, and consists in the knowledge and acknowledgment of one's infirmity and inferiority, not only in comparison with G.o.d, but also in comparison with men.

(b) Its essential act is in the appet.i.te and consists in a regulation of the hope for greatness so that, recognizing one's limitations, one does not strive for that for which one is unfitted. Higher degrees of humility are those which do not desire honor, or which are pained by it, or which desire dishonor.

(c) Its expressive act is in the external conduct. St. Benedict says that the humble person avoids singularity in deed, is sparing in his words and not given to loudness, and bears himself modestly, not staring about or laughing immoderately. But there is also a false humility, which is only in externals, and this is really proud hypocrisy (Ecclus., xix. 23).

2555. Two Requirements of Humility.--Humility is chiefly an abas.e.m.e.nt of self before G.o.d (Gen., xviii. 27), and it is not opposed to truth or to good order. Hence, the two following rules on the lowering of self before fellow-creatures:

(a) in the internal act, humility requires that each one acknowledge his neighbor as his better, if comparison is made between what the former has from himself and what the latter has from G.o.d (Phil., ii. 3; Osee, xiii. 9). But it is not against humility to believe that one has more of divine grace or less of human imperfection than another, if there are good reasons for the belief (Eph., iii. 5; Gal., ii. 15);

(b) in the external act, humility requires that one show proper signs of respect to one's betters. But of persons who are in authority St.

Augustine says that, while before G.o.d they should prostrate themselves at the feet of all, before man they should not so demean themselves to inferiors as to detract from their dignity or authority. Like the other virtues, humility must be guided in its manifestations by prudence as to place, time, and other circ.u.mstances.

2556. The Excellence of Humility.--(a) Humility is inferior to the theological virtues, which tend immediately to the end itself, and also to the intellectual virtues and legal justice, which rightly dispose mind and will about the means to that end. Humility and the remaining virtues incline one to follow the direction of mind and will, but with this difference that, while humility makes one ready for submission in all that is right, temperance, fort.i.tude and the rest prepare one for submission only in some one or other particular matter. To these latter virtues, then, humility is superior.

(b) Humility is the groundwork of the spiritual edifice negatively or indirectly; for, since G.o.d resists the proud and gives grace to the humble (James, iv. 6), the obstacles to the other virtues are removed by humility. But it is faith which positively and directly places the cornerstone of the spiritual life, for faith is the first approach towards G.o.d: "He who would come to G.o.d must believe" (Heb., xi. 6).

2557. Pride.--Pride is an inordinate desire of one's own personal excellence.

(a) It is a desire, for the object of pride is that which is pleasing and yet not easy of attainment.

(b) The desire is concerned with excellence, that is, with a high degree of some perfection (such as virtue, knowledge, beauty, fame, honor) or with superiority to others in perfection.

(c) The excellence sought is personal; that is, the object of pride is self as exalted on high or raised above others. Ambition seeks greatness in honors and dignities, presumption greatness in accomplishment, and vanity greatness in reputation and glory; pride, from which these other vices spring, seeks the greatness of the ego or of those things with which the ego is identified, such as one's own children, one's own family, or one's own race.

(d) The desire is inordinate, either as to the matter, when one desires an excellence or superiority of which one is unworthy (e.g., equality with Our Lord), or as to the manner, when one expressly desires to have excellence or superiority without due subjection (e.g., to possess one's virtue without dependence on G.o.d or from one's own unaided merits). In the former case pride is opposed to greatness of soul, in the latter case to humility. The contempt which is proper to pride is a disdain for subjection, and the contempt which belongs to disobedience is a disgust for a precept; but pride naturally leads to contempt for law and for G.o.d and the neighbor (see 2367).

2558. The Acts of Pride.--(a) In his intellect, the proud man has an exaggerated opinion of his own worth, and this causes his inordinate desire of praise and exaltation. But pride may also be the cause of conceited ideas, for those who are too much in admiration of themselves often come to think that they are really as great as they wish to be.

(b) The will of the proud man wors.h.i.+ps his own greatness, and longs for its recognition and glorification by others.

(c) In his external words and works, the proud man betrays himself by boasting, self-glorification, self-justification, by his haughty appearance and gestures and luxurious style, by arrogance, insolence, perfidy, disregard of the rights and feelings of others, etc.

2559. The Sinfulness of Pride.--(a) Complete pride, which turns away from G.o.d because it considers subjection detrimental to one's own excellence, is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is a manifest rebellion against the Supreme Being (Ecclus., x. 14). Such was the pride of Lucifer, but it is rare in human beings. Complete pride may be venial from the imperfection of the act, when it is only a semideliberate wish.

(b) Incomplete pride, which turns inordinately to the love of created excellence but without disaffection to superiors, is in itself a venial sin, for there is no serious disorder in the excess of an otherwise indifferent pa.s.sion. But circ.u.mstances may make this pride mortal (e.g., when it is productive of serious harm to others).

2560. Pride Compared with Other Sins.--(a) Gravity.--Complete pride is less than hatred of G.o.d, for the former has as its object personal excellence, the latter separation from G.o.d. But after hatred of G.o.d complete pride is worse disloyalty than any other mortal sin; it separates from G.o.d directly, since it abjures allegiance to the Supreme Being, while other sins separate from G.o.d only indirectly, since they offend, not from contempt, but from ignorance, or pa.s.sion or excessive desire.

(b) Origin.--Pride was the first sin, because by it the angels and our first parents fell, the angels desiring likeness to G.o.d in beat.i.tude, Adam and Eve likeness in knowledge (Ecclus., x. 15; Prov., xviii. 11; Tob., iv. 14).

(c) Influence.--Pride is called the queen and mother of the seven capital vices--namely, vainglory (2450), gluttony (2473), l.u.s.t (2494), avarice (2426), sloth (1322), envy (1342), and anger (2549)--not in the sense that every sin is the result of pride (for many persons sin from ignorance, pa.s.sion, etc.), but in the sense that the inordinate desire of personal excellence is a motive that can impel one to any kind of sin, just as covetousness offers a means that is useful for every temporal end (I Tim., vi. 10). Pride is also most dangerous, since it steals away the reward of virtue itself (Matt., vi. 2); and, as humility is the first step towards heaven, pride is the first step towards h.e.l.l.

2561. Abjection.--The other extreme of pride is abjection. (a) As a turning away from these higher things to which one should aspire, this sin is the same as littleness of soul, and it is opposed to greatness of soul (see 2451). (b) As a turning to lower things or to a submission to others which is unreasonable, this vice is directly opposed to humility. Examples are persons of knowledge who waste their time on menial labor when they should be more usefully employed in other pursuits, or who permit themselves to be corrected and guided by the errors and false principles of the ignorant.

2562. Studiousness.--Studiousness (_studiositas_) is the virtue that makes one modest in the desire of knowledge.

(a) Its object is the desire of knowledge; for man is gifted with powers of sensation and understanding, and nature inclines him to desire the exercise of these powers to see, hear, picture, apprehend, judge, reason, etc.

(b) Its function is to make one modest in this desire (see 2465 c); that is, it regulates the inclination of nature according to reason, so that one may avoid both excess and defect in the pursuit of knowledge.

On the one hand, the soul has the urge to discover and learn, but just as bodily hunger leads to gluttony, if not restrained, so does mental hunger become a vice (curiosity), if it is not moderated. On the other hand, the body has a disinclination for the labor, weariness and hards.h.i.+p which study demands, and, if this reluctance is not overcome, one becomes guilty of the sin of negligence or ignorance (see 904, 1326, 1671).

(c) Its character, therefore, is that of a virtue, since it holds a natural appet.i.te within moderation, avoiding the extremes of excess and defect, and keeping custody over senses and mind. This virtue is praised in Prov., xxvii. 11: "Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful"; and in I Tim., iv. 13: "Attend to reading." Essentially, it is a potential part of temperance, for its chief characteristic is moderation of an eager desire; but secondarily, it belongs to fort.i.tude, for great courage, persistence, and self-sacrifice are necessary for a student.

2563. The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.--(a) The vice of excess is called curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on account of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of others because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to satisfy impure desire) or on account of its circ.u.mstances (e.g., a curiosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or more important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a curiosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of G.o.d, Ecclus., iii. 22).

(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is a voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as when a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and negligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry into the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind their own business well).

2564. The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.--(a) Curiosity in itself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy oneself with things superfluous. But circ.u.mstances sometimes make it mortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is curious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on unbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others sacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it serious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to blacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal as when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers, etc., in order to get information.

(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty of knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and thereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a mortal sin.

2565. Modesty.--Modesty should control not only the internal pa.s.sions for excellence and learning, but also the external movements of the body (modesty of bearing) and the external use of corporal things (modesty of living). (a) Thus, modesty of bearing moderates the bodily actions, both in serious things (modest behavior) and in things playful (modest relaxation).

(b) Modesty of living makes one temperate in the use of the externals that serve life (modesty in style) and of the clothing one wears (modesty in dress).

2566. Modest Behavior or Decorum.--(a) The Virtue.--The movements and gestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they are indications of one's own character and disposition, and because they express one's disposition towards those with whom one lives.

Hence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that they be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one's s.e.x, age, position, etc.) and to one's neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social usage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum employs both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act (2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of others (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and society is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus (xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man's looks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be nothing offensive to others in one's movements; and Aristotle mentions among the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and dignified in demeanor.

(b) The Opposite Vices.--Modest behavior is offended by various vices of excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and affectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration for others by flattery and rudeness.

2567. Modest Relaxation.--(a) The Virtue.--Just as the body fatigued by manual labor demands the refreshment of sleep and the recuperation afforded by vacations or by intermissions of work, so also the mind cannot be healthy or active unless from time to time it is relieved by some kind of amus.e.m.e.nt or diversion. The desire for recreation is, therefore, one of the chief inclinations of man, and there is special need of its temperate management by right reason. The person who prudently provides for pastimes and pleasures as a part of his life has the virtue which Aristotle called eutrapelia (good wit, urbanity), and which St. Thomas named gaiety or pleasantness.

(b) The Sin of Excess.--Relaxation is excessive in various ways.

Sometimes the entertainment itself is improper (e.g., obscene comedies, scandalous dances, unjust games of chance). Sometimes the disposition of the person himself is sinful (e.g., those who make recreation the chief occupation of life, Wis., xv. 12; those who recreate only for pleasure, or who enjoy themselves uproariously). Sometimes the circ.u.mstances make an amus.e.m.e.nt unsuitable, such as the person (e.g., when a man of dignity belittles himself by acting as clown, when a female takes part in sports unsuited to her s.e.x), or the time (e.g., when the hours that should be given to divine services, or to study or other Work, are spent in golfing or fis.h.i.+ng; when Good Friday or a day of bereavement or penance is chosen for a ball or picnic), or the place (eg, when a church is used for sports or farces), or the quality (e.g., when the Scriptures or other sacred things are caricatured or parodied), or the quant.i.ty (e.g., when one spends so much on theatres, automobiles, trips and other enjoyments that one has nothing left for duties of justice, charity or religion; when health is injured by violent games).

(b) The Sin of Defect.--Those persons offend here who deprive themselves of necessary relaxation (e.g., misers who fear to take a holiday or go on an outing lest they lose some money), or who interfere with the recreation of others (e.g., killjoys who wish to see others miserable, fanatics who believe that all fun is of the devil). Those who have little sense of humor or who suffer much may be excused to some extent if they never laugh, but at least they should try to look pleasant at times, or at least not frown on innocent happiness.

2568. Gravity of the Sins Opposed to Moderate Enjoyment.--(a) The Absolute Gravity.--The sins just mentioned are mortal or venial according to the character of what is done and the circ.u.mstances. Thus, it is a mortal sin to find recreation in wild revelry and debauchery, or to drive one's children to the devil by forbidding them necessary diversion; it is a venial sin to spend a little too much time at the card table or to work rather too hard.

(b) The Comparative Gravity.--It is worse to relax too much than too little, for amus.e.m.e.nt is not taken for its own sake, but is subordinated to serious things. Just as it is more senseless to take too much salt or other relish in food than to take too little, because the salt is secondary, so it is more foolish to play too much than too little.