Moral Theology Part 115

(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no disobedience if fulfillment is impossible--for example, if a subject who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt to observe them.

(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).

(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence, it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory (e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband picked out for her by her parents).

(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher superior prevails (288 sqq.).

2367. The Kinds of Disobedience.--(a) By reason of the subject, disobedience is either material or formal, according as the transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself.

Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in order not to submit.

(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.

2368. It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions, or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and law.

2369. Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.--(a) From its nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of G.o.d demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2; Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is cla.s.sed by St. Paul with the worst sins of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days (II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).

(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.

(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against G.o.d, and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.

2370. Moral Species of Disobedience.--(a) In formal disobedience, if the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely, that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed by parents or teachers).

(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy pa.s.sion; but if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between meals against the command given by his mother.

2371. Circ.u.mstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.--One act of formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:

(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it is more serious to disobey G.o.d than to disobey man, and more serious to disobey a higher than a lower superior;

(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying G.o.d it is more serious to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for G.o.d always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the lawgiver has more at heart.

2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.--(a) Disobedience against G.o.d (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against G.o.d, for, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against G.o.d is more serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins against creatures include formal disobedience against G.o.d but offend a less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the other theft.

(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme G.o.d than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in contempt than to disregard his precept.

2373. The Virtue of Grat.i.tude.--Religion, piety, reverence and obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the virtues that remain, beginning with grat.i.tude, are a.s.signed to justice on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Grat.i.tude is defined as "a moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to repay with gladness the favors one has received."

(a) The object of grat.i.tude is favors received, that is, some good useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus, grat.i.tude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony) or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get rid of and forced one to take). Neither is grat.i.tude owed for presents made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed), though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives, even when it is not a favor.

(b) The offices of grat.i.tude are acknowledgment and repayment. The former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, a.s.sistance, and gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).

2374. Two Kinds of Grat.i.tude.--(a) In a wide sense, grat.i.tude is the recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to G.o.d as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense, grat.i.tude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from those mentioned above. Grat.i.tude, then, is a distinct virtue and follows in order after reverence.

2375. Is greater grat.i.tude due to G.o.d for the gift of innocence or for the gift of repentance?

(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has been preserved from sin owes more grat.i.tude to G.o.d; for, _per se_ and other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin than to be rescued from it.

(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for G.o.d is more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.

2376. Circ.u.mstances of Grat.i.tude.--(a) To Whom Grat.i.tude Should Be Shown.--Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible (e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or only with a view to self-advertis.e.m.e.nt), for the gift is esteemed chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is wealthy or famous).

(b) By Whom Grat.i.tude Should Be Shown.--Every person who is favored should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his benefactors.

(c) The Time for Grat.i.tude.--Internal grat.i.tude should be immediate, and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received; but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.

(d) The Degree of Grat.i.tude Owed.--If the favor was bestowed by reason of a friends.h.i.+p of utility, the grat.i.tude should correspond with the benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friends.h.i.+p or liberality, the grat.i.tude should be measured by the benevolence that prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, grat.i.tude is sometimes more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and willingness and disinterestedness.

[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.--It is suitable that one repay benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of what was received. But in grat.i.tude, as in benefits, the good will counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpa.s.s the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can at least surpa.s.s in desire and internal benevolence.

2377. The Sins against Grat.i.tude.--(a) Since grat.i.tude is a moral virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by ingrat.i.tude). Since grat.i.tude inclines to surpa.s.s favors received, it is more offended by lack of thanks or ingrat.i.tude than by excessive thanks.

(b) As to its motive, ingrat.i.tude is twofold, material and formal.

Formal ingrat.i.tude consists in contempt for the benefit or the benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against the benefactor. Material ingrat.i.tude is any injury done a benefactor without contempt for him or his favor.

(c) As to its mode, formal ingrat.i.tude is also twofold, that by omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem., xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.

2378. The Moral Species of Ingrat.i.tude.--(a) Material ingrat.i.tude is not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is an act of ingrat.i.tude to G.o.d, and every injury done a human benefactor is an act of ingrat.i.tude to man. But material ingrat.i.tude is an aggravating circ.u.mstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we owe thanks than to harm others.

(b) Formal ingrat.i.tude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingrat.i.tude with other special cla.s.ses of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).

2379. The Theological Species of Ingrat.i.tude.--(a) Formal ingrat.i.tude from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity, which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter.

Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.

(b) Material ingrat.i.tude is venial or mortal according to the nature of the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.

2380. Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?--(a) If the favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the ingrat.i.tude with which they are received. It is not always certain that the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his improvement (Luke, vi. 35).

(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.

2381. The Virtue of Vengeance.--Just as grat.i.tude returns good for evil, so does vengeance (_vindicatio_) return evil for evil, that is, the evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as "a moral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the punishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or private justice."

(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to those who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses.

The duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and pertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of commutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to justice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the equality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of the person who has been injured.

(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the infliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already committed an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with lawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past but present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the virtue of vengeance.

(c) Vengeance uses only lawful means; that is, it seeks redress or reparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and follows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private revenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the "unwritten law," etc., which are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively excusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also exercised by those who desire that justice may be done against malefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as are not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friends.h.i.+p).

Parents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and chastise their children.

(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the vindication of the right order of society or the compensation or satisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one to desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another virtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one's act pertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to secure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of legal justice; if one seeks the honor of G.o.d, the act is one of religion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the wish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a criminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not the vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred, cruelty or other like pa.s.sion, sins grievously and perhaps makes himself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is to be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).

2382. The Morality of Vengeance.--(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it pertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just and is approved by G.o.d (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special virtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves man to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive ends (see 2381). It is closely related to fort.i.tude and zeal, which prepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of G.o.d and man, inspires indignation against injustice, while fort.i.tude removes the fear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally, however, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful, as when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more heavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).

(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury to a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of G.o.d or of the Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who maltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired writers pray G.o.d to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, x.x.xiv, lxviii, cviii, lxxviii, cx.x.xvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12), and Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an injury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego punishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this course is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see 1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal wrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of G.o.d; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of such evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss of such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party, edification, and greater claim on G.o.d's forgiveness of self. Hence, vengeance is called "a little virtue," since it is so often the less perfect way.

2383. Excess and Defect.--Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence should be characterized by moderation as to all its circ.u.mstances. It should avoid the extremes of excess and defect.

(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the quant.i.ty of the punishment offends human rights or surpa.s.ses the measure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to a.s.sociate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an offender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human being as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement in a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is unfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose rigor far surpa.s.ses the degree of offense. There is excess even in medicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for a lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good quality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.

(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or allows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to offenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense.