Moral Theology Part 108

2242. Reversion to Original Vow.--The return to the original vow by one whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may be obligatory.

(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.

(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is immediately held under vow to the subst.i.tuted work. All agree, however, that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the subst.i.tuted work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the vower's own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast, there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the inst.i.tute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the vows revive (Canon 1315).

2243. Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.--(a) A confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows, since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation.

A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of (see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow, the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a year or other fixed period.

(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations, and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment (e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).

2244. External Acts of Religion in Honor of G.o.d.--We now pa.s.s on to consider those external acts of religion in which the wors.h.i.+pper makes use of divine things in order to show honor to G.o.d (see 2175). These sacred things are of two cla.s.ses, namely, objects whose use is the sanctification of man (Sacraments and sacramentals) and words whose use is the power they have on others or the manifestation of reverence towards G.o.d (the Divine Name). Sacraments and sacramentals will be dealt with later. For the present we shall speak of the honor shown to G.o.d by the use of His Name, and hence we shall take up in turn the following subjects: (a) use of the divine name to confirm before others one's declarations or promises (oaths); (b) use of the divine name to move others to do or omit something (adjuration); (c) use of the divine name to express praise and invocation.

2245. Oaths.--An oath is the calling upon G.o.d to witness the truth of what we say.

(a) It is a calling upon G.o.d; that is, it is the selection of G.o.d as the witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to others or a declaration that a fact is known to G.o.d (e.g., "G.o.d knows she has been a good woman"); it is an address or invocation made to G.o.d Himself. Neither is it a mere prayer that G.o.d will in some way bring out the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to corroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it appeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of G.o.d found in Sacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present matter. A prayer to G.o.d to prove one's innocence or the proof of a theological proposition from the Word of G.o.d is not, therefore, an oath.

(b) It is a calling on G.o.d, and hence if appeal is made to some creature (e.g., in the expression, "upon my word of honor") or to some false deity (e.g., "By Jove, I'll do that"), there is no oath.

(c) It calls on G.o.d to bear witness; that is, it confirms the truth of one's words by G.o.d Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He who swears does not ask that G.o.d intervene here and now by some visible or miraculous sign, but that G.o.d confirm, where and when it pleases Him, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the hidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv.

5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in G.o.d will not be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend iniquity and falsehood.

2246. The Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) By reason of the matter, an oath is either a.s.sertory or promissory. An a.s.sertory oath refers to the past or present (e.g,, "I swear that I saw the accident," "I swear that I am insolvent"), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., "I swear that I will execute my office faithfully"). The promissory oath is either without a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, "I swear that I will prosecute, if you do that") or with a pact. This latter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with G.o.d or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn contract, or a sworn vow and contract.

(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory) or execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on G.o.d as a witness (e.g., "G.o.d is my witness that this is true," "I swear by G.o.d, etc.").

The execratory oath asks G.o.d, even though the Divine Name is not expressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the persons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true (e.g., "May G.o.d strike me dead, if this is not true!" "May the devil take my children, if I swear falsely!"). The form commonly used, "So help me G.o.d and these holy Gospels!" has an execratory sense, the meaning being "May G.o.d help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if I speak falsely!"

(c) By reason of the person invoked, an oath is either explicit or implicit. The former calls on G.o.d by name (e.g., "G.o.d is my witness,"

"I speak the truth in Christ"); the latter calls on some creature as the reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the representative of G.o.d (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., x.x.x. 19: "I call upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you life and death").

(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple, judicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony (e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised hand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form of words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in reference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or delinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc., which are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn or simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants strengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the Bible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, x.x.xiv. 18.

2247. Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) Essentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the princ.i.p.al features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there is a difference in circ.u.mstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one kind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account of the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its non-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have other species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to keep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).

2248. Lawfulness of Oaths.--(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has the necessary qualities, for in Scripture G.o.d Himself is represented as swearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men swear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23; Psalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin of oaths is man's faith in G.o.d, and their purpose is the useful one of lending authority to important a.s.sertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of religion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and hence an oath is a profession of reverence for G.o.d's superior knowledge, truth, and justice.

(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality.

Here we should note an important difference between an oath and other acts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own sake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability; hence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it should be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act of religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor G.o.d, even apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This explains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii.

9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of these texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From the context and other pa.s.sages it is clear that the Scriptures just cited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was lawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not used, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.

2249. Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.--The necessary qualities that should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: "And thou shalt swear, 'As the Lord liveth,' in truth, and in judgment and in justice." Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who swears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which he swears.

(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears should do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and in a manner respectful to G.o.d whom he invokes. An oath that lacks judgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears about a trivial matter or swears jokingly.

(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to that which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been used in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false or perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be false, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that one is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely mental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a matter.

(c) An oath should have justice; that is, one should not promise what one has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not say what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter of the oath, then, both as to its object and its circ.u.mstances, must be good, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath that lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under oath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears about a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another person or to boast about one's own crimes.

2250. Sinful Oaths.--(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from its nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any direct injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in levity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an oath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a serious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of standing swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to which it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is thereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On account of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing leads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth with simple a.s.sertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary, daily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be sufficient without his oath.

(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see 172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for G.o.d and disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask G.o.d to be an accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that G.o.d can be deceived.

Hence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever escape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without sufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity.

Pope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light sin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are debarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are subject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons 1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given before a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while subornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are also crimes or punishable offenses.

(c) A wicked oath, even though the thing sworn to be true and the oath be given only after consideration and in a respectful manner, is a sin against religion and any other virtue it offends. The sin committed by reason of the oath is from its nature mortal according to some, since the swearer gravely insults G.o.d by asking Him to become a partaker in sin and by turning into an instrument of sin what should be an act of religion; others hold that the sin is only venial, since it is not serious disrespect to ask G.o.d to witness the truth of what is true; others again make the gravity of the sin depend on the wickedness of the matter or circ.u.mstances. This wickedness committed by reason of the statement or promise is venial or mortal according to the case. Thus, there is grave injustice in revealing a fact seriously detrimental to another and which one is bound to keep as confidential; there is venial scandal in swearing in order to lead another person into a slight fault of detraction; there is a grave sin of impurity in promising to commit adultery; there is a light sin of theft in promising to steal a small sum of money. Finally, others hold that the oath is mortally sinful when it furthers a grave sin (e.g., an oath confirming serious detraction), and that it is venial in other cases (e.g., an oath confirming a boast about past mortal sins).

2251. Mental Reservation in an Oath.-(a) Strict mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one's words so that the listener cannot gather the true meaning, as when one says one has seen Rome, meaning a picture of Rome) is a lie, and hence cannot be used in an oath without perjury. See propositions condemned by Innocent XI (Denzinger, n. 1176).

(b) Wide mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one's words that may be gathered by the listener from circ.u.mstances, as when a servant says his master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be seen) is lawful only when there is some reason of justice or charity that demands it. Hence, it is a mortal sin to swear with this kind of reservation when the questioner has the right to know the truth; it is no sin at all when the questioner has no right to question and mental reservation is the only escape from a serious evil. If the questioner has no right to demand an oath and the deponent has no right to use mental reservation (e.g., when the oath is only private and not concerned with contract or other important matter), the sinfulness of a mental reservation is a matter of dispute. Some think the oath is mortally sinful, because it is gravely irreverent to G.o.d to call on Him to witness testimony meant to deceive. Others think the oath is only venially sinful, because the offense is not against truth or justice, but only against judgment or discretion.

2252. Coperation in Sinful Oaths.--(a) Formal coperation is never lawful, because it makes the coperator will the guilt of what is done.

Thus, he who by command, counsel, promise, etc., induces another to swear falsely is guilty as the princ.i.p.al or accessory to the crime (see 1513, 1778).

(b) Material coperation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason for it, as when a public official demands the oath according to law from a person who, as he knows, will swear falsely. For the public good demands that in certain cases oaths be administered, notwithstanding that for some persons this will prove an occasion of perjury. But the lawgiver should not multiply temptations by demanding sworn statements unnecessarily; otherwise the oath becomes a mere formality deprived of proving value, and the crime of perjury is made common.

2253. Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons.--(a) Incautious or Disrespectful Oaths.--It is not lawful to ask or receive an oath, when there is no great public or private need for it; otherwise one makes a sacred act cheap and common. Neither is it lawful to ask or receive an oath from those who do not believe in oaths (e.g., the Mennonites, some Quakers); otherwise one compels another to swear against his conscience and indevoutly. Those who believe that oaths are sinful may be required, nevertheless, to bind themselves on their solemn word of honor, and may be punished in the same manner as perjurers if they speak falsely.

(b) Perjured Oaths.--It is not lawful for a private person to ask or receive an oath from another, if he is sure that the latter will commit perjury; but one may ask and receive an oath, even though one does not know whether the other person will swear truly or not, if one has a sufficient reason.

(c) Wicked Oaths.--It is clearly unlawful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which something sinful is promised or stated; for the thing itself is then desired and there is formal coperation. But it is not necessarily sinful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which the sinfulness is found, not in the matter of the oath, but in the dispositions of the swearer, for there may be only material coperation. Thus, he who exacts a sworn promise of murder agrees to murder, but he who demands a sworn statement against a third party for which there is necessity does not necessarily agree to hatred, if the person taking the oath swears out of hate or revenge.

2254. Fict.i.tious Oaths.--A fict.i.tious oath is one in which a person swearing externally has no intention internally to call on G.o.d as a witness.

(a) This kind of oath is invalid, for, as was just said, without a real intention to swear there is no oath. Hence, a fict.i.tious oath produces no obligation of religion, but there may be an obligation of justice, as when the oath is the unjust cause of damage to another.

(b) This kind of oath is sinful, for, if it testifies to error, it includes the grave sin of external dishonor to G.o.d; if it testifies to truth, it includes the venial sin of taking G.o.d's name in vain. The fict.i.tious oath is a grave sin if the circ.u.mstances are such that a sincere oath is gravely obligatory, as when a superior or judge lawfully imposes an oath in a serious matter, or the parties to an important onerous contract bind themselves by oath in order to strengthen their pact.

2255. Expressions Confused with Oaths.--Expressions that are sometimes mistakenly confused with sinful swearing are the following: (a) profane or vulgar talk, such as "h.e.l.l," "The devil," "Doggone it"; (b) cursing, such as "Go to h.e.l.l," "G.o.d d.a.m.n you," "d.a.m.n it", (e) contumely, such as "b.a.s.t.a.r.d," "son of a b.i.t.c.h"; (d) vain use of the name of G.o.d, such as "by G.o.d," "Christ," etc., when used as common exclamations; (e) temptation of G.o.d, such as: "If there is a G.o.d, may He strike me dead!"; (f) blasphemy, such as: "May G.o.d perish, if this is not true!"

The expressions, "This is as true as the Gospel," "G.o.d's own word is not more truthful," "I am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin," etc., if used to confirm the truth, are not meant to a.s.sert the speaker's equality to G.o.d and the Saints, and hence they are venial sins of taking the Lord's name in vain. But, if they are used to confirm error, they are mortal sins of blasphemy.

2256. Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath.--An a.s.sertory oath imposes the obligation of telling the truth and of repairing any damage that results from the falsity or injustice of the declaration. In addition, a promissory oath binds one in virtue of religion to perform one's promise; for, as said above (2249), an oath must have truth. Hence, Scripture bids those who have sworn to fulfill the promise (Matt., v.

33) not to make the word of no effect (Num, x.x.xi. 3). But the thing promised must be possible and lawful, or otherwise the oath lacks judgment or justice. (a) Thus, an impossible promise is not binding, for no one can oblige himself to perform what he cannot perform (cfr.

2201); (b) an unlawful promise is not binding, for no one can oblige himself to perform what he is bound not to do. Thus, an oath to revenge murder by murder is null, and sin is committed both in taking and in keeping it.

2257. Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths.--The obligation of a sworn promise not to do what is better (e.g., not to take a vow), or to do what is vain and useless (e.g., an oath to count the steps one takes), depends on the circ.u.mstances. (a) If there are no rights of a third party involved, these oaths do not hold (e.g., he who swears not to vow acts laudably in disregarding the oath). For one may not call G.o.d to witness or be guarantee for that which is less pleasing to Him, or which in no way honors Him, and for which there is no claim on the part of a third person. (b) If there are rights of a third party involved, these oaths oblige one to give the third party what he is ent.i.tled to from the promise (e.g., a nurse who swears to remain with a sick person may not violate the oath by entering religion).

2258. Obligation of Oath Is Personal.--An oath added to a promise made to man and obligatory in justice is personal, and hence it binds the one who makes the oath, but not his heirs (see 2216).

2259. Interpretation of Promissory Oaths.--(a) An oath should be interpreted strictly, for the presumption is that the promisor intended to place upon himself the least possible burden. Thus, if a person swears to observe the statutes of a certain Congregation, it should be understood that he pledges himself to present, not to future statutes; if he swears not to gamble, the oath does not forbid games in which money is not played for. But if the promisor acts deceitfully, the oath is to be interpreted according to the intention of him who receives the promise (Canon 1321).

(b) An oath is always subject to the limitations and reservations which the nature of the case, law, or custom demands. Hence, even though an oath is made unconditionally, the following conditions are understood: "If fulfillment will be physically and morally possible," "saving the rights of superiors," "unless the other party renounces his right,"

"unless the other party fails to keep his part of the agreement,"

"unless there comes a notable change in conditions." If the promisor explains beforehand to the promisee what he understands by the oath, he swears only in the sense thus set forth by him.

(c) An oath follows the nature and conditions of the act (e.g., resolution, promise, vow, contract) that it confirms, for the accessory follows the princ.i.p.al. Hence, if the act to which the oath is attached cannot be obligatory (e.g., an act detrimental to eternal salvation, or the public good, or the rights of a third party), the oath gives no strength to this act (Canon 1318); if the act is naturally invalid (e.g., a promise obtained through substantial fraud), the oath is also invalid; if the act does not become effective (e.g., a promise not accepted), neither does the oath become effective; if the act ceases to oblige (e.g., a promise of secrecy made for a time), the oath also ceases to oblige; if the act is not obligatory under grave sin, the oath is not obligatory under grave sin (e.g., if one swears to observe the statutes of a university, one is not bound to observe those that are commonly neglected, one commits no sin by transgressing those that are merely penal or optional, and one commits no grave sin by violating those that oblige under venial sin).

2260. Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The obligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is that it adds the duty of respect owed to G.o.d to the duty of fidelity owed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more trustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a promissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are other sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against religion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see 2246 a).