Moral Theology Part 119

2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.--(a) They are a.s.sociable, for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice.

Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the vice of old age.

2430. The Virtue of Equity.--The virtues that have been so far treated in the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have the status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list of virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to general (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see above, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).

2431. Definition of Equity.--In law, equity is any court system of extraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as declared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and procedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures where these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the United States courts of equity are those that take care of defined special cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common law courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, 348). But as here taken equity is a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which pertains to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity which belongs to legal justice (legal equity).

(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist unnecessarily on one's strict or legal rights when to do so will be unpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an employer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition to the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of time to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity and justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of justice, since it is really identical with the virtue of affability or friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of justice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.

(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond the common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the law by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is said to be deficient here when its application in a particular case would be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common good or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the prohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this way and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law, according to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the depositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be unsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good law lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view of what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are couched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver himself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).

2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.--(a) It is a distinct virtue, since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the lawgiver's intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver's words.

(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in Articles 5 and 6.

(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is grave (see 1721).

(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two parts--good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment (_gnome_), which pa.s.ses on moral problems that are out of the ordinary run--so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles (viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city, the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity would command one to transgress it.

(e) Equity is, therefore, the n.o.blest act of strict justice. For legal justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.

2433. The Complements of Justice.--To each of the various virtues correspond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits of the Holy Ghost, and Beat.i.tudes (see 159).

(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice, piety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the completion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of justice. This Gift is defined as "an infused habit that renders the soul well disposed towards G.o.d as its kind Father, and makes it quickly responsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial affection towards G.o.d." As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly fathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, Father" (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors G.o.d as Lord, piety as Father; filial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a child tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes the soul rejoice and be glad in the things of G.o.d, in the Saints, the Scriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.

(b) The Beat.i.tudes a.s.signed here are the fourth (Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which agrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who finds his love and joy in G.o.d as Father will be compa.s.sionate to the suffering creatures of G.o.d. Like justice, both of these Beat.i.tudes are exercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).

(c) The Fruits that seem most appropriate here are good will and kindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services for others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163); like piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same heavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it pays what is due to G.o.d as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps with pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally perfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one to see in G.o.d one's Father and in man the child of G.o.d; even that which is not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for justice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy found in the very difficulty itself.

2434. The Commandments of Justice.--The various precepts regarding justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the first three prescribe the duties owed to G.o.d, the fourth the duties owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man has to his equals or to all fellowmen.

2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which consists in the love of G.o.d and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and they therefore outline first the service that is owed to G.o.d (Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to man (Commandments of the Second Table).

(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render to G.o.d the things that are G.o.d's. We must avoid, therefore, the excess of superst.i.tion (Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds before Me) and the defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy G.o.d in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou keep holy the Sabbath Day).

(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to those to whom we are most bound after G.o.d, namely, parents, country, superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor's external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility (Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife) they afford.

2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue.

Rather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are contained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent.

Moreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present work, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can be drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience, however, we give here a list of references, showing the pa.s.sages of this Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are explained.

(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superst.i.tion (2274 sqq.) for the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the perceptive part.

(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the prohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the preceptive part.

(c) For the Third Commandment as to its natural precept, read on the virtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on positive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the Church (see 2575 sqq.).

(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence, obedience and grat.i.tude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under charity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular states.

(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily injury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on charity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).

(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on rest.i.tution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).

(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive justice (1745 sqq.), on rest.i.tution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to property (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).

(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.), on unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).

(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230 sqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).

Art. 7: THE VIRTUE OF FORt.i.tUDE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 123-140.)

2437. The Virtue of Fort.i.tude.--This virtue ranks next after justice and before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness since it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice is next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs; the other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of pa.s.sion, fort.i.tude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason, and temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of reason's enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fort.i.tude is n.o.bler than temperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more difficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain from pleasure.

2438. Fort.i.tude in General.--Fort.i.tude (etymologically, strength, vigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person unshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.

(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the requisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue.

Thus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they do not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit makes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered them over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice is severely punished, or from pa.s.sion, because they are beside themselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.

(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand attack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so const.i.tuted physically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect them strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them (adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or predisposition for moral courage.

(c) Fort.i.tude is also the name of a general virtue or rather of a general condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no virtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue (i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to temperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be said to possess the virtue of temperance.

(d) Finally, fort.i.tude is the name of a special virtue which confers vigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and pains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fort.i.tude that we now speak.

2439. Definition of Fort.i.tude.--Fort.i.tude is defined as "a virtue which in the face of the greatest evils moderates the pa.s.sions of fear and confidence within the bounds dictated by right reason."

(a) The primary object of fort.i.tude is the pa.s.sions, or motions of the sensuous appet.i.te through which the appet.i.te is attracted or repelled by an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or disagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fort.i.tude and temperance with pa.s.sions (see 1709).

(b) The pa.s.sions that chiefly fall within the scope of fort.i.tude are fear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which deals with the pa.s.sions of pleasure. Fort.i.tude has to do with that which is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is agreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of an external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling of self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.

(c) The function of fort.i.tude is to moderate fear and confidence, or to keep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The pa.s.sions in themselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and hence without fort.i.tude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.

(d) Fort.i.tude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even when death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of terrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we do not ascribe fort.i.tude to a man who is not brave except in reference to things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having a tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear springs, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the kinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fort.i.tude in the strictest sense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or its equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to fort.i.tude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal evils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to some other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g., liberality regulates the fear of losing money).

(e) The motive of fort.i.tude is conformity with right reason. The courageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to virtue and has for his last aim G.o.d and true beat.i.tude. Fort.i.tude is exercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end of the work (_finis operis_), or at least the end of the agent (_finis operantis_), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous when it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of country) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending for justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of the brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue's sake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friends.h.i.+p, goes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary, fort.i.tude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue (e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or s.h.i.+pwreck of a person who had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the daring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk ign.o.ble death with bravado is not a virtue.

2440. The Two Acts of Fort.i.tude.--(a) The moderation of fear is followed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the case of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially designated "fort.i.tude." It is not accurate to speak of it as pa.s.sive resistance or pa.s.sive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is performed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and self-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles or make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing, then, as stoical indifference or apathy.

(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circ.u.mstances call for it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part of valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to be called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids nor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a n.o.bler act of fort.i.tude than brave attack; for endurance struggles against superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its fight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of power, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is quick and pa.s.sing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous in attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are n.o.ble, and each is necessary at its proper time.

2441. The Excellence of Fort.i.tude.--(a) Its Rank.--Fort.i.tude is one of the four princ.i.p.al or cardinal virtues. A princ.i.p.al virtue is one that exercises in the most difficult circ.u.mstances one of the four qualities that every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for every virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rect.i.tude (since a virtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation (since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and discretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction).

Now, just as rect.i.tude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in dealing with others, and moderation in governing the appet.i.tes, and discretion in ruling one's own actions, so firmness is most difficult in the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice, temperance, and prudence must also be a.s.sociated fort.i.tude as one of the chief of all virtues. These four princ.i.p.al virtues are also called cardinal virtues (from _cardo_, a hinge), because the whole moral life of man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively rare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly called on to exercise fort.i.tude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal enmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).

(b) Its Utility.--Fort.i.tude has a certain general utility, for it is found to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are admired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable only in certain matters (Aristotle). Fort.i.tude is like a strong tower, or like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are continual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job, vii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the temptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue.

Without fort.i.tude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven is captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who fight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).